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Foreword by David J. Galbreath 
 
Several years ago, a Russian said to me after hearing of a new doctoral 
student of mine, “is there anything more to say about Russians in the Bal-
tic States?”. The argument was that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had 
been observed from every perspective, as Soviet republics, as transitioning 
states, and as future member-states. In nearly every case, the issue of mi-
norities has been a major theme ordinarily discussed as a threat or burden.  
Several scholars began to engage with this characterisation criti-
cally. What could or should Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania do for/with their 
Russians? Accommodate? Integrate? Assimilate? Lithuania took the ac-
commodation route, where Estonia and Latvia sought an assimilationist 
narrative hidden under the guise of “social integration”. European organi-
sations only influenced minority policies at the edges. Estonia and Latvia 
would not let Europeanization stop the “restoration” of pre-Soviet state-
hood. More apt, the European Union and its member-states were unwilling 
to let this situation stand in the way of enlargement. Furthermore, these 
“Russians” turned out to be much more than ethnic Russians, but included 
Ukrainians, Belarusians, Tatars, Poles and even, in Latvia, Lithuanians. 
Most of them will be “Russian-speakers” and many of them will have 
suffered the same fate of many ethnic Russians when it came to citizen-
ship, language and their children’s education. Indeed, when it comes to 
describing the treatment of minorities in the Baltic States, much has been 
written. 
Yet, the problem with all of these studies is not what they have in-
cluded but rather what they fail to observe. Namely, these minority com-
munities are not just that which lies at the end of public policy or at the 
end of accession criteria. They are in fact actors within their own commu-
nities. They often speak the “majority” language, especially the younger 
they are. They own businesses and are consumers, sometimes major ones. 
They belong to clubs, care about their communities and are generally just 
as concerned with the state of society as their titular neighbours. In this 
way, the minority communities are important contributors to Baltic socie-
ties. For too long the literature has failed to observe these groups as users, 
consumers and sometimes voters. It is at this juncture that this book makes 
its core contribution. 
When I learned of a Russian citizen doing research on “Russians” 
in the Baltic States, I was keen to see the end results. These results sit 
within this book. Timofey Agarin has been able to complete this study not 
only because he is Russian, but also because he has impressive linguistic 
David J. Galbreath 
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abilities in all four Baltic languages and is a social scientist at heart. His 
research was not aimed at identifying majority discrimination, as could be 
expected, but rather in identifying minority contribution. This book asks a 
unique question: in what way do minorities contribute to democratisation? 
I am confident in saying that no other author has looked at the Baltic 
States in this way. 
The research presented herein sits within the area studies and so-
cial science approaches to social phenomenon in Central and Eastern 
Europe. For the author, the Soviet (and sometimes pre-Soviet) history 
matters to contemporary conditions. Area studies, as an approach, has 
much to be said for it when looking at the Baltic States. Importantly how-
ever, inherent in his research is an underlying assumption that the particu-
larity of area studies obscures more than it uncovers. As the author states 
in the introduction, echoing the current debates in the democratisation 
literature, there is no end to democratisation, as the receding liberties for 
the sake of “national security” illustrates in many of our communities 
today. States are more or less democratic. At the point that a state stops 
democratising, we should all be afraid. Contemplating the Baltic region or 
Central and Eastern Europe as particular regions is clearly becoming in-
creasingly limited in its analytical value. Today we talk about the possibil-
ity of bankrupt states, including Latvia but also Greece. We examine po-
litical corruption in states like Hungary and Italy. Finally, it no longer 
makes sense for us to talk about Central and Eastern Europe as somehow 
plagued by minorities where nearly every state and society deals with 
insiders and outsiders using similar community building discourses as we 
hear in the Baltic States. 
Thus, the story of minorities in the Baltic States is much like the 
story of minorities elsewhere. Often, political reform alters political power 
dynamics as we have seen in ethnic systems all over the world. The end of 
the Soviet Union and the independence of the Baltic States ended a nation, 
as the author states. At the same time, many of the Soviet era migrants 
were in fact nation-builders while at the same time being agents of Soviet 
control and repression. This book does not make apologies for the Soviet 
Union but rather talks about the processes that have faced the post-Soviet 
Baltic States in both a contextualised and universal way. These migrants 
were often varied in their relationship to the Soviet state, their level of 
education or potential for social mobility. Many were in the then Baltic 
republics to work and live in a rather developed area of the Soviet Union. 
As the Soviet Union changed and the national movements arose in the 
Baltic States, many Soviet era migrants failed to get involved. On one 
hand, it paid to not get involved in Soviet politics, as the last seventy years 
Foreword 
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had shown. On the other, the battle that the nationalists were fighting was 
not that of the migrants. 
Yet, the most striking thing of all is that some minorities in Soviet 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania did join with the nationalist movements. 
This was especially the case with Russian-speakers in Latvia who played 
an active role in the Latvian People’s Front. Of the three Baltic States, 
Latvia has had the greatest minority political mobilisation seen in the three 
left-wing, primarily Russian-speaking political parties that have contested 
every post-Soviet election. This participation was also seen in the educa-
tion reform movements, “SOS: Save our Schools”, that occurred in 2003–
2005. Nevertheless, many Russian-speakers in Latvia still do not hold 
Latvian citizenship and many older minorities never will. The Latvian 
education system has made sure that children come out of school being 
able to speak Latvian. In the end, at least linguistic integration will take 
care of itself, although the EU and its open labour market may make many 
of these issues eventually redundant. 
Make no mistake, this book illustrates how far the Baltic States 
have come from being Soviet Republics. For those who are willing and 
able to learn the national languages, there is easy access to citizenship. A 
lack of citizenship has not stopped many minorities from having an im-
proved quality of life, at least in material terms, as the economies have 
grown. Amazingly, both citizens and non-citizens are able to benefit from 
the EU labour market through the Schengen system. At the same time, 
Timofey Agarin has also shown light on many of the problems that still 
face the Baltic states and their communities. Many citizens and non-
citizens remain isolated from politics often dominated by personalities 
rather than policies. Likewise, both citizens and non-citizens are suffering 
under the strains of the global financial crisis. In the end, this book shows 
us that civil society can be an engine but it can also just be a way of cop-
ing, that democratic institutions can exclude as much as they include, and 
that minorities are both subjects and agents within the democratisation 
process.  
I am honoured to be writing this foreword for an excellent scholar 
who I have had the pleasure of working with for several years and wel-
come you, the reader, to one of the most informative texts on democratisa-
tion and minority communities in the Baltic States. 
 
David J. Galbreath  
University of Aberdeen  
Aberdeen, UK 
 
  
Introduction 
 
 
The demise of the Soviet Union (SU) continues to provide plenty of food 
for reflections on the logic of the transition mechanisms that shape the 
post-communist social and political order. Students of post-Soviet affairs 
have been divided over the appropriate methodological approach to 
change and the paths of democratisation across the region. It remains 
uncontested that post-communist countries have embraced democracy-
building projects. Various schools of post-communist transitology, how-
ever, emphasise that not all changes across the region are strictu sensu 
democratic. As is usually the case in the social sciences, different percep-
tions result from various approaches to the question of democratisation. 
While some schools aim at understanding the post-communist transition 
through the lens of the recent past, others examine more recent events, 
such as political change, economic ruptures and institutional conditions to 
distinguish varying outcomes of the recent transition.  
My research tries to avoid subjective judgements about the place of 
the Baltic states on the map of civilisations, in Europe or elsewhere. 
Moreover, throughout the book I emphasise again and again that ideal 
democracy cannot be installed, or that any one society (or its part) can be 
truly democratic once and for all. Instead I treat social and political 
changes in the states and societies as contingent outcomes of structural 
constraints, dealt with by the actors involved in negotiating the actual and 
potential changes. This book looks at the changes taking place in the Bal-
tic societies in general and within the minority communities in particular. 
Throughout the volume, political institutions are treated as inevitable and 
enduring determinants of changes occurring in the post-Soviet states. 
The title of this book is a Scots idiom for a very quick wash or a 
superficial change. However, those jumping to premature conclusion that I 
consider democratisation of the Baltic states to be shallow will be disap-
pointed. Throughout the book I argue that since independence the institu-
tional design changed both swiftly and profoundly, allowing for the broad-
scale liberalisation of state-society relations. At the same time, I remain 
sceptical about the impact of democratisation on Baltic societies, both the 
majorities and minorities. Today Baltic publics have a number of avenues 
to engage with political, economic and social processes which they did not 
have under the communist regime, but the available means of deliberation 
are used by the few people affected. The comparison of the three case-
studies allows me to conclude that despite successful institutional democ-
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ratisation of the Baltic states, Baltic societies have seen nothing but a 
perfunctory change of expectations, attitudes and values. If nothing else, 
this book argues for the importance of a shift in both political entrepre-
neurs and publics into rational actors interested in dialogue and compro-
mise in order for democratisation of societal processes. 
The research for this book made me realise that for many actors, 
political changes of the past two decades have been the greatest social 
aspiration and therefore beyond criticism. For many of my contacts across 
the region, the current political regimes are perceived as being of the ut-
most benefit for the people affected. Indeed, some of political institutions 
and the “rules of the game” have been asserted in critical debates. Many 
others however were borrowed from already established political regimes, 
or even outlined in a mere negation of the communist past. Unsurpris-
ingly, single party leadership and command economy were first to under a 
cat’s lick in favour of liberal democratic institutions and market economy. 
Unconstrained liberalism was another cat’s lick implemented as an anti-
dote to socialist system of extensive control, but without deep roots in 
society it only fortified asymmetric relations between state and citizen.  
Some apologists say, the state and its citizens across Central and 
Eastern Europe conceded to social contract in which both sides obliged 
themselves not to intervene into each others’ affairs. Others argue that 
states, political institutions and processes were highjacked by certain in-
terest groups: elites, businesspeople, nationalists and others. In the sense 
of this book’s metaphor, accepting the first view would mean to aknowl-
edge that the social actors could not make rational decisions, were unfit 
for democracy and therefore installed only a different form of undemo-
cratic regime. Subscribing to the second interpretation would come close 
to saying that political institutions were tailored and used by the group of 
people, who prevented fundamental changes then and now because of 
their nepotistic interest. Although enjoying high currency in the Baltic 
studies, these two positions fundamentally underestimate the impact of the 
Soviet history on democratisation of the region following 1991. I believe 
that institutional design of the post-Soviet Baltic states and choices of 
political entrepreneurs during independence were constrained and even 
determined by the experience of the Soviet institutions and decision-
making.  
 For my part, I do not have a clear answer on the relations between 
political institutions and societies in the post-Soviet Baltic. In fact, I am 
not interested in such speculations because I believe that democratisation 
is a long-term process and to become “the only game in town” it needs 
certain structural conditions. What I also see in the Baltic is that political 
Introduction  
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structures and regulations copied from the West continue to have limited 
personal relevance for many post-communist citizens. For many members 
of the Baltic publics this is possibly the reason to see their recent political 
shifts as a proverbial return to the “West.” For just as many members of 
Baltic societies, the experiences of the past are increasingly difficult to 
handle and negotiate them with political institutions in place today. This 
book discusses whether and to what degree the publics affected by the 
new, liberal institutions had a chance to negotiate their positions in the 
new political structures. Did political institutions react to the input from 
citizens and societies they affect, and if so how? 
Importantly, this book argues that the design of political institutions 
is crucial for successful democratisation. As I discus throughout this vol-
ume, I believe this structural aspect of democratisation has been signifi-
cantly underestimated in the previous research on Baltic states. I empha-
sise the legacies of Soviet political decision-making and the impact of the 
post-Soviet state- and nation-building on the current relations between the 
majorities and minorities. In addressing the variety of socio-cultural and 
economic experiences of the members of Baltic societies, I discuss how 
these issues are reflected in today’s Baltic politics and shape political and 
social realities. Analysing the progress of democratisation I underline the 
importance of the institutional context in which this process takes place 
and focus on the catalysts for socio-political change in the post-communist 
societies.  
Considerable tension remains between the understandings of the na-
tion-state identity and minority social forces among scholars of post-
communist politics and societies. However, the effects of nationalising 
policies remain under the close supervision of the students of minority, 
migration, multiculturalism and social policy studies. Unfortunately, the 
causes and origins of minorities’ tacit response to persistent exclusion 
from participation in institution building of nation-states remain virtually 
untouched upon by democratisation scholars. To my knowledge no study 
of post-communist politics and societies has asked whether marginalised 
groups in general, and ethnic minorities in particular constitute a force 
advancing democracy. The fact that the very presence of such groups 
conditioned the Baltic states’ institutional change merits additional atten-
tion. My book aims to fill this gap in the scholarship.  
 
 
1.   The challenges of post-communist democratisation  
The eclipse of socialist centralism led to the dismantling of the political, 
social, economic and cultural orientations which dominated the lives of 
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millions of people in the SU and affected many more across the world. 
This reorganisation of the political space after the collapse of communist 
rule in the Central Eastern Europe (CEE) appealed to and reinforced the 
salience of primordial identities based on narratives of nationhood and 
ethnic belonging. The importance of “natural” ties within ethnic groups 
over the social, “chosen” connections has also been continuously empha-
sised. Of course, in the region of post-communist Europe not all countries 
have experienced the negative repercussions of nationalist resurgence to 
the same extent. Nonetheless, in most of the countries elites have effec-
tively mobilised the sense of “ownership” of the state by a particular 
ethno-cultural group prior to dismantling the communist regimes. These 
elites were determined to model the re-birth of their nations in accordance 
with their particular and usually very pragmatic interests.1  
As has been the case throughout history, virulent political and eco-
nomic ruptures have caused changes in the social structure. The rapid 
deprivation of broad strata of the population has provided sufficient 
grounds for the social mobilisation of those who have been denied assets 
they considered to be inherently “theirs.” At the same time, others felt that 
the redistribution of resources was unjust based on attributes of the groups 
affected belonged to. Thus the breakdown of socialist internationalism 
allowed the previously oppressed “nations” to re-emerge as an easy point 
of reference for political rhetoric. The case of the post-communist coun-
tries has been more than illustrative of possible consequences. Intolerance 
was on the rise toward those perceived to potentially challenge the stabil-
ity of the social and political order and, allegedly, the coherence of the 
national (and hence also of state) identity. Throughout the post-communist 
world, those referred to as “outsiders” have been spectacularly stigmatised 
in a wave of national rebirth. More often than not the members of minority 
groups were the ones to receive this blow.  
Remarkably, each and every society in the region was equally prone 
to express nationalist feelings in order to establish law and order in a par-
ticular style at the levels of everyday and official discourse. At the time, 
most of the post-communist countries were being re-established as nation-
states, drawing on criteria of political membership to suit the local major-
ity. Every CEE post-communist society embraced the rhetoric of suffering 
under the communist regime in order to provide legitimacy for compensa-
tory measures and to promote interests of the state’s “core nation” on the 
way to a bright liberal and democratic future. How redistribution of politi-
cal and economic entitlements took place in much of the post-communist 
world has been examined in remarkable detail over the past twenty years. 
The impact of the Soviet political institutions on the choices made and 
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forces unfolding before, during and after the collapse of the SU, however, 
remained fragmented. Even less attention was paid to groups in post-
communist societies, marginalised during the transition to liberal political 
regimes.  
Importantly, some theorists of democratisation argue that the initial 
period of the process is distinguished by a limited consensus on the goals 
of transformation. During this period, a complicated set of incentives is 
mobilised to align the greatest possible number of supporters with given 
envisaged goals. In a somewhat similar vein, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan 
indicate that “in a political system characterized by limited consensus, 
deep cleavages, and suspicions between leading participants, semi-loyalty 
is easily equated with disloyalty by some of the participants.”2 The polities 
mobilising this discourse of uncertain loyalty thus face the double task of 
consolidating regimes and societies, because all those marching to a dif-
ferent drummer might be additionally pressured to demonstrate conformity 
with the newly established rules. Under these circumstances, persuasive 
expressions of fidelity, such as the abstention from criticism, social inte-
gration and/or linguistic assimilation and finally the pledge of allegiance 
to the state are rewarded by inclusion into citizenry. Thereupon loyalty 
becomes an issue of secondary importance. On the other hand, those re-
sisting the pressure to abandon their critical views are likely to remain 
excluded from universal suffrage and, what is worse, are regarded as alien 
and potentially destabilising elements of society.  
In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as in many CEE countries, minori-
ties are seen as lacking loyalty by default, despite lasting ties with their 
states of residence. Some of them are said to endanger cultural uniqueness 
of societies, territorial integrity of the states or even democratic design of 
political regimes in their countries of residence. In the majority of the 
cases minorities’ presence alone is depicted as a challenge to successful 
re-institution of independent statehoods in the region. Precisely for this 
reason, this book examines the impact of these groups on democratisation 
of the Baltic states.  
 
 
2.  Case study: The Baltic states 
After re-gaining independence from the SU the Baltic states have shown 
remarkable potential for socio-political reform and economic develop-
ment. This has been acknowledged by the international community with 
an invitation extended to the Baltic states to join the European Union (EU) 
in the first round of eastern enlargement and NATO in 2004. EU-
accession and NATO membership make Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the 
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only post-Soviet countries to join these European security organisations in 
the foreseeable future.  
Baltic membership in the EU does testify to credible and lasting 
democratic trends. The transition in economic, political and institutional 
spheres is so remarkable that the majority of the Soviet successor states 
can only hope to achieve similar results in the future. But are the Baltic 
states really democratic? Newspaper head-lines on public rallies com-
memorating Estonian soldiers fallen on the side of Nazi Germany, the 
continuing denial of automatic citizenship to long-term Russian-speaking 
residents of Latvia and regular corruption scandals at the highest political 
levels in Lithuania might make some believe that these three states are far 
away from what is understood to be “democracy.”  
Critical research needs to clarify the reasons why the post-Soviet 
Baltic states are considered democracies despite omnipresent deficiencies. 
Certainly there are many contested issues about democratic regimes in the 
post-Soviet Baltic states, but how high would traditional democracies rank 
on the same scale? With regular Neo-Nazi demonstrations in Germany, 
Britain failing to grant citizenship to parts of its large Gujaraty community 
and allegations of corruption reaching into the White House, is there any 
exemplary democratic state? How do we distinguish a democratic regime 
from an undemocratic one? To what degree do we take into account the 
institutional design, and to what degree the popular attitudes towards the 
existing regime? How can we conclude that some societies are more “de-
mocratic” than the others?  
The analyses of democratisation processes require a comparative 
approach. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania share a number of attributes 
which make them comparable within the paradigm of democratisation. 
They share the decisive historical experiences of the past century, maybe 
even more than Baltic residents themselves are prepared to acknowledge, 
with the long experience of the Second World War being just the tip of the 
iceberg. The movement towards independence has been most remarkable 
in the similarities between the Baltic states, emphasising the continuity of 
the statehood tradition from that of the pre-war independent states. The 
rhetoric stressing the objective of the ethnic nationals to secure their 
dominant status and guarantee themselves the key role in the process of 
state-rebuilding has been emphasised in the studies of Latvia and Estonia, 
but similar practices of excluding non-titulars from political influence are 
equally observable in Lithuania. Although differences in citizenship poli-
cies, nation-building strategies and the pace of social consolidation be-
tween the communities of “titular nationals” and of mainly Russian-
speaking communities of minorities range across the three countries, the 
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outcomes of political, economic and socio-cultural transformation in the 
region bear great resemblance. The processes of nation-building have run 
along the same path in all three states, with linguistic and ethnic identity 
being imminently important for acquiring political membership.  
The processes of state and the nation-building aim at defining the 
group of individuals making decisions affecting the public. More impor-
tantly, while specifying the pool of individuals who are allowed to make 
collective decisions, state and nation-building are assumed to be properly 
democratic only in the case that individuals affected by decisions are also 
eligible to participate in these. The re-building of the Baltic states has 
taken place to restore pre-Soviet statehood, while institution building 
aimed at nationalising the states. It was not until the de jure independence 
from the SU that the rhetoric of statehood restoration resulted in national-
ising Baltic citizenries. The rhetoric of state continuity was used to legiti-
mise several very divergent claims, one of which was “framing the past as 
future,” to use the dictum of Vello Pettai.3 
Some of the pre-Soviet legal norms were reinstalled in the post-
Soviet years: constitutions, citizenship legislation and a number of legal 
documents were aimed at underlining the continuity of state principle. 
However, Soviet policies have changed the demographic composition of 
Baltic societies, requiring significant updates in the legislation to address 
the status of minorities after independence. The large numbers of non-
titulars did not pressure the local legislative bodies to address the different 
expectations of minorities and majorities. Instead, they suggested ways for 
future cohabitation in a manner acceptable to the electorate from the core 
nations and to the international community as following “democratic prin-
ciples.”  
 
 
3.  A note on terminology: The minority communities 
Minorities have a long history of settlement in what are currently Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. While Danes and Swedes were trawling the Baltic 
Sea coast in the earlier days, German and Jewish communities came later 
and remained longer. They played an important role in the countries’ his-
tories up until the end of the 19th century. The medieval peripatetic people 
however, left only a trace of their respective ethnic communities in the 
Baltic states.  
In contrast to them, Polish-speakers have been continuously present 
in the southern parts of the region, particularly in what is now Lithuania’s 
South-East and Latgale in Latvia. Russian-speakers however, are rela-
tively new settlers in the region. Starting from the late 19th century peas-
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ants began moving onto arable Baltic lands and actively participated in the 
life of the Baltic provinces while these were a part of the Russian Empire, 
and then also later, in the social and political life of the independent Baltic 
states (1918–1944). Prior to the Second World War and the Soviet annexa-
tion of 1944 Russian-speakers were only one group among many ethnics 
in the region, and not even the most economically and socially important 
one. However, with the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, particularly 
after WWII, the region experienced an influx of Soviet citizens as a result 
of Sovietisation and industrialisation. The last Soviet population census in 
1989 indicated that many “historical minorities” of the Baltic states were 
very small in numbers, while Russian-speaking Slavs were numerous (See 
Table 1).  
The Baltic states regained independence from the SU in 1991 as a 
result of what is now known as the Singing Revolutions, in which the 
majority populations played pivotal roles. After independence was re-
stored, many individuals who arrived to the region during the Soviet times 
returned to their homelands, perceiving the state of interethnic relations in 
Table 1. Baltic Population by Nationality, Total population and in % 
 Pre-Soviet* 1959 1989 2000 2008 
      
Estonia 1,126,413 1,197,000 1,565,662 1,370,052 1,341,000 
Estonians 88.1 74.6 61.5 67.9 68.6 
Russians 8.2 20.1 30.3 25.6 24.9 
      
Latvia 1,905,000 2,094,000 2,667,000 2,377,400 2,270,894 
Latvians 77.0 62.0 52.0 57.66 59.2 
Russians 8.8 26.6 34.0 29.58 28.0 
Poles 2.5 n/a 2.3 2.5 2.4 
      
Lithuania 2,620,000 2,696,700 3,674,800 3,512,100 3,366,400 
Lithuanians 83.88 79.3 79.6 83.5 84.3 
Russians 2.49 8.5 9.4 6.3 5.0 
Poles 3.23 8.5 7.0 6.7 6.2 
 
Note: n/a – not available. *–Estonia 1934, Latvia 1935, Lithuania 1923. 
Sources: Statistical Office of Estonia, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 
Statistics Lithuania, 2000 Round of Population and Housing Censuses in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Statistical Office of Estonia, Retrieved 2008–
08–01 http://www.vm.ee/estonia/kat_399/4305.html Central Statistical Bu-
reau of Latvia, Retrieved 2008–08–01 http://www.csb.gov.lv/csp/ con-
tent/?lng=en&cat=355  
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the region to be tense, for reasons I will discuss in detail throughout Chap-
ter 3. However, there were many who stayed.  
Among them, many had lived in the Baltic states for a prolonged 
period of time and saw the country as their sole homeland, the place where 
they were born, received an education and led their working lives. In their 
majority, the group was made up of Russians, Slavs and other heavily 
russified members of around 200 Soviet nationalities. A significant part of 
the groups’ members have profited from the benefits of Soviet higher 
education and their respective experiences in the Soviet enterprises. Only 
a few of them however had mastered the local languages and possessed 
linguistic skills to communicate with the locals in their languages prior to 
1991. The Russian-speakers remaining in the Baltic states represent a 
highly differentiated group of individuals and consist of a well-educated 
Soviet intelligentsia, skilled workers and those with only rudimentary 
skills. What was common to them is the history of their settlement in the 
region under the Soviet regime, their mother-tongue which was almost 
universally Russian and their status as non-core ethnic groups in the newly 
independent Baltic states. 
This group of people is at the centre of this book. Although I have 
been struggling to find a more appropriate denominator for the group 
members, paying due attention to the vagueness of the similarities, I was 
unable to find any more suitable term than “Russian-speaker.” Of course, 
this is not unproblematic. “Russian-speaker” was a concept inherently 
connected to the supremacy of the Russian culture in the SU and was 
frequently used as a derogatory term when referring to the “uprooted” 
migrants, factory workers and proletariat broadly. As the prior use of this 
term reveals, the Russian-speaking community was held together by the 
primary, or the only language these people spoke and linked them with the 
Soviet descent. When the SU was delegitimized in the eyes of the Balts, so 
were the Russian language and its speakers. Essentially, the chosen mem-
bership in the community of language did not find sympathy with mobili-
sation of the titulars along the lines of primordial identities, such as ethnic-
ity, culture and descent.  
In effect, throughout the 1990s to be a “member of the Russian-
speaking community,” meant lacking culture altogether and by default not 
having any rights to claim one’s culture’s protection. The evolution of 
minority rights regimes across Europe in general, and the Baltic states in 
particular, sees minority groups only in so far as they claim to have dis-
tinct cultures. The ambiguity of the definition of minority is at the centre 
of the recent “linguistic sectarianism” across non-core ethnographic re-
gions in the Baltic states, such as Samogitia, Latgale, Võrumaa and Setu-
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maa. One can appreciate that these “autochtonous” groups would poten-
tially receive the status of minority because they lay claims to “distinct 
cultural make-up.” For the same reason, “Russian-speaking community” is 
unlikely to ever be treated as minority. Possibly to circumvent this bias the 
scholars of Baltic politics sympathetic to Russian-speakers prefer to term 
them Russians.  
At times I also use the terms “non-core ethnics” and “non-titulars” 
to describe the members of what is the minority population in the Baltic 
states. Similarly, I use the terms “non-Estonians”, “non-Latvian” and 
“non-Lithuanian” to point to the members of the groups of minority ethnic 
origin. “Estonian”, “Latvian” and “Lithuanian” is reserved for the mem-
bers of the majority, whom I sometimes (shamefully following Soviet 
tradition) refer to as “titulars” or “the members of the titular community of 
the Baltic states.” Additionally, terms such as “Finn,” “German” and 
“Ukrainian” are the indication of a person’s ethnic origin. On some occa-
sions, the term minority does not fit, especially when I discuss regions of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania where the overall state minority is actually 
in a demographic majority. As a result of the political developments in the 
Baltic states discussed in detail in chapter 4, not all members of the Rus-
sian-speaking communities are part of the Latvian and Estonian citizenry, 
which prompts me to follow convention and use the term “non-citizen” to 
refer to all Latvian and Estonian residents without domestic citizenship.  
 
 
4.   Structure of the book  
The book is divided into nine chapters. The chapters 1–3 set the stage for 
the narrative of the book and the overall argument, claiming that the ex-
perience of the Baltic polities and societies could lead to nothing more 
than institutional democratisation with only a meagre impact on societal 
relations. On the one hand, I discuss structural effects of the Soviet poli-
cies that disproportionately disadvantaged non-titular residents in the 
republics in terms of competition for public goods. On the other, I show 
that the Soviet citizen’s disengagement from political processes later al-
lowed Baltic majorities to use structural resources of the Baltic SSRs to 
their advantage. The chapters 4–6 focus on the process of minority-
making across the region from the dissolution of the SU until 2008, mak-
ing clear that institutional democratisation took place largely because the 
majorities saw this fit their group interests. The chapters 7–9 discuss the 
effects of policies on the members of minority communities. These chap-
ters make clear that democratisation of relations between the Baltic states 
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and societies gradually came to stand-still because the minorities though 
aftected by the nationalising policies, were excluded from policy-making.  
Chapter 1 provides a theoretical introduction into the debate on 
democratisation that informs my research. I review the major discussions 
of the process of democratisation, underlining the issues of relevance for 
post-socialist democratisation. Here I argue that, in spite of the fact that 
popular engagement with the democratic institutions is important for ini-
tial democratisation, only adequate and responsive political institutions 
allow democracy to endure. Chapter 2 provides a review of the institu-
tional framework and the legacies of civic participation in the Soviet state. 
The chapter summarises the major developments affecting minorities in 
the Baltic Soviet republics up until the early 1990s and discusses these in 
the light of the Soviet nationalities policy. Chapter 3 discusses the estab-
lishment of the Baltic independence and the efforts defining these states’ 
relations with minority resident.  
Chapter 4 overviews the legal framing of minority groups through-
out the 1990s, arguing that states’ policies only partially discouraged mi-
norities from participation in political lives of the Baltic states. Instead, 
political institutions preferred to neglect the presence of non-titulars as an 
impediment in the process of state-building. The policies changed towards 
the end of the 1990s and forced minorities to consolidate their identities in 
the face of increasing ethnic polarisation of Baltic societies, as chapter 5 
makes clear. Chapter 6 addresses policies of the Baltic states that sought to 
improve relations between the ethnic communities in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. In the chapter, I discuss the so-called programmes for social 
integration of minorities. The members of minorities could do nothing but 
accept the goals of these programmes as given, because they only reluc-
tantly engaged in or were sidelined in the majority of policy-making is-
sues. The social integration programmes defined states, societies and pub-
lic spheres as serving and preserving majorities’ cultures, pushing minori-
ties out of the public, into the private sphere. 
The concluding three chapters discuss the impact of Baltic policies 
on minority communities. Chapter 7 addresses the linguistic situation of 
minority groups and underlines that the social life of non-core ethnic 
communities has grown increasingly separate from that of the majority 
communities. Chapter 8 further reiterates the point by suggesting that 
minorities are highly dependent on the structural resources made available 
to them by the representatives of the Baltic titular nations. The asymmetry 
in relations between the majority and minority groups determines both the 
reluctance of majority groups to revise the institutional opportunity struc-
tures, and inability of minority groups to even marginally cooperate with 
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the Baltic core ethnics. The opportunities available for non-titulars to 
inform policy-makers of their interests are few and have little, if any po-
tential to improve the interethnic relations in the region. Chapter 9 con-
cludes the investigation of minority participation in the Baltic democrati-
sation by discussing the minority engagement in the civic initiatives. The 
chapter allows me to conclude that the region’s minorities have gone to 
great length to accept even the openly hostile Baltic politics towards non-
core ethnics. Throughout the two decades of independence, minorities 
made many suggestions to political entrepreneurs on how to improve 
political institutions and processes in “their nation-states.” By failing to 
respond to such claims, state institutions have demonstrated that the Baltic 
states are about guaranteeing the well-being of the core ethnic groups, not 
of the minorities.  
In conclusion, I review the major arguments of the book, claiming 
that the accommodation of minorities’ interests and the perspectives for 
their engagement in democratic developments in the region are highly 
dependent on whether institutions respond to their claims. The context of 
debates on institutional aspects of democratisation, nation-building and 
framing of minority communities will allow me to extend a more specula-
tive argument on the importance of the Baltic states in the CEE context. I 
outline some of the major implications resulting from the study of the 
democratisation process in the Baltic states for the scholarly debate on the 
emergence of democracy in societies with weak democratic legacies. 
Ultimately, the argument goes that the Russian- and Polish-
speaking minorities in today’s Baltic states are not as systematically dis-
advantaged as many minorities across the EU. In many cases, the Baltic 
political institutions allow for dissenting opinions in public and demon-
strate considerable potential to accommodate these. The problem lies with 
the individual actors–political entrepreneurs, economic and intellectual 
elites–most of whom are reluctant to accept minority opinions and expre-
sessing opposition to majoritarian rule. It is therefore not surprising that 
the democratic political institutions are being used by the already empow-
ered actors to support majoritarian views and circumvent further institu-
tional transformation. The allegory of a cat’s lick applied to Baltic democ-
ratisation points out that the change was shallow in its effect upon the 
actors guiding democratisation processes. Although the political structures 
have undergone considerable evolution, the changes were not dramatic 
enough to deter the rent-seeking actors from manipulating the consensus 
on the rules of the “only game in town.”  
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Chapter 1 
 
Explaining post-communist democratisation  
 
 
The “Third Wave” democratisations encouraged social and political scien-
tists to move on from the previously popular subjects of study, such as the 
suitability of democracy for a particular nation, to research of the factors 
sustaining democratic development. During the post-communist transition, 
the idea of different democratisation patterns in the CEE countries 
emerged. It substantiated the earlier views that the degree of democracy is 
not a result of “democratic political culture”, but requires a multidimen-
sional analysis of the processes of transition and consolidation.1 
The recent wave of democratisation, followed by the EU enlarge-
ment, has contributed greatly to the popularity of explaining democratisa-
tion in the post-communist world by emphasising institutional changes. 
Certainly, the Copenhagen criteria which had to be fulfilled prior to open-
ing accession talks with the EU largely shaped the candidate countries 
enactment of institutional change and policy-adaptation through borrow-
ing and implementing good practice. During this time, social scientists 
across the world were prompted to investigations of particular factors that 
would provide for lasting democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Some approaches to the democratisation process focused on the mecha-
nisms of crafting democracies, while others investigated the causal rela-
tions between the social conditions and the success of emerging democra-
cies. This chapter outlines the theoretical assumptions, which underlie the 
argument presented in the book.  
 
 
1.   Consolidation of the democratic regimes 
The “classical studies” of Robert Dahl, Seymour Martin Lipset, Giovanni 
Sartori, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, as well as numerous others, 
came primarily from political sociology and examined conditions for sta-
ble democracy in the countries of Western Europe and North America, and 
compared such examples with the cases of other, “failed” democracies.2 
Subsequently, the “Third Wave” of democratisation saw new scholarship 
on the rise. Here the differences between Western European democracies 
on the one hand and Southern Europe and Latin American democracies on 
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the other were explored in detail by academics such as Terry Lynn Karl, 
Guillermo O’Donnell and Karen Remmer.3  
The numerous cases of “failed democracy” observed throughout 
the globe demonstrated that, while some democracies have “failed” just 
after emerging, others retain some semi-democratic features. Democratisa-
tion theorists have focussed great attention on the two “periods” of democ-
ratisation, transition and consolidation. However, many argue that the 
sequencing not only underlies the fundamental teleological fallacy, but 
also creates the expectation that there must be an ideal form of democracy. 
With the uncertainties about the future of democratic regimes closely 
connected to the dangers of reversing the democratic reform, democratic 
transition and consolidation were subjected to close scrutiny by social and 
political scientists.  
A pioneering study in the field, Seymour Martin Lipset’s Political 
Man (1960) was one of the first to demonstrate the variety of prerequisites 
for democracies to work. In his study, Lipset discusses in great detail the 
relations between economic development and democracy, reasons why 
people do and do not vote, and also provides descriptions of class-specific 
political behaviour in the American context. In an integrative approach to 
enduring democratic political system, Lipset relates the behaviour of po-
litical societies to the individual political attitudes in support of the de-
mocratic political system, leaving a powerful imprint on the later studies 
on democratisation and inspiring subsequent analyses of post-communist 
democratisation.4  
Almost at the same time, studies of “civic culture” advanced an 
idea that the wealthier and more educated societies were more likely to 
become democratic, an idea that had previously been expressed in Lipset’s 
writings. The key analyses that are provided by Gabriel A. Almond, 
Lucian W. Pye, and Sidney Verba on the issue have inspired many subse-
quent studies of the “Third Wave” democratisations engaged in distin-
guishing the causes and the effects of democracy.5 The assumption is that 
economic basis is required for development of democracy emphasised the 
essential precondition for social development that, in the eyes of these 
theorists, would result in a democratic political regime. The challenge for 
the theories emerging on this basis was that, by postulating the causal 
relation between democracy and the socioeconomic development, the 
discussion could only provide an adequate analysis of differences in the 
type of democracy, but not of the process of democratisation.6  
The studies on the interdependence of the socio-economic condi-
tions and democracy have been abandoned by the majority of the students 
of democracy during the democratisation of the “Third Wave.”7 Instead, 
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scholarship has been moving increasingly towards conceptualising par-
ticular social and economic developments as factors facilitating or ob-
structing democratic development.8 In this context, research on the democ-
ratic changes has discerned social, economic and political challenges, each 
playing a particular role in establishing and promoting democracy. The 
process of democratisation embraces several “analytically distinct but 
empirically overlapping stages,” leading from disintegration of the au-
thoritarian regime, towards democratic transition and consolidation of the 
system, to maturity of the democratic political order.9 Such a conceptuali-
sation of the democratisation process allows scholars analysing its integral 
parts to study the entire process, as well as the sequential succession and 
path developments of individual political systems.  
Observing the initial period of regime changes in the Eastern 
Europe in 1991, Claus Offe introduces a notion of “triple transition”, 
which post-communist states had to embrace. In his view, political and 
economic changes as well as decisions on identity had to take place for 
democratic transition to be successful. Offe asserts that consolidation of 
identities should be achieved through the establishment of new rules, pro-
cedures and rights, with decisions on the terms and conditions of political 
power distribution and economic resources concluding the process.10 He 
also proposes that a market economy and democracy have to be forced 
upon a society and kept under close supervision “for a long period of 
time.”11 But, if Offe regards the prospects of post-communist transition 
with the great suspicion, warning of the extreme vulnerability of the newly 
established democratic regimes to the popular support from undemocratic 
forces, two decades later we must recognise the significant successes of 
almost all CEE countries as far as democratisation is concerned.  
Of course, today we can re-evaluate Offe’s insecurity vis-à-vis 
post-communist societies, which led him to believe in the necessity of 
active intervention by international organisations and external, presumably 
more democratic states, in order to assist in the institutional design of the 
younger democracies. But even if we consider Offe’s praise for the “con-
stitutional guarantee of citizens’ rights and democratic rights of participa-
tion”12 to be paramount, it appears that a mere institutional change did 
little to boost the public support for “new politics” and sustain high levels 
of public participation in post-communist political processes. While the 
success of the democratic transition can be attributed solely to the modifi-
cation of the state’s institutions, it also requires changes in participatory 
attitudes of the entire society. At the same time, transition from an authori-
tarian regime offers a variety of opportunities to improve the economic 
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conditions, to express political will and, therefore, to engage with reforms 
perceived as essential.13  
The widespread awareness of the economic preconditions for de-
mocracy-building comes as no surprise with respect to post-communist 
democratisation. During the period of late socialism, citizens of the CEE 
countries had almost univocally assumed the democratising potential of 
the market mechanisms, but the pain of economic transition left many 
disillusioned with procedures seen as prerequisites for democratisation. 
Falling short of these expectations, the economic reforms resulted in di-
minishing political support for the democratic process among the general 
public and caused a decline in the acceptance of democracy in the mid-
1990s. In this sense, it is hard to disagree with Juan Linz and Alfred Ste-
pan’s assertion that,  
 
“in countries with imploded command economies, democratic 
polities can and must be installed and legitimized by a variety 
of [non-economic] appeals before the possible benefits of a 
market economy fully materialize.”14  
 
The agency-oriented perspective on transition and consolidation has 
been expressed in probably the most influential comparative work Prob-
lems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation by Linz and Stepan. The 
authors argue that an investigation of the success of democratic consolida-
tion can be narrowed down to constitutional, attitudinal, and behavioural 
dimensions of change.15 Linz and Stepan introduce the criteria of “con-
solidated democracies”, which stipulate the application of the term to an 
independent political entity, declaring that “democracy is a form of gov-
ernance of a state,”16 making the existence of an independent state a criti-
cal requirement for transition and consolidation.  
In their comparative study, Linz and Stepan take both the structural 
and agency perspectives into account in order to emphasise five interde-
pendent arenas where a crafting of consolidated democracy takes place. 
These include civil, political, and economic societies, as well as rule of 
law and state bureaucracy, which all present conditions for mutual rein-
forcement and control for the effective persuasion of democratic political 
rule.17 The existence and functioning of all five arenas presents, according 
to Linz and Stepan, an essential condition for the development of a con-
solidated democracy, which unfolds on two levels of interaction, involving 
both public and private spheres of individual activity.18 Although, as Linz 
and Stepan emphasise, all five arenas find themselves in a constant media-
tion, one should bear in mind that the stronger the three societies are, the 
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better individuals can consolidate democratic rule by improving the effi-
ciency of institutions. 
One of the major contributions of Linz and Stepan’s analyses was 
to point to the limitations of structural explanations of democratisation 
which fail to reflect the nature of agency in crafting democratic institu-
tions. In their approach to consolidation, all three societies–political, eco-
nomic and civil–are important for keeping the process in continuous mo-
tion. In this sense, avenues for expressing common interests and concerns 
are of critical importance for a change of political institutions to be feasi-
ble. The voluntary character of involvement and immunity of individuals 
and groups to the punitive measures of the state are essential for spontane-
ous organisation and unrestricted information flow.19 By emphasising the 
balance of the individual and collective forces in their impact on democ-
ratic consolidation, the theory of Linz and Stepan acknowledges the role 
of society, although it should be said that, in doing so, it persists in treat-
ing this balance as a figure of public discourse, rather than a proper actor 
in the democratisation process.20  
In essence, however, Linz and Stepan, alongside other scholars of 
democratisation, acknowledge that consolidation is achieved when clear 
evidence of public support for the government and legal practices indi-
cates that institutional change has been successful and is desirable.21 In 
particular, the argument in favour of considering the role played by civil 
society in the democratisation process on par with political and economic 
actors formulated in the study of Linz and Stepan, fits smoothly into the 
spectrum of theoretical elaborations and case-studies, such as that of 
O’Donnell et al.22 Although the perspective of actors in the process of 
democratisation were prominent in the early studies of democracy, it is the 
combination and mutual explanatory power proposed in the Problems of 
Democratic Transition that gained wider support in the research on post-
communist societies. These considerations indicate that, despite develop-
ment in the predictable direction of a “more” consolidated democracy, a 
complex approach is required to explain its course. 
The challenges of democratic transition draw our attention to the 
fact that, while institutions can be in place and function appropriately, it is 
only with popular approval and support of their existence that we can 
speak of successful democratisation. Like most theories, approaches to 
democratisation undertook the painstaking work of creating a plausible 
narrative framework to explain the causal relation between democracy and 
factors that facilitate its emergence: the role of agency in support of de-
mocratisation, as well as the societal climate for egalitarian sentiment in 
public and economic development. While the causality is hardly proven 
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and can be easily questioned, democratisation theories have been relocat-
ing the focus of research away from the preconditions for democratisation 
and towards the vehicles of the process. In such theoretical enterprises, 
society, state-institutions, and global mechanisms were discussed as the 
key players.  
Of course, each of the approaches has something to contribute to 
the explanation of democratisation in one or many regions of the world. 
The research presented in the following chapters argues that all things 
being equal, political institutions play a decisive role in prompting social 
actors to choose individually determined action patterns. In other words, 
throughout the book I treat political institutions as mechanisms of sociali-
sation, teaching people to act as individuals, to be attentive to variety of 
opinions across society and hence prone to more democratic political 
behaviour.  
 
 
2.   Democratisation and society 
Ever since the debates on democratisation gained high profile, its success-
ful advancement has been constantly linked to “civil society,” while the 
use of the term has been so extensive that it has come to mean little more 
than “political culture” in the language of social science. Many political 
theories insisted that “stronger civil society indicates better democracy,” 
and thus more successful democratisation. Unfortunately, the efforts to 
define the term itself have not produced many new aspects beyond what 
was inspired by Alexis de Tocqueville. Mostly, the debates placed “civil 
society” in the long line of other fashionable, but contested–and therefore 
limited in their explanatory power–categories, employed to analyse de-
mocratisation. I argue that the countries where significant parts of society 
were excluded from effective decision-making during the authoritarian 
rule and which are excluded from participation in political processes to-
day, allow us to study attitudes towards the established, presumably de-
mocratic political mechanisms. Essentially, the engagement in political, 
economic and social processes that require cross-sectoral cooperation and 
an acceptance of individual equality, provide an indication for bottom-up, 
as opposed to the general view of top-down, democratisation in post-
communist CEE.23  
The bottom-up approach to democratisation identifies the role 
played by individuals and groups, who by their actions legitimise democ-
ratic state polity. These pressure-groups are ultimately conceivable as 
“civil society” and have taken a specific form in the post-communist coun-
tries. While in CEE, as elsewhere, the state relies heavily on individual 
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participation in order to function democratically, “civil society” requires 
mechanisms of political accommodation in order to function impartially 
and enjoy guarantees for the expression and assertion of individual goals.  
The use of the term “civil society” was so extensive that it was fre-
quently used alongside other notions, such as “civic culture”, “civic en-
gagement” and “social capital”. For our part, we might want to keep in 
mind that each of these categories is indeed distinct and contributes to 
different explanations of partially overlapping processes, all of which can 
be found within a broader socio-political process of democratisation. All 
of these have been discussed in connection with examinations of the dy-
namics of the social and political involvement of individuals, and draw 
attention to an array of issues. These range from the facilitation of social 
interactions and interpersonal trust to the origins of institutional change 
and democracy. Ironically, the successful career of the term “civil society” 
resulted in its conceptual overstretch, and ultimately obstructed the under-
standing of the processes it aims to explain.  
Many efforts to define the notion of “civil society” not only show 
how elastic the term is, they also indicate a decisive underlying theme of 
the functional organisation of individuals and groups who unite based on a 
common idea, interest, or cause. In most of the attempts to come to terms 
with what “civil society” is, we see it described as a set of individuals 
involved in social processes for their own and other individuals’ benefit, 
acting outside both the political and the economic institutions. Despite 
various and contradicting understandings of what actually makes up “civil 
society,” it is generally accepted to see it as an agency network. Civil 
society forms a counterpart to the economic and political structures, in a 
way providing individuals with an alternative access to functions the state 
does or would not provide.  
Effectively, all of the interpretations somehow indulge in the legacy 
of the original use of “civil society” by Adam Ferguson, who saw it as 
representing the realm of civilisation where individuals with different 
interests interacted.24 Ferguson’s sceptical approach emphasised that rising 
standards of living and diversification of occupational activities of indi-
viduals diminishes their willingness to unite in pursuit of a common cause, 
and especially to defend their civil liberties, and thus be conducive to 
despotic rule.25 Somewhat later, Hegel inspired the historicist interpreta-
tions of social developments, insisting on a comparable interpretation of 
“civil society” in his efforts to reconcile the diversification of interests and 
social life-forms with the enlightened and growingly inert citizenry.26  
Unsurprisingly, the most influential interpretation of this philoso-
phical terminology into the language of social analysis comes from Karl 
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Marx. His major contribution to the interpretation of the Hegelian juxtapo-
sition of state apparatus and social forces translated the binary opposition 
into the powerful rhetoric of “society against the state.” Marx’s imprint is 
clearly seen in the recently revitalised Gramscian discussion of what civil 
society “is” and “does.”27 By providing the point of reference to explain 
the resurgence of social mobilisation, Marx effectively spelled out the 
tangible programme for the coercive action of citizens exercising their free 
will in the public sphere against the state, which guaranteed the realm 
itself.28 Notably, the majority of the concepts relating to “civil society” 
mark the basic antagonism, pointed out by Marx, as social and political 
struggles emanating from the contexts in which they were born. Ironically, 
all concepts seek to reinforce non-hierarchical, or at least decentralised, 
power-relations, and thus make possible the consolidation of the forces 
critical of existing power institutions.  
Returning to the historical sense of the term, one of the prominent 
students of nationalism, Ernest Gellner, defines civil society as  
 
“institutional and ideological pluralism, which prevents the 
establishment of a monopoly of power and truth, and coun-
terbalances those central institutions which, though neces-
sary, might otherwise acquire such monopoly.”29  
 
Undoubtedly the implication of such an approach presumes a zero-sum 
relation between the state and civil society but equally underlines the im-
portant role civil society plays in promoting communication between the 
individuals and the state. More recent theoretical studies on the role civil 
society plays in the process of containing the state’s unlimited influence 
on the lives of its subjects have similarly pointed toward the informative 
role of civil society.30 A number of studies on the applied side of the field 
have subsumed social movements and pressure groups under the umbrella 
of civil society.31 The scholars also refer to ad hoc groups, social activists, 
and the rest of the crowd pursuing policy change and information of the 
public as members of civil society.  
As distinguished from promoters of ideological programmes that 
portray civil society as united against the state, social and political scien-
tists who provide a definition of the term conceive of civil society as 
“situated” between the public and private spheres, organised to collec-
tively pursue the agents’ interests. For example, Michael Walzer presents 
civil society as designating “the space of uncoerced human association and 
also the set of relational networks–formed for the sake of family, faith, 
interest, and ideology–that fill their space.”32 It is easy to see how these 
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definitions imply the classification of civil societies as groups with differ-
ent interests and require the structural explanation of social processes. In 
this sense, civil society is understood in “spatial” terms as an actor that 
occupies its distinct place in the social structure and is entrenched in a web 
of mutual dependencies. But does the identification of “civil society” as a 
collective of individuals project individual autonomy just a step too far? 
What does the explicit definition of civil society in terms of spatial rela-
tion to other “spheres” of social life add to the description of the function 
of civil society?  
In essence, “spatial” definitions take the primacy of political struc-
tures and institutions for granted and thus neglect their impact on the or-
ganisational possibilities individuals originally have at their disposal.33 By 
interpreting interpersonal interaction as necessarily determined by the 
position of the actor in the social structure, the “spatialists” make it not 
only impossible to determine the functional characteristics of civil society, 
but also to isolate the identity of actors.34 This does not mean, however, 
that civil society understood in this sense does not sufficiently challenge 
traditional forms of representations. Structural definitions of civil society 
have proved that the awareness of opportunity framework might be helpful 
in the critical reassertion of the agency’s autonomy vis-à-vis the social and 
political constraints. The critics of structuralists claim that they remain 
inevitably trapped in the logic of social inscription, as has been pointed 
out by Alberto Melucci.35 For this very reason, approaches to civil society 
promoting different versions of structural determinism overemphasise the 
categorisation of civil society activities as dependent on the social assets 
of individual members. Accepting such a position undermines the explana-
tions of social change from the position of actors, because social structures 
are already presupposed to determine and limit actor’s freedoms.36  
Yet different, functionalist approaches to civil society have proved 
more effective for analyses of political representation and of the strategic 
interplay between the institutions and individuals, by emphasising the 
instrumental character of civil society. Particularly the contributions made 
by functionalists have been invaluable in comparative politics, where both 
aspects of civil society–identity and function–have been incorporated. 
There is particular appreciation for this sort of activity in comparative 
politics, but also among the groups supporting liberal principles. However, 
while “an organization [… that] seeks to monopolize a functional or po-
litical space of society, claiming that it represents the only legitimate path, 
contradicts the pluralistic and market-oriented nature of civil society.”37 
Here the study of civil society does not immediately imply its in-
herent positive impact on the development of democracy, as it is the case 
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in the structuralist representation outlined above. Not only is “civil soci-
ety” presented as a functional equivalence for limiting the state’s impact 
on individuals. It also provides individuals with the instruments for collec-
tive response in “groups that enable citizens to mobilize against tyranny 
and counter state power.”38 Clearly, the core argument presented by theo-
rists arguing for the functional role of civil society reflects upon persisting 
conflict between the institutions of the state and members of society af-
fected by them.39  
All concepts of civil society aim at analysing societal organisation, 
collective action and activities existing aside from, and partially contra-
dicting, prevailing political and economic realities. Despite various short-
comings, all have considerable heuristic value in explaining the increasing 
pluralism of modern societies.40 But as the brief overview of possible 
applications of the term have shown, the recent popularity of the term was 
made possible by the synergies between a certain kind of civic activity, 
democratic political culture, and growing individualist orientations of the 
public. All these fall under the common understanding of civil society, but 
represent very different phenomena. Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards 
proposed an insightful classification of how the term “civil society” is 
applied with regard to the distinctive functions it performs.41  
The first of the functions that is attributed to civil society is genu-
inely neo-Tocquevillean and emphasises its decisive role in the socialisa-
tion of citizens, labelled Civil society I.42 Citizen associations not only 
allow for new avenues to express public opinion and further their goals 
collectively, they also instruct other citizens of democratic values and 
therefore contribute to a more civic society.43 Nonetheless, a wider scope 
of activities usually seen as performed by civil society would include 
functions that are ideally performed by the social welfare state, and de-
scribed as the “third” or “voluntary sector.”44 The discussions of the im-
pact civil society has on various institutions presume that civic associa-
tions are autonomous from the state; to a degree “apolitical.” The empha-
sis on the expectations and directions of social policy development, which 
are suggested by this kind of interpretation of the role civil society plays, 
have led Foley and Edwards to classify this approach as Civil society II.45  
In both cases, Civil society I as well as Civil society II underline 
particular contexts in which these notions are applied, mostly in describing 
political developments or economic strategies that produce “cushioning” 
effects of state policies on individuals and contribute to the greater inter-
personal support of individuals. Larry Diamond, describing the attributes 
of collectivities to be included in the realm of civil society, lists a cata-
logue of features these must demonstrate. They should have the features 
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such as “open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, 
autonomous from the state, and be bound by a legal order or set of shared 
rules.”46 The contestatory function of Civil society II comes to the fore 
here, giving “voice to the distinct interests and diverse points of view 
characteristic of a modern society.”47 
All debates, however, reflect on the functional aspect of civil soci-
ety in one way or another, emphasising associational life as the core con-
tribution made to the good of the entire society. The activity of civil soci-
ety, therefore, is to be seen as a public expression of individual interests 
and, in particular in the case of post-communist societies, testifies to the 
specific strategies of civic engagement learnt in the democratic legal set-
ting. Public engagement in political decision-making represents an essen-
tial mechanism for continuous democratisation. It per definitionem pre-
sents a decisive avenue for members of society to inform the government 
of the practices that must be implemented in order to meet their expecta-
tions and increase collective well-being.  
Apparently, this is not the case in the CEE democracies. Rather, 
what we observe throughout the region is something Jürgen Habermas 
labelled “civil privatism.” This notion describes forms of passive citizen-
ship and social orientation with a characteristically strong interest in the 
institutional output of a political regime despite low political participation, 
and is applicable to all spheres of individual activity within the framework 
of an existing state.48 Taking Habermas’ reservations into account, we 
conclude that although present-day democracy still requires the equality of 
individuals with regard to their electoral right, the meaning of electoral 
participation is of a much more limited importance for a popular under-
standing of democracy.49 Rightfully, many democratisation theorists see 
universal suffrage as a prerequisite for the public perception of democracy 
as universal and exclusive rule.50  
The outcome of the “Third Wave” of democratisation showed 
clearly that not only is the installation of democratic institutions necessary 
for the development of democracy. Continuing the tradition of conceptual-
ising democracy as a particular institutional design, major studies of the 
“Third Wave” democratisations offered a tentative explanation of certain 
issues that facilitate or inhibit effective democratisation: the transparency 
and reliability of state institutions, the accountability and responsiveness 
of state officials, the openness and efficiency of available procedures.51 
Richard Gunther and John Higley, in their study of Latin American and 
South European experiences, make clear that consensus among elites 
about the goals of transition is required for effective outcomes of democ-
ratisation, pointing out the important role played by the individuals.52 This 
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has to be achieved with respect to the rules of political conduct and inter-
nal control mechanisms within formal and informal networks, and is es-
sential for the effective resolution of conflicts, and for a convergence of 
interests. 
Measuring democratic consolidation in one society is difficult and 
therefore invites a focus on the composite parts of this process by disag-
gregating it into partial problems. In so doing, the students of democratisa-
tion break down the overall systemic performance into subsystems that 
produce a cumulative effect of democratic consolidation, and conduct 
empirical research more effectively. As in the case of analytical ap-
proaches, e.g. of Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, separate analyses of 
partial trends clarify the differences between consolidated democracies.53 
From another perspective, the analyses of “partial regimes,” such as politi-
cal performance, the commitment of actors involved, as well as social 
evaluation of civic engagement, underline the procedural character of 
democracy and allow for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of 
new democracies.54  
Despite the different foci of research, the two possible approaches 
point to a common research programme: in order to address political proc-
esses properly it is essential to evaluate the institutional conditions of 
consolidation. Thus, systematic analyses of democratisation make clear 
that political institutions play central role in distinguishing particular paths 
of state and institutional development, possible through elite action, which 
in its turn is highly sensitive to social expectations.55  
The impact civic participation has on policies underlines the impor-
tance of political institutions, framing the decision making processes. In 
all cases, the modelling of civic activities as a part of democratic politick-
ing allows for conclusions about the impact citizens included into political 
community might exercise on policy-making. This is possible through a 
consideration of their interactions with street-level public officials, elec-
toral behaviour, protest, and petitioning. Unfortunately, resident aliens and 
individuals disengaged from politics do not have the same opportunities to 
influence political entrepreneurs and can only expect that their discontent 
will be considered in policy corrections. However, the interaction between 
the disaffected and the state institutions could prompt considerable 
changes in policy.  
The activities of civic actors exercise a greater impact on policy-
makers, not least because they are formulated as group demands, on the 
basis of group initiatives. This clearly points out how groups, underrepre-
sented on or even excluded from the political stage could bring their opin-
ions into the “political” society.  
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3.   Civil society in post-communism 
The arguments emphasising the centrality of civil society for democratisa-
tion show much coherence with discussions on democratic pluralism, 
which present the latter as attainable within the realm of political interac-
tion. But while the term “civil society” has been successfully applied to 
specific areas of academic research, explanations of democratisation proc-
esses necessitate consideration of the factors that lie beyond the discursive 
framework and reflect functional equivalents applicable beyond the limits 
of the Occident.56 Underlining the ad hoc expectations of political devel-
opments outside of the European context, Chris Hann points out that “civil 
society debates hitherto have been too narrowly circumscribed by modern 
Western models of liberal-individualism”, pleading “that careful attention 
be paid to a range of informal interpersonal practices.”57 Following 
Hann’s argument, more consideration should be given to functional 
equivalents of the phenomena that we take as indication of an existing 
“civil society” in the Western context, such as formal structures and or-
ganisations, “towards an investigation of beliefs, values and everyday 
practices.”58  
Another difficulty for analyses of “democratisation” is imposed by 
the understanding of what the term “civil society” entails–post-communist 
citizens are seldom negative about abstract terms such as “democracy” or 
“civil society.” In practice, however, not only such values, but also much 
less fundamental democratic practices and institutions enjoy weak public 
support, indicating that those involved in activities to change the aspects 
of the regime do not undertake these in order for it to become more de-
mocratic in the “Western” sense of the word. The goals are usually de-
scribed in more tangible terms. Universal freedoms and rights are fre-
quently evoked by activists to gain greater recognition and support from 
the post-communist and Western governments. However, taking “civil 
society” at face-value inevitably limits the potential of civic actors to en-
gage with institutionalised and informal politics, as well as with collective 
identities. This latter point especially underlies much of the criticism about 
the weakness of post-communist civil society. 
The scholars of post-communist democratisation have been widely 
discussing the fact that communist societies had only rudimentary public 
organisations that were independent of the state, with the majority of trade 
unions, cultural societies and communications systems relying on the 
state’s support for existence. In this sense state-institutions, governmental 
bodies and officials who occupied the respective offices were to a high 
degree independent from the public under the communist regime. Natu-
rally, it is implausible that unconstrained civic engagement could have 
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existed under such conditions during the socialist era. Nevertheless, some 
researchers have suggested that, already in the SU, there existed areas 
where civic engagement can be seen as performing civil society. These 
approaches presented social processes in the SU as specific expressions of 
civil society in the conditions of the totalitarian regime, and included reli-
gious and grass-root organisations, the description of which resembles 
rather dense social networks with high social capital.59  
In his Weakness of Civil Society Marc Morje Howard assesses the 
major reasons for the limited citizen involvement in volunteer organisa-
tions in post-communist Eastern Germany and in Russia. He argues that 
mistrust in state organisations, persistence of friendship networks and 
post-communist disappointment are to blame for the current social behav-
iour and the (absent) civic activism in these countries.60 According to his 
data, a general tendency toward the passive acceptance of political proc-
esses “as they happen” in the CEE countries would allow us to see a dif-
ferent type of civil society emerging in post-communist Eastern Europe.61 
I largely agree with Howard on his point that “the weakness of civil soci-
ety as a distinctive element of post-communist democracy, a pattern that 
may well persist throughout the region for at least several decades.” How-
ever, I do not share his view that further social and political “development 
would depend largely on the individual leaders, their personalities and 
ideologies, and their political strategies.”62 As the following chapters 
demonstrate, the weakness of civil society in the Baltic states is largely 
attributed to reluctance of political institutions to engage with citizens in 
general, and civic actors in particular. The same could be true in the case 
of other CEE societies. 
Particular attention should be paid here to the nature of “civic en-
gagement.” Ideally it is neither oriented toward power acquisition, nor 
towards profit accumulation, but aims at formulating and implementing 
goals not achievable through individual action alone. For civic engage-
ment to emerge, individuals must be aware that they can express their 
grievances and demands vis-à-vis the state as collective interests, which 
requires mutual “trust” between the democratic state and the individual. In 
an ideal world, the democratic state would commit itself to parity in its 
relationship with subjects, above all declaring its “trust” that its constitu-
ents would not attempt regime change by challenging its particular as-
pects. On the other hand, the citizens must “trust” the state to take their 
concerns and regard their interests seriously. In this framework, any en-
gagement of individuals which influences political decision-making and 
causes an alteration of the structural framework of relations between the 
state and its subject can be treated as an activity of civil society.  
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The responsiveness of the state to the claims and suggestions pro-
vided by the individuals who are affected by political decisions, but who 
do not necessarily have direct influence on their making, allow for conclu-
sions about the relations between the state and its subjects. At the same 
time, the civic engagement of individuals aimed at improving the opportu-
nities to participate in the decision-making process could be taken as a 
proxy for their acceptance of the rules of the democratic game and prepar-
edness to contribute to their further development. The degree to which 
both sides pursue their goals and influence the attainment of their goals 
within the democratic framework is indicative of the depth of democratic 
consolidation in post-communist societies.  
The pioneering study of Barnes et al developed a “protest potential” 
scale and showed remarkable dependence between effects of education, 
income levels, and ideological sophistication on the one hand, and partici-
patory values, levels of acceptance, and preparedness for political action 
on the other.63 The authors contend that “one element of the ‘New Poli-
tics’ is a strong emphasis on broadening opportunities for political partici-
pation beyond the established sphere of electoral politics, which integrated 
to a large extent conventional and unconventional politics.”64 These find-
ings appear helpful to analyses of political actions in the communist coun-
tries during the last years of socialist regime. Signing petitions, participa-
tion in lawful demonstration, joining boycotts, occupying buildings or 
factories, joining unofficial strikes, and blocking traffic were major tools 
for contending socialist regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe.  
The popular movements leading to the disintegration of the SU had 
emerged around only a meagre catalogue of issues. The set of demands 
included adequate representation of popular interests in political decision-
making by providing free and fair elections and free-market mechanisms 
for the control of the economic processes, all taking their cue from the old 
dictum of “no taxation without representation.” “Consolidating democ-
racy” was frequently reiterated as a penultimate goal prior to and after the 
collapse of the Soviet socialist system, and described the aspirations of the 
post-Soviet, in particular the Baltic states.  
Importantly, some theorists of democratisation argue that the initial 
period of democratisation is distinguished by a limited consensus on the 
goals of transition. During this period, a complicated set of incentives is 
mobilised to align the greatest possible number of supporters with the 
envisaged goals. In a somewhat similar vein, Linz and Stepan previously 
indicated that “in a political system characterized by limited consensus, 
deep cleavages, and suspicions between leading participants, semi-loyalty 
is easily equated with disloyalty by some of the participants.”65 The exclu-
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sive logic of uncertain loyalty can have particularly harmful effects on the 
consolidation of political communities, where not all of the affected indi-
viduals have the full right to participate in national politics.  
In the first years, the newly independent states embraced the poli-
cies of economic restructuring, state-and nation-building which led to the 
economic marginalisation and social deprivation of large parts of the local 
population, and diminishing trust towards political elites and the credibil-
ity of democracy as a rule of equals.66 As elsewhere across the former 
Soviet republics, the transition in the Baltic states took the form of a com-
petitive procedure, in which the terms of involvement in the political, 
social and economic life were renegotiated. Although in the Baltic states 
the formal equality of social actors with regard to access to political re-
sources was secured, two of the three Baltic states failed to provide suffi-
cient constitutional opportunities for the members of minority populations 
to change elected officials and choose between contenders for political 
office.  
The study of the patterns of popular support for democratic values 
in the situation of limited political participation is particularly instructive 
in those post-communist societies where individuals have experienced 
economic deprivation and status-loss, and have been held at arm’s length 
from the process of state-building. The strategies of goal-attainment on the 
part of the populace provide an especially unique insight into the opportu-
nities available for participation in policy-making in societies undergoing 
democratic transition.  
I test the reliability of this assumption by focusing on the group of 
people who were initially excluded from the automatic right to political 
participation because they were considered unreliable partners for democ-
ratic games and prone to an undemocratic expression of will. Needless to 
say, the influence of the groups not included in citizenry with regard to the 
political decision-making process requires an analysis of the institutional 
framework as well as politics, during, and after, the transition period. By 
looking at a complex set of issues across the region the following chapters 
discuss the impact of nation-building and nationalising politics on minor-
ity communities in the Baltic states.  
Importantly, the investigation of changes in minority politics in Es-
tonia, Latvia and Lithuania requires a consideration of political institutions 
framing the strategies of minority actors expressing group interests. 
Whether they made strategic choices to increase the leverage of their 
communities or acted as advocates of external claims, such as those ad-
vanced by their “external homelands,” their choices and claims were con-
sistently framed by existing political structures of nascent nation-states. 
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Also, the question has to be raised as to whether minority groups were 
mobilised to alter their status within the given institutional setting or 
whether they aimed for other goals, which accidentally resulted in grant-
ing them broader group rights.  
This discussion has direct implications for analyses of the social re-
sponse to democratisation in the post-communist context. Throughout the 
book, democratisation in the Baltic states is treated as an outcome of both 
agency involvement and structural conditions. The focus of my research 
on the contribution minorities made to the democratisation of the Baltic 
states is twofold: on the one hand, I underline the importance of the struc-
tural constraints on individual political and civic engagement. On the other 
hand, I focus on the reasons for political disengagement and the use of 
non-political opportunities by the members of minority groups to advance 
their interests.  
 
 
4.   Conclusion 
My book explores the role played by the Russian-speakers throughout the 
recent political history of the Baltic states. However, it is difficult to at-
tribute particular socio-political attitudes and activities to individuals of 
ethnic or linguistic communities, despite findings from the field which 
may seem seductively suggestive of immediate causal relations. It has 
been argued in the field of contemporary Baltic studies that the titular 
nationals have endorsed democratic transition as a value in itself, but they 
support democracy in their state as a means to legitimise nationalist claims 
to their territory. At the same time, it has been claimed that the members 
of non-titular, and, in particular, Russian-speaking minority populations, 
were unable to develop a “civic culture” in the 1980s.  
Luckily, the comparison of the three countries allows more bal-
anced analyses, which show that non-titular populations had a more ideal-
istic assumption of what democratic change was to bring them, and, hence, 
were more frustrated with the outcome of transition. Although the Baltic 
societies present a very specific example of the post-communist transition, 
some lessons can be derived from the region showing the salience of so-
cioeconomic conditions, of the political framing of society, and of the 
receptiveness of political actors to civic criticisms. These indicate what 
challenges democratising regimes face and what potential factors exist for 
a slower pace of democratisation. Not unimportantly, this emphasis pre-
sents a visible disconnection between the cultural, social, economic, and 
political aspirations of particular sectors of post-communist societies, 
underlining the differences between various groups that turn out to be 
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essential when cultural arguments become means in the pursuit of political 
ends.  
A note is due on two limitations resulting from the study of the im-
pact democratisation has on minority groups. First of all, in the Baltic 
states as elsewhere in the post-communist world, the popular engagement 
of the populace is limited, and, hence, its impact on policy-making is re-
stricted. In order to address this issue, the accommodation of minority 
claims by the state-actors is conceptualised as dependent on engagement 
of international actors.67 The very same international engagement can also 
have a direct impact on minority civic groups in the form of institutional, 
financial, and technological support. I believe, however, that the growing 
visibility of the minorities in the region and the acknowledgement of mi-
nority rights cannot be exclusively traced back to the involvement of in-
ternational players. Instead, it should be seen as a sign of increasing criti-
cal feedback from citizens/residents on political processes in their state. 
Secondly, in order to conceptualise the activities of minority popu-
lations as dependent upon structural factors (institutions, entrepreneurs) 
this study assumes that Baltic politics are nationalising with respect to the 
minority groups resident in their states. The amount of international advis-
ing to Estonia and Latvia on their minority policies indicates that interna-
tional conditionality influenced these countries’ institutional design, de-
spite the critical views of national elites. At the same time, the re-
appearance of nationalist forces on the political arena in these two coun-
tries, as well as to a lesser degree in Lithuania, makes it clear that Baltic 
nationalisms are far from tamed, and are instead dormant, though poten-
tially explosive political forces.68 
All this suggests that democratic conditionality affected the institu-
tional design of the Baltic states, but that it allows no final conclusion on 
the interim democratisation of societies, still harbouring (ethno-) national-
ist sentiment. My starting point in this respect is the belief that a liberal 
democratic polity should aim at the implementation of the democratic 
symmetry principle in order to enable all those affected to participate in 
decision-making. Expanding this point, I refer to the democratic theory 
literature claiming that a “democratic state” should apply the autonomy 
principle to ensure the equality of political rights among all members of 
the community. These points lead me to consider the regular formalised 
criteria of political membership to provide little help in explaining the 
improvement of democratic institutions and in enhancing social integra-
tion. Instead, I believe that civic participation on the one hand, and the 
effective implementation of feedback mechanisms between political insti-
tutions and political entrepreneurs on the other, are crucial for an assess-
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ment of the extent to which democratic decision-making has been ac-
cepted by a society, beyond the mere institutional design.  
Needless to say, while the structural conditions may differ, they 
only frame the settings designed to accommodate the demands of the pub-
lic for democratic governance. The contention of governance by the elec-
torate only underlines the “formal” aspect of democracy, but not that it has 
been accepted as “the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting 
outside the democratic institutions.”69 The impact of the affected populace 
on political developments could be analysed from the perspective of pub-
lic engagement in the matters influencing individual lives, taking struc-
tural constraints and individual resources into account. Further chapters 
discuss the critical importance of the institutional context in which democ-
ratisation is taking place and how the role of society can be accounted for 
in the study of the process. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Ethno-territorial proliferation in the Soviet Baltic  
 
 
This chapter discusses the policies pursued during the Soviet years in the 
Baltic region and their impact on political developments during the early 
period of perestroika. I investigate some of the most salient issues of so-
cialist life by outlining the structural determinants for development of 
political apathy with minority communities during and after the SU. The 
Soviet period in Baltic history needs to be revisited in order to provide the 
background of social processes as diverse as mass political mobilisation of 
Baltic nationals and the failure to rally for their interests on the part of the 
Russian-speaking public.  
At first glance, the regime support already provides strong explana-
tory power for the differences in political participation across the Baltic 
societies. However, it would be wrong to suggest that while all Estonians, 
Latvians and Lithuanians were engaged in reinstalling “their” independ-
ence, Russian-speakers in these republics were absolutely disinterested in 
the events. Nonetheless, it appears that scholars have widely accepted this 
interpretation of various ethnic groups’ political participation in the Sing-
ing Revolutions, and have advanced the stereotype of “active titulars and 
passive Russians.” In this chapter I discuss the sets of institutional incen-
tives for the Russian-speaking communities in the Baltic states to disen-
gage from political and social activities long before the group was per-
ceived and framed as a minority in the post-Soviet Baltic region. Although 
the Russian-speaking populations were the most visible agents of the So-
viet regime in the Baltic states, they have not played a role generally at-
tributed to them in the analyses of Sovietisation.  
Some would notice that I have stolen the title for this chapter from 
Terry Martin’s article, Borders and ethnic conflict: The Soviet experiment 
in ethno-territorial proliferation.1 Martin argues that Stalin’s affirmative 
action policies on the non-Russian periphery of the SU followed the “na-
tivisation of cadres” (korenizatsiya) and accompanied the centralisation of 
socialist federalism between the wars. This chapter shows that “territori-
alisation of ethnicity” continued after the WWII in the Baltic republics, 
much along the lines of the Soviet nationalities policy of 1920s-1930s. 
Crucially, because it followed Stalin’s definition of the nation as a “his-
torically developed stable community with a common language, territory, 
economic life, psychological makeup manifested in a community of cul-
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ture,”2 many mistakes made in other Soviet regions prior to WWII were 
repeated in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As I discuss in the following, 
although Baltic publics suffered as an immediate result of the Soviet in-
clusion, the socialist state promoted the formula “national in form, social-
ist in content” and empowered titular nationalities at the expense of mi-
norities.3  
In a sense, as Yuri Slezkine has remarkably put it, all Soviet na-
tionalities were assigned a room of their own in a large Soviet communal 
apartment.4 So were the Balts after their inclusion into the Soviet struc-
tures. However, the Russians occupied a relatively wide and spacious 
hallway and were able to sneak into other nationalities’ rooms. This was 
exactly the case with many Russians and other non-Balts in the Baltic 
states who could only rely on the Union’s institutions for support of their 
linguistic, cultural, and social needs.5 As a result, the members of the So-
viet ethnic groups who moved beyond the borders of their national-
territorial unit and settled in another nationality’s republic were disem-
powered and discouraged from participating in politics.6 The develop-
ments in the Baltic societies over the “years of dependence” provide par-
ticularly interesting material for a comparative analysis of later state- and 
nation-building. This analysis of the Soviet top-down policy implementa-
tion and its break-down during perestroika will allow for later discussion 
of the hierarchical principle in interethnic relations inherited by the inde-
pendent Baltic states from their Soviet institutions. 
In this chapter, I argue that the ideological machinery of SU sought 
acquiescence from the society affected, rather than vigorous support of its 
subjects–two reasons responsible for the lack of popular support of the 
Soviet state at the point when it was needed most. Naturally, “Russians,” 
or to be more precise, Russian-speakers were the most numerous and most 
dispersed ethnic group of the SU. This fact led many to suggest that if no 
one else, Russian-speakers were “natural supporters” of the USSR. This 
view, however, found little evidence during perestroika. As I discuss be-
low, the effects of the Soviet regime on communities of Russian-speakers 
in the Baltic states worked in the opposite direction. A complex set of 
mechanisms created conditions for consolidated disinterest of the non-
titulars in the fate of the Soviet state.  
 
 
1.   Economic development and the demographic shift  
The politics of physical and conceptual conquest, as well as the later con-
solidation of local elites within the framework of the Soviet ideology of 
the proletarian state, were reality in the Baltic after 1944 as in other Soviet 
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republics in the 1920s.7 Despite the fact that major debates around the 
process of socialist progress dated a few decades back, the same policies 
were applied in other parts of the country and in the Baltic states particu-
larly. When Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were incorporated into the So-
viet Union, the policies of control and cohesion applied and testified to the 
incapability of the Soviet leadership to find effective solutions to local 
problems.8 The failure to recognise the specific situation in the Baltic 
republics after WWII, where economic development, the formation of a 
national consciousness, and the definition of territorial integrity took place 
long before Soviet occupation, points to the general blindness of the So-
viet policy-makers toward the problems on the ground.  
The Baltic states were finally incorporated into the SU at a time 
when Stalin was increasingly propagating the idea of the Russian nation as 
“the elder brother” of all the Soviet nations. At the time, the dispersion of 
(mostly Slav) specialists and workers into the (mostly non-Slav) national 
republics was highly encouraged.9 Clearly, the Baltic Soviet republics 
were limited in expressing their preferences to the economic development 
objectives within the Soviet federation no more than other Soviet republics 
at that time. The indiscriminate implementation of central directives in the 
Baltics would suggest that the Soviet government was simply eager to 
divide the competences between the centre and the republics. Without 
question, the overarching goals laid in the “flourishing” of the Soviet 
nations could only take place with the assistance and under the supervision 
of the “great Russian people,” as Stalin argued in “The Questions of 
Marxism.”10 
The Soviet Marxist ideology was vigorous in promoting industrial 
development and a concomitant type of society centred on factory work, 
social involvement, and ideological literacy. In the early years of Soviet 
history, these objectives were pursued in various regions of the Union 
through the policy of collectivisation. Urbanisation was used to allocate 
labour force for industrial development and was supported by migration 
from industrially underdeveloped regions of the USSR into the industrial 
hot-spots.  
A number of Sovietologists tend to interpret Moscow’s ambitions 
to industrialise the Baltic region as an effort to attach it to the RSFSR by a 
variety of political, economic and socio-cultural ties.11 However, the facts 
available in the Soviet statistics on the methods of collectivisation, pro-
ceedings of industrialisation, and the extent of labour-force migration into 
the Baltic region suggest a different interpretation.12 As there is hardly 
enough evidence of Soviet capacity for forcing republics into the struc-
tures of the USSR, one should interpret the policies of economic develop-
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ment as the implementation of social policies. The Soviet commitment to 
provide for employment opportunity to every Soviet citizen regardless of 
its usefulness and labour costs can be seen as the reason for state-
sponsored labour migration into the comparatively industrialised Baltic 
republics after their incorporation into the USSR. In addition, during the 
first post-war years many migrants moved into the Baltic republics in 
search of labour opportunities on their own initiative.13 
In the years preceding WWII, Estonia and Latvia experienced eco-
nomic growth, with numerous manufactories rising across the countries. 
At the time, the Estonian economy, although still relying upon cattle and 
dairy farming, saw a number of cotton, flax and wool mills assuming 
production in the North-Eastern part of the country. Simultaneously, the 
country’s natural resources such as oil-shale, clay, and limestone allowed 
for the establishment of fuel and cement industries in the land strip from 
Narva to Tallinn, whilst Estonian timber was exported both to the East and 
the West from the growing ports of Baltiski/Paldiski and Tallinn.14 Simi-
larly, in Latvia the ports of Liepaja, Ventspils and Riga expanded as the 
demand for exporting the products of the local heavy and light industry 
rose in the first third of the 20th century.15 Quite predictably, most of the 
industrial infrastructure of the Baltic states was destroyed during the early 
1940s and farm-production became ineffective as a result of the post-war 
population decline. 
The difficulty of rebuilding the pre-war infrastructure was partially 
attributed to the demographic change of the Baltic republics due to the 
turbulences of the First Soviet inclusion (1940–1941) and the German 
occupation of 1941–1944. Latvia suffered its worst losses during this time 
with a population decrease during the war years of up to 36%; Estonia lost 
33% of its pre-war population, Lithuania 32%.16 These population losses 
had to be compensated for by immigration of Soviet citizens during the 
first post-war years, in order to rebuild industrial facilities and provide the 
production necessary for the devastated SU. Effective functioning of the 
industry was only possible when the ravaged infrastructural facilities were 
rebuilt. In order to accelerate the process, the population of the republics 
was “restocked” by some 31% of pre-war Latvia, 29% of pre-war Estonia, 
and 6% of pre-war Lithuania, mainly by Russian-speaking workers arriv-
ing from other Soviet republics.17 Already the first Soviet population cen-
sus in the Baltic Republics of 1959 revealed significant changes in the 
demographic structure of the societies, particularly after thousands of the 
local residents were purged by the Soviet regime and many more “reset-
tled” into inhospitable remote areas of the SU.  
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The strategies of the post-war economic and political development 
in the Baltic region have significantly influenced the socio-demographic 
and ethno-cultural make-up of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the long-
term. The goals of economic development ranged greatly among the three 
Baltic republics. Their impact on the demographic structures of the respec-
tive societies over the time of the Soviet inclusion and post-Soviet state- 
and nation-building was also very different.18  
Lithuania was the least affected by Soviet labour migration in the 
aftermath of WWII. The last Soviet population census of 1989 recorded 
that 79.95% of its 2,712,000 inhabitants were ethnic Lithuanians, with 
minorities mainly Russians and Poles, both representing less then 10% of 
the total population.19 Some argue that the sustained balance of the repub-
lic’s ethnic composition was an achievement of the local leadership, which 
prevented industrialisation of the republic’s economy and thus the mass 
labour-immigration.20 Notably, the leadership of the Lithuanian CP main-
tained that Soviet Lithuania should preserve its traditional agricultural 
sector as a centrepiece of its economy to contribute best to the economy of 
the Soviet socialist state. With the lack of industrial infrastructure, Lithua-
nia developed a successful export-oriented economy in the pre-Soviet 
years. The state effectively supported small farms, producing meat and 
dairy products for export, which constituted the major source of the na-
tional income in the 1930s. With a mere 8% of the population occupied in 
the manufactures and industry, urban areas remained largely underdevel-
oped prior to Soviet industrialisation.21  
The lack of pre-war industrial infrastructure in Lithuania made it 
impossible to command excess-labour from the Soviet republics to rebuild 
non-existent facilities. Instead, collectivisation was perceived as an effec-
tive measure for restructuring the republic’s economy, where the national 
liberation guerrillas, the so-called miško broliai (Forest Brothers, similar 
groups were active in Latvia and Estonia as meža brāĜi and metsavennad), 
delivered fierce opposition well into the mid-1950s, supported by the 
impoverished peasantry. The emphasis of Lithuania’s economy on agricul-
tural production resulted in limping industrialisation and thus the lowest-
level of per capita investment during the Fourth Soviet Five-Year Plan 
(1946–1950). Predictably, limited investment contained the republic’s 
economic growth and held immigration to a much lower level then in 
EstSSR and LatSSR until the mid-1950s.22 Although the rates of industrial 
production accelerated steeply by the end of the 1950s, the subsequent 
decades saw an overall decrease in industrial performance. Nonetheless, 
the (for Soviet standards relatively high) coefficient of industrial output of 
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60% of the republican gross national product was sustained until the 
1980s.23  
Although industrialisation in Lithuania was relatively modest, the 
LitSSR had undergone significant diversification of its economic system. 
At the time of secession from the SU, industry and construction accounted 
for 64%, agricultural production was reduced from 52% in 1959 to the 
mere 25%, and immaterial production rose to more than 10% of the repub-
lic’s GNP.24 Contained economic development and the slow speed of 
industrialisation, on par with persistent natural population growth and 
availability of human resources in the rural areas, resulted in a limited 
labour-force migration from other parts of the SU.25 Calculations show 
that some 1,093,500 Soviet citizens were employed in Lithuania during 
the Soviet time. Only around 311,000 migrants remained in the republic 
after the expiration of their work-contracts over the period from 1951 to 
1989, constituting a meagre 9% of the republic’s population in 1989.26  
The relationships between Vilnius and Moscow had been develop-
ing in a rather balanced manner thanks to the mediating role of the long-
term Secretary General of the Lithuanian CP Antanas Sniečkius. At the 
same time, Tallinn experienced a series of ups and downs in its relations 
with the Soviet centre. Similarly to the leader of the Lithuanian CP, the 
Russian-Estonian Johannes Käbin (or as he was known by his Russified 
name, Ivan Kebin) remained a servant to the Soviet regime from 1952 to 
1978, facilitating agreements between the CPSU and the Estonian SSR. 
The particular role played by Käbin and other higher echelons of the Esto-
nian CP, including many Soviet-Estonians (or Yestonians, as they were 
known), had been highly regarded for the effective rebuilding of Estonia’s 
industrial infrastructure. The limited exploitation of natural resources and 
underfunding for the rebuilding of industrial premises allowed the local 
leadership to avoid Moscow’s direct intervention into the economic devel-
opment until the 1964 abolition of the republican-based management of 
labour-migration.27  
From 1964 on an increasing migration of industrial workers and 
technical personnel to Tallinn, Narva and Sillamäe significantly raised the 
numbers of Russian-speakers in the republic.28 The majority of Soviet 
labour-migrants stayed in the republic for several years only, living in 
urban areas within a Russian-speaking social environment. They had little 
incentive to acquire the knowledge of the Estonian language let alone the 
opportunity to familiarise themselves with Estonian culture. Over the 
years of the Soviet inclusion, the percentage of Russians in the EstSSR 
rose to 30.33%, or 475,000 by 1989, making up some 78.8% of all non-
Estonian residents of the country in 1991.29 Despite a high turnover of the 
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migrant population in Estonia, by 1989 43% of all non-Estonian residents 
of the republic were born there, and around a half of the non-Estonian 
residents were living in the republic for over twenty-five years.30  
The economic change and demographic shift were even more re-
markable in Latvia. The republic’s extensive pre-war industrial infrastruc-
ture allowed Moscow to send a large work-force into the Latvian SSR in 
order to “rebuild” the sector in the initial years of the second Soviet inclu-
sion. By 1947, major industrial ventures had been repaired and new indus-
trial complexes, mostly of heavy industry, were planned, followed by 
migration of some 500,000 workers from the SU in the period between 
1945 and 1955.31 One could conclude that the Soviet industrialisation 
plans for the Latvian SSR relied mainly upon Soviet factory workers, who 
constituted almost 45% of all persons employed in the industry.32 Already 
in 1959 some 33.8% of Latvia’s population were ethnic Slavs, counter-
weighted by merely 62.0% of ethnic Latvians.33 The erection of the sec-
ond dam on the Daugava and continuous industrialisation of local econ-
omy during the same time could only increase dependence of the LatSSR 
from the Soviet labour-force.34  
This might explain the vigour with which “national communists,” 
headed by Eduards Berklavs, tried to decelerate the economic develop-
ment of the republic. In the course of the education reform of 1958, Berk-
lavs and almost the entire leadership of the republic, including the leader 
of Latvia’s Komsomol (Young Communist League), were purged from 
their positions accused of “national isolationism and protectionism.” No 
wonder then that Moscow-ordered changes in the higher ranks of the re-
public’s leadership contributed little to affirming even the minimal degree 
of republican autonomy. The later period of the Soviet Latvian history 
republic was only to continue this trend.  
The Latvian CP leader, Arvīds Pelše (1963–1966) and Augusts 
Voss (1966–1984), undertook little to contain Moscow’s policies toward 
Latvia. Instead, continuous central financial support for investment into 
the economic sector and the growth of local high-tech, light and heavy 
industries created a great demand for a labour-force from other regions of 
the SU. During the 1950–1960s labour migrants arrived to the Baltic re-
publics to settle in the urban areas. Starting with the mid-1970s, however, 
many immigrants were moving into more rural areas, where the increase 
in agricultural production required an input from an appropriate work-
force.35 Statistical data supports the conclusion of Pabriks and Purs that 
“on a macroeconomic level, the system of perks and benefits coupled with 
massive military expenditures, the misuse and exhaustion of resources and 
decline in productivity was akin to a colony of termites […].”36  
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The rapid growth of the Latvian economy required human re-
sources which the republics simply did not have, hence the difference was 
covered by increasing migration of Russian-speaking personnel. In total, it 
is estimated that 1,517,800 Russians were employed in Latvia during the 
Soviet period, many of whom subsequently returned home to leave 
445,200 mainly Russian-speaking migrants in the LatSSR in 1989. Alto-
gether, some 906,000 Russians made up 34.0% of the republics population 
and hence represented 70.7% of the non-titular residents of 1991’s Lat-
via.37  
The last Soviet population census of 1989 took place in the context 
of the transition to independence in the Baltic republics. The situation in 
Latvia alarmed the titulars, who had almost been reduced to a minority in 
their own republic with a mere 52.04% of the total population.38 More 
fortunate was Estonia, where the share of Estonians had dropped to the 
level of 61.5% in a population of 1,565,662, but still totalled twice the 
number of Russian residents in the republic (30.3%). The Estonian and 
Latvian SSRs had undergone a process of industrial revitalisation and 
rapid growth of tertiary economic structures. Their cost: large scale immi-
gration of Soviet citizens, who took advantage of opportunities for better 
employment and pay, as well as the better quality of life and social struc-
tures available in the republics.  
The different levels of labour immigration in comparison with the 
LitSSR are perfectly explicable by the economic objectives of Moscow’s 
regime and the local government in Vilnius. Slower economic processes in 
the LitSSR helped sustaining a rather ethnically homogeneous society. As 
LitSSR’s government decelerated industrial development and labour-
migration, the titular nationality retained high birth rates and hence could 
cover the growing demand for a new labour-force. In comparison with its 
neighbours, Lithuania’s leadership was thus the most successful in con-
taining the streams of Soviet migration: In 1989 the clear majority of its 
population of 3,674,800 were Lithuanians (79.6%), with significant mi-
norities of East-Slavs, i.e. Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians (12.3%) 
and Poles (7.0%).39  
The Soviet statistics on the socio-economic development of the 
Baltic societies suggest that the swift industrialisation of the economy was 
paralleled by the rise in the educational level among social groups con-
nected to industrial production.40 While similar patterns of social devel-
opment were observable in other industrially developing regions of the 
USSR, a number of factors, such as the higher quality of life and career 
opportunities attracted significant numbers of labour immigrants into the 
Baltic republics as early as the late 1940s.41 Only a few regions of the SU 
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could boast similar living and working conditions, which explains the 
attractiveness of the Baltic republics for the Russian-speakers from across 
the Soviet republics.42  
Several years on, the established communities of non-titular resi-
dents and workers in the region facilitated the integration of the new im-
migrants where they lived. However, this did not mean that newcomers 
were required to integrate into the local society. Throughout the Baltic 
republics, regions with intensive industrial development witnessed the 
emergence of broad social strata of white- and blue-collar workers among 
the non-native population. They resided compactly in the urban areas with 
facilities for consumption of the contemporary culture specific to the So-
viet life-style. The Soviet migrants coming for work settled in the areas 
where their contacts with the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian popula-
tions remained limited. Naturally, this urban middle class had little interest 
in getting to know locals or acquiring skills in the Baltic language.43  
Similar social stratification processes were observed in other Soviet 
republics during the “socialist offensive” and industrialisation.44 Many of 
those arriving were commanded for employment in monocultural work-
collectives and were left with little incentive to acquire the knowledge of 
the republican languages. Arguably, for many Russian-speakers better 
chances for employment were placed higher on the list of priorities with 
their immigration than learning the local language. By propagating labour 
as an ultimate social value, the Soviet regime created a vast class of those 
who used free education as an opportunity for upward social mobility and 
obtained employment, social securities, and housing in a region of compa-
rably great economic prosperity.45  
For many of those migrants arriving in the Baltic republics after 
WWII, the personal experience of improving individual life-conditions 
and opportunities in the republics, which undoubtedly performed much 
better than in the vast majority of other Soviet regions, made this a symbol 
of economic advancement of their country, the USSR. Needless to say, the 
personal experience of many Soviet time migrants into the region could 
leave them with no doubts of an advanced character of their home country, 
the Soviet Union.  
 
 
2.   The making of the Soviet people 
Although many Baltic nationals claim otherwise, the Soviet Union was a 
nation-builder, not a nation-killer.46 For decades, Soviet leadership saw its 
first and foremost goal in empowering many “backward” Soviet nationali-
ties through education and policies of affirmative action, just to mince 
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them later into the new, Soviet people. The merger of the Soviet nations to 
form the “Soviet people” was to be accomplished not through the effort of 
all nationalities of the Union, but mainly through linguistic assimilation of 
non-Russians into the Soviet mould.47  
The largest and the most dispersed nationality of the Soviet Union, 
the Russians, did not fit into the overall hierarchy of the regime. Although 
excluded from the territorialisation plans, many Russians were promoted 
to key positions on the Union level and gradually became an instrument of 
the economic, socio-political, and demographic integration of the state. 
However, at the level of the national republics, Russian-speakers had 
limited opportunities for social mobility unless they were well-educated 
and highly loyal to the regime. The promotion of international solidarity, 
unanimity on socio-political attitudes and economic goals of the socialist 
society and “rapprochement” through promotion of a common language 
was essential for building the multinational state.48 
One of the means to achieve this was to treat each nationality ac-
cording to the status of its national-territorial unit, thus limiting the poten-
tial for interethnic conflict. Naturally, socialist society was to be free of all 
antagonism, the ideal to be secured through the implementation of specific 
policies of bonuses for various ethnic groups. Stalin’s “nativisation of 
cadres” and later Khrushchev’s “flourishing of nations” are cases in point, 
when Soviet nationalities were entitled to have a national territorial unit to 
define and realise their dream of national development. In effect, the titu-
lar nationalities in republics were favoured over the non-titular ones; the 
assimilated non-titular nationalities were favoured above non-assimilated.  
The assimilation of non-Russian peoples into the Russian-speaking 
Soviet culture was not an objective, although the policies favouring Rus-
sians remained an issue for discontent between the titular and non-titular 
ethnic groups throughout the SU. This would have stood in stark contra-
diction with the underlying principles of the state and, besides, would be 
unachievable due to the limitations set by the hierarchy of nationalities in 
the SU. The formation of the Russian-speaking diaspora communities in 
the Soviet republics can similarly be explained by reference to various 
issues. These range from the difficulty to retain ethno-linguistic identity 
outside of one’s non-Russian republic, numeral dominance of Russians in 
the SU, and hence Russian-language communication between diasporas of 
different non-Russian migrant communities. One should not forget the 
obvious benefits of proficiency in Russian for the sake of social and pro-
fessional mobility. Greater opportunities for Russian-speakers and Rus-
sian-speaking bilinguals certainly facilitated the pragmatic approach to an 
acquisition of the “language of international communication” among 
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smaller nationalities and in the diaspora.  
However, the intergroup communication about the expectations of 
the future, visions of Soviet history, and past experiences have largely 
failed among the communities of immigrants and Baltic titular popula-
tions. This contributed to the fact that immigrant communities lived sepa-
rately. Without knowledge of the local language or of the local history 
migrants could not appreciate what the titular populations held of the So-
viet ideological, economic and migration policies. Although the groups of 
migrant Soviet citizens were exposed to the same ideological propaganda 
as the Balts, the fact that they garnered positive experiences with respect 
to Soviet reality led to their becoming a tacit accomplice in cementing the 
regional dominance of the regime.  
In 1959 all Union republics launched “nationwide discussions” “on 
strengthening the connection of schools with life and on the future devel-
opment of the system of national education in the country.”49 Khru-
shchev’s theses were set up a as pretext to school reform. The discussions 
in the Baltic republics largely underlined the opportunities for the children 
to study in their own language, which would be applicable to both titular 
and non-titular children, alleviating the necessity for the former to learn 
Russian, and for the latter the titular language.50 Until then, students in 
schools outside of the national autonomous republics and regions were 
obliged to learn three languages, i.e. their native language, Russian or the 
republic’s official language and a “foreign,” i.e. non-Soviet language. The 
previous Soviet practice of educating children in their native language, de 
facto in the language of their parents, had to yield its place to the choice of 
parents to send a child to a school with a language of instruction of their 
liking.  
Khrushchev’s propositions were, of course, not uncontroversial. He 
suggested allowing a choice of instruction language in each republic, so 
each nationality could have access to school curricula in its native tongue, 
as Leninist nationality policy had advocated.51 Understanding school re-
form in this way would either put an emphasis on the option of linguistic 
assimilation or on an allegiance to one’s own language and culture. Ac-
cordingly, the first option implied the possibilities to advance one’s career, 
whereas the second one limited chances for improving one’s position in 
the Soviet hierarchy.52 The political implications of reform suggested that 
the education in the republican languages would be taken away from the 
jurisdiction of national-territorial units and become subject to the individ-
ual choice of each Soviet citizen.53  
The education reform, despite having caused a loud outcry in the 
Baltic republics on the potential decline and even “ghettoisation” of the 
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Russian-speaking migrants, was implemented by Moscow’s iron fist.54 
The lack of incentives for the Russian-speaking and other non-titular im-
migrants to acquire knowledge of the local languages has proved to be the 
major impediment for the acquisition of the knowledge of the titular lan-
guages in the later decades. Just as certain, the titulars in the national re-
publics could not afford not to attend Russian classes in schools. Lack of 
Russian language skills would close many doors to them should they opt 
for upward social mobility, impossible without the knowledge of Russian. 
At the same time, relieved of the obligation to learn local languages, Rus-
sian-speakers were, as Pål Kolstø argues, “in effect cut off from a deeper 
understanding of the dominant culture of the milieu in which they lived.”55 
These pragmatic and symbolic issues of linguistic preferences played a 
decisive role for the Baltic publics. All in all, it appears that titular com-
munities had objectively less possibility to avoid the acquisition of Rus-
sian than Russian-speakers had in avoiding acquisition of the titular lan-
guage of the republics.  
The long-term effect of the education reforms for the Baltic socie-
ties was the differentiation made by the residents between the “natives” 
and the “others,” which convincingly pin-points limited faculty of the 
Russian-speakers to communicate in the Baltic languages.56 Naturally, not 
only Russians but also the members of various nationalities dispatched 
into the non-Russian republics to supervise the process of building social-
ism at the Soviet periphery were affected by these policies. Given the 
limited availability of minority-language education for their children in the 
republics, the members of the non-Russian immigrant communities were 
logically more assimilated into Russian-speaking communities than into 
titular ones.57  
Although many Russian-speakers were deployed across the SU to 
occupy positions corresponding to their education and experience, their 
predominantly production-oriented education put them in less advanta-
geous positions compared with titular nationals. In the Baltic republics, 
where the titulars had a more “communication-oriented” vocational train-
ing, top-republican officials were either russified, or had a very good 
command of the Russian language, enabling them to diversify possibilities 
for co-optation, competition, and concessions.58 However, the local elites 
and political leaders were also subject to “cadre-rotation policies” and 
were particularly required to prove their allegiance to the ideals of the 
regime. In this context, the struggle for the promotion of the qualified 
titular personal into crucial offices acquired a new dimension, although the 
principle of “Russian staffing” (obsadka) remained in force, by and large 
during the entire time of Soviet rule.59 
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Among the Baltic republics the leadership of the Latvian SSR was 
in a particularly difficult situation, needing to balance the policies favour-
able for the republic with those acceptable for Moscow. By 1980 a third of 
the members of the Presidium of the Republican Highest Soviet were non-
indigenous Slavs, while the titular nationals came mostly from the RSFSR 
and were heavily Russified.60 A similar situation could be found in the 
Estonian SSR, where the Russian-Estonians Käbin, Vaino, or Klausons 
occupied the highest positions in the Republican Party apparatus since the 
1950s. Despite undergoing a process of “re-nationalisation,” the Estonian 
leadership was not perceived as local, as its members mainly arrived from 
the Soviet heartland and, as in the case of Käbin, had only rudimental 
command of the local language. The situation in Lithuania was much the 
same as the Lithuanian First Secretary of the CP, was monitored by a 
Second Secretary, who was of Slavic origin. However, Vasily Kharazov 
played only a decorative role on the side of Antanas Sniečkus, who pos-
sessed the assets in the “areas of substantial experience” for fulfilling his 
duty appropriately without extensive interference from Moscow.61  
Several details about self-perception of the immigrants in the re-
gion need particular mentioning here. The Soviet cadre policy is particu-
larly telling in the context of persisting migration from the labour-surplus 
Soviet regions into the Baltic republics. Although Russian-speakers occu-
pied important positions in the CPs, in economically advanced regions, 
particularly in the Baltic republics, Russian-speakers were overrepresented 
in the lower strata, too. This resulted in the formation of geographically 
compact ethno-cultural communities in each Baltic republic, with Russian 
as the major language of communication therein.62 As large groups of non-
natives arrived in the Baltic states, their interests and needs were met in 
the communities of Soviet citizens, united by their common experience of 
their stay in new Soviet republics, memory of lower economic and social 
opportunities in other parts of the SU and, of course, the language of 
communication.  
No doubt, Russian-speaking immigrants were celebrated as the key 
asset for success of the socialist economy in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithua-
nia, as they occupied the majority of the central positions in the economic 
premises rebuilt during the time of the Soviet inclusion.63 At the same 
time, the majority of the Russian-speaking labour-migrants were encour-
aged to adjust their political and social attitudes to fit in with the views 
dominating in the republics, and to concentrate on their economic activi-
ties.64 Certainly, the lack of motivation to “approach” the members of the 
titular populations at the new place of residence is easily explained by the 
significant improvements in the migrants’ quality of life. At the same 
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time, the rigorous advancement of the Russian language as an “effective 
accelerator of the drawing-together of nations” at the cost of local idioms 
damaged the relations between the members of various nationalities.65 It 
appears that the Soviet ideology undermined the very objective it was 
asserting while developing the civic identity as Soviet citizens, namely 
“internationalism.”66  
Both the occupational and residential separation constrained con-
tacts between the local and the immigrant groups. This was particularly 
felt in those areas where Russian-speakers settled compactly. Lack of 
intergroup contact left “titulars” and “non-titulars” with only stereotypical 
opinions of their “neighbours,” imposing additional hurdles to be over-
come during interethnic encounters. In the long run, the linguistic hetero-
geneity of the region did not translate into intergroup contacts and positive 
group-attitudes, as could have been expected with regard to such great 
representation of different linguistic groups in each society.67 While analy-
ses of “contact theory” suggest that close residence and intensive social 
interaction lead to a reduction of intergroup hostility and prejudice based 
on group identity, limited intergroup contacts have resulted in the persis-
tence of group stereotypes in the case of the Baltic republics.68  
The results of the 1989 Soviet population census only confirm this 
disturbing trend. They indicate a low level of interethnic contact identifi-
able from mutual knowledge of the language, the number of interethnic 
marriages and the like. In the EstSSR 33.57% of the titular nationals could 
speak Russian as the second language, while only 13.49% of non-
Estonians had mastered Estonian in 1989. Due to the slightly different 
mass immigration and settlement patterns, as well as a result of the spe-
cific cadres’ policy in the LatSSR, disparity in the knowledge of languages 
was deeply entrenched. 65.72% of the Latvians claimed being able to 
communicate in Russian, and merely 21.12% of non-Latvians to speak 
Latvian.  
However, the fears of denationalisation prevailing in Estonia and of 
complete assimilation into the Russian-speaking Soviet culture in Latvia 
appear exaggerated. What is more pronounced is the failure of linguistic 
assimilation of the Russian-speakers into the Estonian or Latvian commu-
nities, rather than overemphasis on Russification of the titulars.69 By com-
parison, 66.43% of the Estonians and 34.28% of the Latvians indicated 
low or no proficiency in the Soviet lingua franca. Somewhat different 
economic, social and demographic developments in the LitSSR explain 
the much smaller differences between the linguistic communities regard-
ing the knowledge of the other’s language: In 1989 some 37.36% of the 
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Lithuanians claimed to know Russian and 33.45% of the non-Lithuanians 
being able to speak Lithuanian.70  
In the past, scholars of Baltic history argued that Moscow pursued 
the policy of denationalisation, meaning the Russification of indigenous 
populations.71 The argument however does not hold, as it is based on an 
implicit assumption about the import of language policies into non-
Russian republics and neglects the limited will of the Soviet regime to 
enforce central control over language policies in the national republics. 
Moscow’s limited vigour, vague definitions of long-term goals, and fairly 
pragmatic policies towards, for example, the Baltic republics suggest that 
Soviet officials opted for the strategy of “maximal effect at minimal cost” 
in many respects. As we will see in Chapters 4 through 6, similar rationale 
dominated post-Soviet Baltic policies towards Russian-speakers. 
Of course, Russian was taught to the local populace and was ac-
knowledged as the language of communication between the Soviet centre 
and the republics. The Soviet cadre policy opened perspectives for titular 
nationals to occupy important positions in the local apparatus, but there is 
no evidence of either republican or local officials promulgating Russian as 
the only language of communication in public, or among the public offi-
cials.72 However, while after the 1958 school reform the members of the 
Russian-speaking communities could avoid learning titular languages at 
secondary school, the titulars needed to learn Russian irrespective of their 
attitude towards the regime or degree of their pragmatism.73 The cumula-
tive effect of institutional coercion, community pressures and opportunist 
choices led to growth in Russian-language proficiency with both, the titu-
lar and other non-Russian communities after the WWII. In the end of 
1940s only around 40% of the entire Soviet population spoke Russian, this 
figure grew to 48.7% of all Soviet population in 1970; and increased sig-
nificantly in 1980 to 81.9%.74  
Different figures on the language knowledge of the Baltic residents 
indicate a need to consider the structural impact of the ideological frame-
work on linguistic proficiency across the Baltic societies. Particularly, 
extensive use of Russian in the LatSSR prompted many Latvians to shift 
their language loyalties and discouraged Russian-speakers from learning 
Latvian. At the same time, where language was not necessary to get by in 
the everyday, its proficiency remained low. This is what was observed in 
Estonia, where both linguistic communities had a rather low proficiency in 
each others’ language. Yet again, limited use of Russian language by the 
Lithuanians made knowledge of Lithuanian essential for employment 
opportunities in the republic. Curiously, the parity of Russian and Lithua-
nian languages in LitSSR allowed all residents of the country to develop 
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more tolerant attitudes towards others’ languages. All in all, rational deci-
sion in favour of one or another language should not be underestimated.  
On many occasions, Baltic émigré historians suggested that during 
the 1950s–at the time of the dismantling of the armed resistance to the 
Soviet forces by the forest brethren and in particular after the Soviet crack-
downs in Hungary and Prague–Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians came 
to grips with the idea that their republics were to remain in the SU.75 This 
made even the most anti-Soviet titulars seek avenues for furthering their 
interests in the new socio-political situation.  
 
 
3.   Dissent and contention in the Soviet Union 
As we have seen above, the Soviet state and discourse on social issues had 
been remote from the aspiration of the individuals who it affected. In the 
long run it had not only resulted in the conformist standing of the majority 
of Soviet citizenry towards the policies, but led to the retreat of dissent 
into the private spaces, making it impossible for the ruling class to identify 
the issues of contention.76  
Dissent existed throughout the SU at all times, but it was not until 
the period of perestroika that dissatisfaction of various social groups was 
expressed widely and vigorously.77 The ideas previously put forward in 
samizdat publications were now openly spoken about in public, with sym-
bolic actions taking place throughout the Union by the people affected by 
the same Soviet policies. With common experiences, the citizens of the 
Soviet society could easily find common interests and identify the reason 
behind the discontent, which resulted from the disinterest of the state in 
their wellbeing. However, in contrast to the implications of Bunce’s “ho-
mogenisation thesis,” the opinions of Soviet citizens were not levelled 
completely.78 The mobilisation patterns between the nationalities in the 
Baltic republics can be explained from a different perspective. They had 
surfaced during the glasnost period, but the swift diversification of goals 
and the increasing role of mediation between the regime and popular de-
mands indicate that differences existed at an earlier stage. Specific Soviet 
policies explain the consolidation of the Baltic titulars, as well as the rea-
son for the absence of the Russian-speakers’ determination to reject the 
goals of the national movements more actively. 
The logic of the Soviet nationalities policy allowed for the emer-
gence of dissent movements, which sought to advance cultural and lin-
guistic interests in the national republics across the SU and gained particu-
lar strength in the Baltic republics.79 The Soviet policy promoted ethnic 
particularism at the national periphery by supporting ethnographic studies, 
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which were to underline the diversity within Soviet society and were tol-
erated as expressions of national specificity.80 In order to accustom a so-
cialist to the appropriate national context, folklore groups were active in 
all national-territorial units, focussing on the study of folk songs, pre-
Soviet history, and local religions. However, what Soviet authorities saw 
as expressions of socialist content in the national form for many appeared 
to be the only way of resisting the disappearance of their nations in the 
Soviet mould.  
In the Baltic republics, ethnographic societies even worked under 
the auspices of socialist ideology and laid the foundation for later inde-
pendence movements as early as in the 1960s.81 With the blessing of the 
Soviet regime, many folklore movements went as far as to emphasise the 
specificity of their national traditions and pointed out the danger of West-
ern civilisation and Christianity for their existence. Because both the West 
and the Church were perceived by the Soviet regime as enemies, even the 
circles not explicitly praising Soviet authorities for bringing civilisation 
into their republic enjoyed the support of the Soviet state in strengthening 
their national identity.  
Already in the mid-1970s a number of members of the Russian-
speaking communities in the Baltic republics had expressed growing un-
ease with the status of national and ethnic cultures in the framework of the 
Soviet regime. One of the most prominent organisations, the Democratic 
Movement of the Soviet Union (DMSU), had been active not only in the 
Baltic republics, but in other republics as well. The group coordinated 
activities of dissidents, who asserted that “the road to national liberation 
lies through democratization of the entire Soviet society.”82 Providing for 
effective and extensive networks throughout the SU, the DMSU alongside 
other organisations cooperated with the nationally-minded groups of the 
titular nationals in the Baltic republics and paved the way for the later 
national awakening.  
Actively engaging in the underground movements from the early 
1970s, vast parts of the Russian-speaking intelligentsia in the Baltic repub-
lics had supported and actively participated in the national revival of both 
titulars and non-titulars in the region. Many members of the Russian-
speaking elites and dissidents believed that the liberalisation of nationali-
ties policies should be initiated. Previous research acknowledged that the 
principles advanced by the Soviet nationalities policy allowed the Baltic 
peoples to advance the goals of their nations already prior to perestroika.83 
However, the recourse to national rhetoric as an instrument of ensuring 
ethnic survival would not have been possible without local minorities, de 
facto Russians’ support in restricting the Soviet regime. This leads to the 
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question of whether or not the SU leadership would have cared to negoti-
ate international agreements on the status of minority groups had there 
been no Russian-speaking diaspora in the region.  
International agreements have additionally influenced the political 
balance between Moscow and the national periphery. The Final Act of the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe was of particular 
importance. Signed by the SU and 34 other, mainly Western European 
states in Helsinki on August 1, 1975 it gave a powerful impulse for Baltic 
activists to focus on the issues that were previously silenced by the social-
ist leadership. By signing the Act, the Soviet Union on one hand received 
acknowledgement of its territorial integrity by the Western states. On the 
other, the Soviet leadership had agreed to respect various rights of indi-
vidual residents on its territory. This allowed Soviet activists to form so-
called Helsinki-groups and to report on the implementation of the Helsinki 
accord to Western journalists accredited in the SU. These groups thor-
oughly documented the human rights’ abuses and were connected in a 
network of dissident communities throughout the SU. Starting with the 
foundation of the Helsinki Group in Lithuania in November 1976 (under 
the full name, Helsinkio susitarimų vykdymui remti Lietuvos visuomenin÷ 
grup÷) cooperation between the dissidents of the Baltic republics on hu-
man rights and related issues was common place.84  
While the regime failed to reform in the late 1970s, politics of the 
early 1980s proved reactionary. Glasnost provided a unique opportunity to 
air resentment and openly criticise Soviet Communism. Overrepresenta-
tion of members of the non-titular nationalities in both the top and the 
bottom social strata in the Baltic republics resulted in the growing percep-
tion of the danger for the local, titular nationalities coming from these 
groups of society. This creeping separation of the Russian-speaking com-
munities from the titulars and Moscow’s persisting control of the republi-
can activities had prevented formulating an agenda that united the ethnic 
groups over common aspirations. It appears that the controversial deci-
sions implemented by Moscow in particular with respect to economic and 
cultural policies left many of the non-titular immigrants in the Baltic re-
publics as alienated from the general line of the CPSU as the Baltic na-
tionals were. Given the vulnerability of the immigrants’ position in the 
national republics, their disappointment with the Party line also meant 
disapproval of Soviet reign in the region and, not infrequently, active 
support of the Baltic independence movements which emerged during the 
years of perestroika. The students of Soviet affairs have pointed out that 
the very collapse of the SU was inevitable given the vigour with which the 
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ideological machinery was implementing the principles, undermining its 
very own existence.85  
But did this mean that the new central Soviet government lose its 
grip on the social and economic processes at the national periphery? It 
seems that the Soviet authorities did not see expressions of the national 
consciousness as phenomena outside the nexus of class struggle, the view 
that indeed challenged regime’s chances for survival.86 The absence of 
minority rights in the Soviet nationalities discourse had left only limited 
space for members of non-titular communities across the USSR. These 
needed to either integrate into the titular or in the Russian-dominated So-
viet culture, but did not have any specific status or protection. The Soviet 
policies of affirmative action supported the cultural activities of titulars 
and promoted understanding of national republics as homelands of the 
ethnic groups whose name they bore.87 At the same time, the Soviet state 
had found no suitable formula to address the cultural concerns of the large 
groups of non-Russian, non-titular residents in the national republics, and 
most likely had not even sought one. 
The members of the Russian-speaking communities were not 
granted any guarantees with respect to their cultural or national rights in 
the republics. Indeed, members of Russian-speaking communities enjoyed 
the right provided by the Soviet system to be educated in their native lan-
guage throughout the SU. However, this did not result in any national 
aspirations of these communities, but further dimmed their expectations of 
ethnocultural independence. Likewise, the availability of large Russian-
language mass media did not promote an individual national conscious-
ness of the migrant group. Instead, the Communist ideology coined the 
understanding of the Russians in the Baltic republics (as anywhere in the 
SU) that they were living in their home-country and working for the good 
of all people of the multinational state. Thus it is not hard to understand 
the confusion of the local Russian-speakers, who for the most part had 
arrived in the Baltic believing in the friendliness of the local population 
towards the SU, but were suddenly referred to as “colonists” and held 
responsible for the misdeeds of the regime. The reaction of the Russian-
speakers to this rhetoric of naming and shaming was too predictable. In 
turn they accused the titulars of being narrow-minded and backward na-
tionalists.  
 
 
4.   The impact of affirmative action on Russian-speakers  
Immediately after WWII, Western scholarship posed the question of when 
the Soviet system would collapse due to its territorial overstretch and 
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deficit of human resources. While a zealous drive for industrialisation, 
strict centralisation of bureaucratic procedures and internationalist ideol-
ogy determined social development, socialism never gained the human 
face Soviet bureaucrats had promised since 1920s. Naturally, economic 
growth and broad distribution of social capital across the society had 
changed the world-views of the Soviet citizens and would later push the 
socialist system towards change which it was unable to tackle.  
The commitment of the Soviet system to its ideological roots im-
pacted individuals in various parts of the state and highlighted the particu-
lar aptness of the Russian-speakers to identify with the Soviet regime. 
While various interpretations of this phenomenon are found in the scholar-
ship, two major tenants have dominated this discussion, supporting the 
thesis of the “Russian face” of the Soviet regime. The first major interpre-
tation emphasises the numerical dominance of Russians in the USSR, 
suggesting perhaps the decisive clue for the explanation of the group’s 
relative passivity.88 The community of Russian-speakers was more able to 
profit from the socialist regime and accordingly was unlikely to engage in 
undermining the system that benefited them. Another interpretation ad-
vanced the idea of political calamity of the Russian-speakers deriving 
from the role which was ascribed to them in the Soviet historical narrative, 
believing that the Soviet republics were saved from the capitalist aggres-
sion by the socialist revolutions in which the Russian people played a 
decisive role.89  
As a result, large parts of the Russian-speaking communities had an 
overtly exaggerated view of the contributions made by the Soviet state, 
socialist regime, “big Russian brother,” and particularly themselves to the 
development of local welfare. Some researchers have pointed out that 
ignorance of many Russian-speakers towards the state, policies and fel-
low-citizens prevented them from developing individualist attitudes, and 
led them to patronise titular nationals in the Baltic, as was the case in other 
Soviet republics.90 Valerie Bunce argues that the socialist institutions 
caused a long-term development which was not foreseen by the CP, divid-
ing the powerful, homogenising the weak, and undermining economic 
base of its legitimacy.91 The Soviet regime managed to effectively distin-
guish institutional activities from the individual requirements of the public 
and reduce political participation to a symbolic action of conformity. 
While the ideological dictum sounded the support for rapid social transi-
tion, political development was measured by economic achievements and 
the party penetrated the majority, if not all spheres of individual life.92  
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“At the same time, because of fusion between politics and 
economics in socialist dictatorships, power was redistributed 
along with economic resources. Thus, socialist societies be-
came more autonomous and more powerful when bargaining 
with the party-state.”93  
 
Naturally, republics with greater economic weight had greater leverage. 
The transition from a communist to a democratic regime emerged first in 
the Baltic republics, where relatively high living standards prevailed. The 
Baltic publics were the first to voice their aspirations for more liberties at 
the end of the 1970s and later in the mid-1980s to intensify the democratic 
agenda put forward by Gorbachev. While one cannot fully attribute the 
emergence of the democratic agenda in the Baltic republics to comparative 
economic prosperity of the region, the shift of acceptable social relations 
from those based upon subordination to ones preferring negotiation is 
particularly notable since the mid-1980s.  
The differences between the Russian-speaking communities and the 
titular groups in the Baltic states became of crucial importance. Educa-
tional differences and expectations from the occupational career account 
for considerable variance in attitudes towards the Soviet regime between 
the groups. These were additionally reinforced by residential segregation 
and different preferences in cultural matters that resulted from the differ-
ent role the titular and immigrant groups played in the region during the 
Soviet time.94 The members of the Russian-speaking immigrant communi-
ties improved their economic status by moving to the Soviet Baltic repub-
lics and enjoyed great social securities under the socialist regime. The 
members of the titular nationalities resented lack of opportunities and 
prospects in the Soviet state, although they equally profited from broader 
availability of higher education, increasing quality of life and the like.  
Naturally, the economic devastation of the Baltic infrastructure dur-
ing WWII required intensive human resources for its rebuilding, which 
allowed the republics’ integration into the economic structures of the SU. 
The allocation of the key positions in the industry to presumably loyal 
local nationals or Slav migrants coming from the Soviet heartland further 
illustrates the power of the Soviet centre over the national periphery.95 The 
futile efforts of the Baltic leadership to halt labour migration and the neg-
ligible effect of appeals to consider republican needs and possibilities, 
rather than All-Union Five-Years plans, made painfully clear who had the 
final say in the region. The bargaining and compromising of the republi-
can authorities with the central commanders did not improve the image of 
the central authority either. Issues of national pride and loyalty to one’s 
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ethno-linguistic community sharply distinguished Baltic titulars from 
immigrant Russian-speakers.96 Other issues caused very different reaction 
of immigrant groups too. For them, political, economic and socio-cultural 
policies implemented in each republic played an important role in sustain-
ing the well-being of the Soviet citizenry. As a result, contradictory read-
ings of Moscow’s role and different perceptions of the common history 
were formed with the members of the titular and non-titular communities 
in the Baltic republics. 
In total, the system of incentives erected by the state to support its 
existence led to the formation of interests shared by the Russian-speaking 
publics which were remote from any expectations of Baltic titulars. Thus, 
the Soviet regime had nurtured popular political apathy while catering to 
individual need with provisions for free education, social welfare, and 
universal employment in exchange for public compliance. Where greater 
material security and intellectual autonomy prevailed, national sentiment 
was supported by the republican structures and flourished in the popular 
opinions, as it did with the titular publics in the Baltic republics. As op-
posed to Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, non-titular residents had no 
political ally in the socialist regime, which failed to provide them with the 
institutions supporting linguistic, cultural or ethno-national claims.  
The change in the ideological line of the CP following the accession 
of Gorbachev to the post of the General Secretary of the CPSU led to an 
increase in the civic activities of the titular communities. When criticism 
of the Soviet social and economic development was allowed, the ideas of 
openness and restructuring did not fall onto deaf ears within the circles of 
Baltic intelligentsia. Both the historical materialism and the ideals of pro-
letarian internationalism were subjected to harsh criticism by Soviet dissi-
dents, while Leninist principles of “democratic pluralism” were held high. 
Desperate for popular support of his reforms against the hardliners in the 
Communist party, Gorbachev assented to criticism of Soviet socialism and 
supported national reformists on the Union’s national periphery.97  
Over the course of several years, Communist parties across the 
range of the Soviet republics were deserted by many adherents of reforms, 
who then retracted into the dissident movements. Promoting an image of 
the Party as the sole leader of these social developments and, conse-
quently, changes, many members of the CPSU openly sympathised with 
the popular movements. The division into reformist and conservative 
wings of the CPSU resulted in the formation of republican Communist 
Parties, which attempted to consolidate the reformist forces behind them 
by putting the national agendas into their programmes.98 As Jan Trapans 
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concludes, what the national fronts had declared a year before was now 
openly declared by the Baltic Communist leaders.99  
It seems that the General Secretary of the CPSU underestimated the 
power of criticism and the extent of popular discontent with the Soviet 
system as it was. Soon after the beginning of perestroika it appeared im-
possible to restructure only the economic system while giving the political 
system a mere face-lift. On top of this, Gorbachev opened the door for 
potential contesters of political decision-making, allowing for public op-
position to the CP. This allowed popular discontent, previously discussed 
privately, to enter public discourse. Like many other Soviet nationalities, 
which had their own ethno-territorial units and lived on its territory, the 
Balts could rely on republican institutions to support their agenda with 
affirmative action programmes. Russian-speakers in the Baltic republics 
started to lose out on access to crucial political resources. When the na-
tional resentment of titulars with Communist rule crystallised in debates 
about the Soviet inclusion and on possible paths out of the “prison of na-
tions,”100 Baltic Russian-speakers had no access to the institutions where 
discussions took place.  
 
 
5.   Conclusion 
In the atmosphere of reforms, national identity provided a fresh substitute 
to the rusty edifice of “proletarian internationalism.” However, active 
rallying under these circumstances made sense only for those groups that 
emphasised their national particularity, narrative of history, and cultural 
traditions outside of the Soviet ideological framework. Here, the titular 
nationalities of the Baltic republics had strong symbolic legitimacy and 
stood on firm moral grounds. Russian-speakers in the Baltics and beyond 
had much less with which to bargain.  
The primary objective of this chapter was to show how state poli-
cies have influenced the perception of non-core ethnic groups about the 
time of Soviet inclusion. As I have discussed, the policies of the Soviet 
regime provided structural incentives for the titular groups to barter with 
Moscow for greater autonomy, while the Russian-speaking minority was 
systematically discouraged to participate in political decision-making. In 
other words, the affirmative action empire empowered the weak by weak-
ening the potentially strong ethnic communities. As I will discuss in the 
next chapter, the very same mechanisms were used to construct the new, 
post-Soviet political communities in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. If 
nothing else, the institutional legacies of the SU were used to empower 
titulars at the expense of the formerly dominant Soviet group.  
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Does this mean that the Soviet regime had made Russian-speakers 
in the region a docile group of tacit supporters of any regime? How deep 
was the disinterest in political decision-making during the post-War years 
on the part of this group, and how had Soviet affirmative action lead to 
weakening the Russian-speaking publics in the Baltic republics? This next 
chapter will explore these questions in detail. I will refer to the factors of 
combined deprivation of instruments for the expression of political will, 
social constraints, and the Soviet rhetoric of cultural self-determination–all 
impacting the institutional development of the post-Soviet Baltic polities. 
All this, as I will argue, predisposed the members of the Russian-speaking 
communities to be spectators rather than actors on the stage of the public 
battles for political independence of the Baltic republics in the late 1980s–
early 1990s.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Baltic perestroika and nation-building  
 
 
The Soviet policies of centralisation in the political, economic and social 
spheres had a stark impact on the status and self-perception of both the 
Baltic titular nationalities and Soviet migrant populations. When these 
differences were first voiced by the dissident elites in the mid-1980s, the 
discrepancies in perceptions were seldom explained as simply the differ-
ence in experiences by socio-economic strata of the same society. Instead 
these were commonly described either as a lack of sophistication or as 
pro-Soviet frames of mind of the non-titulars when discussed by the mem-
bers of the titular nationalities. When the Russian-speakers were address-
ing the differences in perception, they underlined these as expressions of 
egoism and the nationalist attitudes of the Balts. These perceptions had 
subsequently coined the later discussions between titulars and non-titulars 
in the popular movements on the future perspectives of the development 
of the Baltic republics. However, the difficulty in accommodating the 
interests of the Russian-speakers in the independence movements was not 
a result of their status as the “proletariat’s fifth column” in the region. 
Instead they were said to have no vested interest of their own, but repre-
sented the will of external states and hence endangered Baltic national 
interests.  
Baltic republics were the major arena where the struggle between 
the authorities and the citizens for the reform of the Soviet system was 
carried out during the 1980s. Perestroika and glasnost allowed the mem-
bers of the titular ethnic groups in the Baltic republics to discuss openly 
the memories of the past. These ranged from experiences of the interwar 
statehood to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, from Stalinist deportations to 
post-war resistance, all symbolising the illegitimacy of the Soviet rule in 
the republics. This dissent, based on perceptions of the socio-political 
community gained prominence in the public over the mid-1980s. It called 
for the restraint of Soviet control over political and economic processes, 
an end to the “Russification” policies and, most importantly, revision of 
the official Soviet history of the region.  
In the following chapter I will discuss the run up to independence 
of the Baltic republics from the SU, outlining how the earlier Soviet poli-
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cies determined Russian-speakers’ disengagement in the process. A dis-
cussion of the independence movements will reveal the weakness of the 
Russian-speakers’ position to oppose the exit of the republics from the SU. 
As we will see, the central government provided institutional opportunity 
structure to the “owners” of republics, the Baltic titulars, while disempow-
ering Russian-speakers. This chapter discusses the time of re-establishing 
the political sovereignty of the Baltic republics and the role Russian-
speakers played in the process. Overall, I argue that in the long run, the 
effects of the Soviet nationalities policy explain how republican political 
institutions thrashed minorities’ political activity while propelling Baltic 
titular communities into the leadership of post-Soviet nation-building.  
 
 
1.   Baltic nationalism awakened  
It is commonly accepted that the Soviet regime supported expressions of 
“national content” in the “socialist form” as highly appreciated forms of 
internationalism. The nationalist rhetoric emerging during the period of 
glasnost significantly challenged the ideological foundations of the re-
gime, but it was nonetheless using the structural mechanisms provided by 
the Soviet policies of ethno-territorial proliferation.  
From the mid-1980s groups of citizens started to fill the space that 
is attributed to civil society in democratic regimes. Acting in line with the 
objectives of perestroika, they alternatively provided a forum for individu-
als to take action and further their individual interests collectively. Al-
though the emergence of civil society had taken different form across the 
SU, the mobilisation of broad social strata in support of the more radical 
change was most successful where national sentiments were in place.1 
With the Soviet regime tolerating and even promulgating ethnic particular-
ism, ethnic identities remained the easiest way to organise dissent into 
popular movements.2 This helps explain the differences between the 
emergence of the popular movements in the national republics and the 
Russian Federation, as well as the activities preferred by the titular nation-
als and Russian-speaking populations outside of the RSFSR.3  
The Baltic cases make it particularly evident that the goals of titu-
lars’ national movements had varied greatly from those of the Russian-
speakers. Decisively, the popular movements in the region show some 
degree of unanimity with regard to their goals because they could call for 
support of the quasi-nation-state institutions of Baltic republics.4 The non-
titulars were far more undecided about the ends of their activity, reacting 
to claims from the titular side rather than formulating their specific de-
mands and actions.  
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At this stage, there was only a limited conflict over the different 
historical narratives, as all ethnic groups were predominantly occupied 
with the delegitimizing of the Soviet past. Mutual contestation of different 
political actors and, above all, of nationalist parties had led to a polarisa-
tion of the political spectrum. The race for the nationalist vote resulted in 
explicit demands for national self-determination of the republics in the 
summer of 1988. However, it appears that neither the formation of the 
Eesti Rahvusliki Sõltumatuse Partei (Estonian National Independence 
Party) in 1988, nor of the Latvijas Nacionālās Neatkarības Kustība (Lat-
vian National Independence Movement) had caused massive reactions of 
non-titular communities in the republics. Neither the discussions on sym-
bolic actions, nor the restoration of the national flag and the state lan-
guage, nor the persistent questioning of the Soviet historical narrative and 
the growing usage of rhetoric referring to non-titulars as “colonist work-
ers” or “occupants” led to the activation of the Russian-speaking commu-
nities.  
Studies of the late Soviet society reveal that the largest part of the 
Soviet citizenry was convinced of the peaceful coexistence of all Soviet 
nationalities and the number of freedoms the USSR brought them.5 The 
Russian-speaking residents in the Baltic republics were no exception. In 
fact, Russian-speakers in the Baltics were not much different from the 
titulars, who engaged in the same festivities: in their majority they did not 
support any party. Although many Baltic émigré scholars assume that non-
titular residents of the Soviet Baltic republics were indifferent and passive, 
they did lead rather active political lives, at least in Soviet terms.6 How-
ever, in many cases it is only the lack of support for independence that 
drew the attention of research, but not the general disinterest in political 
activities.7 While most of the titular nationals had already celebrated the 
re-introduction of “their” national flag and establishing Estonian, Latvian 
and Lithuanian as the only state languages, most of the Russian-speakers 
in the region had taken the role of silent observers in the situation.  
Nonetheless, it is incorrect to assume the complete apathy of non-
titulars in the Baltics. Although the majority did not even aspire to organ-
ise political associations, many were active in cultural organisations, 
when, among others, the associations of autochthonous ethnic groups 
renewed their existence in the second half of the 1980s. However, the non-
titulars in the Baltic republics did not have national awakening movements 
in any way comparable to those of the titular communities. But the minori-
ties throughout the region had significantly activated their cultural work 
compared to previous periods in history.8 In Lithuania activities of the 
Karaim and Polish minorities intensified, and the Lithuanian Jewish com-
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munity resumed its activity in 1988. Similarly, in Latvia Jewish and Polish 
associations were established, and in Estonia the Forum of National Mi-
norities was created, including some 20 cultural groups.9 The rise in na-
tional consciousness among Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians was 
conducive to the establishment of cultural associations on the part of non-
titular immigrants who had joined the popular movements and were wel-
comed by their nationalist leaders to support independence from the SU.  
That said, neither in the rather ethnically homogeneous Lithuania, 
nor in Estonia, where Russians had been living in the ethnic enclaves of 
Ida-Virumaa, did the Russian-speaking population engage in the popular 
front movements en masse. At the founding congress of the Estonian 
Popular Front in October 1988, only 5% of the participants were non-
Estonians. The congress of Sąjūdis, which took place in October the same 
year, had only 4% of delegates who were non-Lithuanians.10  
By contrast, the Latvijas Tautas Fronte (Popular Front of Latvia, 
LTF) brought together the people of various nationalities, who constituted 
up to 12 % of the delegates of the congress.11 Unlike in both other Baltic 
republics, the LatSSR representatives of the Russian community were 
highly supportive of the LTF, signing an open letter to the Assembly of 
the Latvian Writers’ League with the initiative of establishing a democ-
ratic People’s Front, an initiative supported by the Russian-speakers. A 
year later, in 1989, several Russian-speakers were elected to the Council 
of the LTF, with Vladlen Dozortsev emerging as a member of the Board. 
Among others, Aleksei Grigorjev was one of the editors of LTF’s press-
organ Atmoda, assisting in the circulation of its Russian-language edi-
tion.12 
Similarly, in Lithuania Soglasie and Vozrozhdenie were published 
with the help of Sąjūdis, which included some translations from Lithua-
nian publications, but also appealed to the reader by including specific 
information for the non-titular public explaining the recent developments. 
The printed issues of the Rahvarinne Perestroika Toetuseks (Estonian 
Popular Front, more commonly known as Eestimaa Rahvarinne, further 
ERR), Vestnik narodnogo fronta and Tartusskii kur’er enjoyed smaller 
readership than their Latvian and Lithuanian counterparts, but nonetheless 
accounted for 15,000 and 20,000 issues respectively. Soglasie and Atmoda 
were the most widely-read newspapers not only among the Russian-
speakers in the Baltic republics, but thanks to their high circulation–
between 20,000 and 50,000 each–throughout the Union.13  
The popular fronts were representing political rather than other as-
pirations of the Baltic residents and therefore were clearly dominated by 
the titulars. At the same time, Russian-speakers had also been united in 
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organisations which conducted cultural activities by and for the Russian-
speaking residents of the Baltic republics. In Latvia, the Baltic-Slavic 
Society of Cultural Development and Cooperation was established in 1988 
and was the first association of its kind in the SU.14 Although it originally 
included Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian sections, the latter two chose 
to form separate organisations at a later point in time. The LTF became the 
basis of consolidation of the Russian Culture Society of Latvia, with its 
constituent assembly held on March 4, 1989. At this assembly they de-
clared that one of their goals was to develop “to the utmost the Russian 
national culture, to intensify traditional Russian-Latvian relations, cooper-
ate with the representatives of all nationalities of the Republic.” In the 
same key, the Baltic Assembly, the joint conference of the leaders from 
the Estonian and Latvian popular fronts and from Sąjūdis, stated its goals 
in 1989 and aimed at securing “the civic rights of all national and ethnic 
groups who live on the territories of our states, as well as to concede them 
the rights to cultural self-rule.”15  
Different cultural organisations of non-titulars sent partially contra-
dicting signals into the emerging political space of the Baltic republics. 
However, it would be incorrect to conclude that the Russian-speakers had 
remained absolutely disengaged from these processes. As documents of 
the day show, many Russian-speakers have not only tacitly supported the 
independence of the Baltic republics from the SU, many have joined in the 
ranks of organisations promoting the development of cultural diversity in 
the region to the point of creating organisations to further the sentiment of 
solidarity among Russian residents of the Baltic region. The most promi-
nent example, the Russkaya Obshchina Latvii (Russian Community of 
Latvia, ROL) founded in early 1991, laid out an ambitious programme. It 
declared that it intended to assist the Russians of the republic to adapt to 
the conditions of the market economy in a Latvian national state. The 
well-intended project was, however, short lived and fell victim not to the 
growing tension between the organisation and the Latvian state (its leaders 
did not intend to challenge the political powers), but to internal disagree-
ment between the leaders.  
So, it appears that the Russian-speaking residents of the Baltic re-
publics had not simply been waiting for Baltic independence to rain down 
on them. Many had engaged in collective action that aimed at promoting 
the cultural interests of the Russian-speakers in general, and of Russians, 
Ukrainians, Poles, Tartars and other communities, in particular. The po-
litical activity of the Russian-speakers, or generally, non-titulars in the 
republics remained limited. It was not until the organisation of the Citi-
zens’ Committees in the Latvian and Estonian SSRs that non-titular com-
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munities had reason to worry about their future even if independence of 
the Baltic republics would be achieved. In Estonia and Latvia, where non-
titulars have played a decisive role in supporting the popular movements’ 
accession to and establishment in the political arena, the scenario of ulti-
mate titularisation of the state appeared unlikely until 1991. However, the 
foundations of the post-Soviet citizenship legislation were shaped by Citi-
zens’ Committees, mainly by the titular nationals, at the expense of minor-
ity communities who failed to mobilise opposing these steps.16  
The increasingly radicalising rhetoric of the ERR, LTF and Sąjūdis 
had lead the Russian-speakers to formulate alternative models for the 
political, economic and social development of the republics. Particularly, 
claims made by the popular fronts across the Baltic republics in 1989 
during the stand-off between the Union’s and the republic’s authorities led 
to the organisation of the Russian-speakers “from above.” 
 
 
2.   Baltic pro-Soviet movements: The counterforce? 
While the Baltic titular populations organised the movements to push for 
the separation of the Baltic republics from the SU, any popular movements 
of the non-titular residents of the Baltic republics opposing this drive re-
mained dormant. These sprang mainly in response to the increasingly 
alienating rhetoric of the national movements and aimed at maintaining 
Soviet rule under the umbrella of ideological control over the republics 
while voices urging for the proclamation of Baltic independence from the 
SU became louder.  
In this situation, when prospects for Baltic independence became 
brighter, the Russian-speakers–it is usually argued–were passive and dis-
interested in political issues and prospects of the Soviet demise. Although 
this argument is popular with scholars, its logic appears to be inconsis-
tent.17 Scholarship studying the role of the local Russian-speakers in the 
Baltic drive for independence paid much more attention to popular move-
ments. However, very little attention had been granted to the organised 
opposition of the Russian-speakers. A significant part of the Russian-
speaking residents of the Baltic republics had actively supported the sepa-
ration of their republic from the USSR in the second half of the 1980s, but 
there was also another option. “Internationalist movements,” or inter-
fronts, as these were called, are frequently pointed to claim that the Rus-
sian-speakers strongly opposed the separation from the SU and presented a 
real danger to emergent Baltic polities.  
It is true that the interfronts opposed the goals of the popular 
movements by pursuing the logic of “state-keeping,” that is of Soviet 
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centralisation. The problem was, however, that they lacked the support of 
the constituency they claimed to represent. Although not everyone was at 
ease with the idea of Baltic independence, not all of those who opposed 
the popular fronts supported the pro-Soviet movements. Recent studies by 
Western scholars suggested that the interfronts were largely recruited from 
communities of Russian-speakers that were not integrated into the Baltic 
societies, did not speak or poorly spoke the local language and did not see 
much profit in upholding national interests in the republic of residence.18 
The majority of those who founded and supported interfronts were Rus-
sian-speaking and Soviet-minded rank and file party members, army per-
sonnel and retired officers, managers and workers in the large defence 
enterprises–in short, those who realised that they would lose many of their 
privileges should the Soviet system collapse.19  
Three organisations put forward explicit political goals in opposing 
the secessionist drive of the Baltic republics: the Internationalist Move-
ment of the Working People of the EstSSR (Interdvizhenie, or further 
Intermovement) in Estonia, The International Front of the Working People 
of Latvia (further Interfront) in Latvia, and Yedinstvo-Vienyb÷-Jedność 
(Unity) in Lithuania. Their leadership advocated closer ties with the Soviet 
authorities and was active in promoting a centripetal agenda through their 
sister-movements in the republics, such as “The Group for the Mainte-
nance of the Soviet Power” in Estonia, “The United Council of Production 
Collectives” in Latvia and Lithuania, as well as at the union level.20 Un-
surprisingly, the interfronts had similar programmes and political agendas 
since they were created mostly with the help of Moscow between late 
1988 and mid-1989. Mavriks Vulfsons, a member of the LatSSR Supreme 
Council at that time, described the group of those supporting “continuing 
association” with the Soviet Union as “mostly Russians who had leading 
positions in the Soviet Latvia, as well as truly dense Latvian Commu-
nists.”21  
In the LatSSR, Russian-speaking intellectuals participated actively 
in the social and proto-political independence movements on par with 
titulars during 1988–1991, though some had different aspirations. Many of 
the Russian-speaking activists, who were not engaged in pro-
independence activities, were seeking democratisation of the SU as a 
whole. However, when compared to the neighbouring republics the group 
of supporters of reformed Soviet regime was particularly big in the 
LatSSR.  
Another group of LatSSR’s Russian-speaking privilegentsia organ-
ised Interfront in October 1988, convening its founding congress in Janu-
ary 1989. Negative attitudes to proposals on economic and political decen-
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tralisation and the status of the Latvian language, made earlier by the LTF, 
distinguished interfront’s agenda and drew the attention of potential sup-
porters from the Russian-speaking community in Latvia. Apparently, it 
was more a Soviet-minded than a Russian-inspired movement which used 
Soviet symbols and opted for the preservation of Soviet centralism.22 In-
terfront strongly opposed the drive toward independence and condemned 
national, or as it was put then, “cosmopolitan” rhetoric of the People’s 
Front. These were juxtaposed with the cliché “internationalist” slogans 
known from the Communist programme and Labour Day demonstrations 
and clearly aimed at head-on confrontation with the LTF.  
The state-sponsored nature of the Interfront became clear during 
and after the Congress. This was made obvious by the presence of uni-
formed Soviet soldiers at official gatherings, demonstrations and meetings, 
which, for exactly the same reason, had been well organised and visible, 
although they seemingly attracted the very same pool of individuals.23 
Many participants of the Congress had joined the organisation because 
they feared ethnic polarisation.24 The main support emanated from the 
older generation of the Russian-speakers in the republic, in particular 
those in their retirement, whereas younger people favoured the popular 
movement.25 Differences in age, and correspondingly, in length of resi-
dence in the republic, and in the intensity of ties to Latvia and Latvians 
can partially explain the variance in the political preferences of various 
groups within the Russian-speaking community. The expectations that the 
state serve as a provider of guarantees and services led to fragmentation 
within the group of Russian-speakers in Latvia.  
High heterogeneity of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia 
did not allow Interfront to consolidate the protest potential of the non-
titulars. While some had retained faith in the importance of Moscow’s 
control and the leading role of the CPSU in providing necessary resources 
for the republic’s well-being, only between 20 and 30% of the non-titulars 
in Latvia supported the activities of Interfront.26 Even with regard to the 
compulsory-voluntary participation of the military personnel in the repub-
lic, it is unlikely that more than 15% of the residents in the Latvian SSR 
had stood up for Interfront. And even among these, as former supporters 
of Interfront recall, authoritarian tendencies of the leadership and exorbi-
tant bureaucratisation drove many potential supporters away from the 
organisation.27  
The founding congress of Estonia’s Intermovement took place on 
March 14, 1989. Like the Latvian Interfront, Intermovement opposed the 
restoration of Estonia’s symbols of independent statehood: the national 
tricolour flag and Estonian as the republic’s sole official language. The 
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Congress appealed to Soviet authorities to revoke the laws “destabilising 
the ethnic situation in the republic” and to outlaw the use of the national 
flag. Further claims however were made by conservative delegates of the 
Congress, demanding continuous CP leadership and the removal of the 
nationalist cadres from the EstCP. The Congress also called for revoking 
the newly introduced system of economic self-management, or khoz-
rashchet that aimed at decentralising the state control over industrial en-
terprises. Some delegates sounded even more radical claims, demanding 
the inclusion of the areas densely populated by Russian-speakers–
including the land-strip from Ida-Virumaa to Tallinn–into the RSFSR’s 
Leningrad oblast. Not surprisingly, the majority of the claims made at the 
Congress of Intermovement were supported by the head of the Estonian 
KGB Karl Kortelainen, himself a Karelian-Finn, who vigorously opposed 
the popular movement, language laws and the economic self-management 
programme.28 In his note on the speeches delivered at the Congress, 
Toomas H. Ilves claims that “at least one speaker of the Congress de-
manded mass deportations of Estonians.”29  
The issues raised at the founding Congress of Intermovement indi-
cate that its emergence and the vigour with which anti-Estonian sentiment 
was promoted by the speakers is explained not by the interethnic animosi-
ties percolating the previously tight nationality lines. Rather, participants 
opposed the decentralisation of the Soviet state and the emergence of 
centrifugal national rhetoric pertaining to the popular movement’s calls for 
political, economic and social self-determination of EstSSR in the SU. The 
social basis of Intermovement indicates why this was possible: some 65% 
of the movement’s members were white-collar workers from industrial 
enterprises located in Estonia, although financed directly from Moscow.30 
In the case at hand, the two most powerful (and most famous) leaders of 
the movement, Yevgeny Yarovoy and Lev Shepelevich were both direc-
tors of defence industry enterprises, working under the direct jurisdiction 
of Moscow. The implications of decentralising the Soviet economy for 
these enterprises and the economic status of their employees help explain 
the virulent opposition of the industrial ventures’ personnel throughout the 
Baltic republics to any reforms. Correspondingly, the leading role of the 
top-managers in Intermovement makes clear that the strikes of industrial 
workers in Estonian factories in August 1989 were strictu sensu work 
stoppages, ordered by the factory management. Although at their highest 
point these involved up to 4% of Estonia’s workforce, they appear not to 
have resulted from popular opposition to language and voting laws, the 
official pretext to the “strikes.”31  
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Although the leaders of Intermovement referred to the Eestimaa 
Rahvarinne as “irresponsible and nationalist,” most of the non-Estonians 
reacted to their call to participate in the building of a “democratic and 
socialist society” without considering the nationality principle to be the 
core political allegiance to the Soviet regime. The fact that popular support 
for the Intermovement was meagre appeared clearly during the elections 
into the Congress of People’s Deputies in March 1989. Of the 36 seats 
allocated to the candidates from the EstSSR, only five candidates from 
Intermovement were elected, while the remaining positions went to pro-
autonomy candidates of the ERR and CP of Estonia.32 In its best days, 
Intermovement won very limited sympathy from Russian-speakers and 
was supported by 10% of the non-Estonians in 1989, or some 4% of the 
population of the Estonian SSR.33 
Of course, the data suggest that the support for Intermovement was 
limited. This has also been observed at the time of the events by the Fin-
nish daily Ilta Sanomat. The poll of the Estonia’s residents in the spring of 
1989 suggested that less than one third of the non-Estonian population 
indeed supported the positions of Intermovement and the Joint Council of 
Work Collectives. Although both organisations were very active in mak-
ing clear the positive effects of sustained connection of the Soviet centre 
with the working class in general and the Russian-speaking communities 
in particular, they were supported by only 28.7% of the non-titular popula-
tion in the EstSSR.34 The EstCP enjoyed a somewhat greater backing of 
Russian-speakers (32.2%). Estonian-led movements, including the Greens, 
the Popular Front, and even the Estonian National Independence Party, 
however, received the greatest support of the Russian-speakers in the 
republic, accounting for 34% altogether.35  
Similar processes were played out in the political arena in Lithua-
nia. A number of organisations were called into life to express the interests 
of the Russian- and Polish-speaking populations, several of which sought 
to further the cultural aspirations of the non-titulars in general. Most nota-
bly, the Russki Kulturnyi Centr (Russian Cultural Centre), the Russkoe 
obshchestvo (Russian Society) and the Russkaya obshchina (Russian 
Community) were established to represent and defend the interests of 
minorities and to “resolve the interethnic problems which have accumu-
lated.” Similar to the leaders of Interfront and Intermovement, non-titular 
members of Lithuania’s political and economic elites were worried about 
the push toward the declaration of Lithuanian as the official language of 
the republic and established a movement to counterweight Sąjūdis.  
Yedinstvo was founded on November 4, 1988, declaring to uphold 
“the interests and political rights of all citizens regardless of their national-
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ity and religious faith.”36 In fact among the interfronts, Yedinstvo was the 
only organisation that not only declared its “internationalist character,” but 
sought to underline this in its name, which was spelled out in the three 
most common languages of the republic, Yedinstvo-Vienyb÷-Jedność. 
Yedinstvo mainly united the representatives of Jewish, Polish, and Belaru-
sian nationality, but also smaller groups of regionally dispersed Russian-
speakers.37 Frequent reference to the issues of “equal rights of nationalities 
in the LitSSR” by the leadership of Yedinstvo did not prevent them from 
supporting the socialist mechanisms of production and emphasising the 
role of the Communist ideology, the Soviet state and the CPSU, thereby 
defending the interests of the nomenklatura rather than its popular basis. 
Vesna Popovski points out that many Russian-speakers could not see the 
guarantee of their rights as promulgated by the Russian Cultural Centre in 
the face of the growing cultural nationalism of Sąjūdis, allowing Yedinstvo 
to emerge as “the only organisation protecting Russians.”38  
At the Congress in May 1989, the leadership of Yedinstvo has in-
volved in attacking the Lithuanian “cosmopolitans” with “internationalist” 
slogans, performing “dramatic appeals to delegates’ feelings,” which fi-
nally led to the split between its factions.39 A moderate part of the move-
ment stated its reconciliatory attitude towards Sąjūdis, supporting the 
claims for greater economic autonomy of the republic. However, concerns 
were expressed with regard to the future of the Russian and Polish cultures 
in Lithuania by affiliates of the Russian Cultural Centre. Another wing of 
Yedinstvo was particularly conservative. Its members expressed their loy-
alty to Moscow, but for the most part they opposed Gorbachev’s economic 
reforms and political decentralisation, with little interest shown in cultural 
issues or the rights of citizens, both of which where high on the agenda.  
One does not need to study the names in detail to conclude that the 
conservative wing was largely made up of party hard-liners and of mana-
gerial personnel of the all-union enterprises who sought to preserve the 
system of their social privileges and benefits. While the data on support of 
the Russian-speakers movements in Lithuania are scarce, the accounts of 
popular support for Yedinstvo indicate that only non-titulars were involved 
in the organisation. But even in this group, which accounts for a meagre 
20% of the resident population in Lithuania, only 13% were in favour of 
the movement, i.e. less than 3% of the entire republican population.40 It is 
not surprising that neither the organisations furthering a cultural agenda, 
nor Yedinstvo, succeeded in organising a political force competitive with 
Sąjūdis, which was already broadly supported by non-titulars in the 
LitSSR. 
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This discussion points to several reasons why the interfronts failed 
to address and assert the interests of the non-titular publics. The top-down 
organisation, lack of transparency, the view of Moscow as deus ex ma-
china, as well as the impossibility of containing decentralisation of the 
Soviet state had occurred at a time when no popular support could be 
found for these goals either with the public or with the Soviet leadership. 
In all the Baltic republics the reformist wings of the local CPs–if not the 
popular movements–were issued carte blanche by Gorbachev and enjoyed 
support for expressing public aspirations. The kind of public mobilisation 
of the interfronts, however, points to the fact that they were to some de-
gree coordinating their activities, further questioning the popular nature of 
these organisations.  
For example, printed materials for all interfronts were said to be 
imported from the RSFSR into the Baltic republics. In a situation of inten-
sive control of goods, this move would have been impossible without the 
blessing of high-ranking figures with pro-Soviet views. Likewise, the 
United Council of Production Workers, an organisation opposing the im-
plementation of khozrashchet, was founded in Leningrad and then “ex-
ported” into Estonia. Doubts aside, unlike the middle-level apparatchik or 
manager, the average Russian-speaking blue-collar worker in the Baltic 
republics lacked insight into the implications khozrashchet and the decen-
tralisation of the economic and political power would have on his or her 
life. For this reason, while the interfronts utilised the rhetoric of “proletar-
ian internationalism” to convince the workers of the purely negative im-
pact of the reforms, one can hardly speak of the bottom-up popular mobi-
lisation of these movements.  
Especially in the Baltic republics, the devolution of economic proc-
esses implied the reduction of privileges ascribed to the Russian-speakers 
in the region throughout the second Soviet inclusion. Emerging out of 
resentment with Gorbachev’s agenda, the Baltic Russian-speaking privili-
gentsia was uneasy about the loss of economic and political say they 
would face should the Baltic republics become independent. However, 
their efforts to rally support of the Russian-speakers in opposition to the 
decentralisation of the regime misfired. Anatol Lieven suggested two 
possible explanations for this critical moment in the Baltic strive for inde-
pendence. Importantly, the top-down mobilisation of interfronts took place 
under the leadership of the managerial staff, trade-union officials and 
military personnel who–all in advantageous positions–were likely to have 
been lacking credibility with the Russian-speaking public.41  
Secondly, blue-collar workers at the state-enterprises were ordered 
to fall in line with those who had previously failed to address their needs. 
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Particularly, it was made clear that retaliatory measures would be taken by 
the powerful leadership should one fail to support the interfronts. Job loss 
and little prospect for re-employment in the well-off Baltic republics were 
brought into the discussion by the leaders, who, assuming the absence of 
vested interests of the Russian-speaking personnel, acted counterproduc-
tively from the outset.42 
While Lieven addresses the failures of institutional incentives in the 
process of the Russian-speakers’ mobilisation, other researchers have 
blamed various human factors. Particularly, the mentality of the Russian-
speakers in the Baltic republics was said to have prevented them from 
active political steps in transition toward independence. These explana-
tions range from the legacies of the social43 and ideological44 policies in 
the Baltic republics under the SU, to a particular Soviet type of public 
culture they believed destined to be built in the republics.45 It seems how-
ever that the lack of prominent and credible leadership and miscommuni-
cation between the leaderships of the interfronts and the Russian-speaking 
public would explain both the passivity of the population at large as well 
as the expressions of protest frequently mobilised by the conservative 
leaders.46  
The ethnic enclaves in the Baltic republics provided both the pow-
erful leadership and dedicated followers to pursue their goals within the 
Soviet framework of action. Appealing to the principle of territorial self-
determination, Russian-speakers attempted to install territorial autonomy 
in Latvia’s Daugavpils region in April 1989. Likewise, in September 
1989, the local government of Lithuania’s Šalčininkai and Vilnius regions, 
both densely populated by Russian- and Polish-speakers declared auton-
omy and demanded to be included in the Soviet federation as a separate 
national-territorial unit.47 The EstSSR had its own example of territorial 
separation. In 1990 the Interregional Council was called into life by the 
deputies of the Estonian Supreme Soviet and members of various pro-
Soviet organisations in Kohtla-Järve casted an overwhelming vote of over 
90% for Estonia to remain in the SU.48  
The period of uncertainty about the upcoming political develop-
ments was nearing its end over the course of 1991. In particular, the refer-
endum on the independence of the Baltic republics cleared the path for the 
way out of the USSR. The right for participation was extended to all resi-
dents of the Baltic states (excluding the soldiers of the Soviet army, who 
were not de jure residents) and provided a full picture of the attitudes 
present in the societies. Lithuania was the first to hold the vote on Febru-
ary 9, when 90.2% of the residents expressed the wish that their republic 
leave the Soviet federation. It is estimated that only 28% of the non-titular 
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population voted against independence here. In Latvia and Estonia similar 
referenda took place on March 3, with 73.7 and 77.8% of the ballots cast 
in favour of independence respectively. The estimations have shown that 
in both republics approximately 45% of the non-titulars had voted against 
it.49 The prospect of Russian-speakers disloyalty and potential threat to 
independence remerged in Baltic public discourses many times since this 
crucial vote, but apparently it has only limited substance. Ultimately, even 
if all those voting against Baltic independence were to be counted together 
and could have been consolidated in a major political force, a maximum of 
20% of the voting population would find themselves in opposition to Es-
tonia’s and Latvia’s statehood. As we will see, state-building precluded 
automatic access of many Russian-speakers to participation in political 
processes, irrespective of actual or potential loyalty to the new state. 
The data provided by the newspaper for exile Estonians Homeland 
suggests that the shift in the opinion of the non-titular was rapid during 
this period of time. While only 9% of the non-titulars were positive about 
independence in September 1989, in May 1990 already 25% supported 
this option, and almost 65% of the non-titulars who took part in the vote 
cast their ballot in its favour in March 1991. These poll results show that 
the positive evaluation with Russian-speakers grew seven times over the 
course of a year.50 The support for separation of the Baltic republics from 
the SU grew extremely swiftly; this trend was confirmed by opinion polls 
during the same period of time in all Baltic republics.51  
Only a small fraction of the Russian-speaking communities were 
ardent followers of the interfronts, which heavily relied on Communist 
ideology and rhetoric and alienated potential supporters. However, while 
the pro-Soviet forces willingly supported the doomed Moscow putsch in 
August 1991, the popular fronts pushed for full autonomy and declared de 
facto independence from the SU. Not surprisingly, interfronts and regional 
communist parties were banned as unconstitutional and as posing a threat 
to national security in the weeks after independence. 
The contents and dynamics of the popular movements and the role 
played by the Russian-speaking individuals therein indicate that they have 
expressed little support for sustaining dependency relations between the 
Baltic republics and Moscow. From this time, the narrative legitimising 
the nation-building strategies in the Baltic republics diverges greatly from 
the promises made by the popular fronts to align the Russian-speaking 
(then Soviet) citizens with the titulars in pursuit of secession and restora-
tion of independence during perestroika.  
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3.   Cultural nationalism of Lithuania’s Sąjūdis  
As was the case for all of the re-emerging states after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, on their way toward independence Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania had to be redefined as subjects of international law, in the first 
place with respect to who should be treated as members of these polities. 
Given the change in borders of the three states and in the ethnic composi-
tion of their populations during the time of the Soviet inclusion, clear 
criteria were to be put in place to define individuals considered a part of 
the post-Soviet political community and having the legitimate right to 
decide on the state’s path of development.  
During the 1980s the discussions of the impact the Soviet inclusion 
exercised upon the Lithuanian national community brought attention to 
issues that had been placed high on the agenda in Estonia and Latvia as 
well. Members of the Lithuanian intelligentsia shared many views with 
their Latvian and Estonian counterparts that the Baltic cultures had been 
severely weakened by the Soviet nationalities policy, especially Russifica-
tion, by ecological problems caused by Soviet economic modernisation, 
and by the migration of the labour force from other Soviet republics.52 At 
a much earlier stage than in the neighbouring republics, Lithuanian intel-
lectuals appealed to the national sentiment of individuals and their per-
sonal responsibility for the future of the nation.53 Support was also granted 
by Lithuania’s Communist Party which, despite standing on firm ground 
with regard to the Soviet regime, had profited from the discussions on 
national history in the second half of the 1980s. Crucially, Lithuanian 
historians debated the hallmarks of Lithuania’s history, such as the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact, pre-Soviet independence and Lithuanians’ post-
WWII resistance.54 The discussion which unfolded with the participation 
of regime ideologists enjoyed support in the CP, as it mainly sought to 
deconstruct the Soviet interpretation of history without delegitimising the 
rule of the Party.  
The inherent contradictions in this debate appear to have obscured 
interpretations of the steps undertaken both by the CP and Sąjūdis in the 
following years of the nation-building process. Scholarship rightly empha-
sised the central role played by the Lithuanian Communist government in 
adopting hard ethno-territorial policies to consolidate the national move-
ment earlier than the Latvian and Estonian communists could do so.55 The 
emergence of stark cultural nationalist rhetoric resulted from debates on 
history, which was married to the issues of national identity with socialist 
notions of modernisation, thus legitimising the local CP’s steps towards 
social, economic and political reforms.56  
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The national historians and philosophers played a significant role 
by inscribing Lithuania’s cultural history into the teleological framework 
of Soviet ideology. Their involvement allowed traditional Soviet reading 
of history to be challenged on the grounds of national memory.57 This 
interpretation of the history of the LitSSR appealed to titulars to discuss 
the alternatives for social developments within the Soviet state and, logi-
cally argued for pluralism on the political stage. In this situation, the 
emerging Sąjūdis was perceived as an initiative for moderate reform by 
the intellectual authorities of the republic and aimed at national awaken-
ing, as stated in the first issue of its press organ Atgimimas.58 Importantly, 
the debates on events of the pre-Soviet national history framed the climate 
of discussions on the future of the Lithuanian nation which members of 
Sąjūdis and the CP considered to be highly unfavourable.  
In this situation, Lithuania’s elites faced a double challenge. On the 
one hand, adhering to the reformist course was necessary in order to face 
the powerful pressure in the population for a move onto the subsequent 
stage of national development. At the same time, this needed to be done 
without provoking reaction from Moscow and rolling back the glasnost 
policies. The political decision-making and trading of responsibilities with 
the central government allowed the transfer of responsibilities for the 
implementation of political goals into the hands of the LitCP leadership. 
The differences in the agendas of national communists and leaders of 
Sąjūdis were not great at all. Both sides shared the view that Lithuanians 
need to lay their differences aside and together advance the sovereignty of 
their state in order to protect the cultural heritage of the Lithuanian na-
tion.59 In order to facilitate national accord, the debate in LitSSR focused 
on the impact the Soviet regime had on national culture, traditions, and 
language. The enterprise remained strictly an ethnic matter–neither the 
local CP, nor Sąjūdis appealed to non-Lithuanians to join discussions on 
independence. 
The expression of national interests faced little political opposition 
in Lithuania, especially keeping in mind that many members of the Party 
were also members of Sąjūdis or supported it. On the contrary, several 
“patriotic” organisations took an even harder stand on the status of 
Lithuania in the SU and had particularly opposed any further ties with 
Moscow and any governmental officials who were affiliated with the 
Soviet regime.60 Members of patriotic groups, such as Jaunoji Lietuva 
opposed the idea of cooperating with the Soviet-time migrants, while 
Lietuvos Laisv÷s Lyga claimed that all members of the Russian nation, 
including those residing in Lithuania were to be made responsible for 
wrongs done to the nation and needed to be deported.61 In fact, while be-
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ing an umbrella organisation similar to Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, 
Sąjūdis lacked a single political position. Its members were in disagree-
ment on many central issues and unable to find middle-grounds to elabo-
rate a coherent position towards the path of national development. The 
Vilnius- and the so-called Kaunas-factions in Sąjūdis both propagated 
highly ethnocentric views of a Lithuanian nation. They believed the nation 
could only survive in a state of its own, and therefore proposed different 
steps necessary for the development of the national culture.62 The draft 
programme of Sąjūdis declared that  
 
“the equality of national rights could be implemented only un-
der condition that the representatives of all nationalities recog-
nise the right of Lithuanians to self-determination […], territo-
rial integrity, and become acquainted and have respect for the 
Lithuanian history, culture and language.”63 
 
The support of both groups for a cultural interpretation of nation-
hood as a community of subjects remembering common grievances of the 
past and assuming responsibility for the future had two different foci. 
Discussions in the Vilnius-faction underlined a progressive culture of 
Lithuanians when compared with the Russians, although at the same time, 
Lithuanians argued backwards when compared to “European” nations. 
Discussions in Vilnius localised the Lithuanian nation within the European 
cultural context and addressed cultural integration of society as prerequi-
site for the establishment of the fully functioning nation-state.64 Most 
prominently, the founder of Atgimimas and its editor-in-chief, Romualdas 
Ozolas had diagnosed the limits of the Lithuanians’ capacity to identify 
the changes, required for a gradual modernisation of society and to create 
social institutions which would preserve Lithuania’s cultural specificity. 
Ozolas argued in favour of a liberal understanding of nationhood, based 
upon cultural identity and open for change.  
The prominence from the Kaunas-faction argued predominantly in 
moral categories, which excluded non-Lithuanians as possible partners in 
the process of nation-building. Romualdas Grigas and Algirdas Vaclovas 
Patackas advanced the image of the Lithuanian nation as an object in the 
hands of foreign and internal enemies whose utmost goal was to destroy 
Lithuanians and their cultural tradition.65 This thinking fed from the 
Lithuanian interwar history and entailed opposition to any non-Lithuanian 
group residing on the territory of the republic. Importantly the picture 
painted by patriotic activists from Kaunas allowed the emergence of a 
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popular view, treating the Vilnius-faction as part of the LitCP and weaken-
ing its position in the early 1990s.  
However different, both competing fractions of the movement saw 
a culturally integrated society as a prerequisite for a stable post-Soviet 
polity. They began to further this integration by legalising the symbols of 
pre-Soviet Lithuanian state- and nationhood. The ethnic homogeneity of 
Lithuanian society allowed the republican leadership to advance effec-
tively the principle of territorial representation and during perestroika to 
openly collaborate with Sąjūdis. This explains why the LitCP took deci-
sive measures for national consolidation, such as the liberalisation of reli-
gious life, legalising the national flag and anthem, and importantly giving 
Lithuanian the status of state language.  
The actions of the LitCP prior to splitting from the CPSU are of 
high importance. Accounts of cooperation between the LitCP and Sąjūdis 
testify to a common practice, when Sąjūdis recommended an action–it was 
implemented by the LitCP. In fact, broad social support for Sąjūdis and 
the strong moral stance of the movement allowed it to initiate changes to 
which the Party had to respond. In the analyses of the cooperation between 
Sąjūdis and the LitCP, Popovski underlined this moment by arguing that 
the “[Lithuanian] Communist Party did not have its ideological ally in the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but “at home” and that it had to 
respond to the issues already put on the agenda by Sąjūdis.”66 As we will 
see, EstCP and LatCP had much weaker positions in their republics and 
ultimately lost to Citizens’ Committees because they sought to ally with 
Moscow leadership, not with the local movements.  
The separation of the Lithuanian CP from the CPSU in December 
1989 was a result of “politics of small steps” by the Lithuanian Commu-
nists, in order to ensure the balance of republican and union powers on the 
ground. On the other hand, the broad social support enjoyed by Sąjūdis 
allowed the LitCP to propose the development of state institutions without 
explicitly pushing towards independence, which was called for by Sąjūdis. 
For Sąjūdis, independence could come only with reform, which was best 
achieved in the context of republican sovereignty.67 Thus it was necessary 
to assert greater independence of the republican institutions vis-à-vis So-
viet structures, before attempting the separation from the SU. The leader-
ship of both the LitCP and Sąjūdis shared a view that Lithuania’s inde-
pendence could only be declared by the government bodies elected under 
the Soviet republican law. In their view, unity of republican population 
and cooperation under the Soviet law would lend political steps greater 
credibility in the eyes of Moscow.  
Baltic perestroika and nation-building  
___________________________________________________________ 
83 
In the context of these debates, the Language Law was passed in 
January 1989 by the Communist dominated republican Soviet. The deci-
sion was welcomed by the leaders of Sąjūdis. Given the ethnic composi-
tion of Lithuania at the time, nationalists from Sąjūdis argued that the next 
step was the establishment of Lithuanian citizenship as the precondition 
for de facto independence. Despite the seemingly liberal approach of the 
draft law, as suggested by scholars of Baltic politics, the citizenship issue 
of the republic was regulated following pragmatic vision. The Lithuanian 
Supreme Soviet was following suggestions from the moderate Vilnius 
faction of Sąjūdis to act in accordance with the Soviet legislation and 
avoid confrontations with Moscow. Finding itself under the growing pres-
sure of patriotic Kaunas-faction, it pushed through the framework law on 
citizenship into effect in November 1989.  
A milestone for post-Soviet statehood of Lithuania, the law was no 
doubt a product of negotiations between the patriots, nationalists and re-
formed communists. Additionally, the law was much more liberal than the 
Estonian and Latvian laws on citizenship would be two years later. It con-
tained two potentially important issues. On the one hand, the law con-
firmed the goal of creating a political community that would bear respon-
sibility for the preservation of the Lithuanian culture. According to this 
law, Lithuanian citizenship was extended to all citizens of (pre-Soviet) 
Lithuania and their descendants, as well as to all persons born on the terri-
tory of the republic. On the other hand, Lithuanian citizenship was not 
granted automatically, but provided the option of choosing it over citizen-
ships of other states.68 All permanent residents of the LitSSR were able to 
apply for Lithuanian citizenship, regardless of ethnic, linguistic, religious 
or other identities they bore. A period of two years was given to decide for 
all those who wished to legalise their connection with the Lithuanian state, 
with an effect that at the end of registration on November 3, 1991 more 
than 90% of all residents opted for Lithuania’s citizenship.  
The symbolic meaning of the citizenship legislation as a milestone 
on the path towards independence becomes clear when one considers the 
debates in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet elected in March 1990. Three 
quarters of the deputies came from Sąjūdis and the (reformed) LitCP, 
passing the Declaration of the Republic’s independence from the SU on 
March 11, 1990, the second day of its meeting. Once the movement had 
achieved its goal, the reform communists and Vilnius liberal intellectuals 
left Sąjūdis, in particular in the face of increasingly nationalist rhetoric at 
the Second Sąjūdis Congress in April 1990. Thereafter, Sąjūdis consisted 
mainly of representatives of the Kaunas-faction, who differentiated the 
local population into two clear groups, “patriots” and “communists.”69 
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These nationalist Sąjūdis members, with Landsbergis at the top, consid-
ered suspending the November Citizenship Law after demands for territo-
rial autonomy by South Eastern Lithuania in September 1989 and particu-
larly in consequence of the Soviet economic blockade enforced on Lithua-
nia in April 1990. While relations with Moscow were already severely 
strained by the declaration of independence and led to its moratorium on 
June 23, the changes of the Citizenship Law according to the proposition 
of the Kaunas-faction would have led only to a further deterioration of the 
relations between the Soviet centre and the Landsbergis-led Sąjūdis coali-
tion.  
The early implementation of the Lithuanian citizenship law can 
hardly be seen as a result of the liberal understanding of nationhood in the 
republic, and even less so as the result of an inherent desire to engage the 
non-Lithuanian population in the process of nation-building.70 In fact, out 
of the 1021 delegates at the Second Sąjūdis Congress, 96% were ethnic 
Lithuanians with a meagre 41 persons representing the different ethnic 
minority groups of the republic.71 Additionally, the overriding, “pulsating 
consensus” between the LitCP and Sąjūdis generally made for the swift 
implementation of reforms geared towards independence which ended in 
“ideological fever” and greater polarisation of the political spectrum.72  
The division of the political spectrum hardly contributed to greater 
liberal aspirations of the Lithuanian political elites.73 Instead, the mutual 
blockade of leftist (understood in the context of a stronger inclination to 
seek consent with Russia) and rightist (emphasising the traditional na-
tional values and rejecting any connection to the Communist past) forces 
resulted in the frequent practice of state-regulation of economic and re-
gional processes and, importantly, populist rhetoric. Needless to say, both 
resulted in the alienation of the non-Lithuanian population in political 
matters. Despite the fact that the LitCP government passed the Law on the 
Rights of Ethnic Minorities in November 1989, and guaranteed minorities 
extensive avenues to participate in political decision-making within the 
framework of the 1989 Citizenship Law non-Lithuanians remained distant 
from politics.  
In this context, the perceptions of minority representatives of the 
laws passed and their implementation are particularly interesting. The 
previous analyses of Lithuania’s development indicate that the non-
Lithuanian population, decisively Polish, Russian and Jewish residents, 
were highly critical of the legislation implemented in 1989 and expected 
its possible alteration given nationalist rhetoric of both the moderate Sąjū-
dis and more radical patriotic organisations such as Lietuvos Laisv÷s Lyga 
and Vilnja.74 Although the right to freely develop their own culture and to 
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enjoy the support of the state for cultural activities had been defined by the 
Ethnic Minorities Rights Law adopted in November 1989, the step had 
little effect on the support of minorities for an independent Lithuanian 
state. Instead, during 1990 the activities of Yedinstvo increased in Eastern 
Lithuania and dissatisfaction was expressed in municipalities with sizeable 
non-Lithuanian populations, above all in Sniečkus and Klaipeda. More 
policy decisions were made during the course of 1991. Nevertheless, no 
break-through in reducing the suspicions of majority and minorities for 
each other resulted from these decisions in the short-term, although 
Budryte argues that it “probably did help ethnic relations in the long 
run.”75  
Facing an increasingly anti-independence stance in Eastern Lithua-
nia, the region with sizable Russian-speaking and Polish populations, the 
Lithuanian government amended the Law on National Minorities in Janu-
ary 1991. It included provisions for schooling in the native language of the 
minorities and the right to use languages other than Lithuanian in organi-
sations and state-offices located in areas with substantial numbers of non-
Lithuanians.76 However, the law addressed the rights of national minori-
ties without further defining the term. The group was merely defined as 
“collectivities of ethnicity other than Lithuanian,” “with a different lan-
guage, religion and nationality [sic].” The rights included those to estab-
lish ethnic cultural organisations, to maintain contact with fellow groups 
residing outside of Lithuania, and to enjoy representation at all levels of 
government. Furthermore, some specific linguistic rights and the preserva-
tion of historical and cultural monuments of the ethnic minorities were 
provided by the law, as was the right to launch educational establishments 
in minority languages. All of these were extended and specified in the 
mid-1990s. Therefore, the Law on National Minorities provided a legal 
guarantee that the emerging Lithuanian state would accommodate the 
interests of minorities residing on its territory, but this would be only put 
into practice if minorities demonstrated loyalty towards the state’s institu-
tions.  
This requirement was however difficult to fulfil for the majority of 
residents in Eastern Lithuania. During the August coup d’état in Moscow, 
the regional councils in predominantly Polish-speaking districts and the 
city council in (predominantly Russian populated) Sniečkus supported the 
hardliners around Gennady Yanayev and Dmitry Yazov. They were sus-
pended from their posts in the aftermath of the failed coup and direct rule 
from Vilnius was imposed on these regions in September 1991. This step 
was criticised by local minorities, the Polish Parliament, the Helsinki 
Foundation and the US embassy in Vilnius. In addition amendments were 
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made to the Citizenship Law in December 1991. Importantly, they pro-
vided grounds for the legal inclusion of all residents of the republic who 
applied for a Lithuanian passport over the past two years and thus included 
individuals who were to become stateless on the same grounds in Estonia 
and Latvia. Controversial amendments however hit ethnic Poles, who 
resided in the area around Vilnius when it was under Polish sovereignty (9 
January 1919–15 June 1940).77  
After difficult negotiations between Vilnja (the political force rep-
resenting the ethnic Lithuanians in the region), Lenku Sajunga (The Union 
of Poles) and the central government under close observation of Polish 
and international authorities, the local elections of December 1992 were to 
determine the political constellation in the local councils in Vilnius and 
Šalčininkai regions. However, an insufficient number of eligible voters 
appeared to cast their ballot and elections had to be restaged in early 1993, 
leading to the belated formation of popular governments in the region.78 
At the same time, the Law on Election into Parliament was adopted in 
1992 by the Seimas (Lithuania’s Parliament) granting special provisions 
for positive discrimination of minority parties. By lowering the vote-
barrier for ethnopolitical parties to 2%, Seimas made the presence of non-
Lithuanians’ political organisations possible in political decision-making 
and allowed members of the Lenku Sajunga to enter into the first post-
Soviet Seimas.  
As we will see in the next chapters, further steps of including the 
non-Lithuanian, primarily Polish-speaking community into the political 
process were required to ensure their political participation at a later stage. 
Although the other minority political parties gained four (out of 141 seats) 
in the 1992 Seimas elections, their weight diminished when compared to 
their representation in the last Supreme Soviet of the LitSSR, where the 
Polish Union was represented by 8 members.79  
The comparisons among Baltic states focus on greater nationalist 
aspirations behind the political decision making processes in the two 
northern states. As I have argued in this section of the chapter, in Lithua-
nia nation-building was also driven by the majority’s nationalist commit-
ment. The nationalist agenda pursued by the leaders of Sąjūdis not only 
failed to involve the Russian and Polish speaking minorities into the proc-
ess of nation-building, the tactics of Sąjūdis disregarded nationalisation 
fears of the minority communities in Lithuania altogether. In this light, the 
limited political engagement of the non-titulars in elaborating political 
strategies for the accommodation of their interests in the Lithuanians’ 
national state could stem from two issues.  
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On the one hand, as is frequently suggested in scholarly analyses, 
Lithuanian minorities were not loyal to the state and the project of national 
independence from the outset. This interpretation implies that not only the 
titular nationality, but also non-titular populations in Lithuania were 
guided by nationalist aspirations: activities of Russian, Polish and Jewish 
political organisations, efforts to ascribe ethnicity to a particular territory, 
and their appeals for help from “their homeland states” could confirm this 
view. On the other hand, there is no contradiction in suggesting that non-
titulars in Lithuania welcomed the idea of an independent Lithuanian state, 
because many saw their cultural interests better represented in an inde-
pendent Lithuania rather than in the USSR. The limited political engage-
ment of minorities, when held against the majority’s participation, their 
reactive behaviour to policies that clearly undermined the status of non-
Lithuanians and finally cautiousness in the face of patriotic rhetoric of the 
political forces speak volumes for this view.  
Both of these interpretations are in line with the claim made in the 
previous chapter that the non-titular minorities lacked structural resources 
to formulate and stand up to their collective interests in the course of na-
tion-building. Furthermore, the case of Lithuania shows that minorities 
were restricted to support independence only on issues tangent to their 
cultural interests, much like the Lithuanians had done using the institu-
tions of “their” national republics. This might be an indication of the fact 
that minorities have copied nationalist aspirations from the titulars to or-
ganise their activities, but had no structures to formulate their own goals. 
In the following section I discuss similar processes that took place 
in Estonia and Latvia. It will then become clear that the way for the na-
tionalising policies after independence was paved by the lacking response 
of the non-titular populations to the nationalising policies of titulars. The 
discussion of Latvian and Estonian nation-building processes will make 
clear that there as well, opportunities for political engagement were 
largely missed by the non-titular communities during the phase when the 
political institutions of the post-Soviet republics were designed.  
 
 
4.   Estonia and Latvia: The cases of ethnonationalism?  
Nation-building in Lithuania had been traditionally treated differently in 
scholarship allegedly due to the lack of strict nationalist policies. Minority 
politics in Latvia and Estonia, on the other hand, have been consistently 
analysed comparatively.80 In particular, the negative ramifications of the 
restorationist policies in Estonia and Latvia have been criticised for “dis-
enfranchising Russians of their rights” or promoting “expulsion of non-
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native populations” from the republics’ territories. I do not contest that the 
implications of restoration have hit Russian-speakers the hardest in both 
countries. I claim nonetheless, that no attempts were actually undertaken 
by the Latvijas Tautas Fronte (Latvian Popular Front, LTF) and the 
Eestimaa Rahvarinne (Popular Front of Estonia, ERR) to discriminate 
against the republics’ residents on ethnic basis. Both of the movements 
faced strong opposition from the Citizens’ Committees and due to this 
failed to push forward with citizenship legislation while the republics were 
still de facto members of the SU, as it happened in Lithuania. Sound po-
litical opposition from Citizens’ Committees was to unfold only after 
independence was secured and guaranteed, allowing legal steps to be 
taken for restoring statehood and hence excluding members of migrant 
Russian-speaking diaspora from automatic citizenship of post-Soviet 
states.  
In both republics the decisive battles were carried out between the 
leaders of the Popular Fronts and the Citizens’ Committees. Mobilising 
the rhetoric of democratic inclusiveness and individual choice for the 
acquisition of citizenship, the Popular Fronts suggested that the forthcom-
ing political communities in the republics would include all willing resi-
dents. Eestimaa Rahvarinne had underlined its desire to restore the politi-
cal community of citizens of the pre-Soviet state, thus positioning itself 
clearly with regards to the Russian-speaking minority in the republic. The 
Latvijas Tautas Fronte had chosen more sophisticated tactics of embrac-
ing minority support. It enjoyed the support of the local Russian-speakers, 
who were reassured of the Front’s support of human rights, though this did 
not imply granting the opportunity to decide on one’s citizenship.  
Discussions on sensitive historical events took place in Latvia and 
Estonia, as they did in Lithuania. However, the Latvijas Tautas Fronte had 
emphasised aspects of the history common to individuals residing in the 
republic prior to Soviet inclusion as well as to Soviet-time migrants in 
order to generate support for independence with both communities. This 
created expectations amongst Russian-speakers which were not on the 
LTF’s agenda, especially in the face of the Front’s intention not to give in 
to the legalisation of any consequences of the Soviet occupation.81 Keep-
ing their promises vague, the LTF  
 
“generated support for Latvian independence among both the 
Latvian and Russian population. However, following inde-
pendence Latvian policies began to exclude Russians from 
full participation in the republic’s political institutions.”82  
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As a result of rhetoric mobilising local residents around the idea of 
statehood restoration and the absence of alternative aspirations from the 
future political development pushed Latvia and Estonia onto a different 
path of state-building. While the implications of state-restoration were 
well-received by Lithuanians in their republic, the fact that the CP repre-
sented a crucial mediating force and had to balance demands from Sąjūdis 
with the avenues provided within the Soviet confederation softened the 
negotiation of citizenship legislation.83  
Political elites in Estonia and in Latvia had little to share with re-
gard to the future form of their independent state. The tensions between 
radical restorationists, the Popular Fronts and local CPs mattered only 
until formal independence from the SU was achieved and the communist 
parties were outlawed, together with the interfronts. In the absence of 
external pressure, the official talks about who to consider a “member of a 
nation” took place only during the first post-Soviet months. These debates 
were initiated by the Popular Fronts and pressed by Citizens’ Committees, 
who expressed “great concerns” for their nation’s future, made Russians 
collectively culpable for the titulars’ previous suffering and pushed for 
decolonisation.  
The documentation on the terms of citizenship indicates the titulars’ 
great moral investment to guarantee the survival of both the Latvian and 
Estonian nations after “the Soviet genocide.” In both countries political 
forces argued that while the Baltic states were occupied, the Soviet Union 
violated the conditions of the Geneva Convention, which prohibits depor-
tations of local populations and forced population transfers to other coun-
tries. Similar implications of this legal principle however, have also been 
articulated by Jaunoji Lietuva and members of the Lietuvos Laisves Lyga, 
who called for repatriation of those who came to Lithuania during the 
Soviet-time.84 However, in Lithuania these groups remained marginal 
when compared to Sąjūdis. Decolonisation was taken more seriously in 
Estonia and Latvia. In Estonia the Decolonisation Foundation was founded 
by members of the Congress of Estonia (formerly Movement of Citizens’ 
Committees) to facilitate repatriation of Soviet era migrants. The Latvian 
titular nation however, fuelled by the promises of the Latviocracy which 
could be deduced from the LTF programme, resisted any attempts even to 
acknowledge that the residence of Soviet-time migrants in Latvia was 
legal.  
The basis for minority rights in the Latvian State was, however, laid 
fairly early by the Latvian Supreme Soviet once it had adopted the legisla-
tion “On the free development of national and ethnic groups and on their 
rights to cultural autonomy” in March 1991. The law guaranteed all ethnic 
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groups of Latvia the right to cultural autonomy and self-rule in matters 
concerning their culture. It also established the rights of ethnic groups to 
establish national cultural societies and associations and guaranteed the 
right to address the public through government-controlled mass media, as 
well as through their own printed media. It stated that national societies 
had the right to establish and run their own educational institutions while 
respecting the Laws of the Latvian Republic, its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Furthermore, Article 10 stated that the state will support such 
organisations by providing them material support to develop their linguis-
tic, cultural and educational facilities. Although potentially effective as a 
mechanism of regulating the minorities’ cultural aspirations, the law ex-
hibited one serious shortcoming: it did not specify the mechanisms of 
implementation. In addition, the law underlined a certain hierarchy of 
ethnic groups in Latvia that had not been previously defined.  
The preamble of the document stated that “in the Latvian Republic 
live the Latvian nation and the ancient indigenous nationality of the Livs, 
as well as national and ethnic groups.[emphasis added]” This very formu-
lation suggests that the Latvian nation was of purely ethnic, possibly cul-
tural character since it is juxtaposed to other ethnic groups, such as Livs. 
Similarly, the definition of “national and ethnic groups” can be interpreted 
quite broadly, implying that the difference is to be made between those 
who have an external “home state,” and those who do not. Importantly, 
Article 4 of the document states the responsibility of the Latvian state vis-
à-vis the cultural and historical environments of Livs, leaving other, so to 
say non-autochthonous ethnic groups unmentioned.  
As I have mentioned in the first section of this chapter, many Rus-
sian-speakers were active in the popular movements in Estonia and Latvia, 
raising the question as to how the turn towards restorationist rhetoric was 
so dramatic. Clearly, neither in Estonia, nor in Latvia could the citizenship 
question be solved the way it had been handled in Lithuania: the percep-
tions of the demographic threat in the republics influenced the understand-
ing of restoring citizenship so as to continue the ethno-national experience 
of statehood, interrupted by the Soviet inclusion.  
The debates on the legacies of the Soviet past taking place in the 
years of perestroika also emphasised different aspects of nationhood, in 
contrast to the situation in Lithuania. While all three republics had to come 
to terms with the controversial legacies of pre-Soviet statehood, the Esto-
nian and Latvian public debates critically dramatised the demographic and 
linguistic situation in the republics. This created an image of pre-Soviet 
statehood which represented the apogee of national development of the 
two nations.85 Indeed, Lithuanian politicians frequently referred to multi-
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cultural traditions “inherited” from the Grand Polish Lithuanian Duchy to 
emphasize the roots of their political community. Latvians and Estonians 
on their part could only appeal to pre-Soviet regimes which bore clear 
traits of ethnonational autocracies. In both republics, the discussions over 
the period between the declaration of independence from the SU in March 
1990 and de facto independence in August 1991 consequently reduced the 
possibility of including individuals who were likely to reject the idea of 
the nation-state in the future.86  
The Lithuanian legislation left the decision as to which citizenship 
an individual would acquire to the person and, decisively, laid the time-
frame for applications prior to the formal acquisition of Lithuania’s inde-
pendence from the SU. In Latvia and Estonia on the other hand, the pass-
ing of the citizenship laws was postponed in order to secure support–or as 
some had argued, to prevent violence–of the large non-titular populations 
on the road to independence. The “zero option” for citizenship was not 
seen as one by political elites. While the popular fronts in Estonia and 
Latvia were not as popular with the Russian-speaking populations as with 
titulars, they still relied heavily on the support of the former. Surely, par-
ticipation of non-titular residents in the two organisations can largely be 
attributed to promises alluding to the possible endorsement of the “zero 
option” for citizenship.  
Significant differences in mobilisation strategies in both republics 
and their resolution to clarify the citizenship issue might explain the mixed 
perceptions of the non-titulars with respect to their future status. The ERR 
had clearly stated from the outset that Estonian citizenship would be avail-
able only for the citizens of pre-war Estonia. The clear position of the 
ERR resulted from the aggravation of relations between its leaders and at 
that time still powerful officials in north-eastern Estonia, but it did not 
result in violence or efforts for secession.87  
The failure of LTF to make its future policies transparent had long 
running implications for democratic consolidation of the Latvian society. 
In the run-up to the elections of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, the leaders of 
the LTF declared that  
 
“anyone who regards himself as a patriot of Latvia may be-
come Latvia’s citizen. The definition and the criteria for the 
acquisition of citizenship ought to be each Latvian inhabi-
tant’s personal, voluntary, and conscious expression of 
will.”88  
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Later the LTF retreated from this position, which undoubtedly frus-
trated many of those who initially supported the LTF in the elections and 
shocked supporters while generating a distrust in politicians that would be 
felt by non-titulars over a prolonged period of time. The leader of the 
centrist Latvijas ceĜš (Latvian Way) party in the fifth and sixth Saeima, 
Andrejs Pantelejevs, later admitted that the rhetorical acceptance of the 
zero-option citizenship “was a conscious lie in order to avoid human casu-
alties,” as he claims the fight for independence would have led to armed 
confrontations.89 The fear of violent clashes did not materialise in Latvia 
either in the early, or mid 1990s.  
Even before the adaptation of the declaration of formal independ-
ence in May 1990, two parties claimed the right to rule the Latvian Repub-
lic. On the one hand, the Soviet authorities still had legislative power over 
the republican decisions. On the other, the local authorities were publicly 
elected but actually had little control. While Lithuania already passed the 
Citizenship Law and Estonia commenced legal steps in redefining its 
citizenry, Latvia’s declaration of independence did not clarify the situation 
and remained a symbolic step impeding the implementation of other legis-
lative acts. The strong disagreement on the possible solutions of the citi-
zenship issue within the Latvian political elites and the lack of a clear 
stance on the part of the international community further complicated the 
situation and postponed an effective discussion of the citizenship-
legislation until 1993.  
The political regimes installed in Estonia and Latvia have been fre-
quently criticised as having been guided by ethno-nationalist principles. 
My discussion has suggested that postponing the clarification of citizen-
ship rights of the Soviet citizens after the restoration of independence was 
a result of antagonism and struggle for dominance between popular 
movements and citizens’ committees in Estonia and Latvia. The lack of 
consensus on the body of citizenry among the national leaderships put 
many members of non-titular communities into a legal limbo until after 
independence was de facto restored.  
My analysis demonstrates that political community building in Es-
tonia and Latvia had to take a back seat while nation-building was in pro-
gress. Only after independence was secured did state-building start, allow-
ing a more fundamental criticism from the democratic theory point of 
view. Exclusive projects of nation-building were prioritised over inclusive 
state-building and aimed at reducing the autonomous decision-making 
powers of citizenry as much as possible. As we have seen in chapter 2, this 
policy objective was also at the core of the Soviet political processes. 
Although many Soviet institutional practices were brushed aside following 
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the restoration of Estonian and Latvian independence, ethno-territorial 
proliferation as implemented through Soviet policies was reflected in post-
Soviet institutional design. These issues, as we will see in the following 
chapter, continue to shape the political institutions of independent Baltic 
states.  
 
 
5.   Conclusion 
The account of popular participation points out the difficulties inherent to 
the debates about nation- and state-building and decisively democratic 
consolidation in the post-Soviet Baltic states. Unsurprisingly, independ-
ence brought little relief to the non-titulars. Some Baltic studies scholars 
have criticised the process of nation-building as privileging the members 
of communities, resident in the region at some point in time–before the 
Soviet inclusion as in the case of Estonia and Latvia, or between 1990 and 
1991 as in Lithuania. Efforts of state- and nation-building during the last 
years of Soviet inclusion, as well as in the post-Soviet years, did not aim at 
guaranteeing the rights to as many as possible to exercise their political 
will, not even in Lithuania.  
While the Lithuanian authorities had set a transition period when all 
residents of the republic were allowed to choose on their future citizen-
ship, the Latvian and Estonian Citizens’ Committees were vigorously 
promoting the logic of “one state, one nation, one language.” The logic of 
state continuity, established in Estonia and Latvia, allows the state to deny 
the right for citizenship to those individuals who were active in so-called 
“criminal organisations,” the CPSU and interfronts included. Restrictions 
on the right for citizenship were also put on those who participated in the 
interfronts. This step precluded the participation of members of the Rus-
sian-speaking communities in political processes after independence was 
reinstalled and contributed to this group’s further passive stance.  
The initial democratic consolidation in the then Baltic republics 
was a result of popular–i.e. titulars and non-titulars alike–opposition to 
Soviet ideology. However, while the popular movements of the titulars 
chose the “return to independence” as their preferred option in coping with 
the difficulties of independence after Soviet inclusion, Russian-speakers 
had little option than to cooperate in the process. Without structural 
mechanisms that would lead their political participation to achieve con-
crete goals, Russian-speakers in the Baltics did not contest the decisions 
made by the Baltic governments in the late Soviet years. As much as they 
were drawn into the decision-making process, Russian-speakers made 
clear that they would support the new regimes, if these would not dis-
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criminate against them outright. Using the structural opportunities of re-
publican quasi-nation-state institutions, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuani-
ans had much greater leverage in the process of transforming “their” re-
publics into liberal political regimes. In its course titulars also needed to 
decide whether to take Russian-speakers on board. Keeping Russian-
speakers at arm’s length was the most comfortable solution for political 
representatives of titulars, nationalists and moderates alike.  
As we have seen in this chapter, the initial stage of democratisation 
did not result in ethno-nationalist policies. Regulations of language use in 
Estonia and Latvia resulted in discontent with some members of minority 
communities, but they did not lead to mass protests. In addition, the rights 
provided (or promised) to minorities were sufficient to dampen open pro-
test by the Russian-speaking and other non-titular ethnic groups.90 How-
ever, institutional decisions discussed above suggest that choosing a par-
ticular approach to nation-building in each state reflected the perceptions 
of titular nationals and was more in line with the Soviet approach to regu-
lating claims of nationalities for dominance at “their national homeland.”91  
Titular nationals have benefited from the Soviet policies of ethno-
territorial proliferation during Soviet rule. They have also effectively used 
structural instruments to determine the course of “their” country’s devel-
opment following the dissolution of the SU. So in the case of Latvia, while 
Latvians only constituted some 52% of the republic’s population, 78% of 
the citizens were ethnic Latvians in 1995. The remainder were ethnic 
minorities, a fact that makes the republic actually the most liberal among 
the Baltic states as regards the inclusion of non-core ethnics in the post-
Soviet citizenry. Latvia’s restored citizenship was thus extended to some 
38% of the republic’s Russian community, which made up 16% of the 
entire citizenry. Additionally, many members of the Polish and Roma 
communities received “restored” citizenship, making “automatic” inclu-
sion for 62% and 90% of these communities respectively. Lithuania pro-
vides a point for comparison, where only 14% of its citizens are members 
of minorities, with overwhelming 86% of the citizens being ethnic Lithua-
nians. Even more dramatic implications of restorationist policies were to 
be observed in Estonia, where virtually the entire Russian-speaking com-
munity was excluded from restored citizenship. A much more ethnically 
homogeneous pre-Soviet Estonia had only 3% of the non-Estonian popula-
tion at the time, which allowed Estonians to completely dominate its post-
Soviet citizenry.  
It would be a mistake however to expect that if the Russian-
speaking community were larger in number, one would observe greater 
opposition to nationalist politicians. The means available to non-titular 
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communities to take part in the state-building projects were limited. This 
however was not specific to political processes in the Baltic republics but 
was observed across the former Soviet republics.92 Institutional framework 
in which the reform of Soviet institutions took place systematically fa-
voured titular nationals who did not miss a chance to effectively use these 
tools for their purposes. Limited opportunities available to non-titular 
groups to participate in political decision-making were further curtailed 
during the institutionalisation of post-Soviet polities as the ones serving 
the interests of the titular ethnics.  
In describing various activities of the non-titular populations during 
the period of Baltic perestroika, I referred both to aspirations set forth by 
political elites and expectations fomented among the members of the titu-
lar communities. As we will see in the following chapter, the trend contin-
ued during the 1990s.  
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Chapter 4 
 
State-building and framing of non-titulars 
 
 
In the initial years of Baltic independence one of the most persistent topics 
of discussion in the media and academic research alike was the question of 
what was to become of the Russian-speakers across the region. Would the 
group become an instrument in the hands of another state, e.g. Russia, and 
impede the transition of the Baltic states towards more effective democ-
racy? Or rather, would the group be active in supporting the envisaged 
transition, guaranteeing the legitimacy of the post-Soviet independence 
vis-à-vis the former occupation power? Ironically, Russian-speakers re-
jected both options. That was unimportant however, because for the most 
part, their opinions went unacknowledged.  
In the 1990s and particularly during the time of EU accession, mi-
nority roles remained modest. The belligerent rhetoric of the Russian Fed-
eration drawing attention to the status of its stateless “compatriots” and 
attracting international attention, the presence of the OSCE mission in 
Estonia and Latvia, as well as issues of person transit through the Lithua-
nian territory into Kaliningrad made clear that while parity in the relations 
between each of the Baltic states and the Russian Federation was not 
achievable in the short or medium term, regional stability could be im-
proved by adopting measures to guarantee the local minorities’ involve-
ment in, if not loyalty to, the state of residence.  
The dominance of the titular, state-bearing ethnic groups in 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia over the increasingly fragmented non-titular 
communities allowed minorities few other options besides adaption to the 
new situation. The titular nationalities in the region devised the policy 
instruments to consolidate their dominant position in societies in the 
course of the early-mid 1990s. Although no studies of the region elaborate 
specifically on the “framing” of non-titulars in terms of “minority,” social 
science studies indicate that Russian-speaking populations in the region 
looked increasingly akin to a long-standing minority in societies domi-
nated by another group. Because the Baltic popular fronts framed their 
actions around the issue of potential survival of their nations in the Soviet 
Union, designing the membership of the political community was essential 
for Baltic state-building. The Baltic governments had to respond to the 
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fears of ethnic extinction common among the titulars and reinforced the 
status of the state-bearing nations, their languages and cultures in the 
newly independent states.  
In order to illustrate the situation in which non-titular communities 
found themselves at the point of the Soviet demise, this chapter will pro-
vide an answer to the question as to whether institution-building in the 
post-Soviet Baltic region allowed everyone affected by the policies to 
participate in the relevant decision-making. And if so, what role Russian-
speakers played in the process of consolidating political communities.  
 
 
1.   Design of political membership in Estonia and Latvia  
The overwhelming majority of Lithuania’s residents were a part of the 
country’s political community with the Citizenship Law of 1991. Thus, the 
Lithuanian state did not need to encourage non-titular residents to qualify 
for citizenship. In Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand, the building of 
the political community proceeded in small and painful steps over the 
entire course of the 1990s, mainly in reaction to external pressures put 
forward by international organisations. Therefore, a brief overview of 
Estonia’s and Latvia’s policies is needed to explain why the issue of state-
lessness prevails in debates on democratic consolidation of the two socie-
ties.  
In both countries political forces strove for independence from the 
SU under the leadership of popular fronts and Citizens’ Committees. 
While the popular fronts were willing to integrate at least some of the 
Soviet institutions into the new political structures and thus facilitate tran-
sition, Citizens’ Committees favoured the immediate break with the Soviet 
state and opposed granting citizenship to migrants, in popular parlance 
“Russian occupants.” The disagreement dragged on well into the early 
years of independence, resulting in exclusive design of political member-
ship that did not account for the interests of the Soviet time migrants.  
The external pressure which prompted Lithuanian leadership to de-
couple the national consolidation from state-building project was gone 
when Latvia and Estonia passed citizenship legislations. Lacking external 
constraints to be considered while designing political institutions, Latvia’s 
and Estonia’s elites had only one challenge–that is, to consolidate political 
communities which would go along with the suggestions proposed. As we 
will see below, the period of establishing the institutions of independent 
statehood in the two states largely depended on agreement about who was 
a part of a national community. The decision was made swifter in Estonia, 
where the elections into the first post-Soviet Estonian parliament, 
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Riigikogu, were conducted in 1992. Due to disagreements among Latvia‘s 
political entrepreneurs as to who would be allowed to elect the post-Soviet 
parliament, Saeima, the first elections were held only in June 1993. 
After the popular front won the majority of votes in Latvia’s 1990 
elections to the republican Supreme Soviet, it passed the Declaration of 
Independence on May 4. The declaration re-established the de jure sover-
eignty of the Latvian state of the interwar years and started a period of 
“transition to independence.” The August 1991 coup d’état in Moscow led 
to the de facto independence of the Baltic states followed by their interna-
tional recognition. Following that the Estonian and Latvian governments 
made efforts to reach a primary solution for the citizenship issue and con-
duct elections for post-Soviet parliaments. While political leadership in 
both countries favoured the concept of restored statehood, some discuss-
ants have argued that the restrictive approach to restoration in Latvia can 
be held responsible for the delays in state- and nation-building in contrast 
to the situation in Estonia.1  
Drafting a new Latvian constitution started as early as 1990 by spe-
cial commission of the popular front. However, the general consensus on 
the illegitimacy of the Soviet inclusion implied that no institutions elected 
could issue binding legal statutes as long as Latvia was part of the SU. 
Radically minded nationalists argued that as long as Soviet (and later 
Russian) armed forces were stationed in Latvia, the country was occupied 
and therefore could not ratify state-founding documents, such as the Con-
stitution.  
In fact, Latvia had taken the restoration so seriously that the 1922 
constitution was formally re-enacted on August 21, 1991 without any 
significant changes. This meant that no specific references to human and 
minority rights were made explicit in the document. These issues were, 
however, regulated by amendments such as the Declaration on the Acces-
sion to Human Rights Instruments and the Law on the Rights and Obliga-
tions of Citizen and Person of December 10, 1991. In the lead-up to the 
parliamentary debates on the citizenship issue, the resolution on the “Res-
toration of the Body of Citizens and on the Main Principles of Naturaliza-
tion” was adapted on October 15, 1991. The resolution mentions that the 
registration of those who held Latvian citizenship prior to 1940 and their 
descendants would need to take place to guarantee their participation in 
the Saeima elections in 1993.  
It was clear that the large numbers of the Soviet-time migrants to 
Latvia would not be eligible to vote in the founding elections. In the es-
sence, the dilemma of Latvia’s political leadership was as follows: on the 
one hand, they needed to guarantee the survival of the Latvian nation, and, 
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on the other, to adopt a law that would be in accordance with liberal de-
mocratic standards. Fierce debates as to who would be eligible to take part 
significantly postponed the election. As a result of the disagreement on the 
issue of citizenship, up until mid-1993 Latvia’s Supreme Soviet was exer-
cising its powers until the fifth (first post-Soviet) Saeima was elected. 
However, as only “original” citizens of the pre-Soviet Republic of Latvia 
and their descendants were allowed to participate in the election, only 64% 
of the resident population could express their preferences in the parliamen-
tary elections determining the parliament that would draw-up the final 
Citizenship Law.2 
Delays in electing the Saeima meant that no clear criteria could be 
set out for the regulation of the status of former Soviet citizens until 1994. 
Previous resolutions were merely framework documents which did not 
present any clear criteria for the acquisition of citizenship. On the positive 
side however, dragging debates increasingly underlined that the basis of 
the political community would be identification with the past, not with a 
particular language and culture. However, the discussions around the im-
plementation of the Citizenship Law clearly indicate that “affirmative 
action of Latvians to compensate them for the discrimination they have 
experienced in their own country” was the rhetorical lead behind major 
decisions and the resistance of Latvian political elites to ease the require-
ments for citizenship.3 International monitoring of Latvia’s citizenship 
legislation also pressured for greater account of international standards 
and agreements, resulting in the development of what Stukuls-Eglitis 
referrs to as Latvia’s “small nation’s complex.”4  
The Latvian Saeima finally passed the citizenship legislation in July 
1994. The law reiterated the fact that only 1940 citizens were entitled to 
citizenship, but also laid down rules for naturalisation. It also encouraged 
Latvian émigrés to return to Latvia by allowing citizens of pre-war Latvia 
to regain citizenship without renouncing their current affiliation.5 Along-
side the list of restrictions determining who would not be eligible for Lat-
vian citizenship, criteria of the naturalisation process were set up. These 
included permanent residence in Latvia and command of the Latvian lan-
guage, as well as knowledge of basic principles of the republic’s constitu-
tion and of the Law on the “Rights and Obligations of a Citizen and a 
Person,” of Latvian history and of the national anthem. 
It was expected that all individuals who did not receive citizenship 
automatically would either be willing to depart from Latvia, or would 
swiftly turn to naturalisation offices to apply. To avoid this, so-called 
“windows” were established to distinguish various groups of eligible citi-
zens according to a certain timetable, allowing some residents to apply 
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only after 2003. Naturally, such legislation did not lead to an atmosphere 
of trust among the non-Latvians towards politicians. Many of these politi-
cians were catapulted into their offices just years earlier, following the 
promises to grant citizenship automatically to every non-titular resident 
who applied for it. It appears quite natural that there were no queues to 
apply for Latvia’s citizenship once the procedures were defined and the 
naturalisation authority started functioning in February 1995. Over the 
period of one and a half years only 15% of the expected 124,000 persons 
who were eligible to apply actually did so.6  
All residents of Latvia were granted favourable provisions of social 
citizenship (even the non-citizens) with the 1995 “Law on the Status of 
Former Soviet Citizens who are not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other 
State.” Although social provisions were generously applied with the pass-
ing of the Law, non-citizens in Latvia still remained at high risk of unem-
Table 2. Naturalisation in Latvia (absolute numbers, 1995–2008)  
 
Year Applications 
submitted 
Citizenship 
granted 
1995 4,543 984 
1996 2,627 3,016 
1997 3,075 2,992 
1998 5,608 4,439 
1999 15,183 12,427 
2000 10,692 14,900 
2001 8,672 10,637 
2002 8,370 9,844 
2003 11,268 10,049 
2004 21,297 16,064 
2005 19,807 19,169 
2006 10,581 16,439 
2007 3,308 6,826 
2008, 2,601 3,004 
2009, 10 months 2,810 1,686 
Total 130,442 132,476 
 
Source: Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, Retrieved  
2009–12-05 http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/statistika/index.html;  
jsessionid=4CBA1416176CE4EAF55C173AA224C8F1  
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ployment and worse employment, than citizens. 7 Once again, the insecu-
rity and sensitivity of the Latvian stance on the language issue appeared 
clearly in the aftermath of the amendments to the Citizenship Law in June 
1998, which made Latvian citizenship available for all children born to 
non-citizens after August 21, 1991.8  
Much the same was the decision of the Estonian government, which 
passed the Resolution on National Independence of Estonia during the 
August 1991 putsch. The Estonian parliament started to prepare the post-
Soviet constitution, which was adopted by popular referendum in June 
1992.9 The Estonian constitution guarantees the protection of minorities as 
well as social rights for residents who are non-citizens of the republic and 
guarantees them the right to participate in local elections. The Estonian 
constitution therefore also refers to the law on Citizenship that the parlia-
ment passed in February 1992 on the basis of the 1938 law with amend-
ments from 1940. According to this law, some 900,000 individuals who 
had Estonian citizenship on June 16, 1940, or who had ancestors fulfilling 
such a requirement, re-gained their citizenship automatically. The law also 
provided the Soviet-time migrants with an opportunity to obtain citizen-
ship in the case that they could prove having been active in the Estonian 
Citizens’ Committee prior to independence.10 On the basis of this legisla-
tion parliamentary elections were held for the first time in 1992, which led 
to a great number of Estonia’s residents being unable to participate–in fact 
only some 60% of those who voted in the 1990 referendum on Independ-
ence could elect the members of the post-Soviet Riigikogu.  
The naturalisation procedure for some 400,000 Russian-speaking 
Soviet-time migrants in Estonia was outlined in the document in a similar 
way as it was in Latvia. In order to start naturalisation procedure a candi-
date was required to have resided on the territory of Estonia for at least the 
last two years plus one year of waiting time during application for citizen-
ship, an oath of loyalty to the Estonian state and proficiency in the state-
language. The last qualification was put forward to ensure that applicants 
were familiar with Estonian history and culture at least at the basic level. 
Naturally, Russian-speakers in Estonia frequently criticised this require-
ment since; according to the last Soviet population census in Estonia, only 
15% of its non-Estonian residents could communicate in the language and 
lacked opportunities to learn it prior to the implementation of the naturali-
sation criteria.11  
Similar to the Latvian law on resident non-citizens, Estonia had 
adopted the “Aliens Act” in July 1993. The act included a passage encour-
aging non-citizens to apply for new residency permits within an estab-
lished time limit, otherwise they would lose their legal status as residents 
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Table 3. Naturalisation in Estonia (absolute numbers, 1992-2009)  
 
Year Number  Year  Number  
1992 5,421 2001 3,090 
1993 20,370 2002 4,091 
1994 22,474 2003 3,706 
1995 16,674 2004 6,523 
1996 22,773 2005 7,072 
1997 8,124 2006 4,753 
1998 9,969 2007 4,228 
1999 4,534 2008 2,124 
2000 3,425 2009, 2 quarters  985 
Total   150,336 
 
Source: Estonian Citizenship and Migration Board, 
http://www.mig.ee/index.php/mg/eng/statistics   
Retrieved 2009–11-25  
 
of the republic. This step created a feeling of insecurity within the resident 
population, of whom around a third had immediately opted for citizenship 
of other (mainly, former Soviet) states, particularly of the Russian Federa-
tion. Around 90,000 Russian-speaking residents of Estonia collected Rus-
sian passports in the aftermath of Aliens Act, because the Russian Federa-
tion followed an extraterritorial principle in granting its citizenship to all 
those who resided on the territory of the former Soviet republics up until 
2000. As an effect of mass application for Russian Federation passports, 
the number of “aliens,” de facto non-citizens of Estonia was reduced by 
around a third with a single strike of a pen. Ironically, this later allowed 
Estonia to boast having less stateless residents on its territory as a result of 
legislative steps when compared to Latvia.  
The Estonian Citizenship Law was changed in January 1995, ex-
tending the residency requirement for those who entered Estonia after 
1992 from two to five years. Also, despite protests from the President’s 
Roundtable on Minorities, the requirements of the knowledge of the Con-
stitution and language proficiency were tightened.12 This latter institution 
was created in 1993 with the support of international representations in 
Tallinn to facilitate communication between representatives of minorities, 
state officials and members of the Riigikogu. Lacking power, however, it 
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never amounted to anything other than an advisory board, the recommen-
dations of which were rarely considered by lawmakers. Despite the rela-
tive uselessness of the roundtable in the eyes of policy-makers, the con-
solidated pressure of the EU and OSCE resulted in the relaxation of the 
requirements for citizenship for children born to non-citizens after the 
restoration of independence in Estonia.13 Only in 2000, Estonia further 
simplified the naturalisation procedure for persons with disabilities and 
young persons who had passed Estonian language examinations at school, 
with further amendments to follow. Moreover, the application period for 
citizenship was also shortened.14  
The citizenship regulations were amended in December 1998 in Es-
tonia and two months prior to that in October 1998 in Latvia.15 In both 
countries, the amendments were adopted under international pressure and 
reflected the balance between the positive effects of guaranteed admit-
tance into the EU club on the one hand and public concerns about the 
survival of the nations on the other.16 The amendments also abolished the 
naturalisation “windows” previously suggested as a compromise solution 
between the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the 
Latvian law-makers.17 This time, under the pressure of the OSCE (and as 
was perceived in Latvia at that point, of the Russian Federation behind it) 
the window system for naturalisation was lifted, allowing non-citizens to 
apply for citizenship if they passed the history and language exams.  
This was not the end of the story. The right-wing Latvian political 
party, Tēvzemei un Brīvībai (For Fatherland and Freedom) on October 3, 
1998, called for a referendum contesting the amendments, giving auto-
matic citizenship to children born in Latvia.18 Tēvzemei un Brīvībai had 
argued that this step would not guarantee that every Latvian citizen knew 
the official state language and hence further politicised the issue of the 
Table 4. Citizenship in the Baltic states, percent of residents, 2000 
 
 Baltic None Russian Federation 
Estonia 80.0 12.4 6.3 
Latvia 74.4 21.2 0.8 
Lithuania  99.0 0.3 0.4 
 
Source: Board of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, 1998, Population 
Census 2000; Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 2008; Lithuanian 
Department of Statistics, 2006. 
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survival of the state language.19 The vote showed however that the citizens 
favoured a more inclusive approach to citizenship in Latvia and turned 
down the option of withdrawing that piece of legislation.  
Admittedly, there were two camps of those who voted in favour of 
keeping the amendment.20 On the one side, certainly those who craved for 
putting an end to the OSCE’s intervention in what was perceived as Lat-
vian “internal affairs.” Others hoped that once the OSCE was pleased with 
the results, the organisation would turn a blind eye on the stricter Lan-
guage Law under discussion in the Saeima at the time. The number of 
voting members of the non-Latvian communities, and certainly the non-
citizens who were ineligible to vote, expected that further evolution of 
minority legislation would start thereafter, leading towards a more inclu-
sive end for the minority populations.  
Both Estonia and Latvia had continuously asserted that only the 
citizens of pre-Soviet states would be able to acquire post-Soviet citizen-
ship automatically.21 Of course, around one third of Estonia’s and almost 
two fifths of Latvia’s populations were in this case exempted from the 
right to receive citizenship automatically and were required to undergo a 
naturalisation procedure. However, instead of loosening up the conditions 
for naturalisation, both countries were persistent in tightening the regula-
tions. The drafting of the Citizenship Laws in both countries was placed 
under close supervision of the CoE, OSCE and HCNM following demands 
of the Russian Federation to monitor possible “human rights’ abuses.”22  
Restored citizenship, as it was implemented in Latvia and Estonia, 
emerged as a result of the fierce debates among political elites. It was 
essential to connect the post-Soviet statehoods with political communities, 
made up of the citizenry of pre-Soviet republics and suggested the conti-
nuity of the “national political memory.” The logic of restoring the pre-
Soviet nation-state however did not mesh with the calls for democratisa-
tion. The shifts in the ethnic composition of the states during the Soviet-
time were framed as an acute hindrance for nations’ return to the commu-
nity of European democratic states.23 In order to legitimise the lack of 
political steps to include the Russian-speakers into the political commu-
nity, state restoration was profiled as the only means of realigning Baltic 
states in the arena of democratic states. Independence was therefore 
framed as the crucial step in the history of ethnic Estonian and Latvian 
peoples.  
The redefinition of the post-Soviet political communities in Estonia 
and Latvia was just one case in support of the restored statehood as the 
best choice for Estonians resp. Latvians. Many scholars point out that the 
titular nationals had aspired to become “the true masters of their own 
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country,” nothing more, nothing less.24 Importantly, the debates during 
perestroika left a decisive imprint on the way the nation-building projects 
were to unfold, adding a clearly ethnic flavour to the nation-centred dis-
cussions at first over the issue of citizenship, than over the role that ma-
jorities’ cultures would play in the Baltic political arena. 
 
 
2.   Crafting the status of the state languages  
Up until mid-1990s it was possible for the members of minority to get on 
in their everyday without knowledge of Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian, 
while the state institutions and officials were increasingly switching to use 
the state languages. Therefore in order to perform public functions and/or 
interact with the state officials, the members of non-titular groups needed 
to have at least some proficiency in the state language. In this light, the 
state support for minorities wishing to acquire the skills in Estonian, Lat-
vian or Lithuanian was crucial for decreasing the alienation of non-core 
ethnics from the political process, as well as state institutions.  
Since Baltic independence in 1991 the state languages were profiled 
as official languages that were to be used in all spheres of public life in the 
countries. Additional legislations were passed throughout the 1990s-early 
2000s to strengthen the status of the state languages. While the corner-
stones of the language legislation were set into effect already in the late 
1980s, the legislation had undergone significant changes over the 1990s, 
particularly with the adoption of the new language laws: the Estonian 
Language Act (February, 21 1995), the Lithuanian Law on the State Lan-
guage (January 31, 1995), and the Latvian State Language Law (Decem-
ber 21, 1999). In Latvia the new State Language Law appeared also as 
early as 1995, but because of its highly protective nature for the state lan-
guage, it had been harshly criticised by the OSCE and other international 
organisations.25 The Lithuanian Law on the State Language, declares in 
the Article 9 “All the transactions of legal and natural persons of the Re-
public of Lithuania shall be conducted in the state language.” In Latvia, 
the 1999 State Language Law deleted the option, previously mentioned in 
the Law of 1989/1992 allowing individuals to address public officials in 
languages other than the state language.26 According to Article 10 of this 
law “State and municipal institutions, courts and agencies belonging to the 
judicial system, as well as state and municipal enterprises (or companies) 
shall accept and examine documents from persons only in the state lan-
guage.” 
These regulations make clear that while the Baltic governments set 
out to assist the equality of the languages in the public sphere, the prereq-
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uisites for the use of languages are defined explicitly only for the state 
languages. This indicates that from the early days of Baltic independence 
all of the Baltic residents were expected to have knowledge of the local 
official language in which correspondence and documentation in busi-
nesses, institutions and organizations was to be conducted. At the same 
time, all individuals occupied in the service industries needed to acquire 
adequate language proficiency in order to be able to carry out labour and 
remain competitive on the market.  
When in Lithuania the Language Decree was adopted as early as 
January 1989, it also underlined the similar incentive for non-Lithuanians 
to gradually switch from other languages to the state language for the 
purpose of communicating with state-officials. As has been discussed in 
the previous chapter, the decree “On the Use of the Official Language of 
the Lithuanian SSR” reinstated Lithuanian as the official language of the 
republic and stated that it would be the main means of communication 
between the residents of the republic.27  
The new Law on State Language was passed in January 1995, regu-
lating the use of the official language in public life. In defining the use and 
protection of Lithuanian, however, the law stated that it did not apply in 
many cases, such as the language of events of religious communities, as 
well as amongst persons belonging to ethnic minorities. Altogether, the 
law merely regulated the use of the state language in the public sphere, 
that is, on documents, signs and in communication between state institu-
tions. It also allowed for the information to be delivered to speakers of 
minority languages in other idioms, alongside Lithuanian. Decisively, 
Lithuanian legislation diversifies the approach to the language issue in the 
country by providing a general framework for language use in the Law on 
State Language, and special legislation regulated by the Law on National 
Minorities and the Law on Education. Particularly, the Lithuanian Law on 
Ethnic Minorities from 1989 in the Article 4 stipulates that “in offices and 
organisations located in the areas serving substantial numbers of minority 
with a different language, the language spoken by that minority shall be 
used in addition to the Lithuanian language.” Polish-speaking communi-
ties, for example, appealed to this law in order to secure the use of Polish 
in local administrations across the South Eastern Lithuania.  
Given the high proportion of non-core ethnic residents in Latvia 
and Estonia, initially the popular fronts, but also the re-established gov-
ernments aimed particularly at linguistic consolidation of their societies. In 
Estonia, changes were made to the Law on Language of January 18, 1989, 
which claimed that it was necessary to protect the Estonian language and 
declared Estonia to be a monolingual state, making one sole distinction 
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between Estonian and all other, foreign languages. These changes were 
finalized in the Language Act, adopted on February 21, 1995, which de-
fined minority language as “a language of a national minority […] which 
Estonian citizens who belong to a national minority have historically used 
as their mother tongue in Estonia.”28 This act amended the provisions of 
the earlier language law that allowed communication in minority lan-
guages. It did not require Estonia’s state officials to speak languages other 
than Estonian with Russian-speakers, thus strengthening the status of 
Estonian as the language of the state and also as the only language of 
communication by the country’s bureaucracy.29  
Despite reaffirming its strong commitment to identify Estonian as 
the official language of the country,30 the right to use minority languages 
was constitutionally granted in the areas of minority concentrated settle-
ments.31 Both the constitution and the Law on Language stated that the 
government of the localities where resident non-Estonians were in major-
ity might use other languages alongside Estonian. In the case of the mu-
nicipal bodies, Article 52, Paragraph 2 of the Estonian Constitution per-
mits the use of the language spoken by the majority of the inhabitants, “in 
localities where the language of the majority of the population is other 
than Estonian […] for internal communication.” At the same time, Article 
11 of the 1995 Language Act confirms that  
 
“in local governments where the majority of the permanent 
residents are non-Estonian speakers, the language of the na-
tional minority constituting the majority of the permanent 
residents of the local government may be used alongside Es-
tonian as the internal working language of the local gov-
ernment on the proposal of the corresponding local govern-
ment council and by decision of the Government of the Re-
public.” 
 
In practice, however, this provision has never been implemented as 
the national government has rejected all proposals received with respect to 
the issue. The application to permit the usage of Russian in Narva and 
Sillamäe was rejected in 1995 by a decision of the Government, and later 
again in 1999.32 Importantly, while responding to the pressure of the inter-
national community to liberalise the criteria for citizenship, in 1998 the 
Riigikogu amended the Language Law, the Parliament Election Act and 
the Local Government Election Act, which then required elected officials 
to be fluent in Estonian.33 However, under the pressure of recommenda-
tions by the Finnish EU-Presidency, the EC’s second annual report on 
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progress released in October 1999, as well as more intensively from the 
OSCE throughout the run-up period to the closure of its mission in Esto-
nia, language proficiency requirements were abolished in November 
2001.34  
At the same time, Estonian was made an official spoken language 
of parliament and, a year later in October 2002, made the working lan-
guage of the local councils and governments, primarily aiming at promot-
ing the use of Estonian in the north-eastern part of the country.35 The 
measure remained largely ineffective despite activities by the language 
inspectorate in the region: the majority of the official documents were at 
first written in Russian, and then translated into Estonian.36 Despite this 
fact, the Estonian state did not want to back up on the issue.37 My inter-
views with officials in Narva, Sillamäe, and Jõhvi city councils suggested 
that in order to avoid necessary discussions in Estonian, the local officials 
and city-council representatives, in their overwhelming majority Russian-
speakers, met in an informal atmosphere to discuss decisions in private 
and in a “foreign” language. These informal meetings were followed up 
by gatherings in the official premises only for voting, which continued 
well into 2006.38  
The Latvian Language Law of 1992 specifically required all official 
communication to be submitted in Latvian, which, given the fact that only 
20% of non-Latvian population could communicate in the language, pre-
sented a serious hindrance for minority participation in public life.39 This 
law amended the initial 1989 regulation that still allowed the use of the 
minority language in the public sphere. While the previous law underlined 
the right of residents’ to use “their” language in communication with offi-
cials, the new law enforced the status of Latvian as the sole language for 
internal communication of the state offices. Introducing three levels of 
proficiency of the state language, the regulation of the language knowl-
edge required all candidates for state-funded jobs to demonstrate the high-
est proficiency in Latvian.40 This was particularly applicable to individuals 
running in the elections, who, while registering as candidates, must attach 
a copy of a certificate confirming their level of knowledge in the state 
language.41 However, even in the cases in which a person possessed the 
certificate, the state language inspectorate on several occasions re-assessed 
the person’s knowledge of Latvian.42 Similarly, on the municipal level, 
only the use of the state language is permitted, irrespective of the number 
of non-Latvian language speakers who reside there. 
In the beginning of 1995 a new law on language was discussed to 
promote the use of Latvian and regulate the use of that language in private 
business, pushing minority languages out of the public sphere completely. 
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The debate on this restrictive language law continued well into 1999, 
being severely criticised by the OSCE, the EU and particularly the HCNM 
van der Stoel, and was passed only one day before the EC announced the 
list of countries included in the next EU enlargement round. In the face of 
controversies around the new language law, the National Programme for 
Latvian Language Training was devised in 1995 to diminish the linguistic 
segregation of the society and to “promote the evolution of common val-
ues.” Needless to say, the programme was aimed at providing training in 
the official language and giving positive incentives to reduce the use of 
minority languages in the public sphere altogether.  
The comparison of the three states’ linguistic policies and their rela-
tion towards the minority population indicates several contrasting issues 
with respect to the planning and implementation of the steps. Decisively, 
while the complexity of the ethno-linguistic situation in all three states can 
not be overestimated, it appears that in Estonia and Latvia this was per-
ceived as a hindrance for the development of independent statehood under 
the guidance of the state-bearing nation. This perception is clearly re-
flected in the limited preparedness of the Latvian and Estonian political 
elites to initiate the state funded support for non-core ethnic communities 
requiring teaching of the state-language. Although this goal was set on the 
agenda under the auspices of assisting non-core ethnics in improving their 
competitiveness in the labour-market, increasing their flexibility in em-
ployment and, ultimately, integrating into the Estonian and Latvian-
dominated national community, each state failed to develop means that 
supported the language training for non-core ethnics.  
There appears to be little indication that the Lithuanian state was 
more open to developing new ways of assisting the minorities in adapting 
to the new conditions in which the Lithuanian language was the one and 
only means of official communication.43 Even the deputies of Seimas were 
increasingly coming under the pressure of the language inspectorate for 
inappropriate use of Lithuanian in the public forum, with some non-native 
speakers of Lithuanian being particularly targeted for committing an of-
fence on the national symbol, i.e. the Lithuanian language.44 Like in Lat-
via and Estonia, most debates in Lithuania were about visibility of non-
state languages in the country and on state documents, in passports and on 
plaques of state institutions. Discussions continue today revolving around 
claims which legislation has precedence, the state language laws or the 
legislation on national minority. Preference for the former would push 
minority languages out of the public space entirely, while the latter legisla-
tion would allow minorities to determine the spelling of their names and 
use street signs in non-state languages in the areas of their concentrated 
State-building and framing of non-titulars 
___________________________________________________________ 
113
settlement.45 However, different approaches to language training and the 
availability of the state programmes for Lithuanian language tuition during 
the Soviet era somewhat softened the dramatic effect of the language poli-
cies on Lithuania’s non-titular communities. 
 
 
3.   Language enforcement  
The centralist approach to reinstalling the linguistic functionality of the 
state languages was very much the same across the region. As discussed, 
language legislation played and continues to play a central role in facilitat-
ing the centrality of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian in the republics’ 
political and social life. Despite the fact that the languages and cultures of 
minorities are legally protected and enjoy state support, varying demo-
graphic patterns and language situations throughout the Baltic states have 
resulted in quite different outcomes of language regulation. While I return 
to this issue, the discussion thus far makes clear that the Baltic govern-
ments actively promote the knowledge of the state language and tolerate 
(to a certain extent) other languages.  
Some of the consequences resulting from the regulation of the use 
of languages other than state languages specifically touch upon the repre-
sentation of non-titular ethnics. In this sense, the candidates running for 
public offices in Estonia and Latvia have to meet several criteria defining 
the level of language knowledge as established by law, while in Lithuania 
such requirements do not exist. However, in all three states minorities 
have only a limited opportunity to use their native language when com-
municating with public authorities if these are not Russian- or Polish 
speakers themselves. The policies discussed in this section of the chapter 
have aimed at closing this window of opportunity for minority language 
speakers to use languages other than the state one when in public office.  
Since 1991, the Lithuanian Seimas has adopted a number of legal 
regulations, acts and strategic decisions to regulate the use of Lithuanian 
in the main areas of public life. Notably, in 1995, the Law on the State 
Language regulated the use and protection of the state language, guaran-
teeing its application as the major tool for functioning within all social 
areas.46 Some additional institutions have been put into place to regulate 
and administer the development of language use in various areas of public 
life. Most notably the Lithuanian State Language Commission (Valstybine 
lietuvu kalbos komisija), State Language Inspectorate (Valstybine kalbos 
inspekcija) and the County Language Services (Savivaldybiu kalbos 
tvarkytojai) were to monitor language development and use within the 
minority communities. The Institute of the Lithuanian Language (Lietuvių 
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kalbos institutas) and the departments of language study in the country’s 
universities have been involved in this work.  
The most prominent role therein is played by the Lithuanian State 
Language Commission. Although put into operation back in 1961 as a 
non-governmental entity under the auspices of the Lithuanian Academy of 
Science, it was established as a state-run institution in 1990 under the 
auspices of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of 
Lithuania. Consisting of various researchers from the Institute of the 
Lithuanian Language and university professors, the commission is primar-
ily concerned with the questions of implementation of the Law on the 
Official Language and initiates the teaching of the language. The State 
Commission on the Lithuanian Language is in charge of the implementa-
tion of the language regulations, and, at the same time, the enforcement is 
guaranteed by the State Language Inspectorate and municipal language 
officers.47 The Inspectorate also oversees the level of language knowledge 
by the non-Lithuanians employed in the public sector, however, there has 
been no indication of punitive measures towards those who were unable to 
fulfil the requirements.  
The Commission has been increasingly involved in broader lan-
guage policy planning.48 The language policy of the Lithuanian State was 
determined by the State Language Policy Guideline 2003–2008, which 
consolidated the four language programmes approved by the Lithuanian 
Government. These include the Programme for the Use and Development 
of the State Language 1996–2005, the Programme of the Lithuanian Lan-
guage in Information Society 2000–2006, the Programme for the Re-
placement of Loanwords by Lithuanian Equivalents, the Programme for 
the Preservation of Dialects and Ethnic Place-Names 2001–2010. The 
State Language Policy Guidelines 2003–2008 outlined several areas where 
state support for the consequential development of the Lithuanian lan-
guage was to be supervised and supported.49 Among the more declarative 
goals of the document, such as “meeting the requirements of the knowl-
edge based society,” “exhortation of influence on the progressive devel-
opment of the state-language,” and “controlling the creative use of the 
language among the public,” the primary aim was to “ensure the function-
ality of Lithuanian in all spheres of public life.” The framework outlines 
three major areas where its authors saw the interference of the state as a 
precondition for successful functioning of the Lithuanian language in the 
short- and long-run. These include the teaching of the Lithuanian lan-
guage, standardisation of the language system and use, and decisively, the 
means to enforce the status of the language.50  
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As early as April 1992, the government approved the State Lan-
guage Instruction Programme as well as the categories for language 
knowledge. In light of this, as well as following the Law on the State Lan-
guage, three categories were established, applicable to individuals seeking 
employment in the public sector. These range from minimal understanding 
and capacity to speak on the issues of work of low qualification, as appli-
cable to low-skilled employers in banks, post-offices, police etc. to the 
third category, implying an ability to carry on conversation on managerial 
issues and is applied to employees at the highest governmental structures. 
Importantly, these categories are not applicable to those individuals who 
have graduated from schools using Lithuanian as the language of instruc-
tion, or Lithuanian-taught universities’ learning streams prior to 1991. 
None of the people graduating from these schools after the re-instalment 
of Lithuania’s independence are required to pass this examination either.51  
The application of language regulations have also been defined to 
ensure the transparency of the knowledge of the state language by the 
public and state employees, with a system of testing being created and 
approved by the State Commission of the Lithuanian Language. Accord-
ing to the official data, since 1993 a total of 81,160 citizens have taken 
exams and 69,998 have successfully passed the state-language examina-
tion in different categories. Beresnevičiūt÷ and Kasatkina report in their 
research that  
 
“the authorities have indicated that the purpose of the law is 
to establish motivation to learn Lithuanian as the official lan-
guage of the State; they have also asserted that no one would 
be dismissed solely because of inability to meet the language 
requirements.”52 
 
The situation was somewhat different in Latvia after the amend-
ments adapted to the 1989 Law on State Language in 1992, creating the 
State Language Centre, the State Language Inspection and the State Lan-
guage Proficiency Certification Commission as a part of the Centre. The 
State Language Centre was aimed at providing legal support on language 
issues and supervising their implementation to regulate language use.53 
The law guaranteed the right to be educated in Latvian, but it also made 
provisions for the individuals of minority origin to be educated in their 
native language.  
In practice it meant that other languages, mainly Russian, were al-
lowed to be used in minority schools for instruction where Russian-
speakers were in the majority or in the schools which continued to func-
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tion following the model devised in the Soviet times for groups of students 
of non-Latvian origin. This regulation was unnoticed until the later devel-
opments of education legislation. Later, however, the 1992 Law was used 
as a major tool to assist the reform of the linguistic situation in Latvia in 
the post-Soviet years and to eliminate the parallel use of two languages in 
Latvia.54 In an effort to overcome the situation established by the 1958 
School Reform, students (or their parents) would now choose the educa-
tion stream in their preferred language, thus alleviating the linguistic seg-
regation of Latvian and Russian linguistic communities in the long run. 
Similar steps were enforced throughout the time of independence in order 
to increase the importance of the Latvian language in various areas of 
social life, particularly in the state administration.  
In 1998 the status of Latvian as the sole state language was con-
firmed by the Latvian constitution. However, already in 1999 new discus-
sions on the necessity of the new language regulations commenced involv-
ing the president, Saeima, international organisations and some local NGO 
representatives. In comparison with the Language Law of 1992, in the 
period of preparation of the new law, governmental institutions held con-
sultations with a range of interested actors from Latvian political estab-
lishments and international organisations, though few representatives of 
the minority community were involved.55 The law, finally promulgated in 
September 1999, emphasised different use of the state language in private 
and public areas of activity, limited the opportunities for communication 
between its subjects with the state institutions and only spelled out regula-
tions for Latvian.  
A study of this piece of legislation suggests that before becoming 
an EU candidate country, Latvian political elites were required to correct 
their stand on linguistic issues. It was made to fit the existing European 
perceptions, entrenching the relations between the public and the private 
spheres in the legislation on language use. In this light particular attention 
was required for repeated efforts of Latvia’s political elites to further in-
tervene into the area of language use, going so far as suggesting additional 
regulation of language use in some spheres of the private economy, such 
as in the shops and during the internal meetings. Importantly these efforts 
undertaken in October 1997 have drawn considerable attention from vari-
ous international organisations, which have monitored the implementation 
of the legislation in the wake of Latvia’s EU accession.56  
The draft of the 1998 Language Law was tabled, despite severe 
criticisms of OSCE HCNM, as well as by the EC, noting that the law’s 
provisions “take insufficient account of the distinction between the public 
and private spheres” and conditions “contravening international legal 
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standards of human rights, most notably freedom of expression.”57 The 
negotiations with the OSCE and the EU officials resulted in the adoption 
of the law with corrections, significantly changing its original wording. 
While the law still stipulated the regulation of language use in the private 
sphere, the scope of these regulations was only limited to the areas of 
“legitimate public interest,” allowing for continuous use of minority lan-
guages in the private.58 The law defined these spheres with respect to the 
issues of security, well-being, morality and social welfare, also pointing 
out that security at work and social-administrative monitoring was its 
focus. In this respect, the law identified the regulations as “corresponding” 
to the rights and interests of private organisations.59 When the time came, 
the OSCE HCNM validated the law’s essential conformity with interna-
tional obligations and commitments, repeating similar conclusions in 
2000, when corresponding regulations were passed after similar judge-
ment from OSCE and EU.60 
Policy-making in Estonia was similar. The 1997 Estonian Human 
Development Report noted that having Estonian as the official language of 
the country should integrate Estonia’s multiethnic society socially and 
politically.61 However, as could be observed to date, the language factor 
has worked only as a segregating factor in the cultural environment. In-
deed, since the implementation of the Language Law of 1995 which de-
clared Estonian to be the sole state language and treating all other lan-
guages, including Russian, as “foreign languages,” the relations of minori-
ties towards the state language have been distinguished by particular scep-
ticism. Unsurprisingly, the Riigikogu amended the Language Law, the 
Riigikogu Election Act and the Local Government Council Election Act 
on December 15, 1998, to establish proficiency requirements in the state 
language for elected officials from minority groups.  
Following these regulations, subsequent amendments were made to 
Article 5 of the Language Law in February 1999, requiring employees of 
private companies, non-profit associations and foundations to have profi-
ciency in and to use the Estonian language while doing business in Esto-
nia.62 Criticised by international organisations and in particular by the 
OSCE, the Riigikogu adopted further amendments to the Language Law 
on June 14, 2000 to bring it into compliance with OSCE recommendations 
and EU regulations.63 This meant specifically that the language require-
ments for foreign experts were abolished and the regulations on the private 
use of language were suspended. The amendment stipulated that,  
 
“the use of Estonian by companies, non-profit associations 
and foundations, by employees thereof and by sole proprie-
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tors is regulated if it is in the public interest, which, for the 
purposes of this Law, means public safety, public order, 
general government, public health, health protection, con-
sumer protection and occupational safety. The establishment 
of requirements concerning proficiency in and use of Esto-
nian shall be justified and in proportion to the objective be-
ing sought and shall not distort the nature of the rights 
which are restricted.”64  
 
In September of the same year, the first Estonian language level examina-
tions took place in the Examination and Qualification Centre.  
Similarly to the situation in Latvia as discussed above, tightening 
Estonian language regulations was understood locally as a kind of com-
pensation after concessions were made regarding citizenship legislation. 
Overall, compliance of Estonia’s and Latvia’s legislators with the pressure 
from the OSCE and the EC has led some scholars to believe that European 
influence conditioned the changes in the legislation.65 On the other hand, 
one observes that most of concessions made to the European institutions 
were fought against by the national legislators, who drew back on dubious 
arguments to legitimise these decisions to their voters.66 Overall, it appears 
that the international brokers could achieve only as much as national po-
litical actors would allow them to negotiate on the way toward EU acces-
sion.67  
 
 
4.   Internationalisation of minority politics  
The emergent minority politics faced difficulties in reconciling the na-
tional perceptions of the past and future with those of international stan-
dards on granting particular rights to resident minorities.68 The goal of re-
joining the European community was set out even prior to the Baltic 
states’ secession from the SU. To allow swift “return to the West,” politi-
cal elites of the core Baltic ethnics had produced a range of legal acts that 
resulted in the “nationalising” of the statehoods across the region. Follow-
ing independence, legal steps were necessary to bring legislation into 
accord with the standards expected from the candidates for European 
membership. In order to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria a range of topics 
related to minority legislation in the countries had to be addressed. Differ-
ences in the policies of the Baltic states towards their minorities have been 
debated in scholarship as resulting from variations in the ethnic composi-
tion of the Baltic societies, the length of their residence in the region and 
State-building and framing of non-titulars 
___________________________________________________________ 
119
minorities’ geographical dispersion. However, there were also similarities 
in the treatment of the minority populations.  
The ethnic bias in the outlook of the political regime led some re-
searchers to suggest that, particularly in the cases of Estonia and Latvia 
the effects of citizenship policies resulted in a limited form of democratic 
rule, or as some referred to it, “ethnic democracy.”69 Drawing back on 
work of Sammy Smooha some researchers suggested that the principles of 
ethnic ascendancy, perceived threat to state existence, and diminished 
form of democratic accountability plausibly qualify Estonia and Latvia for 
ethnic democracies.70 However, Priit Järve argues that despite installing a 
control system that prevented non-Estonians from participation in formu-
lating the political and legal mechanisms, the country is prone to move in 
the direction of liberal democracy. This is partially due to ongoing natu-
ralisation processes and individual assimilation of non-Estonians into the 
Estonian society.  
Järve also indicates that these two aspects will equally facilitate the 
development of the Estonian version of multiculturalism, which is de-
signed to protect the culture and language of the core ethnic group as is 
declared in Estonia’s constitution.71 Indeed, the Preamble to Estonia’s 
Constitution envisages the state as belonging to one ethnic group, when it 
reads,  
 
“Unwavering in their faith and with a steadfast will to secure 
and develop a state which is established on the inextinguish-
able right of the Estonian people [Eesti rahvas] to national 
self-determination [… ] which shall guarantee the preserva-
tion of the Estonian [ethnic] nation [eesti rahvus] and its cul-
ture throughout the ages − the Estonian people [Eesti rahvas] 
adopted, […] the following Constitution.”72 
 
The Latvian Satversme (Constitution) does not proclaim ethnic principles, 
suggesting that it is potentially possible to develop state institutions in a 
liberal direction. Diachkova, in what she presents as an argument underlin-
ing the thesis of ethnic democracy in Latvia, concludes that the Latvian 
state is committed to the legal equality of individual citizen’s rights. It also 
supports ethnic and cultural communities and thus facilitates naturalisation 
as well as civic participation of minority ethnic groups.73 Inevitably, she 
argues, the growing numbers of non-citizens acquiring competence in the 
state language and naturalising will lead to development of a more civic, 
less ethnocentric democracy in Latvia.  
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To my knowledge, there is no publication suggesting that Lithuania 
could be handled as an example of ethnic democracy. However, Lithua-
nia’s Constitution is clearly in favour of the principle of ethnic ascen-
dance. It names only ethnic Lithuanians as founders of the state, stating 
that  
 
“The [ethnic] Lithuanian nation [Lietuvių tauta] having cre-
ated the State of Lithuania many centuries ago, […] having 
for centuries staunchly defended its freedom and independ-
ence, having preserved its spirit, native language, writing, and 
customs [savo dvasią, gimtąją kalbą, raštą ir papročius], em-
bodying the innate right of the human being and the Nation 
[Tautos] to live and create freely in the land of their fathers 
and forefathers–in the independent State of Lithuania, […] 
adopts and proclaims this Constitution.”74  
 
While in Latvia the processes were similarly entrenched in the concept of 
state-continuity, in Lithuania as we have seen in the chapters 2 and 3 these 
were less explicit. However, the ethnic setting in which Lithuanians domi-
nate non-Lithuanian citizens of the country is fairly clear.75 Despite the 
freedom all residents of the LitSSR had to choose citizenship, the demo-
graphic composition of society ensured the privileged access to political 
participation for the titulars while limiting that of the non-titulars.  
In these terms, there is a distinct similarity between the three states 
with respect to choice of strategies for political inclusion, guarantees made 
to titular linguistic communities and policies enforced to co-opt non-
titulars in the process of state and nation-building. Pettai and Hallik sug-
gest that in the case of Estonia a degree of control by an ethnic majority 
determines the political behaviour of non-core ethnic groups.76 This ap-
plies equally in the two other Baltic states, where any opportunities for 
accommodation of minorities need to be defined from the perspective of 
monoethnic titular state-culture. In both Latvia and Lithuania, ethnopoliti-
cal relations are heavily misbalanced in favour of titular ethnics, allowing 
them to maintain “superordinate power over minority […] through any 
combination of the three main mechanisms of segmentation, dependency 
and co-optation.”77 Thus Baltic non-titulars were increasingly perceived as 
a minority group during the negotiations of states’ EU membership and 
specifically during the period of transposing European legal corpus, the 
Acquis Communautaire into national legislations.  
During the run up to EU accession negotiations, national language 
legislation was scrutinised by international experts and partially changed 
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as a result. The particular role played by native languages in their relations 
with other issues of minority legislations has been the focus of analyses by 
the international community and scholarly experts alike.78 Not surpris-
ingly, in Estonia and Latvia the issue of language rights fell frequently 
into the same category of minority protection as the right for citizenship, 
both regulations on which the CoE and the OSCE had issued numerous 
recommendations for change. Crucially, many of them drew attention to 
the changes in rationale of language legislation. Since Baltic states became 
OSCE members just a few days following independence from the USSR, 
the organisation began pressuring Estonia and Latvia particularly to mod-
ify their nation-building to account for the complex ethnic composition of 
their population. Because the state of minority-majority relations were 
perceived to be a potentially destabilising factor across much of the CEE, 
OSCE drafted the Copenhagen Document that stressed the importance of 
liberal democracy and the role human rights play therein. 
Two means were available for OSCE to enforce the compliance of 
Baltic governments with these regulations. On the one hand, there were 
standing missions in Estonia and Latvia, on the other, the institutions of 
High Commissioner on National Minorities. Particularly, the HCNM was 
to exercise “quiet diplomacy” and communicate OSCE’s recommendation 
to Baltic governments. However, because the concept of “national minor-
ity” was not defined in the mandate of the HCNM, the bulk of recommen-
dations from the OSCE could be easily neglected by the governments 
where no “sticks” for neglect were involved. In this sense, much of the 
HCNM’s legal advice encouraging power sharing between ethnic groups 
could be dismissed as inappropriate for the country, or even as violating 
constitutional principles.  
There were three major documents that framed the remit of 
HCNM’s activity towards the Baltic states. The 1996 “Hague recommen-
dations regarding the education rights of national minorities” stressed the 
need for mutual bilingualism of majorities and minorities. The 1998 “Oslo 
recommendations regarding the linguistic rights of national minorities” 
pressed states to grant linguistic rights to resident minorities thus extend-
ing their political and civic rights. And the 1999, “Lund recommendations 
of the effective participation of national minorities in public life” empha-
sised the importance of minorities’ visibility in the public service to facili-
tate relevant agenda-setting.79 However, although the HCNM was consis-
tently using both “sticks and carrots” to achieve changes in Baltic policies, 
the existing legislation prevented significant changes in nation-states’ 
treatment of minorities. Although some general changes followed the 
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advocacy by the HCNM, many were subsequently neutralised by amend-
ing old or passing new nationalising laws. 
The weakness of the HCNM as an institution advising nation-states 
on behalf of minority groups comes particularly to fore with regard to the 
general mandate of OSCE missions to Estonia and Latvia. These differed 
considerably, resulting in somewhat different outcomes. In Estonia the 
mission was to encourage and facilitate communication between the ethnic 
communities while working in concert with the HCNM. The mission in 
Latvia was not required to cooperate with the HCNM, but rather advise 
government on desirable changes in legislation.80 The first HCNM Max 
van der Stoel thus had limited means to advise policy-makers in Latvia 
and Estonia, but had slightly greater chances to be heard by the Estonian 
political establishment.81 On many occasions, he expressed concerns over 
several pieces of legislation in Estonia and strictly objected to several 
principles promoted by the Latvian elites as the foundation of the citizen-
ship legislation. The pressure from the HCNM however largely led to 
more stringent regulation of language use to ensure the dominance of the 
state language in the public sphere. These regulations additionally antago-
nised ethnic communities and thus gradually increased the salience of 
ethnic identity when participating in the public sphere.  
This fact is particularly striking in the face of the titular popula-
tions’ highly critical perceptions of loyalty of the local minorities towards 
“their” state. Policy-making with regard to minorities however had taken a 
different form in Estonia and Latvia than in Lithuania. The former states 
have implemented legislation which would ensure gradual spreading and 
strengthening of the titular languages in the public sphere. Lithuania has 
promoted a shift from Polish or Russian to the Lithuanian language by 
much softer means, providing additional opportunities for securing the 
linguistic identity of the national minorities. At the same time, naturally 
the situation in which minority legislation has been devised and imple-
mented refers back to the limitations imposed by the citizenship legislation 
on non-titular populations across the Baltic states.  
The minority status of the Russian- and Polish-speaking residents 
of Lithuania was more secure when compared to non-titulars in Latvia and 
Estonia. The state policies referred to the groups’ cultural and linguistic 
affiliation in official documents addressing and partially securing their 
group rights. However, despite relatively small numbers of minorities in 
Lithuania, social exclusion of their members was not precluded explicitly 
by the policies. Demographic factors, such as the small number of mem-
bers of the minority groups when counted against Lithuanians, dispersion 
(mainly of Russian-speakers) across the country and the high degree of 
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linguistic integration into Lithuanian society were decisive for the rela-
tively fast resolution of controversies concerning their cultural rights. The 
early acknowledgement of the multiethnic basis of the Lithuanian state too 
had a positive impact on the consolidation of the country’s ethnic commu-
nities on the basis of their identity as Lithuanian citizens. 
The Lithuanian Law on National Minorities, as discussed previ-
ously, already asserted the rights of minorities to preserve and develop 
their cultural rights, as well as receive education in their mother tongue. 
Importantly, the law indicated that the language of education in Lithua-
nia’s schools for minorities would be the one of their choosing, but also 
stated that training in the Lithuanian language was essential. In order to 
help the process, the government was eager to support the training of 
teachers for minority schools, passing a special resolution on the issue in 
1994. Again in support of the minority schools after the revised version of 
the Law on State Language was accepted in 1995, the Minister of Educa-
tion and Science issued a decree “On Reinforcement of the Law on the 
State Language in the Educational Establishments of National Minorities” 
on April 9, 1996. There the status of Lithuanian was defined as suiting the 
official communication, leaving minority schools to decide in which lan-
guage they would operate and communicate with students and their fami-
lies. In fact, it let schools with Polish, Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian 
language instruction develop approaches that best fit local realities and 
residents’ demands. 
It appears that in the inter-Baltic context, the Lithuanian state chose 
the most inclusive minority politics. Without imposing pressure on the 
speakers of non-titular languages, it provided facilities and opportunities 
for development of bilingualism of minorities.82 A series of constitutional 
provisions and legislation provided Lithuania’s minorities with opportuni-
ties to establish and sustain their educational, cultural and religious institu-
tions.83 Lithuania also acceded speedily to international treaties to embed 
the right to use minority languages in the international legal context, 
among others European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, both ratified in 1995. Decisively, a number of bilateral agree-
ments between the government of Lithuania and the “external homelands” 
of local minorities were signed with the Russian Federation, Poland, Bela-
rus, Ukraine and Germany. Significantly, the signing of the treaties took 
the issue of national minorities in Lithuania into the realm of interstate 
relations and further away from potential interest of OSCE. During the 
only visit HCNM paid to Lithuania in January 1993, van der Stoel did not 
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discover any domestic and international tensions that needed urgent ad-
dressing. 84  
The Lithuanian case is highly illustrative at this point. It appears 
that while political entrepreneurs in Estonia and Latvia have opposed the 
“internationalisation” of minority rights issues, Lithuanian leadership had 
profited from connecting its resident minorities with the international 
security concerns of their external homelands. In effect, all of the states 
concluding treaties with Lithuania have pledged significant funds for de-
velopment of education and language training specifically. Internationalis-
ing minority issues allowed Lithuanian policy-makers not only to co-opt 
external financial help for the cultural needs of its minority citizens. Much 
more important was the perception of the state as a homeland of the titular 
ethnic group, which underlines the state treaties. The Lithuanian state 
declared support for minority initiatives, but primarily it was the responsi-
bility of the minority’s external homeland to finance its activities. Hence-
forth, Lithuania would regularly support minority initiatives but pay far 
greater interest to ethnic Lithuanians living in the Polish-speaking South 
East Lithuania and abroad.  
The compact territorial settlement of Estonia’s Russian-speaking 
communities could allow for similar arrangement with the Russian Fed-
eration, however, as have been argued elsewhere, because the residents 
were de facto “aliens” to the state, such approaches were not realistic.85 
Although Estonia failed to accommodate all residents as members of its 
political community, it addressed differences in the perceptions of ethnic 
groups early enough to stabilise interethnic relations. The issue of the state 
language use, a specific occupational structure and educational differences 
in the largely non-Estonian Ida-Virumaa further aggravated the divisions 
along ethnic lines. The passing of the law on aliens in the summer of 1993 
significantly worsened the situation and led the HCNM to assume the role 
of an active mediator between the state and minority political actors. 
The “Aliens Crisis” proved to be a litmus test for the OSCE’s abil-
ity to broker negotiations. Within a period of several weeks the HCNM 
undertook several trips to Estonia to assuage political leadership in Ida-
Virumaa, who demanded greater political rights and staged a referendum 
on the region’s independence. Although the referendum was declared 
unlawful by the Estonian Chancellor of Justice, it was to be held to indi-
cate the pluralist nature of minority initiative and receive concessions from 
the central government. Specifically, during the meetings with the mayors 
of Narva and Sillamäe van der Stoel collected information on the reasons 
and motivation behind the move of the region’s political elites and later 
communicated these to the Estonian national authorities, president and 
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government. The leaders from Ida-Virumaa made clear to the HCNM that 
they were neither planning to undermine the rule of law in Estonia, sought 
secession, nor would press for the implementation of referendum’s out-
comes. Furthermore, the legal framework of Estonian state left regional 
leaders with little leverage on state policies in addition to their overall 
weak position versus central governments. In this sense, the HCNM acted 
as a negotiator between the strong central state and representatives of the 
weak minority. Admittedly none of the changes suggested by van der 
Stoel were reflected in the amendment passed to Aliens Law in June 1994, 
underlining the strength of the central government in the dispute with the 
regional political entrepreneurs in Ida-Virumaa.86 Overall, the HCNM’s 
engagement had only further consolidated the existing state institutional 
take on regional political processes, allowing Estonian government to 
dismiss suggestions for auxiliary regulations for obtaining citizenship, 
residence permits and non-citizens’ passports as inappropriate.  
Through temporary suspension of the discussion on the issue of in-
clusive citizenship, territorial autonomy for minorities and granting of de 
facto cultural autonomy to Russian-speakers in the northeast of the coun-
try, the Estonian state reduced the potential for interethnic tensions. Also, 
by prioritising economic growth to the development of the political agenda 
inclusive of non-titulars, the Estonian state allowed for some alleviation of 
the socio-economic disparities between the titulars and non-titulars in the 
long term. Although the Estonian state did not recognise any languages 
other then the state language in the public domain, the use of “foreign 
languages” was tacitly tolerated in the areas of Russian-speakers’ compact 
settlement during the decade of the run-up to invitation for EU member-
ship. At the same time, while signing the FCNM in 1997 Estonia (like 
many signing countries, in fact) made significant reservations with regard 
as to whom the Convention would apply. The scope of the Convention’s 
protection was limited to Estonian citizens only, thus limiting the antici-
pated impact of the document on the Russian-speaking non-citizens of 
Estonia. Although around 40% of Estonia’s residents could potentially 
profit from support under the FCNM, around 60% of minorities in Estonia 
were non-citizens or citizens of other states and thus left out of Conven-
tion’s protection.87  
From the early days of Latvian independence, this country’s politi-
cal leadership vehemently opposed internationalisation of minority issues. 
The belated implementation of the Latvian Citizenship Law in 1994 ar-
guably alienated the Russian-speaking community that initially supported 
the move for Latvian independence. At the same time, many NGOs claim-
ing to represent the interests of the Russian-speaking community have 
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been closely cooperating with international monitoring organisations. The 
OSCE’s long-term mission in Latvia involved these NGOs’ work to rec-
ommend changes in general minority related policies, and specifically on 
citizenship, naturalisation, alien’s legislations to the Latvian state.88 The 
assessed issues were as diverse as the lack of automatic citizenship for 
long-term residents of the state, alienation from political processes and 
systematic disadvantages for non-citizens to participate in the early priva-
tisation.89 The prominence of the Latvian language was frequently pointed 
out as the reason for growing alienation of Russian minority from political 
processes in Latvia, prompting HCNM to suggest to President Guntis 
Ulmanis the establishment of the Consultative Council on Nationalities in 
1996. High Commissioner had also resorted to issuing warning to Latvia’s 
governments that the effective solution of the citizenship issue was di-
rectly linked to country’s credentials as a democratic state,90  
The Latvian situation appears to be more complex in all respects. 
Social and political developments following secession from the SU have 
solidified the fronts between the members of different cultural communi-
ties towards each other, though the potential for ethnic tensions has hardly 
been reduced. The topic of minority rights had remained a decisive obsta-
cle for consequent steps toward social integration in Latvia until member-
ship in the EU was secured in 2002. The major conflict was, nevertheless, 
rooted in an attitude of the titular population that is “best described as a 
social and psychological rejection of everything Russian.”91 However, 
with the passage of time, the integration of non-Latvian communities into 
one Latvian society seems to be increasing without suggesting the Rus-
sian-speakers’ overall assimilation. The members of Russian-speaking 
communities adapt to the situation mainly through formation of “hybrid 
identities.” These processes go somewhat along the lines observed by 
David Laitin in the Estonian context, where the quality and quantity of 
interethnic contacts conditions short-term outcomes.92 Despite the policy 
implementations which, especially in the area of minority policies as 
David Galbreath and Liz Galvin argue, bear resemblance to Soviet strate-
gies,93 Latvia’s ethnic and linguistic groups seem to progressively con-
verge as the number of interethnic contacts grows over time.94  
More detailed examinations as to how the principles adopted by the 
Latvian government accommodated the interests of Latvia’s non-titular 
residents are still needed. Elsewhere, Galbreath concludes that continuous 
reference to minority rights by international organisations and local politi-
cians has created expectations of the Russian-speakers for greater political 
and cultural rights in Latvia.95 In the view of Galbreath, the failure of the 
national governments to provide concessions to the minority communities 
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and dissolve the majority’s fears of ethnic extinction has resulted in the 
persistence of controversies on central issues of post-Soviet statehood, 
such as citizenship, language and education policies.96  
All the same, non-citizens could freely participate in civic activity, 
have access to social benefits and conduct business. Both the Latvian and 
Estonian states have provided a solid base for the minorities’ appreciation 
of their state of residence as “service stations.”97 Precisely these reasons 
should be mentioned as rationale behind the limited interest of Latvia’s 
and Estonia’s non-citizens to express greater affection for their states of 
residence. In both cases, albeit by different means, the state has de facto 
acknowledged the status of cultural autonomy for the Russian-speaking 
communities, which in the short run can explain the growing separation of 
the cultural groups in the two countries.  
While in the short-term the potential for interethnic conflict in the 
two states has been significantly reduced, as I will discuss in the following 
chapter, in the mid-term the conditions provided for gaining the knowl-
edge of the state languages are likely to contribute to greater separation of 
the ethnic communities in the two countries. It remains to be seen, how-
ever, whether in the long-run the process of generational replacement will 
facilitate the change in the attitudes of the non-titular communities to-
wards language, education opportunities and minority-related politics in 
their states of residence.  
 
 
5.   Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discerned several problems that non-titular commu-
nities in the Baltic states faced during the 1990s. I have indicated that 
state- and nation-building in the three countries has largely collided, being 
envisaged by the majority populations without consultations with the local 
minorities. The steps taken were, in the first place, aimed at building a 
political community on the basis of citizenship and in relation to the So-
viet past. I further suggested that this logic finds its expression even more 
so during the 1990s, when all three Baltic states pushed for greater linguis-
tic cohesion of the non-titulars into the communities by defining the terms 
of acquiring citizenship and the use of language and by providing hard 
incentives for education in the state-language.  
The policies and legislative measures have framed political com-
munities as continuing the legacies of the pre-Soviet past and ensured a 
high degree of control by the core groups over the minority populations. 
These policies distinguished the particular role ascribed to the core ethnics 
in the further development of state institutions as serving the interests of 
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majority communities. While at first excluded, the largest part of the non-
core groups found it hard to engage themselves in the political processes 
and win back a place on the political stage. Although these are the implicit 
assumptions in the studies of the minorities’ adaptation strategies, the 
steps defining the group in explicit minority terms by the core nationalities 
of the Baltic states need to be reconsidered with greater precision.  
Undoubtedly, some steps were intended by the titular majorities to 
improve the linguistic competence of non-titular groups and increase their 
interactions with political institutions dominated by majorities. As I dem-
onstrate in following chapters, these policy-changes were rarely effective 
because they never took minority opinions into consideration. Over time, 
non-titular residents in the Baltic states were effectively marginalised in 
the nation-building, and then in the negotiations about the design of politi-
cal institutions. 
Starting from the situation described in this chapter, I proceed with 
a study of the policy steps undertaken to strengthen the status of the state 
language in the three countries and underline the active policies of regulat-
ing minority education. Specifically, I question whether this might be 
considered an example of systematic exclusion of the non-titulars from 
political influence or should be attributed to the processes of consolidating 
the democratic regime around the principles of one cultural and linguistic 
community. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Titularisation of Baltic education  
 
 
The concerns about survival of the titular languages did not disappear with 
the regained independence of the Baltic States. Ironically, the prospect of 
EU accession additionally influenced the perceptions of Estonians, Latvi-
ans, as well as Lithuanians of their nations’ and languages’ potential dis-
appearance, giving rise to anti-European sentiments over the course of 
membership negotiations. Membership in the EU for Estonia and Latvia 
was strongly connected to fulfilling the directives of the EU on issues 
where local political elites and their voters were not prepared to compro-
mise. Above all, the issues of political membership, language legislation 
and the education policies of Estonia and Latvia were closely monitored 
by international organisations in order to assess their relevance for the 
accommodation of minority communities in these two states. Lithuania 
experienced far less criticism in this respect, as it was said to have em-
barked on a more liberal version of nation-building. This chapter com-
pares three states by addressing the regulations regarding minority educa-
tion.  
To do this, the present chapter investigates constraints imposed on 
the minority populations in the process of the EU-accession in all three 
states. Here I discuss the range of policies which strengthened the status of 
the state language, primarily through reforms of education system. The 
seminal studies on the issue, such as David Laitin’s “Identity in Forma-
tion,” Volkov’s and Apine’s “Latvia’s Russians’ Identity” and Kasatkina’s 
and Leončikas’s “Adaptation of Lithuania’s Ethnic Groups” all underline 
the behavioural change of minority individuals, their predilection for inte-
grating into the majority society, and the majority’s preparedness to ac-
commodate political realities in their states of residence.1  
Decisively, this was not a result of concerted policies to integrate 
minority populations into the majority societies, nor was it caused by the 
growing acceptance of Russian- and Polish-speakers as parts of Baltic 
societies. During this later period, however, minority groups increasingly 
developed multilingual skill, thus complying rather than challenging the 
implicit ideological assumptions of importance and status of national lan-
guages for successful life in the Baltic. While the members of non-titular 
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groups increasingly sought to access public domain and participate in 
political, social and cultural life of Baltic societies, minorities were still 
considered the biggest threat to survival of titular cultures and languages. 
To be accepted as equals by the members of the titular nation, minorities 
had to speak state languages both grammatically correct and without an 
accent.  
As I discuss in this chapter, education reforms only further secured 
the dominance of state languages in the public space. Because reforms 
were generally in line with the previous strategies of nationalising the state 
and its institutions, many members of the minority used the window of 
opportunity to profit from potential for social mobility. The sceptics from 
among the minority communities were ambivalent, trusting that political 
institutions had finally accepted that Russian-speakers were there to stay. 
Additionally, many minorities believed that instead of being granted tools 
for adapting to the situation of titular dominance, majority political actors 
used all tools at their disposal to perpetuate structural dominance over 
speakers of non-state languages. This chapter argues that precisely this 
had happened in all three states. 
 
 
1.   Language teaching  
The governments were active in promoting minorities’ proficiency in the 
languages with the means available: specific categories of proficiency 
have been in place since the early-1990s, state agencies overseeing lan-
guage development were put in place and school curricula were developed 
to ensure teaching of the state language to minorities. In this situation, the 
educational authorities, state-language teachers and textbook writers faced 
educational and language teaching problems and challenges ranging from 
the development of new materials for second language acquisition to up-
grading the Soviet materials to suit current needs.2 This involved the de-
velopment of a new concept for teaching Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian 
as a second language, revising the content of learning programmes, pro-
viding new curricula, devising novel teaching methods and means of as-
sessment, as well as preparing new teachers.3 
As observed by Baltic scholars, the level of bilingualism of the titu-
lars in the Baltic states was steadily declining since the Baltic republics 
abolished the compulsory study of the Russian language in schools in the 
late 1980s. On the other hand, the speakers of minority languages, particu-
larly the younger generation, have come to acquire working knowledge of 
the respective state language. Needless to say, the increase in the use of 
the state languages in the Baltic states was facilitated by their growing 
Titularisation of Baltic education  
___________________________________________________________ 
137
prestige, but also by the growing requirements of their deployment in the 
public sphere, and not least by the legal requirements installed.  
The Lithuanian government sought to provide adequate facilities 
and opportunities for individual development of bilingualism, while at the 
same time being sensitive to allowing minorities to develop their linguistic 
education. A row of constitutional provisions and legislation provided 
Lithuania’s minorities opportunities to establish and sustain their educa-
tional, cultural and religious institutions. The Lithuanian Constitution 
addresses national minorities on several occasions, among others in the 
Preamble, with the bulk of additional legislation on National Minorities, 
on Citizenship, on Education, on the Non-Governmental organisations, on 
Public Information, on Religious Communities and on Political Parties and 
Organisations. International treaties to which Lithuania has acceded also 
include a number of Conventions where the minority language issue is 
specifically regulated, such as the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Fundamental Freedoms (signed in 1993, ratified in 1995) and the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (signed 
in 1995, ratified in 2000).  
Decisive, however, have been the bilateral agreements between the 
Government of Lithuania and the “national homelands” of the minorities 
residing in the country.4 The change in status of the language during the 
post-Soviet years also corresponded with the steps undertaken by the gov-
ernment to facilitate the adoption of the national minorities to the require-
ments of the state, following what is generally conceived of as a suppor-
tive strategy for language learning. The objective of integrating the mem-
bers of ethnic minority groups into the mainstream society was accompa-
nied by measures granting minorities opportunities to preserve their iden-
tity by protecting their native language and culture.5 
Since independence, minority language schools have been particu-
larly in the focus of policy-makers. For the graduates of the main and 
secondary minority schools the instruction in Lithuanian was adjusted in 
the light of the large scale move of minority students into Lithuanian-
speaking areas. Importantly, as has been observed throughout the country,  
 
“in order to enable their monolingual children to master the 
Lithuanian language quickly and thoroughly, parents from 
ethnic communities have increasingly started to send them to 
schools where Lithuanian is the medium of instruction.”6  
 
This might be explained to a great degree by the fact that individu-
als of non-Lithuanian origin graduating from compulsory and secondary 
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schools are considered to be sufficiently prepared to use Lithuanian in 
their studies in institutions of tertiary education. Likewise, all of the 
graduates from the Lithuania’s schools after 1992 are considered linguisti-
cally fit for work or any other public activity. For the graduates, the lan-
guage examination system has been streamlined, and students who pass 
their secondary school language examination receive a document equiva-
lent to the certificate of state-language competence for adults. However, as 
representatives of Polish-speakers in particularly claim, the state has con-
sistently neglected the need of its community for central examination in 
non-state languages such as Russian and Polish.7 
There are considerable signs of consolidation of Lithuania’s society 
on the basis of the language knowledge, while the different linguistic 
needs, particularly in the area of education, are continuously addressed in 
Lithuanian politics. However, as some have claimed, behind the peaceful 
coexistence of several languages there is an intensive policy of promoting 
the state language at the expense of other minority, particularly regionally 
dispersed, languages. Although they have been debated among the mem-
bers of the minority communities, in autumn 2001, the Lithuanian Minis-
try of Education officially started to provide bilingual schooling in areas 
with high concentrations of minority populations.8  
Overall however, the debate in Lithuania does not appear to be as 
laden with conflict potential as it is in the neighbouring Baltic states. Al-
though members of the minority communities addressed issues of state 
protection of the Lithuanian language, in interviews with the author many 
of the activists affirmed that the Lithuanian state could do more for the 
preservation of the linguistic rights of autochthonous Polish-speakers and 
of the Russian-speaking communities. At the same time, in their eyes, the 
state also had an obligation to ensure that all Lithuanian residents are 
fluent in Lithuanian.9 The representatives of the Polish-speaking commu-
nity particularly, have argued that there is only a shadow state support for 
the use of Polish in South Eastern Lithuania. However, the community 
activists interviewed would not like to challenge the primacy of Lithua-
nian for the functioning of the state offices in the regions. More so, the 
representatives claimed that Polish should be recognised as a means of 
facilitating the communication between state officials and the local popu-
lation, not as the region’s official language. Because the majority of the 
Polish-speaking community in the region is highly fluent in Lithuanian, 
granting Polish the status of an auxiliary language would confirm the 
multilingual and multicultural nature of contemporary Lithuania and allow 
minorities to be visible in the public sphere.10  
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Similar arguments were also collected in interviews with represen-
tatives of the Russian-speaking communities in major cities in Lithuania. 
These expressions stand out in the light of general support expressed by 
minorities for the “nationalising” approach to regulations of language use 
in Lithuania, which have clear assimilationist intentions. At the same time, 
the members of the minority communities seem to profit largely from the 
fact that the issue has not become an object of regular politicking. This 
allowed the ongoing governmental support for minority schools, even if a 
rather tokenistic one, and thus the approximate equality of linguistic profi-
ciency for minorities and majorities in higher education, the labour market 
and in competition for positions in the public sector.  
While training in Lithuanian was available prior to independence, it 
was within the framework of Latvia’s independence that the methodology 
for teaching Latvian as a second language was developed from scratch. 
The attention of the Latvian government focused on the training of non-
Latvians in the state language immediately after independence. Due to the 
limited proficiency of the local minority populations in the state language 
and very modest budget for such activities, this was done with the aid of 
foreign donors. Where large sections of the population were excluded 
from automatic citizenship, the knowledge of the state language was the 
precondition to its acquisition.11  
One of the major facilitators in the project was the United Nation 
Development Programme (UNDP), which allowed the launch of The Na-
tional Programme for Latvian Language Training (NPLLT). The interna-
tional funding was largely dedicated to tuition in the state language, target-
ing the residents of Latvia whose native language was not Latvian.12 The 
Programme needed to develop a new methodology of language teaching, 
prepare the necessary teaching staff and draft teaching materials. In these 
steps the teachers of Latvian in the Russian-language schools were sup-
posed to be the centre of attention as well as other non-titular groups 
threatened by unemployment due to the lack of language proficiency.  
Initially operating under the UNDP aegis, the NPLLT applied in-
ternational expertise to ensure the availability of language learning oppor-
tunities for the minority communities, as well as enabling conformity with 
the international expectations placed on the Latvian government that it 
guarantee non-Latvians’ the right to use their native language. While ini-
tially the NPLLT aimed at a ten year plan earmarking the goal of training 
180,000 adults and the same number of pupils in the language, it had to be 
enlarged and attached to a specially created National Agency for Latvian 
Language Training to ensure the implementation of its goals. In 2001 the 
Ministry of Education and Science of Latvia took over administrative 
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monitoring, further consolidating the implementation of the Programme. 
Subsequently, in October 2004 the NPLLT Project Management Unit 
changed its status to the Latviešu valodas apguves valsts aăentūra (Na-
tional Agency for Latvian Language Training, LVAVA). The Agency’s 
activities were planned in action phases, with an aim to provide the learn-
ing of the Latvian language and bilingual education especially for non-
Latvian students. Currently, the State Language Policy Programme (2006–
2010) and Support Programme for the Latvian Diaspora (2004–2009) are 
also implemented through the Agency. 
Since the mid-1990s, the Soros Foundation-Latvia was active with 
its project “Open School” that had the somewhat similar incentive of fa-
cilitating language training and implementing of methods of linguistic 
education in minority schools. In extension of its commitment (and re-
sponding to the pressure from the international organisations), the Natu-
ralization Board also launched language training courses for citizenship 
applicants in the early 2000s.13 The majority of the non-titular members of 
Latvian society indicated that this should be read as a sign of the Latvian 
state reacting to increasing pressures from the international community. 
However, an increase in minority’s passing the exams could be interpreted 
differently. The local members of the minority tend to interpret the state 
policies of enhancing the proficiency of non-Latvians in the state language 
as an indicator of states’ preparedness to assist in the national consolida-
tion process.14 Over the 1990s the strengthening of the status of the state 
language was undertaken in the constant bid for nationalist votes rather 
than in order to support minorities.15 Nonetheless, the provisions made for 
minorities to achieve better opportunities for competition in the labour 
market should be acknowledged as tacit acceptance of this responsibility 
by the Latvian state vis-à-vis its non-Latvian inhabitants.  
As discussed, Lithuania had already devised a viable training pro-
gramme for non-Lithuanians to acquire the skills in the state language 
prior to independence, and Latvia did so with the help of the UNDP in 
1995. The Estonian Government neither possessed a tenable programme 
for teaching non-Estonians the state language during the Soviet period, nor 
did it develop the teaching programmes for this comparatively difficult 
language until fairly late.16 The European commission made an offer of 
financial aid via the EU PHARE programme to the Estonian government 
in 1995. Although the government accepted the offer, nation-wide lan-
guage training programmes were not offered for three more years.  
Estonia responded by establishing a Language Strategy Centre with 
the purpose of training teachers of the Estonian language, writing Estonian 
textbooks and organising stays for Russian-speaking school children in 
Titularisation of Baltic education  
___________________________________________________________ 
141
Estonian language summer camps.17 However, the Centre barely remained 
active for the period of time of around three years, lacking governmental 
funding for its activities. Not until 1998 did the Language Centre produce 
an action plan to help Russian-speakers’ schools to accomplish their re-
quired transition to full Estonian-language tuition, already set to take place 
in 2004. Still within the framework of the international funding, on April 
21, 1998, the Estonian Government had assigned the Ministry of Educa-
tion to draw up the task strategy for increasing the capacity of Estonian 
Language Knowledge with the population.  
The European Commission welcomed these amendments and ac-
knowledged Estonia’s considerable progress in its subsequent report of 
2000. In May 2001, following the recommendations of the European 
Commission, the government adopted new regulations for state language 
use in the private sector. The Commission’s report of 2001 stated: “Esto-
nia should ensure that in the implementation of this regulation the princi-
ples of proportionality and justified public interest are properly re-
spected.”18 As a result, the “Language Teaching Strategy of the Non-
Estonian Population” emerged. Subsequently in 2001–2002 the Estonian 
Language Council studied the conditions of teaching the Estonian lan-
guage with the result of drawing a “Development Strategy of the Estonian 
Language” in 2003, which went into public discussion on November 22. 
Only a limited period of time was available for the corrections of the strat-
egy however, and it was approved by the resolution of the Government on 
August 5, 2004. The strategy was adopted by the Riigikogu and prioritis-
ing the development of Estonian language for the years 2004–2010.19 The 
run-up to draft the document suggests that the Estonian Government 
showed only limited interest in increasing minority’s proficiency in the 
state language. All the same, considerable steps were undertaken to estab-
lish the nominal dominance of the State language in the state institutions 
and in the public sector. 
As discussed, Lithuania was particularly proactive in developing a 
coherent and systematic approach to language regulation and hence train-
ing, Latvia was able to devise supporting programmes only with the finan-
cial help of the UNDP, while Estonia failed to react even to financial in-
centive. How can this be explained? The connection between the enforce-
ment of state language use, the question of membership in the political 
community and the country’s general education system comes to fore.  
The language regulations range across the three states. Some schol-
ars suggested that the stringency of restrictions was determined by politi-
cal elites’ perception of potential pay-offs in the international and national 
arenas.20 The first glance at the situation corroborates this view. Lithuania 
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was in no hurry to push for more rigorous legislation of state language use, 
because its minority populations did not need to prove language knowl-
edge to acquire citizenship. The connection was far more explicit in Latvia 
where initial funding of the UNDP was aimed at training in the state lan-
guage, the knowledge of which was seen as a precondition to inclusion of 
non-Latvians into the citizenry. Additionally, the training of Latvian lan-
guage teachers would improve the market value of the state language in 
the country.21 There was a considerable lack of political will in Estonia to 
undertake any changes despite the studies prepared by local scholars argu-
ing the urgency of such a step.22 At the same time, the Estonian case sug-
gests that language learning was framed as essential for the envisaged 
national consolidation vis-à-vis international actors.  
Thus, among the immediate results of international interference in 
Estonia and Latvia was the consolidation of the titular community around 
the issue of the status of the state language and the resources that came 
with it.23 Sociolinguists observe similar processes in societies, where lan-
guage nepotism becomes a pre-emptive response in competition for scarce 
resources.24 As a result of language enforcement, state languages started 
losing their importance as a symbol of identity and status and were largely 
viewed as symbols of resourcefulness. The enforcement of training in the 
state language and encouragement of minority participation in the public 
life were positively worded, but were meant for local non-titulars as well 
as for the international community. Official statements and declarations 
carefully used rhetoric sensitive to international expectations and minor-
ity’s scepticism, but effectively prevented consolidation of the minority 
communities’ opposition to education reforms. Formally, they provided 
opportunities for those who wanted to improve their status; off the record, 
of course, they meant to further marginalise minority members who were 
not prepared to dance to the majority’s tune.  
In all three states the place of the minority in the social edifice was 
not clearly defined and was barely addressed in all of the documents, 
strategy papers and framework documents. Hence, the role played by the 
minority was strongly connected to their upward mobility and perceived in 
an assimilationist manner, which was based mainly if not solely on lin-
guistic accommodation to the titular language. Indeed, David Laitin has 
suggested that the choices of the minority populations in the region might 
be driven primarily by rational choices, determined by aspirations of mate-
rial well-being and related social advancement.25 For minorities, the aspi-
rations to adjust to the state linguistic policies and seek solutions to the 
challenges presented by linguistic and hence social marginalisation re-
flected practical and necessary choices.26 The governmental policy in the 
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region appears to have channelled minority preferences by streamlining 
linguistic requirements in various areas of public activity. By connecting 
minority perspectives for social advancement with proficiency in the state 
languages, Baltic governments incorporated rational incentives into a 
coherent approach of “pacifying” the non-core groups into minority posi-
tions. Overall, these policy changes have much resemblance to Soviet 
policies co-opting Baltic titulars into republican bureaucracy.  
The analysis of group adaptation strategies to changes in linguistic 
demands of the public sphere should not only focus on the elusive atti-
tudes of minority communities resulting from their cost-benefit calcula-
tions. The range of incentives also included compulsory measures which 
kicked in when cooptation did not bring the expected fruit. As I argue, 
over the years of independence the opportunities to receive education in 
the languages other than the state one were continuously undercut, forcing 
rather than allowing minority linguistic adaptation. The reform of the 
educational system assumed a central and active role in the process. 
 
 
2.   Introducing bilingual education programmes 
The policies of the Baltic states to place the state languages in a position 
of dominance in the public sphere point out two competing logics of lan-
guage use. On the one hand, there lay newly emerging ethno-linguistic 
tensions referring to minority rights arguments, while on the other, a suc-
cessful strategy of titularisation of the newly established states. Not inci-
dentally, the two motivations, although competing in the case of the Baltic 
states, are not mutually exclusive and in fact re-enforce one another. 
Whilst the formerly disadvantaged languages had regained central status 
in the process of state and nation-building, political entrepreneurs arguing 
in favour of the protection of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian have un-
derlined the centrality of language for preservation of the cultural and 
national communities. To what extent have the dominant elites undertaken 
measures to provide for adequate protection of the rights of the new mi-
norities who were previously perceived as being oppressive?  
The majority of the references to the situation in question have 
been made from the perspective of the asymmetric bilingualism of the 
state-bearing nationals at the initial stage of post-Soviet democratisation. 
As suggested in the previous chapter, minorities were encouraged to adopt 
themselves to the new situation, without much enforcement from the titu-
lar nationalities. Many found ways to preserve their cultures and lan-
guages in private while removing them from the public sphere as being 
different members of the Baltic societies. With the range of political 
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mechanisms at hand, the majorities in the Baltic states could only use this 
opportune moment to further frame non-core ethnic groups as minorities 
by installing structural constraints on these groups’ opportunity for educa-
tion in languages other than the state language. 
Initially there was a consensual opinion among the Latvian and Es-
tonian elites that education should be permitted in the minority, above all 
in the Russian language. The shift in policy-priorities has slowly led to the 
change of this perception in both countries.27 Needless to say, access to 
education in the minority language is among the most pressing and most 
controversial issues in various regions, but in the Baltic states it has fre-
quently been interpreted in the context of forced adaptation to the socio-
political realities as well as in the context of the previous Soviet policies.28 
However, in the light of the aspired national consolidation, the declared 
commitment of the local governments to support the development of mul-
ticultural societies in the region have not resulted in the actual steps im-
plemented to strengthen the status of the state language. The analyses of 
the education reforms in Estonia and Latvia give decisive clues on policies 
reinforcing the use of the official language in the public sphere by import-
ing the discourse on multiculturalism in order to secure reliable support 
from the EU. Once again, the tripartite comparison of the Baltic states 
provides an ample outline of the situation.  
The Estonian Basic Schools and Upper Secondary Schools Act of 
1993 determined the use of languages in general schools. In the basic 
schools, that is grades 1 to 9, “any language may be the language of in-
struction,” determined by the responsible municipality. However, in the 
upper secondary schools, grades 10–12, the legislation allows only Esto-
nian to be the language of instruction. In the light of the transition to sec-
ondary education with the language of instruction being Estonian only, an 
amendment to the law was adopted in 2000, where the “language of in-
struction” was defined as “the language in which at least 60% of the teach-
ing on the curriculum is given.” Respectively, even in secondary schools, 
up to 40% of all curricula can be taught, in principle, in a minority lan-
guage–which was the case in areas of compact settlement of minorities 
until the 2007 school year. In addition to the secondary schools, the voca-
tional schools also need to use Estonian as the language of instruction. 
However, the Minister of Education can decide on the use of other lan-
guages as languages of instruction under Article 18 of the Vocational 
Educational Institutions Act of 1998.29 However, because the participation 
of Russian-speakers in the political process in Estonia was based on their 
language skills, the attention of education planners increasingly shifted to 
the linguistic cohesion of minority communities.30 
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The provisions for acquiring education in minority languages are 
the most stringent in Latvia. Article 9 of the 1998 Law on Education does 
not permit education in languages other than Latvian to be used unless 
education is taking place in private institutions, at state or municipal edu-
cation institutions implementing national minority education programmes 
or at education institutions defined by special laws. Such schools may be 
an exception and they were relatively few and far between. Hence in Lat-
via, the law establishes mandatory bilingual education in primary schools 
(grades 1–9) and starting with the year 2004, all secondary schools as well 
as all vocational schools had to change to teaching 60% of classes in Lat-
vian, with the rest of the classes in minority languages.31  
The state was phasing out the state funding for minority schools 
during the 1990s, but with the 1998 education legislation the Latvian gov-
ernment completely eliminated the opportunities for state and municipal 
support for complete secondary education in a minority language as of 
2004. The strict regulation of the language of education, as well as the 
prescriptions of the language use in various arenas of public life might 
explain the change in the ethnic balance in the schools teaching in state 
languages. Until mid-1990s, the share of pupils in Estonia and Latvia by 
language of instruction roughly corresponded to the shares of the respec-
tive linguistic communities. The changes in favour of state-language edu-
cation started occurring since the second half of the 1990s. The legal and 
administrative stipulations provided a growing preference for schooling in 
the state languages with minority communities and subsequently caused 
considerable pressure on minority pupils to move into schools with educa-
tion in the state language.32  
In both Estonia and Latvia, the question of the state’s financial re-
sponsibility for the education of Russian-speaking minority children has 
been one of the most controversial topics in the majority-minority dia-
logue.33 While Estonia switched the education at the gymnasium level to 
the state language in 2007, Latvia had already done so in September 2004. 
As has been emphasised in the public statements on the education reforms 
in both countries, this step was undertaken in order to facilitate the con-
solidation of the respective societies.34 However, the policy preferences 
indicate that by pressing for linguistic integration, legislation actually 
implemented steps towards societal integration. This goal would be 
achieved mainly through better knowledge of the official language by the 
Russian-speaking minorities, but education reforms largely disregarded 
the diminishing opportunities for minority speakers to achieve full profi-
ciency in their own mother tongue.35  
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Understandably, the efforts of the authorities to reform education 
by shifting it to teaching in the state language led to widespread concerns. 
Specifically, the parents of Russian-speaking pupils stated that the quality 
of education would deteriorate as a result and that children might be even 
less competitive in the local labour market as a result. Fear of the deterio-
ration of the quality of education stemmed from the fact that many teach-
ers in minority schools did not feel able to teach in the state language.36 
This problem was compounded by the fact that many pupils would not 
understand the subjects properly even if the teachers had a very good 
command of the state language–the level of teaching of the state language 
remained unsatisfactory during 1990s. This was a topic of considerable 
debate at the advent of the school reforms.37  
Consequently, Estonia has been pushing for the transition from a 
bi-communal education system aimed at providing education in Russian 
and in Estonian separately towards a unified system that would secure the 
knowledge of the state language by the end of secondary school. The Law 
on Language in Estonia permitted the use of foreign languages in educa-
tion. Already as early as 1993, the Law on Basic Schools and the Law on 
Upper Secondary Schools prescribed that the Russian-language upper 
secondary schools (grades 10 to 12) undergo the transition to Estonian as 
the language of instruction by the year 2000. However, in the year 1997 
due to structural problems, mainly due to the lack of appropriate personnel 
capable of teaching in the state language, the Riigikogu passed an 
Amendment to the Law on Basic and Secondary Schools postponing the 
deadline for introduction until the start of the academic year 2007/2008.38  
The full-scale transition then started on September 1, 2000, when 
teaching of the Estonian language began in the first grade classes.39 In this 
context the Ministry of Education allocated additional funding for Russian 
medium schools to handle their teaching of Estonian. While the number of 
hours available for teaching in Estonian ranged broadly, many schools 
addressed the issue by teaching non-core subjects, such as music, arts, 
physical education, regional studies, mathematics–in the state language 
starting from the primary school grades.40 As of this amendment, from 
2007/2008 all minority upper schools started the transition to Estonian, 
which in turn influenced the right of members of non-Estonian communi-
ties to receive education entirely in their language.  
In April 2000, the Riigikogu reached a compromise by adopting 
amendments to the Law on Basic School and Gymnasium according to 
which the state will support minority schools if they teach 60% of the 
curriculum of the upper grades in the official language.41 The legislation 
laid the final stone into the foundation of the Estonian multicultural model. 
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Supported by the OSCE local mission’s regular feedback on the models of 
education and support of activities aiming at the reform of minority 
schools along multicultural lines, both the international actors and the 
local politicians were clearly not averse to improving the teaching of Es-
tonian in the Russian-language schools.42 Most likely, it was now the 
availability of international structural funds for social integration that 
allowed the Estonian government to address the issue more coherently and 
focus on issues of integrating minorities rather than disregard their exclu-
sion due to their insufficient knowledge of Estonian.43  
In March 2002, following work by minority parliamentarians, a 
new amendment to the Law was adopted. It authorised the boards of trus-
tees of minority schools to apply for the postponement of the language 
switch slated for 2007, based upon the preparedness of the schools to 
teach in the state language. While these amendments could not fully dis-
miss worries about the quality of education, tensions in majority–minority 
relations in Estonia were defused to a great extent.44 However, minority 
representatives stressed that no stable institutional framework had been 
created for the preservation of Russian-language gymnasial education in 
Estonia because the appeals of the boards of trustees need to be approved 
by a local authority and then the national government.  
It is important to acknowledge that members of non-Estonian com-
munities were prompted to acquire knowledge of their language in Esto-
nian schools. It should also be noted that despite the fact that no education 
is available in full in a language other than Estonian from 2007, up to 40% 
of curriculum can be taught in minority languages.45 Among other issues, 
the Estonian government provides additional support for the non-
Estonians who study in Estonian schools. Non-Russians, who study in 
Russian schools, can also attend classes which provide them with educa-
tion about their respective culture and language. However the funding 
appears to be insufficient so far. The 2003 EC’s report encouraged Estonia 
to ensure the effective and flexible implementation of the planned transi-
tion to bilingual education in non-Estonian speaking schools by 2007. In 
addition, European institutions called on Estonian policy-makers to ensure 
that the implementation of the language law at all levels respects the prin-
ciple of justified public interest and proportionality, as well as Estonia’s 
international obligations.46  
Likewise, Latvian local politicians used the moment of international 
attention on Latvia’s debate about citizenship to abandon the “self-
referential discourse on restoring the pre-Soviet policies.”47 The Latvian 
government was forced to align itself with European values in order to 
avoid explicit discrimination of non-Latvians, thus opting for the introduc-
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tion of discourse on “ethnic integration.” The rhetoric of Latvianisation 
and the reversal of Soviet Russification policies were nevertheless imple-
mented.48 This was done by two pieces of legislation. In 1998, the Saeima 
passed a new school language law (Izglītības likums) stating that Latvian 
will become the sole language of instruction in state-funded schools and 
education in some schools will be in Latvian only.49 According to that law, 
starting in 2004, at least 60% of subjects in tenth grade shall be taught in 
Latvian while about 40% could be taught in the minority language in all 
minority schools, including schools with Russian as the language of in-
struction. Schools were required to decide which subjects to teach in what 
language. Starting in 2007, all grades at the secondary school level were to 
be taught according to this principle. The reform targeted schools with 
Russian-language instruction since other minority schools had already 
been using a similar bilingual methodology since their establishment.50  
Bilingual education models were introduced in primary education 
and schools were able to choose between four models of bilingual instruc-
tion which differed in the amount of Latvian taught.51 The models, how-
ever, have been criticised because of the short time frame provided to 
decide on the options by the Cabinet of Ministers and the method of their 
implementation, all to take place during the summer vacations of 1999.52 
On the other hand, the Saeima passed the Law on General Education (Vis-
pārējās Izglītības likums) in 1999, providing an opportunity for education 
in the minority language during the state-language programme, particu-
larly in relation to subjects relevant for cultural identity.53 The law, how-
ever, stipulated that access to minority language education was allowed 
and not guaranteed leaving the decision on the issue with the Ministry of 
Education.54 The students and the parents of those affected in the Russian-
speaking communities, as well as different groups of Latvian experts, have 
expressed concerns about the opportunities and guarantees for primary and 
secondary education in the minority language, stressing the importance of 
native language education.55  
From the point of view of policy-makers, the goal of education re-
forms was to facilitate the linguistic integration of society. This was to be 
achieved mainly by providing a secure basis for all non-Latvians to ac-
quire knowledge of the state language and, correspondingly, to accustom 
themselves with the cultural heritage and major principles of the Latvian 
culture. This was to be accomplished by increasing the importance of the 
Latvian language in education, leading to complaints by Russian-speaking 
activists that the integration policy had assimilation in mind rather than the 
rapprochement of ethnic communities through mutual work.56 Russian-
speakers’ perception that language teaching is pursued only to facilitate 
Titularisation of Baltic education  
___________________________________________________________ 
149
assimilation was further reinforced by bringing minority education in line 
with the aims set out in the state programme on society integration. 
In Lithuania, education reforms were not on the government’s main 
agenda over the period of time concerned. Since Lithuania’s minorities are 
among those with the highest education rates in the Baltic states, they also 
demonstrate high levels of proficiency in the state language if compared 
with the minority populations in Estonia and Latvia.57 As opposed to its 
northern neighbours, Lithuanian education was under much less pressure 
to provide greater opportunities for minorities to learn the state language: 
where the rationale behind the Latvian and Estonian education reforms 
was to ensure the qualitative learning of the state language and hence 
facilitating linguistic integration of minority populations into the majority-
dominated society, the integration in Lithuanian society was perceived 
more in terms of alleviation of social and income differences, which–at 
least in the official rhetoric–were not explicitly tied to language profi-
ciency.58  
Because of the relatively broad scope of teaching of Lithuanian 
throughout the country, there were different implications for the speakers 
of minority languages. The numbers of non-titular population to be taught 
were significantly lower in Lithuania than in Estonia or Latvia. The teach-
ing methods were also considerably different. Effectively, the approach 
chosen aimed at guaranteeing the possibility to learn the language suffi-
ciently to be able to communicate in it, rather than emphasising the intrin-
sic value of being able to speak Lithuanian, which was the model de-
ployed in Latvia and Estonia.59 In part, the previously available methodol-
ogy of teaching Lithuanian to the speakers of other languages had allowed 
for greater flexibility in designing the new curricula and significantly 
calmed the tensions over language education. Some observers argue that it 
was also a reason for considerable de-politisation of the issues connected 
with the language legislation in general, and education reforms in particu-
lar.  
While the major issues with regard to education were regulated by 
the Lithuanian Constitution, the Lithuanian government approved the 
General Concept of Education (Lietuvos švietimo koncepcija) in 1992, 
filling some remaining gaps in the legal framework for minority and edu-
cation in general.60 Over the entire decade following independence, educa-
tion reforms were constantly being undertaken, gradually changing the 
process. On 2 July 1998, several essential amendments were added to the 
1991 Law on Education (Švietimo įstatymas), such as the introduction of a 
basic 10–year education, admission of school children from the age of 14 
to vocational schools, and the like. A further draft law that would amend 
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these regulations was discussed in 2001, and was published on June 17, 
2003 (Law on the Amendment of the Law on Education, Švietimo įstatymo 
pakeitimo įstatymas). This and other legal documents deal with educa-
tional matters in Lithuania including the Law on Science and Studies 
(Mokslo ir studijų įstatymas, 1991) regarding the institutions of science 
and higher education, the Law on Vocational Education and Training 
(Profesinio mokymo įstatymas, 1997), the Law on Special Education (Spe-
cialiojo ugdymo įstatymas, 1998), the Law on Informal Adult Education 
(Neformaliojo suaugusiųjų švietimo įstatymas, 1998) and the Law on 
Higher Education (Aukštojo mokslo įstatymas, 2000).  
These documents present a comprehensive development of the leg-
islation. This corpus of laws grants national minorities the right to hold 
lessons in their mother tongue and provides for the right to have schooling 
in the minority language.61 These laws also acknowledge that general 
education and non-formal education facilities must provide teaching in the 
language of the ethnic minority and foster the ethnic minority’s culture.62 
Furthermore, while in minority schools the Lithuanian state language is a 
constituent part of the curriculum, the teaching process must be conducted 
or certain subjects must be taught in the language of the ethnic minority.63  
However, the trend of increasing the number of schools with the 
state language as the language of instruction is similar to that observed in 
other Baltic states. Not surprisingly, the number of Lithuanian and Polish 
schools has been on a constant increase, although overall the number of 
schools has been decreasing. The numbers of those who study in Lithua-
nian has been consistently rising over the past two decades resulting in 
less than 10% of students studying in minority language throughout the 
education system. As of 2000, around 7% of vocational schools, 1% of 
vocational colleges and less then 2% of university students were educated 
in a minority language.64 In part, classes for minorities residing in the 
mixed areas have been provided at different titular schools, and the De-
partment of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad (Tautinių 
mažumų ir išeivijos departamente prie Lietuvos Respublikos, TMID) has 
supported a number of Saturday- and Sunday schools.65 The majority of 
minorities support Saturday/Sunday schools where children can acquire 
the knowledge of their native language and take courses on culture and 
“homeland” history. Among these the Polish, Belarusian, Ukrainian, Rus-
sian, German, Jewish, Latvian and Armenian communities are active, but 
also those of the Karaims, Tatars and Greeks. In 2004/2005, there were 46 
such schools. In the school-year 2001/2002, around 90.5% of schools 
operated in Lithuanian and some 3.7% in Polish, with overall diminishing 
numbers of Russian schools. To an extent the change was facilitated by 
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the fact that many schools operating in Russian were merged with the 
schools of Polish, Lithuanian and other languages, at the “request of stu-
dents’ parents.” Over the following years, the number of secondary 
schools has further diminished considerably, mainly due to their merger 
resulting in a reduction of 296 schools in the 2004–2005 school year. This 
also resulted in diminishing numbers of minority schools functioning in 
Lithuania, which in 2004/2005 amounted to only 173.66  
The overall trend in the changing numbers of schools and the lan-
guage of instruction has been accounted for by the demographic changes 
in the country, resulting mainly in the reorganisation of Russian-speaking 
schools, their merger with Lithuanian, or altogether their abolition to pro-
vide space for overcrowded Polish schools. At the same time, the trend 
that is alarming minority leaders in the northern Baltic states, minority 
parents’ tendency to send their children to study at the titular schools, has 
been particularly overwhelming in Lithuania.67 In Lithuania no outcry 
accompanied the increasing move of minority children into schools teach-
ing in the majority language. While the government had consistently em-
phasised the fact that education in Lithuania was to be carried out in the 
state language, some of the educational establishments have encountered 
issues of under-achievement amongst the country’s Polish community in 
recent years. These represented the greatest bulk of those with low educa-
tion in Lithuania, competing mainly with the minority traditionally distant 
from higher education: the Roma.  
The meagre debate about the decline of Russian-language education 
only repeated the opinions of many minority parents that the better knowl-
edge of Lithuanian provided for better social and educational chances of 
their children. Additionally, many argue that being at ease with the 
Lithuanian language and culture allow minorities to preserve its cultural 
identity in a state dominated by Lithuanians. Instead of full-scale educa-
tion in Russian, Russian-speakers are relocating into Russian-language 
Sunday schools or extracurricular activities, which are frequently seen as 
providing assets for cultural links whilst guaranteeing better jobs and 
higher social status in Lithuania’s society. While social scientists in 
Lithuania claim that a growing number of minorities in the Lithuanian 
schools pose a certain challenge to ethnic identification and tolerance in 
Lithuanian society,68 parents and school children affected appear not to see 
this as a state-sponsored strategy of assimilation. Needless to say, the 
official rhetoric sees these developments as a form of successful integra-
tion of ethnic minorities into the titular society–the rhetoric that is usually 
employed in bilateral relations with the external “homeland states” of 
Poland and Russia.69 
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However, as in other Baltic states the success of Lithuanian institu-
tional developments can hardly be assessed separately from the minority 
settlement patterns, the accessibility of education facilities in the rural 
areas and the values and social standing of the family, as these seldom 
reflect the language of instruction. Similarly to the other Baltic govern-
ments, Lithuania has disregarded the opportunity for teaching minority 
languages at Lithuanian-language schools. Particularly in the region where 
minorities are de facto majorities, such as in South Eastern Lithuania, 
minority language training could have been integrated into the social co-
operation model.70  
The differences in views amongst those members of the majority 
who favour “thick language policies” and those opting for “thin policies,” 
as well as lack of attention to minority voices prevent a coordinated ap-
proach to the development of bilingual education in Lithuania, just as they 
do in Estonia and in Latvia. While Estonia currently offers an immersion 
model for the Russian-medium side-stream schooling, despite providing 
Estonian as a second language students are often poorly integrated into the 
overall education system, particularly where the Estonian-speaking envi-
ronment is missing. The biggest part of minority schools in Latvia has 
complied with state directives to implement changes in curricula. Argua-
bly, this antagonised the differences between the members of Russian-
speaking communities, hardening the lines between those in favour and 
those against titularisation of Latvia’s education. 
All this indicates that the school reforms aimed at ensuring better 
knowledge of state language with minorities rather than at improving 
teaching methods and overall competitiveness of the members of minority. 
However, while generally having reached the objective, education reforms 
only marginally accounted for regional differences in opportunities for use 
of state languages by the non-core ethnic groups in Estonia, Latvia, as well 
as in Lithuania. Crucially, education reforms reinforced the image of state 
language as being a bastion, rather than the bridge in relations between 
ethnic communities in the Baltic states.  
 
 
3.   Changes in school curricula 
The challenges of devising curricula for the local minority communities 
centre around two issues. Firstly, the regional approach to development 
had to take differences in group settlement patterns into consideration and 
hence reflect on the frequency with which minorities could use their 
knowledge of the state language acquired. At the same time, language 
teaching was to be set up to meet the communicative needs of the non-
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core ethnic communities. There was a distinct variance in proficiency in 
the state language, as well as preferences for the language of education 
among the groups of minorities. The failure of majority political entrepre-
neurs to take these issues into consideration while devising the new cur-
ricula and/or implementing education reforms account for the growing 
disengagement of non-titulars from political processes and the frustration 
with state top-down policies on highly sensitive issues in the cultural do-
main.  
The Lithuanian government is providing educational establishments 
with the opportunity to operate in the native language at the secondary 
education level and as such supports the endeavours of minorities to sus-
tain their native languages. The Ministry of Education reports that as of 
the 2001–2002 school year around one tenth of all schools in the country 
were operating in the minority language (206 as compared with 1953 in 
Lithuanian).71 With 80 schools, Polish is the language of instruction at the 
majority of the minority-language schools; Russian is the language of 
operation at 61; there is one Belarusian school. Language combinations 
are used at 65 schools, for instance Lithuanian-Russian, Lithuanian-Polish, 
Polish-Russian, Lithuanian-Polish-Russian. Finally, a number of schools 
with mixed instruction in minority languages, such as Belarusian, Hebrew 
and Yiddish, and German were also established.  
On January 16, 2002, The Minister of Education and Science 
passed a Decree on the Regulation of National Minorities Education, aim-
ing at the regulation of the specific organisation needed for national mi-
norities’ education. The decree specified the organisational and financial 
aspects of the work, introducing special coefficients for financing minority 
schools in light of the fact that education in minority school is more ex-
pensive than when the official language is used. This step has been criti-
cised, however, for being “quite abstract and […not identifying] concrete 
measures for achieving their goals.”72 Especially in light of the chronic 
underfunding for minority language schools, many minority students tend 
to choose schools in which Lithuanian is the operating language, since 
they believe that they can thus gain better knowledge of the state language 
on an official level.  
The representatives of ethnic minorities frequently criticise state 
policies in the realm of education as depriving the schoolchildren of a 
truly voluntary choice of language, ethnicity and cultural identity. This 
argument is particularly salient with the Polish-speaking NGOs. Although 
the government of Lithuania is undertaking some steps to create a new 
inclusive civic identity for all residents of the country, they argue, this is 
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done at the expense of cultural and linguistic diversity of state’s citizenry. 
Polish minority organisations claim that the state is pursuing a policy  
 
“of gradual elimination, or limitation, of the use of the Polish 
language in public life. Many of the actions of the authorities 
and politicians indicate that the ultimate aim is to limit the 
use of the Polish language in everyday relations within the 
circle of Polish community organisations, or indeed amongst 
friends and family.”73  
 
Russian and Polish speakers in Lithuania have consistently demon-
strated different attitudes in the choice of schools for their children. Whilst 
Russians tend to favour mainstream education, many Poles are inclined to 
prefer Polish secondary schools. In Soviet times they had chosen Russian-
medium instruction.74 As has been confirmed in the interviews with the 
members of the Polish-speaking community engaged in informal educa-
tion, in recent years schooling in the native language is perceived as the 
best condition for the preservation of their national identity and culture. In 
addition, secondary education guarantees Polish-speaking students an 
opportunity to enrol in Poland’s institutions of higher education.75  
The changes that have occurred during the last decade have affected 
parents’ attitudes to education, leading many minorities to prefer schools 
with Polish as the medium of instruction and where Lithuanian is taught as 
a second language. Arguably, compact settlement of Polish-speakers in 
South Eastern Lithuania gives them an advantage of sustaining a network 
of schools with education in Polish. The Russian-speaking community is 
much more dispersed across the country and for this reason is said to have 
opted for education in Lithuanian as a precondition for integration into the 
majority community.  
 
“Members of this community are inclined to have their chil-
dren educated in Lithuanian schools. Thus, the resident Rus-
sians like to foster their own culture and language whilst inte-
grating into the Lithuanian society, as opposed to the Poles 
who tend to adhere to things Polish.”76  
 
Similarly to Estonia and Latvia, models of bilingual education have 
been introduced throughout Lithuania. Russian-language schools mainly 
took part in the process, while the Ministry of Education also indicated 
that Polish-speaking schools were reluctant to participate in projects of 
this type.77 Specially designed curricula and textbooks for bilingual educa-
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tion were prepared in order to facilitate the acquisition of the state lan-
guage by members of minority groups, while at the same time providing 
them with opportunities to retain their native language during education. 
In order to “better supply the needs of the changing society and to harmo-
nise, humanise, and democratise the system of education,”78 the Ministry 
of Education promoted the establishment of different models for the 
schooling of minorities.  
In September 2001 the project “Development of Bilingualism” was 
launched to provide for bilingual education of minorities. Accordingly, 
five bilingual models with differences in intensity and priorities for lan-
guage acquisition were proposed for adoption by schools. These models 
potentially ensure that minority children continue to maintain and develop 
their mother tongue at a native-speaking level and at the same time, pro-
mote Lithuanian bilingualism and literacy in the state language. The im-
plementation of these new educational developments is being steered by 
the Education Development Centre in Vilnius, who also acted as consult-
ant for those schools implementing the programme.79  
Despite positive feedback from students and their parents, some of 
the experts in the field of minority education argued that the models 
adopted in Lithuania are assimilationist in tendency, leading to transitional 
bilingualism.80 This view is supported by the fact that, currently, classes in 
tertiary education are conducted in Lithuanian only, hence the pragmatic 
view that the integrative function of learning in the state language is in-
strumental and is preferred as a mean of accommodating oneself to the 
overall demands of society.  
 
“Seeing their children’s future directly linked to success in 
the mainstream, these parents clearly did not want education 
to limit their offspring’s chances by offering too much ac-
commodation (i.e. education in the minority languages 
only).”81  
 
On the positive side, however, the implementation has been fa-
vourably commented upon as providing positive incentives for minorities 
to obtain access to higher education facilities and integration into social 
life. It has been frequently mentioned in the discussions over the strategy 
that the approach largely disregards the regional specifics of the ethnic 
composition of the population, the accessibility of education and the qual-
ity of education already provided.82  
The situation with the education of the Roma should be mentioned 
as well. While included in the special “Programme of Integration of Roma 
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into the Society of Lithuania 2000–2004” a Roma Public Centre was es-
tablished in Vilnius in September 2001, whereupon 26 Roma children 
were able to graduate from preparatory classes in 2002.83 Additionally, the 
implementation of the programme allowed publication of study materials 
for Lithuania’s Roma community and supported Roma education more 
generally. Overall however, the follow up reports on the situation of Roma 
have attested to only symbolic success.84  
While there was visibly no contention between the ethnic groups, 
the issues relating to the state language and the use of minority languages 
in Lithuania were effectively depoliticised in the early years of independ-
ence. The situation in Latvia, however, was radically different. Nonethe-
less, the political elites in Latvia deemed it necessary to stress that ethnic 
accord in the country could be achieved only on the basis of the Latvian 
language. This narrative was thoroughly pursued in the education reform 
of 1998. It appears that in the short term this goal was not achieved be-
cause Latvia’s political entrepreneurs had established dominance of the 
Latvian language in the public. Rather than seeking dialogue on the role of 
state language in education, compliance with the top-down regulations 
was meticulously enforced. As we will see in chapter 7, during the protests 
of minority groups over reform of education the opportunity for a dialogue 
was missed and, as a result, the cleavage between ethnic communities in 
the country deepened.85  
Latvian and international researchers have emphasised the impor-
tance of education reform, but many saw it as badly implemented. How-
ever, there was no opposition to the implementation of the language re-
quirements per se.86 The study by the Baltic Institute for Social Science 
(BISS) in 2004 indicates that bilingual education was supported by 65% of 
the teachers and 54% of the parents, whereas only 39% of parents and 
22% of the teachers would like to see teaching in Russian only.87 It ap-
pears that the major reason for conflict is not the transition towards educa-
tion in the state language, as has been overwhelmingly represented in the 
media. Rather it was the preparations for transition to “60/40 language 
teaching” scheme. Particularly telling in this context is the wording of Igor 
Pimenov, the head of Latvijskaya associaciya v podderzhku shkol s 
obucheniem na russkom yazyke (Latvian Association in Support of 
Schools with the Russian Language of Education, Lašor). His organisation 
“advocates the allocation of a distinguished place for the study of native 
language in secondary schools to allow schools greater opportunity for 
choice [in implementation].”88 The issue of minority education reform 
gradually became the force that galvanised political mobilisation of Rus-
sian-speakers.  
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The necessity of reform was already clear for minority groups even 
though the conflict escalated due to the poor responsiveness of Latvian 
officials. The BISS study “Integration of Minority Youth” conducted 
across Latvia suggests that the minority community widely believed that 
good knowledge of Latvian is necessary for all members of the Latvian 
society, but also that the major problem with the reforms lay in the head-
on approach of the Latvian authorities.89 Around three-quarters of non-
Latvian respondents in the BISS study state that knowledge of Latvian is 
necessary in the labour market and for education.90 While acknowledging 
the importance of the Latvian language for career opportunities, at the 
same time many minority representatives place great value on granting 
Russian the status of the second state language. Especially in the context 
of education reforms, the attitudes of many minority representatives reflect 
the negative reaction towards the ongoing titularisation of the state. Thus, 
while before the fierce debates 84% of non-Latvian residents supported 
the idea of Russian being a state language, after the discussions up to 96% 
expressed their wish to see Russian language granted this status.91  
A number of local experts were equally critical of the roadmap for 
implementing the education reform. In the debate which took place in 
February 2004, Brigita Zepa indicated that the period of time for reform 
towards bilingual education was too short. “[The implementation period] 
started with the first grade in the year 1999 and is currently insufficient to 
accomplish the transition into full-scale Latvian-language learning by 
2004.”92 NGOs representing the interests of Russian-speakers in Latvia, 
Lašor and Obyedinennyi Kongress Russkoi Obshchiny Latvii (United 
Congress of the Russian Community of Latvia, OKROL) among others, 
expressed widespread concern among non-Latvians that reform will bring 
severe difficulties into learning for non-Latvian children.93  
Meanwhile, the total number of students who studied in the Russian 
language fell from 154,912 in 1990 to 127,784 in 1996. This trend has 
continued and in the school year 2001/2002 the figure was 103,350, which 
constituted 30.67% of all students.94 In Latvia there were 725 schools with 
Latvian as the instruction language and 175 schools with Russian as the 
major language of instruction. Linguistic preferences in education show a 
slight but permanent increase in the share of Latvian instead of Russian, 
especially among first graders.  
Much later than its Baltic neighbours, the Estonian government ap-
proved the “Development Plan for the Non-Estonian School” in January 
1998. This consolidated measures recommended by the Language Strategy 
Centre for bringing the Russian-language school system in line with Esto-
nia’s national curriculum.95 However while Latvia implemented pro-
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grammes to provide teaching of the state language from early 1990s, simi-
lar programmes were unavailable in Estonia until the early 2000s. Still 
resembling the strategy of assimilating the minority groups living in Esto-
nia into the titular society, the government indicated that it was willing to 
distance itself from the previous policy of denying the presence of the 
minority on Estonian territory.96 Estonia’s politicians moved onto encour-
aging Russian-speakers to adapt to the new situation and aimed at provid-
ing equal chances for the future perspectives of the majority and minority, 
based on the knowledge of the titular language.97  
This step made clear that the same curricula would have to be de-
ployed at all educational levels, independent of the language of instruc-
tion. Estonian policy also acknowledged different requirements with re-
spect to the linguistic proficiency for each level of education of minority 
students. The curriculum suggested the guidelines for instruction and the 
study conditions, so that graduates of secondary schools with a language 
of instruction other than Estonian would acquire sufficient knowledge and 
competence in Estonian to continue education in an Estonian-language 
medium and higher education. Special attention was paid to equal oppor-
tunities for competition in the labour market that should be granted to 
these graduates. The ability to pass the language test for citizenship was 
required for graduates of Russian-speaking schools. In short, the curricula 
for the non-Estonian secondary schools created conditions under which 
the graduates would be able thereafter to study specialty subjects in Esto-
nian, and hence have an opportunity for social mobility.  
One could argue that, after outlining the process of changing the ra-
tionale behind the education reforms in Estonia, a clear change in the 
mood of Estonian political entrepreneurs is clear. Previously pursuing the 
policy of separation was seen as the most effective means of ensuring a 
stable society. Over time, as local scholars argue, incentives had to be 
made for the minority community who–despite the initial expectations of 
some more radical politicians–did not plan to leave Estonia.98 However, 
the new amendments to the education law have proved that in order to 
reduce social tensions between the Estonian and Russian-speakers in soci-
ety, a full-scale programme is required to address the issues of cooperation 
on the very basis of a common language. The amendments might have 
reflected the view that the Estonian political elites became increasingly 
aware of the problem with minority linguistic integration (although not 
with European standards in the area). However, one cannot ignore that the 
issues addressed simply offered an instrumental solution to European 
conditionality99 and dealt with the issue using the funds provided by inter-
national organisations.100  
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During this time however, the Estonian government continued to 
place great emphasis on its commitment to building a multicultural soci-
ety, as is spelt out in the National Integration Programme. The more recent 
developments in the education policy of the Estonian state suggest that, 
although during the years of intensive monitoring and significant subsidies 
being introduced into the language training and education programmes, 
the state has not consulted minority community on its needs. The training 
of Estonian language teachers to be employed in the education of minority 
students and the development of programmes and models of education 
which would suit the requirements of areas where Estonian is rarely spo-
ken on a daily basis have taken a back seat.  
At the same time, the outspoken commitment of the state can be ob-
served in the areas of implementing programmes for teaching the Estonian 
language abroad, support of materials for Estonian-learners with non-
Russian linguistic backgrounds and a systematic lack of commitment to 
ensure minority linguistic rights in the country. The general perception of 
the minority population in Estonia indicates that while state agencies have 
demonstrated to the international community, and first and foremost to the 
European states, that it can adapt to and implement know-how in linguistic 
education, it is hardly capable of either devising proactive minority educa-
tion programmes or of achieving any success in the field of majority edu-
cation to facilitate interethnic dialogue.101 
Despite the mass of attention education reforms and the debates 
surrounding them have received from the local publics, the international 
community has not entered the debate. Most likely, the lack of interfer-
ence could be explained by the fact that no international standards exist in 
this area. The international contribution to Estonian and Latvian reforms, 
from the European Commission for instance, has been restricted to point-
ing out examples of successful bi- and multilingual education in other 
countries and calling for a “constructive approach” to the issue.  
The reforms in Estonia and Latvia however have been criticised for 
their abrupt character and for not taking into consideration the lack of 
sufficiently prepared teachers, which certainly undermined the quality of 
education as such. Regardless of the fears of minority populations in Lat-
via, the Education Laws, passed along with the Language Law envisaged 
that all minority schools should continue to function according to a bilin-
gual methodology. Ultimately, the implementation of school reform in 
Estonia has been postponed due to a lack of qualified teachers. So in the 
end, neither the complete turn from Russian-language education was as-
serted, nor was the abolition of training in Russian feasible. Nonetheless, 
while since 2007 all grades of the secondary school throughout the region 
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should teach according to this principle, the reforms were mainly aimed at 
schools teaching in the Russian language.102 This means that within the 
next decade all members of minority will be fluent in the state language 
and, following official state terminology, will be considered fully inte-
grated into local society.  
Especially in the context of new geopolitical realities, the impor-
tance of guaranteeing the dominance of one ethnic group in political deci-
sion-making was sought by many members of the majority, especially 
those who were particularly nationalistically-minded. Some of the groups 
“did not conceal their more ambitious overall goal: that of promoting the 
migration of Slavs, termed ‘voluntary repatriation.’”103 Still, the strategies 
of framing the minority community in the Baltic states generally can be 
reduced to a continuum of steps resulting from an emerging ethnopolitical 
balance in the countries aimed at guaranteeing the structural advantages 
for the state-bearing nation in a complex ethnic setting. 
Boris Tsilevich, member of the Latvian parliament, also claims that 
the “promotion of the titular languages is linked with an ulterior purpose: 
the eradication of Russian as a symbol of the eradication of Russia’s 
domination.”104 Particularly in this light, majority politicians would like 
the state language to dominate in the public sector as much as possible and 
to ensure its unprecedented role in public offices. This can be seen as 
playing the symbolic role of retribution for the time of past suppression in 
the Soviet Union.  
The reluctance of the local political elites to promote the use of mi-
nority languages in the official domain would be a perfect illustration of 
the close link between the knowledge of the state language, loyalties to the 
independent state and reliability in political issues before joining the EU. 
This situation is not specific to Latvia and Estonia. Lithuania’s Depart-
ment of National Minorities, the state institution installed to support the 
use of minority languages throughout the country, is preoccupied with the 
promotion of the Lithuanian language in the South Eastern, Polish-
speaking regions of Lithuania more than with other objectives.105  
The opposition met by the members of minority groups that support 
education in minority languages indicates that there is much more at stake 
than fluency in the state language. Much more, titular policy-makers per-
ceive limited language skills as an indication of uncertain loyalty under-
mining the principle of statehood in Estonia and Latvia. Similar arguments 
apparently stand behind the ongoing restriction of Polish language on 
street signs and official buildings in South Eastern Lithuania. More telling 
are the alarms coming from state language commissions on the impact of 
youth jargon on coherence (i.e. purity) of state languages. Remarkably, the 
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speakers of the local varieties of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian in 
Võrumaa, Latgale and Samogitia are also experiencing pressures from the 
state language inspectorates. It seems that during the decade of nationally 
sensitive rhetoric, many political entrepreneurs have internalised the view 
of language as bulwark against their nation’s disappearance and as part 
and parcel of a security argument.  
 
 
4.   Conclusion 
A brief and far from complete overview of the steps undertaken by the 
Baltic governments could suggest that the degree of cohesiveness of edu-
cation preferred somehow reflects the numbers of minority in the society 
in question. Tsilevich believes just that: 
 
“The higher the proportion of speakers of Russian in a given 
population, the more rigorous the linguistic containment pol-
icy: the language legislation is visibly more liberal in Lithua-
nia, [...] more severe in Estonia, and the most restrictive in 
Latvia, the most ethnically diverse Baltic state.”106  
 
However, the policies of the Baltic states regarding the implementation of 
linguistic criteria in the social processes as reviewed in this chapter require 
qualification by analysing social processes. The state languages are mostly 
promoted through legislative restrictions, such as language requirements 
for employment and the prescription of mandatory use of the state lan-
guages in various areas. Legal instruments for punitive measures and gov-
ernmental bodies responsible for monitoring the implementation of the 
language legislation are also in place.  
At the same time, minority languages are implicitly recognised, but 
there are limited to no opportunities for their use in the public sphere. The 
practice of implementing language equality tends to be legislatively lim-
ited to certain areas, such as the activities of ethnic cultural societies, reli-
gious practices and private relations. Some argue that these reactions to 
language issues are particularly harsh due to their perception as issues of 
crucial importance for the development of re-established statehood.107 
Others state that, while Baltic linguistic legislation is “essentially in con-
formity” with the international obligations of the Baltic states, serious 
criticism is essential when one discusses the implications of provisions.108 
Among these are the clear inequalities of political and social participation 
between different ethno-linguistic communities in the Baltic states.109 
Language proficiency requirements for the candidates to national parlia-
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ments and local municipalities, the prohibition of establishing private 
electronic media in minority languages or the discrimination against ac-
credited private minority schools in terms of their access to state subsidies 
have all been discussed in earlier studies.  
Importantly however, one needs to establish the extent to which 
the state is prepared to push minority groups to the line when accommoda-
tion with state regulations is at the expense of sustaining their own culture 
and language. As we have seen in the chapter 4, the state founding docu-
ments in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania decree the formal dominance of the 
titular majority and grant these groups structural advantages over minority 
populations. The ethnic make-up of the Baltic nations was further 
strengthened through legislation on language use, while minor concessions 
were only made in exchange for EU membership and frequently compen-
sated for by other pieces of legislation. Chapter 5 indicates that Estonia’s, 
Latvia’s and Lithuania’s societies became increasingly split along the 
ethnic lines. The next chapter will look at the policy steps across the re-
gion to conclude whether Baltic societies are ethnically (or otherwise) 
divided. This will allow me an investigation on the processes of co-
optation of minority populations into the structures of domination and how 
social cohesion was framed in terms of multiculturalist rapprochement. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Minority cooptation in the Baltic societies 
 
 
The previous chapters suggested that political entrepreneurs in the Baltic 
states have developed language and education policies frameworks to 
improve minority communities’ adaptation to institutions dominated by 
the titular majorities. Despite this, Baltic political elites have been hesitant 
to give way to minority populations’ demands of greater protection and to 
allow their full-scale participation in envisaging a common political fu-
ture. The gap remained between the aspiration to accommodate and the 
difficulty in addressing the expectations of all minority populations. This 
underlines the importance that political resources have in ensuring that the 
greatest possible number of individuals is engaged in the democratic proc-
ess.  
In fact, not until the late 1990s did the Baltic states start to devise a 
programme to encourage broader participation of non-titular residents in 
the processes of common state-building and dialogue on viable options for 
society at large. Paradoxically, however, the mere presence of minorities 
led Baltic political leadership to acknowledge the potential impact on the 
states’ development in the future. Even though no significant changes 
were undertaken to allow automatic citizenship for Soviet-time migrants 
in Estonia and Latvia, the relation between the states, the citizens of non-
titular nationality and the non-citizen residents of the country was under-
stood as a significant step forward with the adoption of the programmes 
for social integration.1 In Lithuania, the conceptual framework for eth-
nopolitics was also developed to address the different aspects of minority-
majority relations and the role the state would assume in this respect.2  
The situation in Lithuania was investigated to a much lesser degree, 
partly due to the fact that ethnic differences in this country were less prob-
lematic. However, as has been continuously emphasized in the studies of 
the Centre of Ethnic Studies (CES) in Vilnius, equality in political mem-
bership for all Lithuanian residents is only a precondition for the adapta-
tion of minorities to social processes dominated by the majority popula-
tion.3 Comparable research on Latvia’s efforts of consolidating state and 
nation-building has also stressed that the means available to non-core 
ethnic groups for political participation in the first decade after the restora-
tion of independence have been highly dependent on an individual’s citi-
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zenship status.4 Somewhat similarly, in Estonia the availability of citizen-
ship appears to have played a decisive role in strategies of minority rela-
tions with the state and their subjectively perceived position in the social 
hierarchy.5 The difference between citizens and non-citizens in the two 
states, as well as the preponderance of social and economic marginalisa-
tion, have prompted the scholarship to suggest that Estonian and Latvian 
authorities had gone through the full cycle of possible relations with their 
non-core ethnic groups. Starting with the effective denial of responsibility 
for its resident non-citizens (1990–1998) to accepting these as minorities 
in the Latvian and Estonian states (1998–2001), and later to providing 
them with the means to integrate into a society dominated by the state-
bearing national group (after 2001).6 The policy steps of the Lithuanian 
authorities do not correspond to those in Latvia and Estonia. However, 
like in the other two states, minority groups were largely left to their own 
devices to adapt policy documents promoting minorities’ equal chances to 
access and participate in political processes.7  
In this chapter I show how institutions envisage the baseline for 
minority participation in the social, economic and the political life. Be-
cause policy documents reflect on the governments’, as well as the major-
ity populations’ views of minority participation, it will become clear why 
non-core ethnic groups have only participated in political decision-making 
throughout the region to a limited extent. The chapter investigates the 
background from which both groups undertake negotiations of their status, 
what presumptions they make about the possibilities available and the 
outcomes they expect in return.  
 
 
1.   Multicultural in form, national in content  
As I discussed previously, communal relations between the increasingly 
marginalised non-titular groups and the increasingly powerful titular popu-
lations have effectively been regulated within the framework of independ-
ent statehood. Both the steps enforcing the citizenship and language legis-
lations and the changes in minority education were undertaken against the 
backdrop of understanding of the Baltic states as sovereign polities of 
ethnic nations. Previous studies of the rhetoric of the Baltic political entre-
preneurs suggest that the perceptions of the majority communities have 
changed considerably since the Baltic states were short-listed for EU 
membership.8 Throughout the region the potential deficiency of democ-
ratic design was brought up in numerous communications between the 
international organisations monitoring the situation on the ground, NGOs, 
government officials and local academics. Some analyses suggest that 
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certain rights were provided to non-core ethnics in the course of the late-
1990s as a result of the “conditioned” accommodation of minority rights 
by international actors. 9 Many scholars conclude that the “conditioned” 
response of institutions undermined the non-titular acceptance of decisions 
made by political entrepreneurs as being made bona fide.10 In addition, the 
scholarship on social processes across the Baltics suggests that titular 
nationals came to view European integration as a security issue, fencing 
them off from the claims of resident minorities and the minorities’ exter-
nal homelands alike.  
In stark contrast to Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania had passed the 
Law on Ethnic Minorities prior to gaining independence from the Soviet 
Union. Although Lithuanian governments subsequently amended these 
regulations several times, the vast majority of corrections were aimed at 
protecting the link between the state and the Lithuanian ethnic nation, in 
accordance with Lithuanian Constitution. The Law on Ethnic Minorities 
and its amendments have established a comprehensive system of tying 
minority rights to issues of Lithuania’s domestic and internal security by 
providing mechanisms of social cohesion for Lithuania’s non-titulars. In 
2001, a new draft of the Law was passed by the Seimas, prepared by the 
Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad 
(Tautinių mažumų ir išeivijos departamente prie Lietuvos Respublikos, 
TMID) and involving consultations with the Coordination Council of 17 
national minority organisations accredited with the TMID.  
The liberal approach of this law left the decision to be treated as a 
minority entirely to the person affected, effectively downscaling the state’s 
responsibility for minority protection. The decision also aroused the atten-
tion of some particularly nationally-minded Lithuanian politicians who 
have alarmed the public that this provision could be misused by those 
aiming for the fragmentation of Lithuanian society, particularly in light of 
growing regional sentiment in Western Lithuania, Samogitia (Žemaitija). 
Interestingly, Kasatkina and Beresnevičiūt÷ indicate that it also raises the 
question as to whether “the state presumes that non-Lithuanians belong to 
an ethnic minority until declared otherwise,” which brought about the 
unprecedented effect of drawing attention to the issue of social integra-
tion.11  
Importantly, the Law on Ethnic Minorities provides for non-citizens 
to have full rights as the citizens of Lithuania. It establishes that perma-
nently resident non-citizen ethnic minorities can receive state aid for fos-
tering culture and education, the right of members of minorities to receive 
information in their native language, as well as to have information sign-
posted for them in the areas of their compact settlement. The law equally 
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guarantees the right to communicate with political, administrative and 
judicial authorities of their region in their preferred language.  
On June 20, 2002, the Seimas went even further in acknowledging 
the rights of minorities by amending Article 119 of the Constitution.12 In 
an unprecedented move in the region, non-citizens residing in the country 
were granted the right for both active and passive suffrage at the local 
level, thus taking a considerable step in the promotion of political partici-
pation for all resident populations, including ethnic minorities residing 
legally in the country, but without citizenship.13 This regulation, however, 
has changed little in the relatively low political participation of the minor-
ity groups in Lithuania since the adoption of the law. 
The outlined policy-steps indicate that nearly all of Lithuania’s mi-
norities were citizens of the state, and the state identifies the problems this 
group faces as a result of their limited participation in political decision-
making. The Lithuanian state treats minorities’ limited political participa-
tion not as an issue of the specific ethnic population, but rather as an at-
tribute of a particular social group. This was also indicated in other policy-
documents and analyses specifically addressing the low representation of 
minorities in governmental offices. The minority population in Lithuania 
was generally viewed as a group which lacks interest in organising itself 
into a sound political force and hence cannot impact political processes 
that would reflect their specific interests. Nationalist forces in Lithuania 
interpreted the lack of minority engagement as reflecting the absence 
minority ethnocultural identities as such, and hence as a successful out-
come of state and society Lithuanisation. 
Such interpretations were present for quite a while. In 1994 TMID 
was already organised to address minority concerns and facilitate dialogue 
between ethnic minorities and policy-makers. TMID was also to supervise 
and support education in minority languages and to assist in development 
of non-Lithuanian media. The department was also treated as an official 
governmental institution for protection of ethnic minority rights. Its main 
aims were to formulate and implement governmental policy on harmoni-
ous interethnic relations, to grant opportunities to ethnic minorities to 
preserve their identity and to encourage participation in social, political, 
and cultural life. However, just as in Latvia and Estonia promotion of 
tolerance and civic education, encouragement for mutual understanding 
and trust among the people of different nationalities and increase in re-
spect for the cultures, customs, traditions and religions of the various na-
tionalities of Lithuania was undertaken from a position of Lithuanians’ 
dominance.  
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These steps were taken to facilitate the retention of minority iden-
tity as well as the coordination of communities’ activities by the govern-
ment of Lithuania. To this end, the Council of National Associations was 
established under the aegis of the TMID in 1995, consisting of the leaders 
of 17 minority communities. The Council is responsible for coordinating 
minorities’ activities and overseeing the implementation of state policies 
on minorities. The department itself is responsible for relations with the 
NGOs of minorities and for coordinating the implementation of different 
projects on cultural matters, as well as the implementation of equal oppor-
tunities for ethnic groups. However, because the financial support address-
ing the cultural and educational demands of minorities was also chan-
nelled through the department, the state did keep tabs on activities that 
challenged patronising relations of TMID with minority NGOs.  
Although both the TMID and the Council of National Association 
were established to provide minority leaders with the opportunity to dis-
cuss social, educational and other issues important for minority communi-
ties in their relation to the state, there is little evidence of this happening 
thus far. Over the years of its existence, the TMID’s budget had just 
enough money to support its priority area of work: sponsoring the activi-
ties of Lithuanians abroad, which over the years was allocated around 65% 
of TMID’s budget. Remarkably, the second priority was the support of 
Lithuanian language education in the South Eastern Lithuania (around 
18%), whereas integration on non-Lithuanians into Lithuanian society 
ranked third at best, continuously receiving less then 15% of the depart-
ment’s budget. The remaining 3% of TMID’s budget went to projects on 
Roma integration, which was highly debated in 2004 and has been on the 
constant decline ever since.14 Naturally, one can conclude that Lithuanian 
states were taking the principles of the interstate treaties seriously: as a 
national homeland of Lithuanians, the state was responsible for Lithuani-
ans at home and abroad, while national minorities living in Lithuania, 
citizens or not, have to be taken care of by their “homeland” states. As we 
will see later, this was in fact what Poland and the Russian Federation did.  
In both Latvia and Estonia, a range of state institutions were pre-
occupied with minority integration, above all the Naturalisation Board in 
Latvia (Latvijas Republikas Naturalizācijas pārvalde, LRNP) and the 
Foundation for the Integration of Non-Estonians in Estonia (Mitte-
eestlaste integratsiooni sihtasutus, MEIS). Some observers suggest that 
these were erected and sustained only with great support by external fi-
nancial donors.15 These quasi-governmental organisations were set up to 
supervise national integration programmes, confirming the governments’ 
rhetorical commitment to international obligations while generally keep-
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ing a low profile on any of the real outcomes of integration. The close 
connections of the LRNP and MEIS to governments indicate that the ma-
jority political actors were on the defensive vis-à-vis claims made by the 
international community, while being content with the political passivity 
of their minority groups. This becomes increasingly clear when one con-
siders the framework documents which address the integration in Estonian 
and Latvian society.  
The development of the Latvian programme started in April 1998. 
“The Integration of Society in Latvia: Framework Document” (further, 
ISL-FD) was adopted by the Latvian government during the period of 
accession talks with the EU in December 1999.16 After a period of public 
debates on the programme, initiated in March 1999, to inform the public 
of the programme’s goals and to collect feedback on the implementation 
strategies, the national programme “The Integration of Society in Latvia” 
(further, ISL-NP) was thus developed with some input from the minority 
communities. With the participation of different institutions–among others 
the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Latvia, the Natu-
ralization Board, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lat-
via and the National Programme for Latvian Language Training–various 
points of concern were identified.17 
Unsurprisingly, the programme had attracted great interest from the 
public. However, the governmental feedback on civic input had effectively 
considered only the issues which were outlined in the framework proper. 
Thus, issues of regional and sectoral differences in the Latvian society, as 
well as approaches to the role of language and education in the process, 
were specifically considered, with the development of a chapter on social 
integration that reflected on the hazards of social marginalisation present 
in subsequent versions of the programme. Further progress was made with 
the meeting of Cabinet of Ministers on December 7, 1999 in developing 
efficient steps towards the integration of Latvia’s society, with an approval 
of a short version of the programme at the meeting of the secretaries of 
state just a month later, on January 13, 2000.  
The 1999 version of the programme reiterated the principles which 
emphasised the means of preserving the national language and therefore 
appealed very strongly to the titular group. Emphasis was placed on a 
certain view of history and the preservation of the state language. The 
framework therefore made clear that “The current predicament of the 
Latvian language reflects the complicated political, economic, ethno-
demographic and psychological processes, which have taken place during 
the course of history in Latvia.” Social integration was perceived by the 
policy-makers as a tool for excluding possibilities for alternative devel-
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opment, rather than for investigating the intrinsic reasons for addressing 
the issue.  
The debate in Estonia on the issue of integration was initiated in 
1996 by a group of Estonian social scientists, who became known as the 
“Vera-group.”18 This group of social scientists from Tartu and Tallinn 
founded a project “to consolidate the existing research on the non-
Estonian community and to examine more closely their social integra-
tion.”19 In its initial year of existence the team, led by Marju Lauristin and 
Mati Heidmets conducted a series of workshops funded by the Estonian 
Ministry of Education to examine a range of issues relating to minority 
integration. Despite the differences within the group, the first bulk of re-
search with a focus on Russian youth was issued in 1997, indicating a 
consensus that there was a growing need to start a dialogue between Esto-
nia’s ethnic groups.20 It is important to underline that while no policy-
prescriptions were made in this stage, the publication of the results dem-
onstrated that the Russian-speaking minority already represented an inte-
gral and strategic part of Estonian society.  
This coincided with the growing pressure from the EU to see the 
Estonian government undertake positive policy steps in the direction of 
integrating its large non-citizen community, particularly in the light of the 
tightening naturalisation procedure and the implementation of a stricter 
Language Law in 1995. In mid-1997 the Minister of Population and Eth-
nic Affairs, Andra Veidemann, appointed several of the key figures from 
the Vera-project to draft general policy principles aimed at minority inte-
gration. The draft-commission was made up only of the representatives of 
the Estonian-speaking elites, which allowed the minister to present the 
new integration project not as a result of a bi-communal negotiation. 
Rather the draft commission envisaged a process of Estonian-dominated 
formulation of policy for the benefit of the state and dominated by ethnic 
Estonians.21  
From within this political consensus and with a clearly Estonian-
centred perspective, the commission appointed by Veidemann formulated 
a draft document by the end of 1997, which was approved by the govern-
ment in February 1998 and by the Riigikogu on June 10, 1998, as the 
“Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian society: The bases of the 
Estonian’s national integration policy”22 (further, the Bases). Though 
devised without the involvement of the minority community, this brief 
document was path-breaking in formulating Estonia’s relation with its 
non-titulars.  
The document itself was brief but presented a solid foundation for 
developing the agenda in the future. Starting off with the assessment of the 
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previous political choices by the Estonian state, this 5–point plan identi-
fied the fragmentation of Estonia’s population: “Under current legislation, 
the non-Estonian segment of society is divided into four legal categories–
Estonian citizens, citizens of other states, persons with undetermined citi-
zenship and undocumented persons.”23 It also states that while 
  
“Estonia’s current policy on non-Estonians and the legisla-
tion expressing this policy evolved in a specific socio-
political context characterised by the restoration of the inde-
pendence of Estonia and its emergence from the sphere of 
influence of its eastern neighbour.[…] By the beginning of 
1998 the national and international situation has changed. A 
mental shift has occurred among the majority of non-
Estonians, including the acceptance of Estonian independ-
ence as an inevitable fact. Compared to the beginning of the 
1990s, the approach of Estonians on issues involving non-
Estonians has also developed; attitudes have become more 
tolerant and open.”24  
 
Proceeding to the emphases on the change in the initial situation the draft 
established that an “appreciable number of the non-Estonians” were 
“alienated from Estonian society,” withdrawing into “their linguistic 
community and mental world.” These statements were followed by the 
assertion of the loss that Estonia’s society has experienced due to the fact 
that a big part of the minority youth was unable to develop their profes-
sional skills and that in the long run this would lead to growing criminal 
rates and hence the instability of society.  
In its essence the document proceeded quite unidirectionally. It 
states, “the changed internal and external situation requires that Estonia’s 
policy on non-Estonians take a new step forward.” The direction in which 
the process should move was clear from the title of the document, “The 
Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society.” The Bases however 
did little to address the expectations from Estonians, stating merely that 
the reduction of the number of non-citizens and their participation in the 
life of the Estonian state were expected. The appeal also clearly read that 
the integration process will be a challenge to Estonians: 
 
“Integration requires a serious effort on the part of non-
Estonians, since language skills and the resulting competi-
tiveness do not come on their own. At the same time it is a 
challenge to Estonians’ openness and democracy. If Estoni-
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ans do not understand the need for such development and 
are not prepared to take steps of their own, there is no point 
in setting goals for integration. Without a doubt, integration 
strategy is also a difficult task for the Estonian state and 
politicians since domestic policy objectives for the devel-
opment of Estonia as a democratic nation state must be de-
fined.”25 
 
Essentially, the minority’s attitudes towards the state had to improve in 
five major areas; language, education, culture, regional isolation and po-
litical participation. All these also find their correspondence in the integra-
tion programme and mainly addressed the actions to be undertaken by the 
minority community in order to adapt to the way Estonian society works. 
Within this framework, the MEIS was established in June 1998, with the 
main aim of supporting grass-roots integration programmes. Being a semi-
private institution, the foundation was put in charge of coordinating the 
development and administering of funds allocated by the government for 
the bottom-up integration strategy support.26  
Reiterating the goals of the original 1997 framework document, its 
longer version was passed on March 2, 1999, as “The Integration of Non-
Estonians into Estonian Society: The Government’s Action Plan”27 (fur-
ther, NIP). The NIP laid three cornerstones for what would be later known 
as an “Estonian version of multiculturalism,” later embodied by the Inte-
gration Programme. Indeed, the NIP called for a full-scale national inte-
gration strategy, accentuating an “individual centred approach, common 
societal core and Estonian cultural predominance.” Vello Pettai suggests 
that “by focusing on the individual, the Action Plan (and hence also the 
Estonian government) sought to make it clear that the Estonian version of 
multiculturalism was not based on collective rights or groups.”28 Instead, it 
emphasised the rights of individuals to choose group affiliation and the 
need for opportunities to freely develop the culture and national belonging 
of minority groups. Essentially, this is not what multiculturalism is about.  
Vello Pettai interprets the state approach as a testimony to the fact 
that the Estonian part of society “did not have any objection to voluntary 
assimilation.” The members of minority community however could under-
stand the same call as an appeal to the Estonian part of society to accept 
those who have decided to fit into the Estonian-dominated social frame-
work of the state. This point returned in the document with the reference 
to the “common societal core,” which despite the obvious reference to 
modern liberal thinking, was seen as being defined in ethnic Estonian 
terms.  
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“It is natural that a large part of this common core will derive 
from [ethnic] Estonian culture; both the state language as well 
as the dominant language of societal communication is Esto-
nian; the day-to-day norms as well as behavioural patterns 
which have evolved here must also become part of the com-
mon core.”29  
 
In fact, the NIP even went a step further to dispel any illusion in the 
understanding of Estonia as a multicultural state where different ethnic 
groups would enjoy equal protection. In the final aspect of the NIP, the 
issue of cultural predominance of Estonians returned again, now from the 
perspective of its relation to the state and effectively redefining the role of 
society as assisting the development of Estonian multiculturalism:  
 
“As a democratic state, the task of the Estonian state is both 
to support the development of [ethnic] Estonian culture and 
to ensure the developmental opportunities of minority cul-
tures. Whereas society may become multicultural, the state 
is and shall remain Estonian-centred. The Estonian nation-
statehood is manifested in the state’s responsibility for the 
preservation and development of the Estonian cultural space 
in a globalizing, multicultural world.” [emphasis added]30 
 
The Estonian NIP, like the Latvian ISL-FD, has upheld the vision of the 
state as a homeland of ethnic core groups, nd the only place where the 
titular culture and language could be promoted.31 As I have discussed, in 
both countries this point has been reiterated as the only possible way of 
fitting the legal tradition of statehood restoration with the logic of alleviat-
ing the ethnic fragmentation of society. Like its Latvian counterpart, the 
Estonian NIP has been formulated within the context of growing interna-
tional pressure in light of EU accession and therefore had frequently been 
seen as conditionality’s immediate outcome. However, the background to 
its elaboration–mainly in the political climate of nationalist forces–
indicates that the rationale behind its development lies in the greater 
awareness of social and academic elites about the possible set-backs in the 
processes of social development.  
The Latvian ISL-FD and the Estonian NIP were both devised by 
members of the titular group and passed in a government dominated by the 
ethnic majority–two indices of the claim that the political entrepreneurs 
were in fact reactive, rather than proactive in devising the state approach 
Minority cooptation in the Baltic societies  
____________________________________________________________ 
179
to integration. Despite all the similarities of the documents, however, there 
were considerable differences in the process of drafting. The ISL-FD was 
mainly understood by members of non-Latvian communities as based 
upon the values of the (ethnic) Latvian nation, which obviously was unac-
ceptable for the members of the non-titular minority.32 At the same time, 
the NIP was warmly greeted by some of the members of the Russian-
speaking community in Estonia, while strictly opposed by the others. 
Those opposing it were explicit in their worries of the final steps to “titu-
larise” the Estonian state and assimilate all non-Estonians into the majority 
culture and to push those unwilling further towards the marginal edge.33 
Although some of the minority proponents of the NIP had shared the same 
concerns, they also welcomed Estonians’ interest towards the previously 
ignored non-Estonian part of society.34 In this part of the chapter, it ap-
pears that Lithuania had chosen a different approach to its minorities and 
we will see that these differences were minimal.  
 
 
2.   The instruments of minority integration  
Now that we have established the initial steps earmarked by the majority 
community to integrate minority populations into the dominant society, we 
can proceed with an analysis of the policies implemented and their ex-
pected outcomes. In order to do so, it is necessary to assess the persistence 
of the claims by the titular political entrepreneurs in the three states with 
respect to the development of the majority cultural domain, as embedded 
in the integration regulations. At the same, we need to pay additional at-
tention to rhetoric produced for minority consumption. Appealing to both 
parts of the local audience was a difficult task, however, though it turned 
out to be much easier because the programmes were also scrutinised by 
the international monitoring community, which resulted in considerable, if 
only rhetorical, concessions to minority rights and multiculturalist concep-
tions of society.  
The development of the Latvian integration programme took place 
in two steps. Initially, the draft was developed and submitted for discus-
sion in society. In the second step, the final draft of the programme “So-
cial integration in Latvia” was outlined, revising the first draft and incor-
porating the feedback from social debates and discussions.35 The second 
version, officially drafted from June 1– August 1, 1999, significantly sup-
plemented the original draft, doubling the original length. The Programme 
distinguishes four thematic fields relevant to ethnic policies and social 
integration of society, while declaring that  
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“The integration of society in Latvia is oriented to mutual un-
derstanding and co-operation among individuals and different 
groups in the framework of Latvia’s legal system; it is based 
on the Latvian language as the state language and on loyalty 
to the state of Latvia. The goal of integration is to form a de-
mocratic, consolidated civil society, founded on shared basic 
values.”36 
 
Needless to say, these areas do not explicitly define the cultural and lin-
guistic preservation of the (ethnic) Latvian nation and its accommodation 
of minority cultures. However, significant emphasis is put on the cultural 
aspects of integration. In a similar vein, reference to the Soviet past of the 
country already appears in the introduction into the programme, emphasis-
ing the challenges for survival of the Latvian language represented by 
non-titular residents:  
 
“Latvia has inherited more than half a million Soviet era im-
migrants and their descendants, many of whom have not yet 
become integrated into the Latvian cultural and linguistic en-
vironment, and thus do not feel connected to the Latvian 
state.”37 
 
Referring to the Soviet inclusion, the document advocates a condemnation 
of the Soviet period of Latvian history so that the younger generation will 
acquire the historical consciousness of Latvians. Failure to do so, as is 
stated, might present an impediment to the integration process. “The Lat-
vian people did not voluntarily choose the Soviet regime and life in the 
totalitarian system; this must be understood.”38 The reference to the Soviet 
past within the ISL-NP suggests that integration would need to take place 
not only on the basis of a common linguistic environment, but would also 
require a common understanding of the relations between ethnic groups 
prior to Latvia’s regained independence. In plain words, the Latvian inte-
gration programme sought to address the consequences of the Soviet pres-
ence in the republic and possibly to rectify the injustices inflicted on the 
Latvian majority population. The debates around the consequences of the 
state language regulations have already pared down the “concept of com-
mon linguistic environment” to a single and undivided Latvian language, 
denying any special status even to Latgalian, which was considered a 
separate language in the Soviet Latvia.  
The first chapter of the programme addressed the issues of individ-
ual integration strategies, however the second chapter seems to put greater 
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emphasis on collectivities that needed to be “integrated.”39 It also ad-
dresses the measures necessary for creating a society of individuals with 
equal opportunities, presuming the leading role of the titular group, the 
Latvians. Again, state language features as the most important tool for 
social cohesion. The issues of poverty are addressed, as are income dis-
parities, unemployment and the shortcomings of the social security sys-
tem. Lower education is made responsible for groups’ limited social inte-
gration, while the wording of the document suggests that minorities’ lack 
of language skills and misunderstanding about their role in the Latvians’ 
state have resulted in their marginalisation.40  
The third chapter of the programme, “Education, Language, and 
Culture” stresses the importance of the long-term stability of interethnic 
relations in the country.41 The chapter begins with evaluating cultural 
development, stating that  
 
“Culture is a condition for development of a humane, crea-
tively active, self-confident national character. In order to 
promote the development of Latvian culture and minority 
cultures, a unified cultural environment must be created and 
the cultural dialogue ought to be expanded during the proc-
ess of integration.”42  
 
Clearly, the Latvian language is conceived as an effective tool for the 
integration of non-Latvians and Latvians of all generations.  
 
“In implementation of the integration process of society, 
children and young people make up the most important tar-
get group. However, the level of democratic and political 
education and command of the Latvian language is a deter-
minant in the integration of adults as well. Therefore, the 
Latvian educational system becomes the most important 
driving force of the integration process. The educational 
system must ensure the learning and inheritance of human 
and specifically Latvian values, and the opportunities to pre-
serve inter-cultural education and the cultural identity of 
minorities.”43 
 
The ambitious and, hence more controversial approach of the programme 
to integration aims to safeguard public space, where communication 
should take place in the common language. The draft stresses that “preju-
dices and mutual distrust persist in Latvian society.” In this context, the 
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ISL-FD mentions the lack of appropriate language training for non-
Latvians with “many objective and subjective factors hinder[ing the] 
learning of [the] Latvian language.”44 But the phrasing of the ISL-NP 
states more firmly that the “legislation on language should help to estab-
lish a balance and to stabilise the relationship between the state and minor-
ity languages.”45 These fragments clearly indicate that while the discourse 
on integration has started, there is only a limited commitment to distribute 
some of the power resources to minority groups in the processes. Impor-
tantly, while the dominance of the titular group already has been estab-
lished in the Constitution, the ISL-NP was another step toward ethnic 
understanding of the Latvian nation. 
The formulation of the programme in Estonia was also connected 
with some public debate but was more dependent on the political will of 
the newly appointed Integration Minister, Katrin Saks. Director of the 
Soros funded Open Estonia Foundation and responsible for minority inte-
gration, Saks had personally facilitated the long-term orientation and ex-
tension of the NIP into a full scale integration programme. A newly de-
vised policy required elaborations of measures from various ministries and 
departments. Distancing itself from the original formula in the NIP, the 
new programme indicates five areas where integration could be pursued 
and focuses on three aspects of this integration: linguistic-communicative, 
legal-political and socio-economic.  
The NIP had a very distinct focus on the linguistic capacities of 
non-Estonians, to which it attributed the failure of political integration and 
participation, as well as the economic backwardness and social problems 
of the regions with predominantly Russian-speaking populations.46 While 
the reasons for the regional problems in the north-eastern Estonia could 
have been obviously reduced to the lack of proficiency in the state lan-
guage, the problems of legal-political integration, such as high numbers of 
non-citizens among the non-titular populations, were similarly treated as a 
mere problem of language-knowledge. In order to promote the numbers of 
naturalisations–which, incidentally, have been on the decline since the 
introduction of the naturalisation procedure, reaching an all-time low in 
200147–improvement of language training, as well as the expansion of 
various test equivalencies have been suggested. 
The final version of the integration programme presented a quite 
different version of Estonian multiculturalism which largely reformulated 
the core components of the initial NIP. Most crucially, the programme has 
abolished the stress on the ethnic Estonian predominance in the state and 
emphasised the importance of preserving Estonian culture more explicitly. 
While Estonian culture was still seen as essential for the existence of the 
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state, its position was no longer exclusive. The NIP relied on the hierarchy 
of cultures in Estonia, claiming that the Estonian one was more privileged 
in relations with the state. The state programme “Integration in Estonian 
Society, 2000–2007” (further, SIP) made use of multicultural rhetoric to 
recognise the existence of different cultures in Estonia, which could be 
misleading for those who anticipated a change of wind in Estonia’s rela-
tion towards its Russian-speakers.48 Instead, SIP has done nothing less 
than to consolidate Estonian state nationalism on the ethnic basis.  
 
“In relations with the state […], the position of [ethnic] Esto-
nian culture is different from that of minority cultures, to the 
extent that one of the goals of Estonian statehood is the pres-
ervation and development of the Estonian cultural space.”49  
 
Along with this, the redefinition of the “common societal core” was re-
quired to render it less abstract, instead giving it a definite shape which 
could be implemented in policy-making. It stressed the centrality of Esto-
nian experience, though it used much softer terminology to address the 
possible grievances of minorities and fit it into the multiculturalism de-
bate. Specific elements of the societal core were now spelt out as “general 
humanistic and democratic values, common informational field and Esto-
nian-language environment, common state institutions,” all in stark con-
trast with the presumably non-democratic, anti-humanistic values of non-
Estonians.  
A set of civic principles was defined mainly in line with the ethnic 
Estonian understanding of the state.50 These included general knowledge 
of the basic facts of Estonian history, an appreciation of being an Estonian 
citizen and a conscious awareness of the multicultural character of the 
Estonian society. While these ideals were in line with the goals of individ-
ual accommodation in Estonian society, the final draft went even further 
by dropping the reference to individualism altogether and emphasising a 
concept somewhat similar to cultural pluralism. However, because lan-
guages and traditions of minorities are not treated as a part of the Estonian 
core, they are collectively excluded from the public sphere and need to 
find ways of adapting. The final version stated that ethnic minorities 
should have an opportunity to preserve their linguistic and cultural dis-
tinctiveness, to organise mother tongue education and to participate in 
state-building through social life.51  
All this indicates that the policy steps envisaged in the integration 
programmes were primarily emphasising the role of language in inde-
pendent states. The integration programmes emphasise the importance of 
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cultural issues for the policy-makers and suggests that the titular political 
entrepreneurs were acting from a defensive position to ensure the use of 
titular languages, specifically their development and promotion. The per-
sistent promotion of cultural and linguistic goals in the integration docu-
ments supports the findings of the previous analyses that the majority 
populations in Latvia and Estonia perceived policy changes as necessary 
from their own subjective positions. The policy-corrections undertaken, 
firstly, pay lip-service to the equality of all residents of the state by provid-
ing them with the same set of rights, while secondly and most importantly 
ensuring the central place of the titular language in the cultural domain of 
the state. Do we see similar processes in Lithuania? 
The Lithuanian Department of National Minorities appointed a 
steering committee for the preparation of the Concept of Ethnic Policy in 
2002. A group of experts, governmental employers, representatives of 
minorities and social scientists were engaged in drafting the document.52 
Earmarking the development of state planning on the issues of ethnic 
policy, this document was based on the analyses of economic, social, 
cultural and political developments of ethnic relations.53 While conceived 
as a framework document for a specific ethnic policy document, the Con-
cept aimed at providing specific guidelines for ministries and state institu-
tions for the long-term development of Lithuanian society, while vague 
notions introduced allowed one to describe the document as addressing the 
issue of multiculturalism.  
Designed in a fragmentary manner, it is comprised of eight substan-
tial chapters that describe the social situation of the ethnic minorities in the 
country, the process of their adaptation, their education facilities and op-
portunities for life-long learning, NGO activities, cultural organisations 
and the problems of discrimination. Focusing on these issues, apparently 
the main goal of the Concept was to address possibilities for civic partici-
pation and the development of the non-governmental sector of minority 
activity. The Concept indicated the desired development of democracy, 
prevention of exclusion and the assurance of harmony and dialogue across 
the diverse groups of Lithuanian citizenry. Interestingly, the introductory 
remarks of the Concept addressed the minority, as well as the majority 
groups in society, without explicit differentiation between the citizens and 
non-citizens of the state.54  
The Concept was not developed into a policy document because of 
the resistance of the nationalist political forces taking part in its drafting. 
Beresnevičiūt÷ and Kasatkina, however, report that concerning the rele-
vance for the political climate in Lithuania and the scope of activities 
initially planned, it was not far from what we observe in the Estonian and 
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Latvian integration programmes. After the introductory overview on the 
state of minority-majority relations in Lithuania and fragmental descrip-
tion of the existing problems of non-titular groups, the document “deals 
with evaluation of the forms of political participation, institutional envi-
ronment of political activities, opportunities for non-governmental organi-
zations of ethnic minorities in civil society of Lithuania.”55  
The document covers many issues relating to the position of the 
ethnic groups in the country, the means of their cooptation into state insti-
tutions and cooperation with majority populations in the various spheres of 
social and political life: issues of tolerance and ethnic hatred and its mani-
festations in Lithuanian society, citizenship, ethnic identity and sustainable 
development of the latter are covered alongside the local and international 
obligations of the state. However, while the description is aimed at further 
developing a legal basis for the state’s relation with minority groups, the 
recommendations listed in the document only tentatively suggested the 
adjustment of the legal basis and in the end were not considered by law-
makers.56 While the Concept presented some of the activities as absolutely 
necessary to combat incremental discrimination of national minority 
groups and socially vulnerable parts of society, the implementation of the 
ethnic policy never occurred and development was not pursued beyond the 
draft point. Written in an academic style, it appealed little to policy-
makers and contained too few statements indicating the urgency for politi-
cal intervention into the ethnopolitical situation in the country. Instead the 
Concept has been set aside for future consideration. 
As early as 1997, the TMID was additionally pressed to address 
Roma minority residents in Lithuania. As a result thereof, the country has 
been pioneering the development of the programme Integration of Roma 
into Lithuanian Society, 2000–2004, followed by the Roma Integration 
into Lithuanian Society, 2008–2010.57 Although criticised for developing 
and implementing this programme without proper consultations with the 
Roma community and without having explicitly addressed the discrimina-
tion of Roma, it has been positively evaluated by the international group 
of experts as a pro-active step toward reduction of Roma discrimination.58  
A similar programme was also devised in Latvia in 2006.59 Despite 
regular calls upon the Estonian government to establish institutions and 
facilitate integration of Roma into society, no policy documents were 
developed in Estonia.60 I will not dwell on these documents in detail, be-
cause the Roma in Latvia and Lithuania, as well as elsewhere in the CEE 
do not only suffer from segregation but from an overall racial discrimina-
tion, among others issues.61 However, the way political entrepreneurs dealt 
with the problems of Roma community are indicative of an overall ap-
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proach to integration of minorities in Latvia and Lithuania. Although the 
problems of Roma are quite specific, policy documents addressing the 
Roma community and prevention of this group’s social exclusion were 
devised by the state agencies and were largely at odds with the expectation 
of community itself.62  
The Liv’s are another ethnic group that stands out in Latvia for be-
ing granted an official status of minority. A special programme had been 
in place to help this minority develop their culture, keep their language 
and improve this group’s international image. The programme “The Livs 
in Latvia” was first approved in 1999 and re-launched in August 2008, 
with the main objective to resist assimilation.63 Remarkably, the remit of 
this programme grants Livs many financial incentives to learn the Liv 
language, conduct and participate in cultural exchange programmes (such 
as summer camps and the like) and support the co-operation of Finno-
Ugric NGOs and state officials abroad. The scope of interest and support 
granted by the Latvian state to this group of around 180 registered Livs 
standing for a, no doubt, endangered language community of less than 20 
language speaker is admirable. These efforts however need to be con-
trasted with state’s commitment to ensure and preserve language rights of 
around 900,000 Russian-speakers across the country.  
 
 
3.   Diluted outcomes of integration 
The previous discussion of the integration programmes indicated that 
titular political entrepreneurs outlined the measures to address the poten-
tial threat coming from the non-titular community in a reactive manner. I 
will now turn to the provisions spelt out in the documents which, on the 
surface, endorsed greater inter-communal dialogue in society. The cover 
of multiculturalism, however, only hid the lack of clarity about the ex-
pected outcomes of integration. In addition, the references to a range of 
issues in search for support from minority and majority communities sig-
nificantly diluted the overarching aim of the two programmes; the devel-
opment of mutual tolerance of ethnic groups.  
The state programme “Integration in Estonian Society 2000–2007” 
(further, SIP), suggested that a bilateral process would involve both Rus-
sian- and Estonian speakers, though both would interact on the basis of 
knowledge of the Estonian language.64 While both groups were to “har-
monise society,” both were allowed to preserve their identity and create a 
common core within the Estonian cultural domain. This consisted of “gen-
eral human and democratic values,” the Estonian language, common state 
institutions and knowledge of Estonian history. Decisively, the Estonian 
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language was described as an “attribute of statehood,” not as an ethnic 
symbol, hence somewhat ameliorating the resounding minority opinion 
that the programme was aimed at the assimilation of non-Estonians into 
the Estonian core.65  
At the same time, one of the major policy goals outlined was the 
improvement of the linguistic competence of non-Estonians. Though do-
mestically criticised for vagueness in its use of terms and its description of 
goals, the programme appealed to both nationalist groups and local minor-
ity activists, who were no longer referred to as aliens in the Estonian state, 
but as a part of society.66 Strong focus on language adaptation for minori-
ties clearly reflected the fears of the Estonian population that their lan-
guage might become extinct should so many non-native speakers become 
well-integrated. Similarly, for minorities the implementation of the inte-
gration programme presented a danger for linguistic and ethnic identity. 
Despite its overall positive intention to remove the barriers for the political 
participation of non-Estonians, the SIP “gave minorities only one choice, 
namely assimilation.”67 
The term “integration” was left undefined, resulting in harsh criti-
cism from the Roundtable of Ethnic Minorities. A member of the 
Riigikogu, Vladimir Vel’man, criticised the Estonian state for setting 
goals aimed at the integration of society into one distinct cultural commu-
nity, integrating individuals or assimilating Russian-speakers into Estonian 
culture altogether.68 The regular integration monitors remarked upon im-
plementation that the major goal of integration was to achieve national 
reconciliation within the framework described in the national constitution, 
i.e. within the framework dominated by ethnic Estonians.69 While ethnic 
groups were to be tolerant and to know Estonian history, Estonians had to 
accept the individual choices of minority members to function within 
Estonia’s political and social framework, run mainly by Estonians.  
As in Estonia, the role to be played in the process by the Latvians 
remained unclear and vaguely defined by the Latvian National Pro-
gramme. Various aspects of the programme appealed to the non-titular 
actors, prescribing more than advising in the bi-communal integration 
process. The ISL-NP claims that “[t]he integration of society will not 
succeed if it is directed only from ‘the top down’ without active civic 
participation from the grass roots level.”70 However, the key issues of the 
integration programme reflect a strong top-down political logic, particu-
larly when it comes to relation between the state and society and the role 
of individuals in the political decision-making process.  
Chapter one, “Civic Participation and Political Integration,” intro-
duces the discussion of the role individuals play in the political decision-
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making process, consistently presenting conformity to the interests of the 
majority as an overall goal: “Active civic participation in social and politi-
cal life fosters the irreversibility of integration and conformity with the 
interests of the majority; it creates unity among the residents of Latvia and 
strengthens democracy” [emphasis added].71 The role of individuals in the 
political decision-making process is initially introduced in the context of 
the long-term experience of the Latvian state as a home to many minori-
ties, who, particularly in the light of the developing integration pro-
gramme, are invited to contribute to the discussion on future strategies for 
societal development.72 The ISL-NP indicates that the non-titular minori-
ties in the Latvian state can now assume the role of the advisers to political 
decision-makers, if they refrain from claiming the right to make decisions 
on par with the Latvians.73  
Two of the three subchapters, “Civic Participation” and “Participa-
tion in the Non-governmental Organisations” repeat the strong emphasis 
on developing a unified society in Latvia, where individuals of different 
ethnic backgrounds mutually accept their differences, as well as the right 
of the Latvian people to political self-determination. The document sug-
gests dealing with these issues by means of increasing mutual trust of all 
inhabitants.74 A minority reader would see a definite contradiction in 
terms here: The Latvians have the right for political determination, while 
the minorities should accept that their rights are different and trust Latvi-
ans to make the right decisions. This is indicative of the state’s intention to 
support all those members of non-titular communities to integrate into 
Latvian society by accepting that the state might be receptive to its Latvian 
citizen, while other residents could be consulted should it be necessary. 
Naturally, if minorities have “a positive orientation toward naturalization 
and the integration of society,” as well as the “knowledge on the issues 
important for the society of Latvia,” they will understand that Latvian state 
has always made correct decisions on their behalf.75 It is thus clear, why 
the final version of the Latvian document dropped references to intercul-
tural dialogue, unlike the Estonian SIP. Instead, the ISL-NP focused on the 
benefits of its residents accepting the decisions made by the Latvian state.  
A particular role in this process was ascribed to the development of 
the networks of civil society and active political participation of Latvia’s 
residents. “Active civic participation in social and political life fosters the 
irreversibility of integration and conformity with the interests of the ma-
jority; it creates unity among the residents of Latvia and strengthens de-
mocracy.”76 The role of civil society organisations in this process is highly 
ambivalent as portrayed in the ISL-NP, as these are expected to expand 
their activities to create a more stable political community. The role of the 
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NGOs is also outlined and made responsible for “individual participation 
in the life of society.” At the same time, activity of civil society is ex-
pected to support the national and cultural identities of national minorities.  
It is highly questionable whether civic participation would diminish 
the tensions between the official position on the core ideals of the state 
and the views of minority groups. While the major areas of concern relat-
ing to civic participation are outlined in order to address and “overcome 
alienation of people from governmental and local authorities by maintain-
ing a dialogue between the individual, the society and the state,” most 
likely the result would be quite the opposite.77  
Additionally, by stressing repatriation, migration and cooperation 
with expatriates abroad this section of the ISL-NP particularly stresses the 
centrality of Latvianness for the narrative of statehood and social cohe-
sion. This is clearly aimed at Latvians abroad, rather than the local non-
titular communities, the goal being the establishment of “a unified system 
which would ease the return to his/her homeland for any Latvian or citizen 
of Latvia who wishes to do so and would assist in his/her integration in the 
society of Latvia.”78  
The lack of bi-communal dialogue on the issues relevant for social 
integration resulted in non-core groups’ perceptions that their fate had 
been decided without acknowledgement of their own opinions.79 Doubt-
less, the programmes for social integration in all three countries had quite 
different meanings for the core ethnics and the minority groups. Minorities 
were interested in receiving access to local political, economic and cul-
tural lives, but they feared that this would only be accomplished through 
their assimilation into the majority culture. In this case, it is difficult to 
distinguish between the real and perceived effects of the integration pro-
grammes when discussing the policy decisions and steps undertaken by 
the political entrepreneurs.  
Hence, it makes more sense to analyse integration policies as ma-
jorities’ signalling to minorities who would then implement the “real” 
change. As I have indicated, the programmes invited members of the non-
core ethnic groups to engage pro-actively in policy-making by contribut-
ing to civic activities, NGO engagement and the like. This was not geared 
toward the greater exclusion of the non-titular Soviet-migrant population, 
but in the direction of this group’s enhanced cooptation by the state insti-
tutions. The strategy of cooptation was clear during the discussions of the 
Estonian and Latvian programmes and has been interpreted as an indica-
tion of the growing preparedness for compromise by the titular groups. In 
the case of Estonia’s SIP, an oft-repeated statement from the programme is 
one which reads,  
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“integration is expressed in the gradual disappearance of 
those barriers which today prevent many non-Estonians 
from being competitive in the Estonian labour market, tak-
ing part in educational opportunities available here and par-
ticipating in local cultural and political life. These barriers 
are above all connected with shortcomings in knowledge of 
the Estonian language and local culture, with uncertain legal 
status and also with fears and prejudices resulting from 
rapid social changes.”80  
 
For Estonians, as the programme stated, it is also essential to change. On 
their part, successful social integration would require the “retreat of repel-
lent attitudes towards ethnic minorities in the context of recognition of the 
multicultural model of society” and a “decrease in fear concerning ethnic 
survival of the national identity and cultural domain.”81  
The programme included four sub-programmes, which largely fell 
in line with the assessment of the working groups.82 Crucially the fourth 
sub-programme, “Social competence,” focused entirely on increasing civic 
activity among the public, convergence of Estonian and non-Estonian 
opinions and the improvement of living standards for those segments of 
society with special social needs.83 In order to achieve this, media and 
public information channels would need to facilitate the exchange between 
Estonians and non-Estonians. Another pillar of the programme, “The edu-
cation and culture of ethnic minorities” was also taken into consideration 
when drafting the budget for the measures. However, these two sub-
programmes received only 7% and 4.5% funding of the planned budget, 
respectively. At the same time, up to 81% of SIP’s budget was channelled 
into two other sub-programmes which aimed exclusively at language ac-
quisition within the non-Estonian community: extensive language training 
for non-Estonian adults was run with support of the EU-PHARE pro-
gramme and the re-organisation of the Russian-language education facili-
ties was also carried out. 84 
While the EU generally welcomed the launch and implementation 
of an integration programme, the EC also reminded Estonia that  
 
“it is necessary for the Estonian government to continue to 
devote adequate resources and give proper attention to the 
implementation of all elements of the integration programme. 
This includes, in particular, the need to ensure a high level of 
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awareness and involvement in the integration process across 
all sections of the Estonian population.”85  
 
In spite of the mild tone, the critical remark by the European Commission 
clearly pointed out the overtly intensive focus on minority training in the 
Estonian language. The programme, through addressing these four sub-
areas of competence, did not assess the possible changes in “laws and 
other legal acts presently in effect in the Republic of Estonia, and on the 
other hand, mainly addresses state agencies and their sub-agencies, local 
governments and third-sector organisations.”86 However, it did require any 
institution responsible for a sub-programme to “develop regional action 
plans in co-operation with county governments and local governments, 
based on the distinctiveness of the region, and development programmes 
that had been launched.”87  
The Latvian ISL-NP also indicates that alienation between the 
members of society and the state is impeding cooperation between ethnic 
groups and is an undesirable inheritance from the Soviet times. As is de-
clared in the introduction to the ISL-NP, the complete abolition of the 
social differences inherited is highly desirable for the successful develop-
ment of Latvian society. The Latvian programme aimed at forming a de-
mocratic civil society united by two common beliefs: the commitment to 
the independence of Latvia and statehood based on the Latvian language. 
One of the explanations for the limited social cohesion in Latvia at the 
time when the programme was drafted was the segregation of Latvia’s 
information space into one functioning in the titular language, and one in 
the Russian language. The divisions in the information space, the varying 
media of communication and the different systems of schooling are seen 
as catering to different socio-economic and cultural-linguistic groups. 
While the sections on “Education” declare the importance of schooling for 
raising the consciousness of the residents concerning independent state-
hood, the ISL-NP also stresses the importance of creating a common in-
formation space in Latvia. The initial draft emphasises that  
 
“there are two sectors of information space in Latvia corre-
sponding to those persons who commonly speak Latvian 
and those who speak Russian. A segment of Latvia’s popu-
lation is still influenced by the Russian information space, 
and Russian sources of information play a significant role in 
shaping their opinions. Many materials published by several 
Russian newspapers in Latvia adopt a tone that is sceptical 
and ironic.”88  
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However, the final version of the programme drops the statements on the 
separateness of the information spaces in favour of focusing on prospects 
and possibilities to emphasise common issues:  
 
“The basis for common information space is laid by forming 
an awareness of common fate. It will foster considerably 
achievements in the Latvian language learning. Good com-
mand of the Latvian language will help to overcome a bar-
rier in receiving information, which exists due to the lack of 
knowledge of Latvian and an inability to read the Latvian 
press, or to listen to the radio and watch TV programmes. 
[…]The existence of press services that reflect a variety of 
viewpoints should be encouraged.”89  
 
At the same time, not only the mass media, but also the academic commu-
nity were called upon to assist in the process of integration. The final part 
of the programme outlines the possible areas where contributions of vari-
ous social sciences are expected and are welcome, and how these should 
assist social accord in the new situation.  
 
“the integration of society requires a large spiritual and 
moral capacity; the work of integration encourages everyone 
to assume a position of being a person who is tolerant, re-
sponsive, understanding and open. However, the process of 
integration also requires concentration on self-actualisation 
so as to better develop and preserve conviction and mental 
strength, individual judgement and independent behaviour, 
when in the presence of people who have different beliefs 
and values, and with people having another ethnic iden-
tity.”90  
 
A method for coordinating these broad goals under the auspices of the 
programme is difficult to imagine. However, political entrepreneurs draft-
ing the document acknowledge the importance of the state in drawing the 
linguistic communities closer together. The programme remained largely 
declarative and was ridden with repetition. It also had discernable diffi-
culty in determining both the active role of the majority in social integra-
tion and the steps–besides learning the Latvian language, of course–
expected from minority populations to create an integrated society. Be-
sides, the drafting committee was not entirely certain as to how to achieve 
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a compromise between the insecurities of the titular community, despite 
an obviously fruitful opportunity structure, and the growing assertiveness 
of the non-titular minority in the country. Overall, the Latvia’s ISL-NP 
was enforced as a compromise between hard-line nationalising forces and 
those convinced of the importance of due implementation of the frame-
work. Preceded by decisions from different governmental bodies, the 
Department of Integration of Society was set up in November 2000 within 
the Ministry of Justice to coordinate the implementation of the document, 
with the Ministry of Justice commissioned to report to the Cabinet of 
Ministers on the process of its implementation.  
To address these issues the National Programme outlined the im-
portance of establishing the Secretariat of the Special Assignments Minis-
ter for Society Integration (Īpašu uzdevumu ministra sabiedrības inte-
grācijas lietās sekretariāts). Likewise, the Society Integration Foundation 
(Sabiedrības integrācijas fonds) was established in 2001 in order to facili-
tate the integration process. The objective of establishing a secretariat was 
not reached until 2003, when the institution was finally established to 
elaborate and implement the state policy on integration, but also to over-
look the approach to minority rights, development of civil society and 
elimination of racial discrimination. Both institutions functioned quite 
successfully, occasionally calling for greater transparency in funding and 
involvement of minority NGOs into policy-making. However, weak insti-
tutional links for the implementation and limited cooperation of the insti-
tutions undermined the successful implementation of the programme’s 
goals.91  
The frameworks of integration suggest that the mutual perceptions 
of minority/majority are likely to acquire a more balanced relation to one 
another as a result of the programmes’ implementation. However, while 
the signposts of the programmes have opened up many opportunities for 
all ethnic communities to participate in political decision-making, the 
minority publics seem unwilling to engage actively. Of all the principle 
reasons for residents’ unwillingness to assume an active part in the life of 
the Baltic societies, the lack of equal opportunity on par with the titular 
groups is probably the most frequently mentioned reason.92 However, 
there are also other strictly structural issues at play.  
As I have indicated before, the Lithuanian Concept did not call 
upon national minorities to adjust to Lithuanian views or participate in 
activities crafting a democratic regime in Lithuania. The Concept did 
however outline the virtues which would accompany the democratic re-
gime in the country if its citizenry, the non-Lithuanians in particular, en-
gaged in civic activities.93 The Concept in general has not explicitly en-
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dorsed the support of minority NGOs and organisations standing in de-
fence of minority groups vis-à-vis the state. Instead, it aimed more at pro-
viding minority organisations a framework from which they could address 
the state in search of financial support. Interestingly, the recommendations 
of the Concept towards non-governmental organisations were later taken 
into consideration with the implementation of the governmental policy on 
expansion of NGO activities.94  
In conclusion, the social integration programmes overestimated the 
readiness of members of both titular and non-titular communities to en-
gage in intercommunal dialogue. Crucially, the documents defined inte-
gration as a wide concept with a range of components, seeking to co-opt 
support from different groups of society. The SIP, NP-ISL and the Con-
cept built upon minorities’ willingness to support policies which included 
guarantees for non-titulars to preserve their cultures. At the same time, all 
three documents reiterated that minorities had to accept that the public 
sphere was to remain titular and monolingual, co-opting support for poli-
cies from the members of majority.  
The programmes nonetheless made a considerable concession to 
non-core groups by recognising their right to potentially participate in 
decision-making in the country of residence. The fears of minorities that 
integration meant assimilation were also addressed, in part because non-
titulars were guaranteed opportunities of education in their language, at 
least in secondary or Saturday/Sunday schools. Unsurprisingly, across the 
region precisely this clause was regurgitated in support of separate school-
ing streams in the titular and Russian languages. Scholars have previously 
suggested that the titular groups in Estonia and Latvia perceived of “inte-
gration” in fact to mean “separation” of ethnic communities.95 Avoiding 
contact with the members of the minority seems to be the only feasible 
path for majority communities in the face of, as was perceived, far too 
many Russians polluting titular languages with impurities.  
In my interviews in Lithuania, the members of Russian and Polish 
communities argued that the reason why social integration programmes 
never took off in their country was the same.96 Thus, we can legitimately 
conclude here that the programmes did not focus on the measurable out-
comes of the integration process, but proposed a model of de jure multi-
cultural, de facto ethnonational society for the approval of political com-
munities dominated by titulars. This explains the emphasis on strong po-
litical institutions seeking to preserve and develop the cultural domain of 
titulars in accordance with the values of the ethnic core. There were no 
other clearly benchmarked goals in the integration programmes and of the 
Concept. Thus, it is clear why state institutions, political entrepreneurs of 
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the majority and the majority itself did not and could not accept the mi-
norities’ option of non-integration.  
 
 
4.   Cooptation as a model of integration 
In Estonia, as it was in Latvia, the political steps undertaken by the core 
national group indicate a crucial incentive for non-titular populations to 
abandon several discourses, which by the early 2000s had grown to be-
come largely self-referential: from one of ethnic conflict to one of human 
rights’ violations and unfairness in treatment. In the final versions of the 
Estonian SIP and Latvian ISL-NP, the rhetoric of democratic state-
building, national consolidation and civic cooperation prevailed, thus 
guaranteeing the common reference for both the titular as well as non-
titular groups addressed.  
The Lithuanian political entrepreneurs failed to scale down the 
ethnocentric rhetoric of the original draft of “The Concept of Ethnic Poli-
tics” and to envisage the contribution of non-Lithuanians to the country’s 
political development. Like similar documents in Latvia and Estonia, the 
Concept failed to identify the role of the Lithuanian majority–all of which 
indicates similar deficits of bi-communal dialogue in that country. Based 
on the previous discussions, it would therefore make more sense to indi-
cate that the “invitation to cooperate,” extended to non-core ethnic groups 
in Latvia and Estonia, was made under conditionality pressure and not 
without international financial assistance, both factors which were lacking 
in the Lithuanian case. This might explain why, however ingenuous, the 
call to non-titulars to assume the role of minority players in Latvia and 
Estonia was more successful than it was in Lithuania. Not only were 
Lithuania’s minority groups not invited to engage collectively in bi-
communal learning processes, they were actually marginalised to geo-
graphical regions where they were in the majority, in a sense, to proceed 
with their own democracy building while not interfering with the major-
ity’s work.  
The communication bypass and double meaning conveyed by the 
integration programmes in Estonia and Latvia have hugely determined the 
relations between the majority and minority groups. Primarily, this con-
cerns the growing upward mobility of representative minority members 
after the implementation of the programmes in Estonia and Latvia, when 
compared with Lithuania. The changes observed include the increase of 
minority representation among the political entrepreneurs, downscaling in 
perceptions of ethnic tensions and the salience of interethnic issues at the 
institutional level. On the other hand, the research of the local social scien-
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tists equally indicates the growing impact of the non-titular political entre-
preneurs, civic actors and social elites on greater institutional openness 
and the development of the political process. This clearly underlines the 
success of integration programmes in co-opting the members of minority 
groups.  
The brief overview of the programmes suggests that all three of 
them represented an ambivalent step towards improvement of interethnic 
cooperation and provided minorities’ incentives to integration. All three 
states equally witnessed the lack of bi-communal dialogue, which yet 
again pointed out to the members of the minority community that they 
should play by the “majorities’ rules” if they wanted to break out of mar-
ginal social positions. The Estonian SIP has also indicated that  
  
“Integration as a whole is directed towards the creation of a 
balanced and democratic multicultural society, although it is 
clear that this is a complicated and also contradictory process 
lasting decades and requiring the long-term and systematic 
support of the Estonian State.’97  
 
Interestingly, the Latvian national programme sets a clear framework in 
which bi-communal cooperation could be pursued, effectively by silencing 
the opinions critical of the politics and policies of the Latvian state. ISL-
NP illustrates this point bluntly.  
 
“[Latvian state does not support] the formation of a two-
community state; the model of ‘two societies in one nation;’ 
confrontation between elements of society, segregation, mar-
ginalisation and forced assimilation; tendencies to ethno-
federalism that would undermine the formation of a unified 
Latvian state; extremism, intolerance and national hatred.”98  
 
Ultimately, national integration programmes pushed minorities to 
accept that the ethnonational logic of state institutions will not change. 
Both the Latvian and Estonian documents opted for communitarian multi-
culturalism to signal their unwillingness to assimilate minorities, but im-
plicitly allied with the liberal multiculturalist approach by turning a blind 
eye on individual freedoms to assimilate minorities into the majority cul-
ture, language and, crucially social environment. In pragmatic terms, each 
member of the Russian-speaking community was granted the option of 
going along the titular road of success, acceptance and self-realisation, or 
no way at all. The monitoring of integration processes in Estonia indicated 
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in 2005 that Estonians were irritated by the behaviour and lifestyles of the 
local Russians, the indicators for which had risen from 46% in 2002 to 
59% in 2005.99 Increasingly, local scholarship sounded the alarm that the 
isolation of non-titulars was a threat to social stability in Estonia.100 How-
ever, the intolerance towards minorities was not limited to Russian-
speakers exclusively. Before the EU accession, Estonia and Latvia fea-
tured as the candidate countries most resistant to the concepts of multicul-
tural society, qualifying by the highest intolerance towards Muslims and 
the racial minorities among the CEE states. Thus, while the first round of 
integration programmes drew to an end, it became increasingly clear to all 
parties involved that neither the SIP, nor the ISL-NP have achieved their 
ambitious goals of creating societies tolerant to difference.101  
As was the case with the previous programmes, Estonia’s and Lat-
via’s governments opened up the floor for discussion on the contents of 
the follow-up documents. In Estonia, the Strategy for the Integration of 
Estonian Society, 2008–2013 (further, SIS) was drawn up and distributed 
among government officials, civil society organisations and international 
experts. SIS stated that the previous efforts geared towards integration 
were insufficient and that especially in the area of socio-economic integra-
tion of minorities, much more could be done.102 Estonia was pressed hard 
by the international community to bring its commitment to multicultural-
ism more in line with international standards.103 Because the SIP’s agenda 
on improving minority’s socio-economic status, combating employment 
and addressing the poverty-related social and health problems among 
Russian-speakers remained thin, multicultural development was believed 
to be undermined from an onset.  
Despite international criticisms, SIS did not revise any of the previ-
ously stated objectives on development of the “Estonian version of multi-
culturalism.” Instead it sought to parallel the situation of Estonia’s minor-
ity with that of migrants in the Western European states. In referring to the 
EU’s “Common Agenda for Integration–Framework for the Integration of 
Third Country Nationals in the European Union,” SIS framed Estonia as a 
receiving country of the global processes of migration. SIS introduced the 
concept of “the new immigrants,” and declared that the previous Estonian 
take on non-Estonians was generally correct and could now be applied to 
broader categories of non-titular residents. However, as opposed to SIP, 
SIS dedicated considerable space for monitoring integration outcomes and 
outlined a set of indicators to be used in future reports.104 Although the 
document provided a more comprehensive roadmap and signposts for 
measuring the outcomes of integration, its implementation was delayed by 
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mass riots around the removal of the Soviet monument in Tallinn, April 
2007.105 
The Estonian Integration Strategy, 2008–2013 (further, EIS) was 
adapted by Riigikogu in April 2008. The document continued on the gen-
eral line of monolingual and monocultural Estonian society, previously 
established in the SIS and SIP, and in line with the Constitution. However, 
as we can see throughout the document, international pressures bore fruit 
with the EIS reiterating issues of human rights, individual freedoms and 
connecting Estonian values to the values of the European Union.106 The 
scope of the strategy was broader, but the primary focus remained on 
language learning. The programme states:  
 
“The process of integration of the population of Estonia is a 
long-term one and its ultimate goal is a culturally diverse so-
ciety with a strong Estonian state identity, sharing common 
democratic values in which, in the public sector, permanent 
residents communicate in Estonian.”107  
 
The EIS emphasises the commitment to a multicultural society already 
expressed in the SIP and calls on all members of society to engage in 
contacts with another ethnic group, avoid negative stereotyping and learn 
the state language.108 Segregation of cultural domains is further empha-
sised with respect to educational and cultural integration, calling for more 
effective teaching of Estonian at all levels and prompting minorities to 
seek preservation of their cultures outside of the formal education.109 The 
EIS equally sticks to the legal-political measures of the previous pro-
gramme aimed at increasing the naturalisation rates among non-Estonians.  
One significant improvement of EIS in comparison with previous 
programmes is the acknowledgement of Russian-speakers’ contribution to 
Estonian public life and political decision-making. While the EIS notes the 
persistence of repellent attitudes of the Estonian majority towards non-
Estonians, it revealingly appeals to change in these attitudes as one of the 
goals of the programme.110 In this context, the programme brings forward 
the idea that neither the citizenship, nor the knowledge of state language 
are as important for creating Estonian society as is the sense of belonging 
among the minorities. To this end, the EIS signposts the need for intensifi-
cation of interethnic communications and the reduction of unemployment 
among Russian-speakers, but it fails to mention the significant underrepre-
sentation of minorities in the state apparatus.111 As before, the EIS grants 
the Estonians a role of pacesetters in the integration processes, but does so 
only by reference to the development of an “open” attitude toward non-
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Estonians and their involvement in society. Very few aspects of the pro-
gramme are actually aimed at the ethnic Estonians; the largest chunk of 
the funding is reserved for the improvement of language skills among non-
Estonians.  
Estonia’s policy towards minorities however was bound to stall 
because of the structural constraints imposed by the constitution. By de-
claring the state identity as based on the Estonian values, the constitution 
effectively undermined all potential interpretations of multicultural soci-
ety. Equal contribution of ethnic and linguistic communities to societal 
development is unconstitutional, unless it is about reaffirming Estonian-
centric values, traditions and importantly the language. Hence, the empha-
sis of the policy on state identity, joint activities of ethnic groups and 
cooperation at the level of local governments were all geared towards 
cooptation of minority members willing to support Estonianness, while 
scape-goating all those in opposition as undermining the constitutional 
foundations of the state.  
The EIS was developed as a result of both international pressure on 
Estonia to address the segregation of its minority community, and the calls 
of local elites upon the Russian-speaking minority to participate more 
actively in political processes. The situation in Latvia was even more 
controversial because local non-citizens cannot participate in political 
decisions even at the local level. Thus, the lack of representation of mi-
norities remained a serious challenge for democratic consolidation of 
society and the development of any solution to ethnic segregation.112 In 
addition, neither the European conditionality, nor the ISL-NP produced 
the necessary consensus regarding either “integration” or “minority rights” 
among the titular Latvian public, which hampered the further development 
of policy on integration. In this light, it is not surprising that there was no 
follow-up programme when the ISL-NP ran out.  
In early 2008, the Secretariat for Social Integration released a draft 
of “Basic Principles for Social Integration Policy, 2008–2013,” but came 
under significant fire from majority politicians and the media for failing to 
promote the status of the state language more vigorously.113 During 2008, 
the secretariat continued consultations with NGOs and local stakeholders 
and developed the draft of an updated social integration programme. The 
draft was submitted for consideration of the government in the late 2008, 
but apparently it did not appeal to policy-makers as the programme was 
not prolonged.114More importantly, the secretariat was reorganised and 
adjoined to the Ministry for Children and Family Affairs of Latvia in 
January 2009, putting an end to official rhetoric on society integration in 
Latvia.  
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The efforts to continue with the integration programmes were par-
ticularly important, because intolerance toward visible minorities in both 
Estonian and Latvian societies was on a constant rise. The topics dominat-
ing public discourse circled around ethnic issues and the discrimination 
faced by non-titulars from the titulars and vice versa. Estonian, Latvian 
and also Russian-speaking politicians across the region continuously em-
phasised ethnic issues to mobilise the electorate and stir up interethnic 
tensions.115 The review of the integration programmes suggests that de-
spite policy-maker’s efforts at creating common understandings about the 
role of the nation-state, the content of integration and the meaning of mi-
nority rights, all of these failed. It remains for further studies to clarify 
whether the resistance of majority political actors and publics are singu-
larly at fault.  
The constraints of space do not allow me to elaborate fully on the 
impact the debates on the social integration programmes had on the Baltic 
societies, although I will return to several issues brought up in the follow-
ing chapters. The debates on “common national core,” “national identity” 
and “cultural differences” gained particularly high currency during the 
debates on social integration and kept such a profile over the past decade. 
Due to this, brief discussion of the identity debates seems in order here.  
The initial period of post-communist transition modelled the Baltic 
states and societies into the image of the pre-Soviet polities and relied 
heavily on the core cultural and linguistic values, something that is said to 
lie at the centre of the primordial reading of national identities.116 Culture-
blind, but not culture-unbiased legislations on citizenship and language 
use connected post-Soviet political institutions to their pre-Soviet proto-
types, but they also, as I have shown up until now, have incorporated 
essential elements of the Soviet institutional treatment of nationalities: 
Soviet republics belonged to titulars, were officially run in the republican 
language, and guaranteed preferred access to institutions to titular nation-
als. Finally, because integration of Soviet society relied on the language of 
all-Union state institutions, non-Russians were significantly disadvantaged 
if they were not proficient in the Russian language. Thick language poli-
cies to protect Baltic languages were implemented to shield them from 
Russian influence, commissions were created to monitor language purity 
and language inspectorates (commonly known as “language police”) were 
installed to enforce language regulations. These policies fit too well in the 
Soviet institutional framework supporting titular identities at the expense 
of resident minorities, and, like the Soviet policies, they were not negotia-
ble.  
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While political institutions supported nation-building and forged 
national identities of various kinds, throughout the 1990s discussions in 
the Baltic societies came to reflect on differences between the members 
from different ethnic groups.117 Although several studies on the role eth-
nicity in the post-communist democratisation, regime consolidation and, 
crucially, social cohesion were produced, generally identity was treated as 
a given and unchangeable. In the short run, it meant that the identities of 
all groups were in a state of conflict and needed to be stabilised, as we 
have seen the topic recurrent in social integration programmes. 118 Natu-
rally, empirical scholarly research focused on the role identity plays in 
political institutions, whether the differences could be alleviated, and if the 
identities of Russian-speaker would change.119  
Titular identities were more often than not perceived as unchange-
able and permanent, or at least in no need of changing, while the problems 
and dynamics underlying identification patterns of minorities were treated 
as resulting from the “Soviet ballast” and were perceived as alterable.120 
Very few studies treated majorities’ identity as a product of social con-
struction or as a conscious choice, negotiating past and contemporary 
social, political and cultural constraints.121 The conflict of identities turned 
out to be seen as an issue of security and neatly framed in terms of “state 
security” during the EU membership negotiations.122 The Baltic states’ 
swift accession to the EU and NATO could do nothing but support the 
general perception of Baltic Europeanness. In this context the staunch 
resistance of the majority populations to debates on minority rights and 
value-liberalism suddenly became a proxy of each and everyone’s eth-
nonational identity, just as it did during the Soviet perestroika. Ultimately, 
no one was to challenge the EU’s credentials as minority protector or as a 
stronghold of democracy. The Baltic politicians, now officially a part of 
the European political elite referenced just that when dealing with minor-
ity claims for “multiculturalism with a human face.”123  
Particularly, the research on the progress of the integration pro-
grammes in Latvia and Estonia indicates that identities were not negotia-
ble. Officially, titulars’ identities were fixed, while minorities’ were in 
flux and needed to be shaped by the structural disincentives for participa-
tion in public processes as members of the minority. Some were effec-
tively co-opted, while others faced attitudinal difficulties in seeking inte-
gration. Limited motivation to acquire the state language and the set of 
negative collective images about the post-Soviet state and its citizenship 
was singled out as the most salient hindrance in all of the research on 
minority identities. At the same time, the emphasis on the ties of majori-
ties with the state was strengthened to a degree that left the members of 
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minority with no other options but to dissociate from the public space 
dominated by the majority, or to blend in.  
State integration programmes outlined the means for minorities to 
become accepted by learning the state language and adapting to the struc-
tural dominance of the titulars. At the same time, Estonia’s and Latvia’s 
integration documents and Lithuania’s legislation on minorities strength-
ened their perceived similarities through the lens of the nationalising poli-
cies and their effects on non-state language communities. These two logics 
decisively influenced the prospects of future bi-communal relations across 
the region.  
 
 
5.   Conclusion  
As I argue in this chapter, the documents aiming at the integration of the 
Baltic societies address issues relevant to minorities by inviting them to 
cooperate with the state institutions and majority publics on the terms 
defined by the majority nationals. On the one hand, the rhetoric of the 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian documents suggest that the state-bearing 
nations in part continue to perceive themselves to be locked in a position 
where active steps of protection of the national language, culture and na-
tion-centred education are necessary. The importance of the common, 
(majority-based) cultural values and views of history, the value of linguis-
tic proficiency and the social accommodation of the interests of the repre-
sentatives of non-core groups all feature strongly.  
The rhetoric of the national integration programmes allows me to 
conclude that perception about the status of Estonians, Latvians and 
Lithuanians in their homeland countries is best described as that of “mi-
noritised majority.”124 On the other hand, however, I demonstrate that 
parts of the documents hint at the expected change in the relations between 
the core and non-core ethnic communities. While both are expected to be 
involved in shaping nation-wide policies, the role of the titular community 
is stressed throughout, with clear indication of the fact that the minorities 
would need to accept to the dominance of the state-bearing ethnic group 
and its language. Nothing could be a more pronounced indication that non-
core groups would need to retreat into the position assigned to them by the 
majority as the status of an ethnic minority assuming a helping, but not 
central, role in development of the nation-states.  
In the context of the Estonian and Latvian situations, this was no 
mean feat. The policy-makers provided strong indications of their inten-
tion to support the development of minority cultures and the retention of 
non-core groups’ linguistic identities within the framework of the existing 
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state. A number of studies released since the adoption of the policy-
documents, however, have demonstrated that its drafters largely overesti-
mated the degree of political galvanisation of minority groups, as well as 
the degree of non-titulars’ disaffection with the political entrepreneurs of 
their state of residence.125 The minority members, particularly those with 
no citizenship and no voting rights, have even less incentive to associate 
with the political process in the country and see it as a tool of the titulars 
to establish policies which are favourable for the majority group.126 While 
this statement is more applicable to the northern Baltic states with signifi-
cant numbers of non-citizens, it also has relevance for the estimation of 
position by the Lithuanian minorities. They face similar difficulties of 
adapting to the situation of more explicit domination by the national ma-
jority.127  
The focus on the agency of integration could provide for a better 
understanding of non-titulars’ motivation to develop more intensive ties 
with the state and its institutions. The Baltic political institutions are im-
portant signposts for those members of non-titular communities willing to 
take advantage of integration opportunities. For all those who are not 
willing or are not prepared to cooperate within the framework of the pro-
grammes, incentives are now provided to scale-down their expectations of 
political participation.  
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Chapter 7 
 
The Language of alienation  
 
 
In this chapter I discuss how the majority and the minority communities’ 
perceptions play out in the context of social interactions. As I demonstrate 
throughout this chapter, limited opportunities for social mobility for cer-
tain linguistic groups in the Baltic states have been conducive for a limited 
amount of intercommunal dialogue between the titular and non-titular 
ethnics in the Baltic states. The dialogue, as I demonstrate, is mainly based 
upon the stereotypical representations in the media and the belligerent 
discourse of elites in both communities.  
I also suggest that the members of minority communities have con-
siderably changed their views on their states of residence, as well as of the 
majority communities from the 1990s through the early 2000s. However, 
the representation of non-titulars in the local media suggests that the 
communities, although existing side by side, have a rather shallow experi-
ence of interethnic dialogue. I outline several reasons for this. The lack of 
political will to accommodate many of the minority claims in the frame-
work of Baltic legislation discussed above had complicated the situation 
and continues to impede solutions to interethnic tensions. I then discuss 
how the position of minority groups is viewed by majority populations and 
by minorities themselves, as is taken from public opinion research. While 
comprehensive data on perceptions of minority communities by the ma-
jorities is not available for the Baltic states, studies of minority groups’ 
image in the regional media are abundant. These indicate the reasons why 
the Russian-speakers had limited engagement in political processes in the 
Baltic states between 1991 and 2004. Finally, I discuss the consequences 
of the linguistic segregation of the Baltic societies, taking the mass mobili-
sation against school reform in Latvia and the removal of the Soviet sol-
dier monument in Estonia, as well as the reaction of respective govern-
ments, as examples of non-existent communication.  
The current chapter addresses the question as to how structural con-
straints imposed by language legislation conditioned differences in opin-
ions of different ethnic communities. I take proficiency in the state lan-
guage as the indicator for persisting social inequalities across the region, 
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providing the foundation for the intercommunal tensions in each of the 
Baltic societies.  
 
 
1.   Minorities’ proficiency in the state language 
Issues of language use, such as teaching through the medium of a minority 
language and linguistic proficiency as a prerequisite for integration into 
the Baltic societies, have been constantly at the centre of attention in both 
the minority and majority populations. The research on the political con-
sequences of regulating language use across the region leaves no doubt of 
the titular languages’ importance for the functioning of the Baltic socie-
ties. However, representatives of minority groups have consistently criti-
cised the regulatory aspect of linguistic policies in the Baltic states.  
However, the data from the official sources of the Lithuanian, Lat-
vian and Estonian republics clearly suggests that over the years of inde-
pendence the members of non-titular communities have improved their 
knowledge of the titular language and increasingly use it as the first lan-
guage in communication with other people. Although the official Estonian 
position states that over the past years the interest of the non-Estonian 
population in acquiring the skills in state language has grown, the monitor-
ing of the integration process in the country suggests that it effectively 
halted in the early 2000s.1 Prior to that, the language skills of the minority 
population had constantly been on the rise with 67% of adults and 92% of 
young people claiming proficiency in the Estonian language in 1999. 
Overall only 42% of resident non-Estonians declared (any) knowledge of 
the state language in 1989; by 2007, the numbers had risen to 83%.2 These 
numbers have been growing over the past decade, but the level of profi-
ciency among the adult non-Estonian population is still considered to be 
insufficient to compete with Estonians in the labour market on an equal 
basis.3 It is also frequently mentioned that the language skills of non-core 
ethnics are most often far too low to allow them to cope in the Estonian-
speaking environment in everyday situations.4  
Different schemes were provided by the Estonian government to 
improve the language proficiency of the minority population. The pro-
gramme “Interest,” operating 1999–2005 was particularly successful in 
language training while providing a refund of the language learning fees 
for the candidates who successfully passed the language examination.5 
The information collected from those applying for the refund suggests that 
more than half of those would use the language training to gain access to 
citizenship examinations. Only around a third of those seeking financial 
support stated that they were simply improving their knowledge of Esto-
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nian.6 The reports suggest that around 11% of the students were enrolling 
in these courses in order to access higher education in Estonian high 
schools. This data clearly indicates that at that time there was an insuffi-
cient number of educational establishments functioning in languages other 
than Estonian and that the language training at minority schools could not 
sufficiently prepare graduates to study at the university level in Estonian. 
More recent research on education facilities in Estonia corroborates these 
earlier findings, although there is general improvement in the levels of 
state language knowledge with minority students.7 
The data provided by the language learning facilities in Estonia also 
indicates some curious reasons for non-titular residents to acquire and/or 
improve knowledge in the state language. Around half of those taking 
advantage of the course were individuals with undetermined citizenship 
and had passed the language test at the lowest level.8 Most certainly, these 
course participants had sufficient levels of state language proficiency to 
apply for Estonian citizenship before attending the courses and could be 
considered “integrated” into Estonian society, following the state defini-
tion of integration.9  
The increasing proficiency of non-titulars in Estonian comes par-
ticularly in the face of diminishing knowledge of Russian by the younger 
generation of Estonians, while the growing number of Russian-speakers in 
the country who declare active knowledge of the state language. At the 
same time, Estonian social scientists indicate that minorities favour the 
state language to communicate with their Estonian peers or when address-
ing individuals in public.10 The survey of the process of integration, “Inte-
gration Monitoring,” suggests that some 45% of the students in Russian 
schools who have been studying Estonian, indicate that they gain only 
basic skills in the state language. The lack of opportunity to apply the 
knowledge gained undermines the overall language skills of the Russian-
speakers and ultimately results in the loss of Estonian knowledge.11 The 
2007 TIES study of minority youth additionally indicates that Russian-
speakers residing in the country’s capital are more likely to have better 
knowledge of the language, but have less opportunity to use it due to the 
lack of Estonian-speaking networks.12  
The study “Mina, Maailm, Media” indicates that although the high-
est level of self-reported language proficiency is among 30–54 year olds, 
this is also the group that has the fewest contacts with Estonian-speakers.13 
At the same time, the report by Ernst & Young, prepared in cooperation 
with the Integration Foundation, clearly demonstrates that the group of 
15–19 year olds use the Estonian language the most (around 93% declare 
active regular use), with the elder age cohort (20–29) declaring the second 
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most frequent use of the language and contacts with speakers of Esto-
nian.14 On the basis of the data collected in the TIES study in 2008, Jennie 
Schulze reports that Russian-speakers have used Estonian even more 
widely since.15 
Integration monitoring has not failed to indicate the inherent drive 
of the non-Estonian groups in the country to acquire knowledge of the 
state language without having also learned to identify with the state of 
their residence.16 On some occasions, the reports suggest that studying the 
language would facilitate the application for citizenship, as well as create 
more opportunities for participation in Estonian society.17 The non-
Estonians, as is positively emphasized in these reports, seem to be willing 
to contribute to the development of the Estonian state and show positive 
attitudes and behaviours towards the Estonians, as well as towards Esto-
nian society.  
On the part of Estonians, however, as is repeated in the monitoring 
results, there is only a limited preparedness to identify the non-core eth-
nics as potential contributors to the country’s development. The last point 
is corroborated in the studies of Russian-speakers’ attitudes.18 Consider-
able doubts have been raised by local observers examining whether the 
limited willingness of non-Estonians to engage in the life of civil society is 
determined by their beliefs in the state’s disinterest in their fate, by per-
ceived alienation from the titular ethnic group, or should be explained by 
some other means. As had been stated in the mid-term report on the inte-
gration process, “non-Estonians do not perceive a clear interest from the 
state towards their prospects nor do they feel Estonians accept the multi-
culturalism that has developed in society.”19  
“Integration Monitoring 2005’ indicated that the Estonian youth 
have a very fragmentary picture of the ethnic minorities inhabiting the 
country because they have limited contacts with non-Estonians. Generally, 
Estonian youth believe that the integration process should affect non-
Estonians only without requiring any steps to be undertaken by the Esto-
nian majority.20 The research also indicated that Estonian society is per-
ceived by many young people as guaranteeing the place and survival for 
one ethnic group, i.e. Estonians, in which Estonia’s minorities should be 
prepared to assume an inferior social status.21 For members of the minority 
community residing in areas dominated by Estonians, this is increasingly 
becoming a reality.22 The same view appears to be unacceptable in regions 
such as Ida-Virumaa, where non-Estonians are clearly the demographic 
majority.23  
My interviews with members of minority NGOs in 2006 have con-
firmed, members of minority groups themselves consider ethnic Estonians 
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to occupy the higher position on the social ladder by the mere fact of their 
belonging to an ethnic majority group.24 Thus they envision that the best 
way of improving their social status is only by acquiring skills in the titu-
lar language. The studies of relations between Estonia’s youngsters in the 
aftermath of the 2007 Bronze Night events additionally suggest the de-
creasing preparedness of Estonian-speakers to engage with Russian-
speakers throughout the country. Russian-speaking youth on the other 
hand, are found to be more willing to entertain contacts with Estonian-
speakers. However, the findings are alarming in so far as the titulars ap-
pear to be more resilient in blocking interactions with non-Estonians in 
informal situations.25  
In Latvia the results of the population census in 2000 showed that 
79% of the population speaks the state language, a dramatic increase from 
the 50% in 1989. This, however, does not indicate that the use of Latvian 
expanded at the expense of other languages, mainly Russian. The study 
“Ethnopolitical tension in Latvia” conducted in 2004 states that  
 
“communication between ethnic Latvians and local residents 
of other nationalities usually takes place in Russian, because 
Latvian language skills tend to be much worse among Rus-
sians and people of other non-titular nationalities than are 
Russian language skills among ethnic Latvians.”26  
 
The “Language,” a research by the Baltic Institute for Social Science (fur-
ther, BISS) assessed the efficacy of the state language programme be-
tween 1996 and 2004. The authors argue that the titular nationals almost 
exclusively use the state language to communicate with other ethnics. A 
great number of the non-titular, non-Russian populations in the region, 
such as local Poles, Ukrainians, Jews and Germans still deploy Russian as 
the major tool for communication among each other and with Latvians.27  
The “Language” also indicates that each of the ethnic communities 
in Latvian society predominantly employs the language of their own group 
for intragroup communication. The data suggests that over 90% of Latvi-
ans and Russians use their respective language at home,28 while at the 
same time the non-Latvian minorities are employing their Russian-
language skills for daily communication at home and at work.29 In this 
light, it is of course alarming for the titular community in Latvia to see 
that after almost a decade of independence a large part of the non-titular 
community is still “separated from the Latvian-speaking environment.” 
The BISS study shows that up to 10% of surveyed non-Latvians, when 
reviewing their language skills, admit that they do not know the state lan-
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guage at all, while 43% indicate a “very poor” level (the lowest level of 
language skills in official testing terminology). At the same time, the 2004 
survey shows that eight years after the introduction of the state language 
programme in Latvia, less than half of respondents (47%) have a “more or 
less free command of the Latvian language.”  
An important difference in terms of language knowledge and use is 
visible in terms of generational differences among non-Latvians. The 
members of the younger age group (15–34 years old) estimate their 
knowledge to be very good, but they are counterweighted by the majority 
of population in the age-group 50–74 who have no command of Latvian. 
A somewhat similar trend is observed with respect to Russian-language 
skills among ethnic Latvians. However, one should note that titulars still 
claim to know the Russian language better than non-titulars know Latvian: 
73% of Latvians declare a good command, 23% poor skills, and 4% do not 
know Russian at all.30  
Nonetheless, the use of the state language has been noted to in-
crease gradually over the past years. A number of BISS analytical reports 
suggest that in the period of 1996–2000 non-titulars use Latvian at work 
and on the street much more often, showing a rising tendency from 9 to 
23%, and 21 to 23% respectively.31 Between 2000 and 2003, the attitudes 
of minority groups towards the Latvian language have been constantly 
improving, growing from 29% of respondents who responded that they 
“enjoyably” speak Latvian in 200 to more than a third (38%) stating the 
same in 2003.32  
Minority populations constitute only a marginal part of Lithuania, 
which could explain their somewhat different level of proficiency in the 
state language. Indeed, the results of the national population census in 
Lithuania (2001) suggested that while accounting for merely 16% of the 
population, minorities have from “good” to “very good” knowledge of 
Lithuanian. The most striking difference can be observed between the 
autochthonous minorities and the Soviet-era migrants: the majority of 
Polish-speakers residing in South Eastern Lithuania and an Old Believer’s 
community in Northern Lithuania demonstrate “very good” proficiency in 
the language and hence are considered to be well-integrated in official 
terminology.33  
The regional settlement of Polish-speakers predisposes the mem-
bers of the group to choose a more protective attitude to their language, 
even in the face of this group’s high levels of state language proficiency.34 
As local surveys indicate, Lithuania’s Poles tend to use their native lan-
guage more frequently for everyday communication, as well as with re-
spect to communication with public officials.35 They also send their chil-
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dren to Polish-speaking schools more frequently than Russian-speaking 
minorities choose Russian language schools.36 Today, however, while 
Polish-speaking school-students are educated in their mother tongue, only 
a limited number of Lithuanian Poles continue to use the higher education 
institutions of their country. This accounts for the plummeting levels of 
higher education among the Polish-speaking community, which is lower 
than among any other ethnic group in the country.37 The distinct ethnic 
composition of South Eastern Lithuania also has implications for the dis-
tinctiveness of the Polish-speakers who, residing in compact communities, 
enjoy significant opportunities for linguistic favouritism.  
The members of Lithuania’s Russian-speaking community demon-
strate far less linguistic cohesiveness. This is particularly clear from the 
observations of the educational behaviour of Russian-speakers, who tend 
to send their children more frequently to institutions where the language of 
instruction is Russian, and only where schooling in Russian is unavailable, 
in Lithuanian. The results of these educational preferences, as I discuss in 
chapter 5, have gradually led to a growing decline in the number of 
schools providing education in Russian over the past decade. While espe-
cially in Southern and South Eastern Lithuania many individuals demon-
strate active bilingualism or even trilingualism, there is growing evidence 
that linguistic preferences have been changing over the years of independ-
ence from Russian towards Lithuanian and Polish. Some researchers even 
go as far as to argue that the lack of strict linguistic cohesion and enforce-
ment policies of the Lithuanian state have over time resulted in the im-
provement of “the prospects for social integration and the promotion of 
linguistic and cultural diversity.”38  
Some Russian and Polish-speakers also send their children to be 
educated in Lithuanian language schools. Once again, the differences 
between the ethnic groups are striking: While up to 33% of Russian-
speakers indicate that schooling in Lithuanian allows their children to 
attend a better university in Lithuania, only 9% of Polish-speakers agree 
with the same statement. The agreements of the Lithuanian state with 
Poland and Polish governmental programmes supporting ethnic Poles 
abroad allow Lithuanian (and also Latvian) Poles to gain education free of 
charge in neighbouring Poland. During my interviews many representa-
tives of the Polish community suggested that such opportunities for geo-
graphical and social mobility encourage many parents of Polish-speaking 
children to emphasise education in the mother-tongue in order to improve 
their children’s future employment opportunities.39  
It appears that the funding provided by the Polish state for the re-
gional development of South Eastern Lithuania plays a key role in this 
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respect. Since signing the interstate treaty in 1994, Poland has provided 
considerable financial support for schools with Polish as the language of 
education by offering materials, supporting student exchanges to Poland 
and generously financing the infrastructural development of minority 
schools. Poland’s quasi non-governmental organisation, Wspólnota Pol-
ska, is particularly active in advocating state support for minority educa-
tion and throughout the years was monitoring the fulfilment of the inter-
state treaty by the Lithuanian authorities. In addition, Wspólnota Polska 
draws up suggestions for the Polish government to allocate financial re-
sources into regional infrastructure and support Polish-speakers education 
in Lithuania.40  
Poland’s calls to establish a Polish-language university to improve 
the education situation in South Eastern Lithuania were at the heart of 
contention for nearly a decade and provided a rallying point for Lithuanian 
radicals. Finally, Białystok University was granted permission in 2007 to 
establish a branch in Vilnius and train specialists in economics and infor-
matics.41 Arguably, the move was endorsed by the Lithuanian government 
due to the considerable “brain drain” of Polish-speakers who, throughout 
the 1990s-early 2000s had moved to Poland, where they could receive 
university degrees free of charge and frequently did not return to Lithua-
nia.42  
The Lithuanian state however continuously sought to undermine the 
opportunities for Polish-speakers to migrate to Poland for education pur-
poses. During the term of Zigmas Zinkievicius at the head of the Ministry 
of Education (1996–1998), teaching of Lithuanian was intensified in Pol-
ish language schools, while the number of subjects with obligatory teach-
ing in Polish was reduced.43 In addition, the Polish language exam was 
scrapped from the list of obligatory subjects in secondary school exams 
and was made optional, causing significant protests across the country and 
in Poland proper. In a move that is supposed to improve Polish-speakers’ 
proficiency in Lithuanian throughout education system, the Ministry of 
Education removed (native) Polish language from the list mandatory ex-
aminations at the primary school level as of 2010. These regulations went 
hand in hand with the promotion of Lithuanian in all minority schools, 
which now will be obliged to conduct all written communication with the 
students and their parents in the state language. One could interpret this 
push as a top-down effort to enforce the status of Lithuanian in a tradition-
ally Polish speaking area, especially given that the move came after the 
general education and particularly language teaching in the South Eastern 
Lithuania were evaluated positively in the early 2000s.44 
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The lack of a concentrated settlement of Russian-speakers in 
Lithuania brings about different results for the same reasons: parents are 
prompted to send their children to Lithuanian schools in order to facilitate 
their linguistic and social integration into the mainstream society through 
education facilities. In interviews with members of the Russian-speaking 
community in Vilnius, it became apparent that opportunities for higher 
education in Russian abroad, i.e. in the Russian Federation or in Belarus, 
do not present an attractive prospect in the long-run.45 While education in 
Polish and in Poland might bring Lithuanian Polish-speakers greater assets 
in the context of the European Union, Russian-speakers recognize that 
higher education in their native language does not bring them strategic 
advantages in Lithuania. Other observers suggest that it is  
 
“mainly the more educated strata of the minority population 
that favour Lithuanian-medium schools for their offspring. 
These parents clearly see their children’s future as being di-
rectly linked to success in mainstream society, and thus do 
not want to limit their chances in this regard by offering 
them too much accommodation (i.e. education in minority 
language alone).”46  
 
Russian is still spoken by the widest majority of the population, i.e. up to 
90%, and is very closely followed by Lithuanian at 83%.47 These numbers 
also suggest that the majority of Lithuanian minority residents is proficient 
in the state language and are even in favour of the centralised language 
examination for graduates of all schools to ensure formal equality in em-
ployment. The reasons mentioned most often in this context include in-
strumental attitudes, e.g. job opportunities and equal chances in the labour 
market, but predominantly indicate idealistic reasons such as raising the 
level of competence, unifying the country, etc.48 Kasatkina and Leoncikas 
suggest that the members of minorities are not only declaring their prepar-
edness to acknowledge the central role of the Lithuanian language but also 
to support this by various means.49  
As elsewhere in the Baltic states, Lithuanian minorities demonstrate 
a complex set of linguistic loyalties which do not correspond to their eth-
nic identities. In fact, Lithuania’s two largest linguistic minority groups, 
Polish and Russian, demonstrate positive views towards the state lan-
guage, and representatives of the smaller national minority groups indicate 
that there is a particular affinity of these groups for their “titular” lan-
guage. While the population census indicates that over the years of inde-
pendence the spread of the state language is increasing in Lithuania as in 
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the other two Baltic states, various ethnic groups demonstrate different 
levels of proficiency and a range of reasons for acquiring the state lan-
guage. Polish-speakers mention idealistic reasons for the knowledge of the 
language–for instance, “a citizen of Lithuania should know the Lithuanian 
language,” as well as note that “the language of Lithuanians is important 
to avoid being cut off from society or to be accepted.”50  
My discussion so far indicated that those parts of the minority 
populations across the region that have opted for accommodation with the 
dominance of the state language have done this by acknowledging its 
importance for social mobility, not for idealistic reasons. The next part of 
the chapter demonstrates that the limited opportunities for communication 
between linguistic communities cannot solely be tied to proficiency in the 
state language. The majority members’ lack of will to take minority claims 
seriously has perpetuated the linguistic divide in the Baltic societies. The 
cleft between the communities in each state is particularly visible from the 
analyses of the media produced for different language communities.  
 
 
2.   The Russian-speaking information space  
The individuals from minority communities have been continuously im-
proving their proficiency in the state languages since the mid-1990s. 
However, as I have also made clear, the reasons for language acquisition 
frequently do not converge with the expectations of the titulars, who 
would like to see minorities learning the state language for intrinsic rea-
sons, as a way to identify with a nation-state and its language policies.  
Minority populations in the region acquire language skills for 
pragmatic reasons, among others, because the state language is necessary 
for social advancement and the improvement of economic status. The 
research of language use in urban areas provides a wealth of data confirm-
ing that members of the minority can rely on services and social networks 
functioning entirely in their native language.51 One of the areas in the 
public domain that sustains the relative autonomy of the minority linguis-
tic communities’ social interactions is the media. From the media re-
sources in minority languages, non-titulars collect information about other 
ethnic groups in their country, form opinions on political issues and ex-
press their expectations to an audience with the similar rhetorical reper-
toire. Nonetheless, local scholarship indicates that the reference of minor-
ity groups to the information in their native language largely impedes 
national accord and hinders social consolidation.52 This topic recurred 
forcefully during the mass protests against education reform in Latvia, 
2004, and the April 2007 events in Estonia.  
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While no restrictions on language use exist in any of the Baltic 
states in the field of printed media, the situation regarding the electronic 
media in Estonia is markedly different from that in Latvia. The Estonian 
Language Act states that, during broadcasts, “foreign language text shall 
be accompanied by an adequate translation into Estonian.” The radio 
broadcasts “aimed at a foreign language audience” are explicitly exempted 
from this requirement.53 Arguably, the term “foreign language” was a 
significant improvement when compared to pre-war Estonia’s Language 
Law of 1934, where all languages except for Estonian were termed 
“alien.”54  
The 1994 Broadcasting Act requires that at least one of the two 
public Eesti Raadio channels air “in a foreign language,”55 naturally ap-
plying to the broadcasts in the language of the Russian minority. However, 
the Estonian Language Act, amended in 1997, limits the volume of “for-
eign language” news and live programmes on both public and private 
television which can be broadcast without translation into Estonian, to no 
more than 10% “of the volume of weekly original production.”56 In Lat-
via, the share of broadcasts on private radio and television channels in 
languages other than Latvian must not exceed 25% of the total amount of 
daily broadcasting.57 As for public television and radio, the first channel 
must broadcast exclusively in the state language, whereas the same law 
allows for up to 20% of broadcasting in “foreign languages” on the second 
channel.58 In practice, these regulations not only constrain the freedom of 
expression in non-state languages, they also effectively prevent minorities 
from establishing their own electronic media broadcasting in a “foreign 
language” from within the country.  
As has been argued by minority activists, the legal regulation of 
language use in the media effectively restricts access to information from 
official channels on Latvian and Estonian current events and redirects 
minority members to sources providing information in their language.59 
While these language limitations do not affect cable and satellite broad-
casts, many members of minority communities are limited in access to 
information aired regularly. This encourages them to seek information in 
their language from sources located outside of their country of residence, 
predominantly from the Russian Federation.  
The Russian Federation is an active player on the information mar-
ket in the Baltic states by supporting a range of media broadcasting from 
outside the region. Despite targeting Baltic Russian-speakers, broadcasts 
from the Russian Federation dedicate much more of their air-time to in-
formation on the events in Russia proper than on political and social 
events in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The digests of the events in the 
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region are more often than not presented in a language containing gener-
alisations and mild (but distinct) accusations, depicting Baltic events in a 
negative light and at times openly fanning the hysteria on sensitive issues, 
such as interethnic relations. 
In Lithuania the situation differs slightly, although insignificantly. 
The Lithuanian Ethics Commission, the Radio and Television Commis-
sion, the Council of Lithuanian National Radio and Television and the 
Foundation for the Support of Press, Radio and Television oversee the 
broadcasting in minority languages. While the members of the Ethnic 
Commission and other institutions are appointed by the media industry, as 
well as by various public non-political organizations, public interest and 
reflections on minority issues appear to be highly politicised in Lithua-
nia.60 Over the past decade, the amount of radio broadcasting in minority 
languages has been diminishing down to half an hour per day in Russian 
and fifteen minutes in Polish. The changes have left minority members 
without full-scale state-funded broadcasting services in their native lan-
guages due to curtailed funding. While previously the daily news was 
broadcast in Russian on state television, this practice has been discontin-
ued due to lack of financial support by the state, leaving only private re-
gional television companies to broadcast programmes in Russian, Polish 
and Belarusian. On a broader scale, Lithuania’s minorities have access to 
35 newspapers and 6 magazines in their languages: 31 of them are pub-
lished in Russian, 7 in Polish, 1 in Belarusian and 2 in German.61 How-
ever, the “newspapers in Russian, for instance, are written in bad Russian; 
they depend on the information from the press of Russia and largely the 
reviews of this press. The same may be said about other minority press.”62  
Despite the persistent calls for establishing national Russian lan-
guage channels to inform the minority publics of the current political and 
economic events, such projects have not been considered in any of the 
states. While local media research suggests that television is the most 
popular and hence most influential mass-media throughout the region,63 
the local journalists argue that the current amount and quality of Russian-
language programmes is “working not for, but against integration” of 
ethnic communities.64 For example, percentages of the titular community 
in Latvia that follow radio and TV programmes in their language only are 
84 and 85%, respectively, while for the Russian-speaking community in 
Latvia these numbers are 78 and 85%, respectively. Even in the case of 
printed media, up to three-quarters of all non-titular respondents in Latvia 
indicate that they never read papers in the state language, a number sig-
nificantly higher than those unable to speak Latvian.65 All of these obser-
vations demonstrate that at present, not only are language issues at play, 
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but when it comes to the minority taking notice of the media in another 
language, other factors are also of significant importance.  
Studies of the media in Lithuania suggest that the extent to which 
minority members turn to information resources in the state language 
depends on their success in adapting to their position in society, the qual-
ity of the media and on the perceptions that they encounter in reports on 
the issues of concern to them.66 Tadas Leončikas suggests that the more a 
group is integrated into society, the more its views on social and political 
events and preferences for information sources resemble those of the ma-
jority. He also stresses that the differences in presentation of the issues 
such as the integration of Lithuania into Europe impacts the preferences of 
the Russian- and Polish-speakers for different media sources.  
In reviewing Lithuania’s Russian-language press Birute Sinočkina 
indicates that despite the fact that some essential differences in the major-
ity and minority press persist, current publications in minority languages 
have a clearly distinguishable audience.67 The country-wide press in Rus-
sian such as Respublika, Litovskij kurier, Ponedel’nik and Obzor caters to 
those in search of an alternative interpretation of political events, minority 
and majority alike. At the same time, the local and regional newspapers, 
such as Klaipeda, Slovo, Vesti Šal’či, Švenčionskij krai, Nalšios Žinois, 
Kurier Wilenski, Vilnius and Sugardas mainly address the issues of inter-
est for the residents of particular towns and regions, and are also read by 
local Lithuanians.68 One of the interesting observations Sinočkina makes 
with respect to the press in minority languages in Lithuania is that fre-
quently Russian-language publications are also paralleled by Lithuanian 
versions of the same material (e.g. Lietuvos rytas, Respublika, Klaipeda, 
Ponedel’nik/Pirmadienis, etc.) The content of the Russian-language publi-
cations, Sinočkina suggests, focuses mainly on people with limited knowl-
edge of the state language. However, they also have a clear appeal to 
Lithuanian older readership and those residing in areas of compact minor-
ity settlement.69 In general, however, she predicts that with the growing 
number of Russian-speakers proficient in Lithuanian, the amount of Rus-
sian-speaking press addressing national and local issues will be declining, 
while the publications providing a digest of the news from the Russian 
Federation will keep their place in Lithuanian media landscape.70  
The Lithuanian context questions the assumption made by the me-
dia analysis in Latvia and Estonia, namely, whether the preference for a 
particular language of information depends solely on the language profi-
ciency of an interlocutor.71 Interestingly, the research in Latvia and Esto-
nia stresses that, although minority populations only have limited access to 
the media in their own language, they rarely resort to the news coverage in 
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the language of majority. The local research see this as the reason for 
minorities’ alienation from the state institutions and majority populations, 
but the style of coverage and information provided suggest that there is a 
more fundamental mismatch between the media spheres.72  
Particularly, the research on media in Latvia has detailed and ad-
dressed various differences found between Latvian and Russian-language 
sources. Similar conclusions are drawn in “Ethnopolitical tension in Lat-
via.” Here the BISS includes an introductory remark that “the audience of 
the mass media in Latvia is divided up between those who read, watch and 
listen in Latvian and those who read, watch and listen in Russian.”73 Im-
portantly, the majority of Russian-speakers in Latvia use the mass media 
from Russia, with television being the media with the largest audience. 
BISS analysts thus suggest that “the attitudes of many Russian-speakers in 
Latvia are closer to the attitudes that are expressed in the Russian media, 
as opposed to the official views of the country in which these people 
live.”74 However, the situation might be somewhat mitigated by the fact 
that some 7% of Russian respondents and some 8% of other non-Latvians 
taking part in the survey indicate that they read at least one of the Latvian-
language national newspapers (most frequently, Diena) regularly.  
Despite the meagre impact of the titular language press on minority 
communities, the difference in references to the printed media is not as 
pronounced as one would expect. Both parts of society in Latvia are only 
rarely interested in each others’ newspapers. The Latvian audience favours 
the state-centred and somewhat more conservative Latvijas Avīze and 
Neatkarīgā (23% and 12%, respectively). Russians and other non-Latvians 
read Vesti Segodnya, Subbota, Chas and Telegraf,75 all much more critical 
of the political events in the country and standing more in defence of mi-
nority interests in Latvia.76 On several occasions, local researchers have 
effectively blamed Soviet linguistic policies for creating linguistically bi-
polar societies in the Baltic states. Pabriks notes that  
 
“precisely because of the linguistic inability to access the 
mass media operating in Latvian, the political orientation 
and attitudes of Russian speakers differed and continue to 
differ from those who were bilingual or whose native lan-
guage was Latvian.”77  
“The difference can be characterized in a way that most of 
media in Russian present cynical views about the state as 
such while media in Latvian on the same issues only criti-
cize the authority, institutions or particular politicians.”78  
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However, critical studies of the Russian-speaking press in Latvia 
increasingly suggest that the journalists working for these papers are less 
interested in the unbiased presentation of the situation in Latvia, but act 
more under economic pressures and hence are more responsive to incen-
tives from the financial donors to their publications. The Latvian journal-
ists frequently argue that Russian-speaking publications enforce the situa-
tion where two information spaces exist separately.79 This allows Latvian 
journalists to speculate on Russian business interests in Latvia’s Russian-
language media and on the anti-Latvian interests within the Russian-
speaking community.80  
It is therefore not surprising that the results of media content 
analyses of the leading Russian- and Latvian-speaking newspapers con-
ducted by the Latvian agency “Mediju Tilts” in 2004 indicate that the 
majority of comments about the “other” nationality were presented in 
highly emotional and frequently negative terms.81 The report concludes 
that the Latvian-language press still struggles with accepting the Russian-
speaking community as a part of Latvia’s society: Russian-speakers are 
frequently referred to in the context of “occupation,” “repressions” and the 
Russian state. Overall, the frequent parallels drawn between the Russian-
speakers of Latvia and the Russian state have no positive connotation in 
the Latvian-speaking press, although Russian-speakers who have mastered 
the Latvian language are presented in a more positive light. On the other 
hand, the Russian-speaking press transmits a negative picture of the situa-
tion in Latvia. It does so by distinguishing Latvia as the country of resi-
dence, rather than a political system. In this sense, politicians and the 
government more often than not are seen as representatives of the titular 
nation, of Latvians, but not of the residents of Latvia. Media studies in 
Estonia suggest that the situation there is similar to that of Latvia,  
 
“it is natural that the media can be of two kinds: the Estonian-
speaking and the Russian-speaking. [… ] There is a reason to 
presume that they are acting differently in covering rather 
sensitive society issues and especially the relationship be-
tween the Estonian- and Russian-speaking communities resid-
ing in Estonia.”82  
 
Two decisive points with respect to the media in that country have 
been noted in media studies since the mid-1990s. Firstly, the media re-
flects the ethnopolitical gap between ethnic groups, with public informa-
tion channels being instrumentalised by various political and economic 
actors for their purposes.83 Media research in all three states points to a 
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clear difference between the media in minority and majority languages, 
which cover the same events. Some have interpreted the difference as a 
result of politicking by majority groups, and the “circumstances inhibiting 
integration are often found particularly in the attitude of Estonians.”84 The 
Estonian-language press addresses the issues of high concern for the ma-
jority society, but it is equally successful in disregarding the opinions and 
concerns of the minority as has been observed during the period of EU-
accession, EU-referenda and education reforms.85 This point has also been 
mentioned in the studies of Lithuanian and Latvian dailies.86 The experts 
of the Legal Information Centre suggest that in Estonia  
 
“ethnic minorities in most of the cases appear as the ‘source 
of problems.’ The most common theme is lack of language 
knowledge, high number of persons without citizenship, for-
mer military servants that are not entitled for the residence 
permit, refugees etc, those issues are very often presented in a 
negative way […].”87  
 
In Latvia too, “the publications are often tedious and negative vis-à-vis the 
other socio-linguistic group.”88  
Secondly, a study by the Legal Information Centre for Human 
Rights (LICHR) points to another issue with respect to interethnic rela-
tions as reflected in the Estonian media. The report suggests that the Esto-
nian-language press is self-sufficient in gaining access to information and 
frequently provides analyses based on commonly held views and stereo-
types, which are often negative towards the Russian-speaking part of soci-
ety. The majority media mainly ignores ethnic minorities as authoritative 
sources of information and opinion, preferring to use the opinions of au-
thorities “to speak on their behalf.”89 The Russian-speaking media, on the 
other hand, frequently re-prints Estonian-language articles for their reader-
ship and therefore figures as a means of communicating the Estonian point 
of view to minority readers.90 This is also a common practice in Latvia and 
Lithuania, where the sources from the majority media are often used as a 
source of information alongside interviews with political leadership. Some 
observers suggest that this “can be interpreted as the approximation of the 
two communities where Russians seem to be faster adjusting to the Esto-
nian-dominated power distribution model”91 The Latvian scholarship 
however, pointed to the same facts to claim that the local Russian-
language media was lacking democratic credentials in.92  
After all, what are the differences between the ethnic minority and 
majority populations which media reinforces? “Ethnopolitical tension in 
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Latvia” argues that the minority media feeds off the conflictive percep-
tions without great investment in a critical approach to commonly held 
views such as “the Russian language in Latvia is endangered,” “there are 
differences in culture” or “political actors and ethnic policies are to be 
blamed.”93 Additionally, the perceptions of victimhood within the minor-
ity community have established the perceptions of a continuous latent 
conflict, which is transmitted and enforced in the media, as a later study 
by Zepa et al argues.94 The results of “Monitoring of Estonian Media 
1999–2003” also suggest that similar topics dominate the Russian-
speaking media, leading it to be highly critical of Estonian politics, the 
implementation of the integration programme and the reform of Russian-
language education. However, as Estonian media research indicates, the  
 
“Russian-language journalism is frequently reproached for 
the inadequate fulfilment of the functions of minority me-
dia: non-Estonians do not get a picture of what is taking 
place in Estonia by reading Russian-language newspapers, 
Russian-language newspapers are not loyal to the direction 
chosen by the Estonian state, non-Estonians do not read lo-
cal newspapers and instead prefer Russian television chan-
nels, and other such deficiencies.”95  
 
These criticisms however misjudge the acceptability of the information 
provided in the Estonian-speaking media about the social and political 
processes, which are interpreted in an ethnocentric manner and lack the 
basic reporting skills for helping mutual ethnic stereotypes to disappear.96 
The situation in Latvia has also been discussed in the same manner. The 
Russian-speaking media is much more involved in presenting the political 
events in the country to its readership, but, in addressing the much larger 
population of politically disenfranchised residents provides plenty of in-
terpretation of the current political events. While the Russian and Polish-
language press in Lithuania has not been accused of the same deficits, it is 
also highly critical of the policies of the state and points frequently to 
perceptions of the titular majority as sources of policies.97  
The role played by the minority media throughout the Baltic states 
has been quite similar, acting “primarily as a ‘watchdog’ that barks and 
bites but does not wag its tail so easily.”98 However, the criticisms ex-
pressed in Estonia’s and Latvia’s minority media towards political devel-
opments were particularly unwelcome. The media of Lithuanian minori-
ties, in avoiding a head-on confrontation with the majority perceptions 
was also accepted as a necessary instrument for the criticism of democ-
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ratic processes in the country. As I demonstrate, the minority media in all 
three countries encompasses some measures to urge their readerships’ 
integration into the overall society, and in providing criticism of political 
decision-making it supplies the majority community with opinions of 
minorities. It is the receptiveness to criticisms by the majority that differs 
considerably across the region–this explains both the number of publica-
tions operating solely in the minority language, as well as the numbers of 
their majority readership.  
While the images contained in the Baltic media offer different eth-
nic communities specific perceptions of each other, the receptiveness to 
criticism appears to be higher with the members of minority communities. 
With the exception of Lithuania, the majority appears to have demon-
strated only limited preparedness to view the opinions expressed in the 
minority media as worth considering, or even as acceptable. The majority 
media, as indicated in media monitoring, tends either to ignore the opin-
ions of minority representatives or dismisses these as being aimed at de-
legitimising the political, economic and social developments in the respec-
tive country. Markedly, Estonian and Latvian-language media studies 
suggest that this is done to avoid critical reference to the issues perceived 
by the majority communities in these two states as central for nation and 
state-building, i.e. the status of citizenship and of the state language. The 
Lithuanian media on the other hand, despite continuously propagating 
some ethnocentric attitudes and its disregard for minorities’ special needs, 
has effectively avoided collective negative references to communities and 
therefore still enjoys high credibility as a source of information for non-
Lithuanians.99  
The differences in perceptions of the mainstream discourses in the 
media have initially surfaced in the studies of researchers from minority 
communities. Valeria Jakobson’s 2002 study “The Role of the Estonian 
Russian-language Media in the Integration of the Russian-speaking Minor-
ity into Estonian Society” examines Russian-language media in Estonia, 
and for the very first time unveiled the general perception among the Es-
tonian research community that the Russian media is nothing more than 
the Russian Federation’s propaganda outlet. Jakobson prominently chal-
lenges the perception that the Russian language media was homogeneous, 
undermining the earlier view that all Russian-language publications were 
separatist and isolationist entities. Instead, she points out that the belated 
and half-hearted efforts of society integration hamper the development of 
the Russian-speaking group identity. The state’s failure to identify minor-
ity’s role in institution building undermines the evolution of the Russian-
speaking community and leads to fragmentation of community. Jakobson 
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claims that the Russian-language press in Estonia does not mediate be-
tween the majority and minority communities, but rather trades in its voice 
and loyalty for spontaneous opportunism, antagonising political issues of 
high currency. The overview of the media landscapes in Latvia and 
Lithuania could indicate similar presumptions made by the titular re-
searchers and parallel Jakobson’s conclusion in that the media in these two 
states is not an active ideological, but a reactive informative player.  
The difference in the focus and tone of media indicates only some 
of the reasons for minority representatives to avoid referring to the infor-
mation provided by the state language media on social and political issues. 
The knowledge of the language features centrally in the study of media 
preferences of minority communities throughout the Baltic states. Indeed, 
the government does not support the dialogue between the ethnic groups 
through the media and/or finance channels to provide information in the 
tone and language easily accessible to non-titular populations in any of the 
Baltic states. I argue here that the type of attitudes towards minorities in 
general and the criticisms of state- and nation-building specifically can be 
made responsible for minorities’ unwillingness to turn to the majority 
media for information. One might believe that among other reasons, many 
minority speakers could not but resort to the information provided to them 
in their language to avoid encounters with views “scapegoating” “their” 
cultural-linguistic community as a whole.  
Considered in the context of an overall “fragmentation” or “divi-
sion” of societies, the reaction of Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia 
presents a rational strategy to avoid the stamp of collective guilt when 
reading the majority press. As I will demonstrate in the next section, the 
perceptions of different ethnic groups differ considerably and pose a seri-
ous hindrance for intercommunal dialogue. Overall, the inferior position 
of minority groups and the majorities’ lack of preparedness to take their 
perceptions and criticisms seriously will point to the essential deficits of 
the democratisation process.  
 
 
3.   Language sabotage? Minority/majority dialogue  
Despite the differences outlined here, it would be a grave generalisation to 
conclude that there is a state of ethnic conflict in the Baltic states. The data 
available to date suggests rather that the tension between sociolinguistic 
groups result from differing perspectives on the ethnopolitical situation. 
As I discuss in the following, antagonistic perceptions have become 
widely accepted in Baltic societies, contributing to the consensus that 
societies are “divided” along cultural-linguistic lines. One of the side ef-
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fects of minorities’ accepting existing structural inequalities was the in-
creasingly positive evaluation of the state language by non-titulars in order 
to be accepted as integrated and considered socially competent. At the 
same time, majorities grew less tolerant of non-state language use in the 
public space, less receptive of minorities’ views and as a result, increas-
ingly intolerant towards non-titulars. 
State policies placing the focus on individual responsibility for lan-
guage acquisition have prompted many speakers of minority languages to 
choose the information space less dismissive of their group identity. So-
cially vulnerable members of the minority, those residing in the areas of 
compact settlement and those simply dissatisfied with the political proc-
esses in their country were left to their own devices to acquire knowledge 
of the state language. Thus, large groups of minorities with similar needs 
had only limited opportunities to develop skills in the titular languages and 
to prove themselves “socially competent” in the sense of the Baltic major-
ity societies. Not only did it lead to growing separation between the mi-
nority and majority linguistic communities, but was also reflected in the 
emergent media presentations of each other, further exacerbating the prob-
lems of ethnic relations. There was of course considerable difference be-
tween the approaches of the three states to the issue of linguistic profi-
ciency with the minority populations. By and large, the policy documents 
on social integration have determined how linguistic competence would be 
interpreted in the context of minority-majority dialogue.  
Surprisingly however, while the perceptions of linguistic communi-
ties across the region are largely negative, titulars and non-titulars appear 
to have a rather positive view on the state of the interethnic relations when 
it comes to their personal experience. Latvians estimate relations with the 
Russian-speakers in their country to be on average good, while Russian-
speakers estimate these as being slightly better–the source of disparities 
are, however, different in each case.100 The main reason for feelings of 
injustice on the side of the Russian-speakers clearly stems from the issues 
of citizenship and education policies, while for Latvians the use of their 
language and the “restoration of historical truth” appear to be of the high-
est importance.  
In “Ethnopolitical tension in Latvia” the researchers suggest that the 
main differences in opinion between the two linguistic communities in the 
country are based on the prevalence of the ethno-cultural issues in political 
discourse. The views of the Latvian majority, that claims of Russian-
speakers are illegitimate, are supported by references to legislation grant-
ing equal, full citizenship rights, to opportunities to improve their knowl-
edge of the Latvian language and to the availability of education in minor-
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ity languages.101 Throughout the survey analyses, the minority communi-
ties are said to understand their own position as being inferior to that of 
Latvians, but nonetheless hoping that Latvian society will stay unified. 
The results however, also point out that all residents of Latvia, irrespective 
of their ethnic identity, are striving for a common prosperous future within 
the framework of one society with many nationalities.102  
The study also finds a strong belief among all respondents that the 
political elite are increasingly separated from society and particularly from 
the Russian-speaking community.103 Young people participating in focus 
group discussions stated that Latvia is an ethnocentric country, because 
the “state not only fails to listen to other parts of society [i.e. minorities], it 
is essentially based on the idea that there is no need to hear the views of 
those other parts of society.”104 In this lies probably the greatest challenge 
for the future development of Latvian society, where two ethnic groups 
have quite contradicting views on the path of development that Latvia 
should take, as well as the decisive difference in opinion as to the role 
their ethnic group should play in the process of democratic consolidation.  
The studies of the representation of minority groups in the Lithua-
nian mass media have indicated that national newspapers usually proceed 
with portraying some members of minority communities as not integrated 
into the mainstream society, frequently as criminals or socially unreliable 
elements.105 This indeed indicates that the media, a significant source of 
information for the Lithuanian population, creates a stereotypical picture 
of minorities, confirming the disstressing beliefs about the behaviour of 
members of non-core ethnic groups and emphasising minorities’ status as 
an inferior part of society. Elsewhere, Beresnevičiūt÷ also argues that 
stereotype-driven relationships with minorities contribute to the develop-
ment of social distance between the individuals and lead to the separation 
of ethnic communities.106  
Stereotypes obviously impede the consolidation of Lithuanian soci-
ety. They also considerably reduce the preparedness of the titular national-
ity to accept minorities as equal partners and contributors to societal de-
velopment. In the same key, Arturas Tereškinas examined the representa-
tion of Russian, Polish, Roma and Jewish minorities in the largest Lithua-
nian daily, Lietuvos rytas. He concludes that the reports of positive events 
in the Lithuanian daily limit themselves to mentioning the name of a per-
son, without indicating his/her affiliation with the minority group. How-
ever, negative reporting usually does not go without a reference to a per-
son’s national identity.107  
More recent research conducted by the Centre for Civil Initiatives 
in Vilnius reveals the image of national minorities in the Lithuanian press 
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covering the three of the most read dailies (Lietuvos Aidas, Lietuvos Rytas, 
Respublika). The analysis suggests that mass media presents the communi-
ties of the Poles, Jews and Roma most negatively. The news on the mem-
bers or communities of national minorities frequently portray them as 
groups of socially unprotected citizens, or as groups alien to the state, 
dismissing most of their problems to be related in first instance to their 
national background and overtly politicised issues of culture.108 In all three 
dailies Roma  
 
“are depicted as criminal, socially unsecured community, of 
whom the state and the society on the whole should take 
care. The Polish community is presented as the only one 
ethnic group of Lithuania that is clearly and publicly defined 
and it defines itself as national minority, and which con-
stantly insists on demands such as “special status” and 
‘rights of minority.’”109  
 
The members of the Russian community are presented as the most inte-
grated ethnic group. They are frequently referred to as being bound by 
close cultural ties with the Lithuanian majority, although with a set of 
distinct “great nation problems,” which do not result from the status of 
ethnic, cultural or linguistic minority.110 Beresnevičiūte also claims that 
these attitudes consolidate the basis for background expectations from 
certain minority groups, instigate the development of different stereotypes 
and hinder integration of the minority communities into Lithuanian soci-
ety.111  
This point is reflected in my own observations of the different 
treatment of ethnic groups in Lithuania by political institutions, and in 
particular of the attitudes transmitted through the Department of Nation 
Minorities. Many of the problems addressed by the department have been 
identified as typical of an ethnic, but not a socio-cultural (Roma), linguis-
tic (Russian-speakers) or regional (Polish-speakers) minority group, hence 
limiting the public perception of the additional help required for minorities 
to be able to effectively cooperate with the majority society.112 
Estonia’s approach to the issue of interethnic communication em-
braced the concept of “social competence” in connection with the linguis-
tic abilities of an individual as a prerequisite for one’s suitability for soci-
ety. “Social competence” was defined as a 
 
“person’s ability to function adequately on all levels of so-
cial life. The state programme treats social competence as a 
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key factor in people's ability to organise on the basis of 
common interests (to be carried out in the third sector) and 
changes in the availability of objective information and atti-
tudes in society (to be carried out in the field of the media 
and public opinion).”113  
 
As some observers argue, the “selective highlighting of certain features of 
social competence tends to label those Russian-speakers as being in a 
presumed state of social incompetence if they do not speak adequate levels 
of Estonian.”114 While the Estonian concept of interethnic dialogue fo-
cuses entirely on reference to language acquisition as a panacea for the 
range of needs in social situations, the Latvian document on social integra-
tion attempts to improve the situation of those on low incomes and in 
poverty. As discussed in chapter 6, the Latvian integration programme 
aimed at providing residents with basic knowledge and information on 
their possibilities to participate in the local community and the labour 
market, developing skills necessary for social participation, obtaining 
membership in NGOs and facilitating co-operation with local authori-
ties.115  
From the point of view of minorities, the document’s primary goal 
is the subordination of multicultural dialogue towards the goal of creating 
a monolingual society where the minority community does not distort the 
majority’s linguistic space. Similar support of the Lithuanian state for 
training in the state language had suggested that only those members of 
society proficient in Lithuanian could be considered adapted and claim 
assistance to improve their social status. Remarkably, the study of Lithua-
nian ethnic groups by Kasatkina and Leončikas suggests individual per-
ception of social segregation as the sign of marginalisation, which leads to 
an “infantile attitude towards civil society.”116 While I return to the issue 
of minority civic engagement in chapter 9, the observation made by the 
Lithuanian scholars underpins the structure of incentives for intercom-
munal dialogue and cooperation.117  
Opportunities for language use and knowledge patterns differ ac-
cording to a locality’s ethno-linguistic composition.118 The best docu-
mented results refer to the studies of areas with compact–mainly remnants 
of the Soviet industrial areas–minority settlements, mainly Russian-
speaking groups in Latvia and Estonia. There are also vast settlement areas 
in Lithuania, where minority languages remain largely self-sufficient with 
little contact with titular communities.119 Located in the larger townships 
such as Vilnius, Klaipeda and Visaginas, but also in rural areas across 
South Eastern Lithuania, members of non-Lithuanian communities have 
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demonstrated different patterns of language acquisition, as well as differ-
ent reaction to state policies of linguistic titularisation.  
Throughout the Baltic states some regions exist where non-core 
ethnic groups constitute a majority of the local populations. Eastern 
Lithuania has a particular place in this respect, because Lithuanians here 
represent a minority and hence the knowledge of the state language is not 
required for effective organisation of daily life by the local Polish-
speaking community. The research of the Centre for Ethnic Studies 
pointed out that while a positive attitude towards the state language has 
been dramatically increasing among the minorities throughout the country 
since 1991, the situation is somewhat different in eastern Lithuania. How-
ever, even in the regions with overwhelming Polish settlements only 6% 
of the population indicate that they have no knowledge of Lithuanian.120 
Those who are not proficient in the state language indicate that they do not 
intend to learn the language because they “do not need it,” “it is hard to 
learn” or they are “too old.” The main obstacle here, as in the other Baltic 
states, is not the limited time for attending courses, but the lack of motiva-
tion to learn and the opportunity to practice.121  
The situation is mirrored in the other Baltic states and refers to two 
tendencies of linguistic adaptation across the region. On the one hand, 
younger members of the minority communities have been receptive to the 
titularisation policies and have acquired skills in the state languages at 
schools. At the same time, the accommodation with the new situation was 
particularly hard for the members of the older generation, who lacked the 
motivation and essential skills for learning.122 The younger generation has 
been intensively exposed not only to the teaching of the majority lan-
guage, but has also had to face limited chances for social mobility if they 
were not proficient in the state language. In order to be successful in the 
new social and political settings, many had to adapt to the official mono-
lingualism policies of the public sphere to boost their chances for upward 
social mobility.  
Does this allow for the conclusion that there are different opportu-
nities for social mobility and hence the views of the state in the Baltic 
societies are running along the lines of linguistic communities? The stud-
ies of minority groups in Estonia and Latvia suggest that the primary dif-
ference between the titulars and non-titulars lies in the languages they 
employ everyday and hence determine a range of their everyday 
choices.123 Interestingly, this statement might be supported by the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians declare 
their mother tongue to be the state language. At the same time, more than 
half of non-Russians in the region declare that they are native speakers of 
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the Russian language. In Latvia, Russians see Russian as their mother 
tongue almost in all cases, but only 36% of non-Russian minorities see the 
language of their ethnic kin to be their mother tongue, and only 6% de-
clare Latvian to be their mother tongue.124 Hence, the groups of non-titular 
non-Russian minorities have a greater resemblance to the members of the 
Russian-speaking community and clearly distinguish themselves from 
Estonians and Latvians in this social context.125 Non-Russian minorities in 
Lithuania also appear to align more with Russian-speakers than with 
Lithuanians when choosing an education path, developing interpersonal 
networks and implementing strategies of adaptation.126  
One would expect that when members of different ethnic groups 
use different languages and do not communicate with each other often, 
there would be a precedent of linguistic segregation. Indeed, the situation 
has on occasion been described by local observers as a “linguistically and 
politically highly divided society.”127 When the steps of ensuring the rights 
of minorities to use their language to communicate with officials, make 
use of education in their mother-tongue and receive information on the 
internal developments of the country of residence are not supported by 
affirmative action policies, the compartmentalisation of the linguistic 
communities is likely to continue and possibly increase.  
The state policies for tuition in the state language have also affected 
the younger generation in the non-core communities. The vast majority of 
the non-titulars, however, were too old to profit from such measures de-
spite being subjected to “pragmatic political considerations” in the early 
1990s. For these people, the decision of national elites, such as the reduc-
tion of statelessness in Latvia and Estonia, and social inclusion in Lithua-
nia, did not retranslate into social dialogue and further aggravated the 
impact of linguistic fragmentation.128 Simultaneously, the lack of motiva-
tion to address specific minority needs in acquiring knowledge of the state 
language and the belated implementation of language training programmes 
in Estonia and Latvia–where language proficiency was also more tightly 
tied to the criteria of political membership–have alienated large parts of 
the minority populations from participation in political process.129  
The reasons for the linguistic separation of media landscapes in the 
Baltic state are therefore apparent, if not self-explicatory. The media of the 
different linguistic communities transmits entirely different cultural, social 
and importantly, political imagery. The Russian-speaking media effec-
tively plays on the stereotypes about majorities, something that goes hand-
in-hand with the linguistic difficulties of establishing an intercommunal 
dialogue. In the absence of interpersonal dialogue, strengthening media as 
a forum for interethnic dialogue is central to the improvement of relations 
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between the groups and dissolution of mutual stereotypes. The results 
presented here suggest that the divided informational space in the Baltic 
societies only further solidifies the difference in perceptions of the same 
events. As Ilze Šulmane suggests,  
 
“the more integrated society becomes, the less the Russian 
language media in Latvia will assume the role of a militant 
opposition. Then Russian media will become typical minority 
media which satisfy the cultural needs of various groups in 
several languages.”130 
  
The results of the media analyses presented here fall neatly together 
with the debates on language regulations by the titular nationalities to 
undertake cultural planning in “their” homelands. All this puts groups of 
speakers of minority languages in a situation of limited opportunities for 
the use of minority language(s) and has been conducive to the linguistic 
separation of ethno-linguistic communities. Thus, for many members of 
minority groups, developing asymmetric bilingualism in the state language 
and acquiescing to a partial assimilation into the dominant society were 
the only solution to avoid marginalisation. 
 
 
4.   Consequences of linguistic segregation 
The state language has become one of the central issues during state- and 
nation-building since the early 1990s, resurfacing later in the framework 
programmes for social integration. Throughout that time, the reasons for 
language acquisition and use by minority groups has remained determined 
by their expectations of social mobility and not their growing acceptance 
of the political and social dominance of the titular groups. In response to 
the state policies of linguistic titularisation, the centrality of linguistic 
proficiency for social and political participation and the lack of prepared-
ness for dialogue, minority populations have had to accept adaptation to 
“linguistic favouritism” as essential for all further cooperation with the 
members of titular communities.  
While the political actors have failed to encourage cooperation be-
tween the minority and majority communities, throughout the region these 
efforts have been successful on the local level. Among others, the efforts 
of integrating the representatives of minorities within city councils and on 
the local political arena have been implemented throughout the Baltic 
states, but were not visible at the national level. Some of the most notable 
positive developments in this regard included the development of special 
The language of alienation  
____________________________________________________________ 
235
framework documents addressing the issues of minority integration at the 
local level.  
These actions were partially successful due to high representation 
of minority groups in the city councils and the involvement of minority 
representatives of as consultants. Although social integration remained a 
concept within the domain of Lithuania’s nationalist politicians, language 
study centres were established. During the 1990s minority representatives 
in municipalities prompted programmes for language training throughout 
South Eastern Lithuania and in towns with significant numbers of Rus-
sian-speaking residents. In Latvia the city of Ventspils adopted an integra-
tion programme and created a non-citizen’s Advisory Council that sup-
ported the work on the local integration concept in 2000. Liepaja’s city 
government similarly established a working group promoting the integra-
tion of minority and majority communities locally in 2000. This group 
prepared a draft of the city’s integration programme. Kohtla-Järva, a 
largely Russian-speaking city in North Eastern Estonia, has its own inte-
gration centre, providing information on citizenship acquisition, funding 
for minority NGOs and language training. The City of Tallinn established 
a Department of Social Security and Integration in the city administration 
and had also aimed at developing a local integration programme after the 
1999 local elections, when minority representatives occupied numerous 
posts in the city government. The work on the programme has ceased after 
the departmental staff was publicly condemned for the embezzlement of 
public funds, although further evidence suggested a political motive be-
hind the story, which emerged from a rival Estonian party.131 The work on 
the programme, however, was resumed following the 2007 unrest in Tal-
linn.  
Similar evidence can be derived from the work of the consultative 
organs of the Estonian and Latvian governments, such as the presidential 
Roundtable on National Minorities in Estonia in 1993, and the Consulta-
tive Council of Nationalities at President’s Office in Latvia in July 1996. 
Both the council and the roundtable included representatives of different 
ethnic minorities, as well as members of the parliaments, to facilitate dia-
logue between ethnic communities and to discuss minority related issues. 
Neither of these organs was perceived as successful, having lacked any 
effective links to legislature and being able only to recommend changes on 
various policy issues.  
While some observers attribute the reluctance of central authorities 
to grapple with regional needs and developing regional approaches for the 
alien populations, it seems that lack of communication should be made 
responsible for setbacks. Top level political elites obviously had little 
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interest to engage in dialogue with minorities and opted out of negotia-
tions that could significantly contribute to the integration of non-titulars 
into the public sphere, at least on the local level. Slightly more successful 
were the efforts of municipalities, where non-core ethnics were highly 
visible as a part of the administration. Their active take on developing 
methods of alleviating the social disparities of their home communities has 
been frequently criticised from the national centre, but no doubt their work 
bore an imprint of success. 
Limited preparedness to openly admit short-comings in planning 
and implementation of policies by the central authorities suggests that the 
ethnic principles increasingly became less important in the public. Instead, 
the affected individuals differed in their attitudes towards the existing 
institutions and subjective perception of individual profits these offered 
for the co-opted. By demonstrating a consolidated response to the fact that 
it would mainly be through the increased importance of the state lan-
guages in the social life, political elites have established some stability. 
Minority populations on the other hand, were less and less engaged in the 
process of bargaining for their linguistic rights, and focused on more gen-
eral issues of recognition.  
The rallies of the Russian-speakers over Latvia’s education reform 
and protests in opposition of removal of the so-called Bronze soldier from 
downtown Tallinn illustrate the only means of recognition available for 
the disempowered minorities. Popular sentiment was brought to the atten-
tion of the titular communities during the protests by members not heard 
from since the period of national awakening in the late 1980s. In their 
course, non-titular communities, NGOs and politicians aimed to secure the 
remaining rights for public visibility of non-titular populations. As could 
be expected, the criticism came from activists in the Russian-speaking 
community who had organised various protest activities near the Latvian 
Saeima building and in the close vicinity of the seat of the Estonian par-
liament and Tallinn city administration. These protesters engaged in pick-
eting, demonstrations and strikes.132 While it seems obvious that the gov-
ernments did not make any concession to pressure from minority commu-
nities, it is worth examining the signals political entrepreneurs sent to both 
the titular and Russian-speaking observers and participants of the events.  
Throughout the 1990s, the Latvian government and minorities as-
sumed almost directly opposing positions on the public expression of 
dissent by Russian-speakers. The government’s view was that, before 
learning more Latvian and pulling themselves out of their economic and 
social exclusion, minority groups would not express much discontent.133 
For the minority representatives the issue of native language education 
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was the primary means of achieving proper equality, irrespective of all 
other opportunities the state provided. Hence, the issue of school reform 
could definitely mobilise the minority, as they perceived reforms as a way 
of rendering them not more but less competitive in the labour market.134 
The rallies amassed in Riga brought together an estimated 50,000 people 
on 1 May 2004, to protect the Russian-language schools and to protest 
against the reform.135 A solution to this confrontation could only be found 
if the government and the minorities established a constructive dialogue, 
something that had been lacking in the period since independence. 
At the height of this opposition, the All-Latvian Congress of Sup-
porters of the Russian-language schools was convened on March 5, 2004, 
where the stance of the minority leadership was reiterated once again. The 
opposition to the decisions of the political leadership became the “normal” 
stance for many of the defenders. The speakers were generally outbidding 
each other in the extent of the claims for the protection of the Russian 
language in Latvia. In effect the final resolution made three statements 
which in and of themselves had little to do with language reform. While 
including the demand to continue teaching in Russian language, the reso-
lution also demanded the elevation of Russian to the status of state lan-
guage, as well as granting Latvian citizenship to all non-citizens of Latvia. 
Similar claims were repeated at numerous protest meetings in Riga and 
other cities throughout Latvia, highlighting that the protest was not merely 
about the language of education.136 As I have discussed previously, most 
of the Russian-speakers were in favour of greater emphasis on the state 
language in education, in other words, they were already co-opted. The 
protests were about the praxis of decision-making and the terms of dia-
logue between Latvia’s ethnic communities, and ultimately against the 
“take it or leave it” arguments of the government. 
Regardless of the pressure exercised by the members of the minor-
ity community, the Latvian President announced the implementation of the 
Education Reform on February 13, 2004. At the same time, the interna-
tional community, the EU, OSCE and CoE included, affirmed that Lat-
via’s reforms and the language requirements were in-line with interna-
tional standards.137 These comments extended by the international organi-
sations, however, did not alleviate the tensions between the two linguistic 
communities. Instead the differing perceptions of the situation around the 
implementation of legislation prompted a deeper divide in the reporting on 
political events in the Latvian press.  
Latvian newspapers consistently stressed the importance of the 
steps made for the existence of their nation while the Russian-language 
press continued its opposition to any reforms, fuelling the uncompromis-
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ing stance of Russian-speaking readers. The Latvian population was more 
concerned with the survival of their language, whence all the arguments 
around integration resulted in heated debates on the terms of inclusion. At 
the same time the Russian-language press applied a discourse on minority 
rights, which should be guaranteed by the Latvian state, the legitimate 
guardian of all residents of Latvia.138 Printed and electronic media rou-
tinely accused Latvian officials of having Nazi sympathies. In 1998, one 
of the leading Russian dailies, Komsomolskaya pravda waged an attack 
one of Latvia’s biggest exports, sprouts. With the slogan, “Buy Latvian 
sprouts and help the SS,” it brought “Latviophobia” in the Russian Federa-
tion and Baltic Russian-speaking communities to a new height. Although 
there is no clear evidence whether such rhetoric was sponsored from the 
Russian centre, was a result of targeted blackmailing of the Latvian state 
by the liberal Russian press or fed off the long simmering resentments of 
Latvia’s Russian-speaking communities, similar cover stories were printed 
during 2004. 
When in 2006 the gathering of Russian-speakers around the Bronze 
Soldier monument attracted a great deal of attention in Estonia’s and Rus-
sia’s press, the ground was fertile for populism. Following a clash between 
Russian-speakers and ethnic Estonians at the statue, the area around it was 
monitored by a Russian youth group, known as Nochnoi Dozor, who 
claimed protection of the monument.139 The mass mobilisation of Russian-
speakers in Estonia’s capital was unprecedented, as the protests gained 
momentum only on the grounds of titular’s hysteria over the issues of the 
past.140 Indeed, as the colourful discussion on the (web-) pages of the 
Russian language press in Estonia suggests, the Bronze Soldier Crisis was 
not initially seen as a case of interethnic tension.141 Instead, the Russian-
speaking community viewed the monument as the only symbol left of 
their presence in Estonia’s public space, while ethnic Estonians attached a 
stigma of occupation to the statue.142  
The difference in media resources informing Estonia’s ethnic com-
munities was essential. Different discourses on the run-up to events and on 
the views of minority groups attempting to find negotiation strategies and 
avoid conflict with the Estonian state came to the fore. Naturally, both 
sides sought to gain as much political capital in favour of their group’s 
view as possible. Russian-speakers inevitably tuned into Russia’s informa-
tion channels, where the democratic deficiencies of the Estonian state 
were talked up yet again. At the same time, Estonian authorities did not 
approach local Russian-speakers and left those who were able to follow 
Estonian-language debates overwhelmed by the belligerent rhetoric of 
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Estonian nationalists, outbidding each other in proposals for the decoloni-
sation of Estonia’s capital.  
Pressured to uphold the constitutional right of Estonians for a na-
tional state, authorities responded by accusing Russia of inciting ethnic 
riots. Both the Estonian President and the Foreign Minister noted that the 
coverage of events in the Russian media was “biased,” without conceding 
to an inherent anti-Russian bias in discussions around the Bronze Soldier 
in Estonian language press. No doubt, Russia’s media emphasised police 
brutality, but the Estonian press did not even engage with protestors, deny-
ing their voice any legitimacy.143 Even more disturbingly, despite the fact 
that only a tiny fraction of Estonians were affected by the events of the 
April Crisis, they attribute an immense symbolic meaning to it.144  
In large part, the rallies around the monument of the Soviet soldier 
indicated that the integration of society was a flop. While younger minori-
ties have better knowledge of the state language, demonstrate greater po-
tential to compete with members of the titular nation and in the medium-
run are better equipped to move into key social positions, they are unlikely 
to be taken seriously by the members of the majority political elites. The 
success of intercommunal debates thus stalled because the members of 
majority were isolating themselves from the Russian-speaking voices over 
the 1990s and 2000s, perceiving most, if not all, minority claims to be 
illegitimate. Naturally, the new generation of titular political and social 
elites came to perceive such a state of interethnic relations as normal and 
anticipated that the opportunities granted to minorities to cope with the 
changing socio-political situation were enough to keep the lid on intereth-
nic tensions. The Bronze Night events proved them wrong.  
The April Crisis had an additional effect on research of interethnic 
relations. A wave of research that followed the mass protests painted a 
grim picture of interethnic relations in Estonia and questioned the overall 
democratisation of social relations. The TIES 2007/2008 study indicates 
that Estonians prefer avoiding the members of the Russian community, be 
it at work, place of residence or during their free time. Overall, Schulze 
states that “there seems to be a desire among Estonian respondents to 
socialize within their own ethnic group to a greater extent than is true of 
Russian respondents.”145 In his analyses, Martin Ehala claims that the 
number of Russian-speakers with attitudes and values converging with 
those of “Estonian” fell considerably, from 46% in 2002 to 27% in 2008. 
The number of those cooperating with Estonians on pragmatic grounds but 
disillusioned about their own chances in Estonia had risen from 20% to 
33%. 146 At the same time, Estonians perceive ethnic conflict more sharply 
than before. The proportion of those who were ready to tolerate, but did 
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not want to have contacts with Russians rose from 28% in 2002 to 40% in 
2007, resulting in a decrease of integrative attitudes among the Estonian 
public down to 36% from 53%.147  
Undoubtedly, media has played a crucial role in solidifying the 
perceptions of group opinions in Estonia and Latvia. If anything, it seems 
that democratic consolidation in these societies could stand a chance only 
if running along the lines of ethnic communities. The mediascapes how-
ever, also suggest a dynamic relationship between the institutionalisation 
of the majorities’ dominance and the discursive construction of intercom-
munal tensions. A variety of means for ethno-linguistic separation were 
available for non-core ethnic communities to ensure the existence of self-
sufficient minority societies. The lack of preparedness by majority groups 
to discuss issues of direct and, as these two cases indicate, urgent concern 
for Russian-speakers have stalled interethnic dialogue .  
Whether the media, operating in two different languages and per-
petuating antagonistic discourses, stood a chance of successfully mediat-
ing opinions of minorities and majorities remains to be clarified in further 
research. What is clear at this point is that titularisation of state institutions 
made improvement in interethnic relations incredibly difficult, but it 
seems there was no effort to decrease the salience of identities and seek 
negotiation between groups. The separation of ethnic communities, as I 
discussed in this section, is particularly visible in the conflicting images of 
opposing ethnic groups as presented in media and reflected in public opin-
ion.  
While there are means available that could improve the communi-
cation between the ethnic groups, the media analyses suggest that in order 
for the members of linguistic minority communities to adapt to the situa-
tion, their acceptance of the structural dominance of the state-bearing 
nations was paramount.  
 
 
5.   Conclusion  
The debates of the titular majorities about the minority’s insufficient 
knowledge of the state language have reinforced a commonly shared belief 
within communities about the inferiority status of those members of soci-
ety who are not proficient enough in Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian. As 
is obvious, the emergent consensus on the necessary “common societal 
core,” based entirely on the linguistic dominance of the state language, has 
over the period of independence slowly outscored the debates on the sen-
sibility of these requirements for the effective functioning of the public 
sphere. This perception caused a limited understanding of minorities’ 
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contributions to the transition of the Baltic states towards more democratic 
political regimes and about their place in public altogether. 
The studies referred to in this chapter explain the marginality of 
non-core ethnics in the region based on their reluctance to see their state of 
residence as a protector of their rights. As a result thereof, many fail to 
apply for citizenship, lack linguistic skills in the state language and as a 
result are highly disadvantaged in terms of social mobility. To a large 
extent minority communities in the region have been marginalised by the 
pro-active policy steps of the state-bearing nationals to enforce the domi-
nance of the state language and hence, ethnic core communities.  
In this respect, the self-segregation of minority communities could 
be the most dazzling outcome. However, the continuous emphasis on the 
importance of the state language by Baltic political elites undermines the 
equality of chances to participate in social, political and other activities for 
different linguistic groups. As I show, the lack of compromise by the state-
bearing communities in terms of linguistic accommodation of non-core 
ethnics limits the opportunities for inclusiveness by the evolving social 
and political regimes. In the next chapter I focus on the political engage-
ment of minorities in the region to point out that in these areas as well, the 
processes of social exclusion exhort adverse effects on intercommunal 
dialogue.  
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Chapter 8  
 
Minority representation in social structures 
 
 
In the previous chapter I have outlined the reasons for which to consider 
the Baltic societies to be linguistically divided. However, the difference 
between the ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups in the Baltic societies 
probably would not have been perceived as sharply, were minorities not 
underrepresented in the key social, economic and political positions. In 
this chapter, I discuss the differences between the majority and minority 
communities in terms of their representation on the social ladder, eco-
nomic status and the extent to which they form a part of the political elite.  
The review of the differences in the social status of the majority 
and minority groups allows me to identify the structural limits of minority 
participation in political processes. This will also allow me to spot the 
differences that are potentially impeding intergroup dialogue and hence 
the democratic consolidation of the Baltic societies. The theoretical 
framework of my book suggests that the differences in social status are 
likely to cause greater propensity in the disadvantaged groups to see de-
mocracy as being of no relevance to them personally. The overall objec-
tive of the chapter is to investigate minority engagement with social issues 
that might provide reasons for intergroup tensions and/or conflict. The low 
number of minority representatives among political elites and minority 
overrepresentation among underprivileged strata of society condition the 
majority’s perceptions of this group. In order to assess whether the limited 
political participation of minorities should be interpreted as a result of 
their lacking acceptance of the post-Soviet polity, this chapter investigates 
whether minorities are excluded from effective influence on developments 
in their states of residence. 
Firstly, I discuss the differences in employment as indirect conse-
quences of Baltic language policies, which, while not being discrimina-
tory, facilitated the initial decrease of non-core ethnics employed in key 
socio-political positions. Secondly, I investigate whether the ethnic frag-
mentation of societies in the initial years of independence could be blamed 
for the limited representation of minorities in public office. Finally, the 
discussion of political representation of minorities demonstrates that the 
political forces of minorities are marginalised and are not seen as possible 
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contributors to democracy building in the region. This will serve as the 
basis for my outline of the spheres of activity in which the members of 
minority communities could continue their engagement, which I undertake 
in the last chapter of the book. 
 
 
1.   Employment and social status of non-titulars 
A knowledge of state languages has gained critical importance over the 
years of Baltic independence. Above all it is language proficiency that has 
differentiated members of the various ethnic groups in their social status 
and opportunities for mobility. In this part of the chapter, I discuss the 
differences in employment between minority and majority communities 
across the region, suggesting that specific employment of minorities dur-
ing Soviet times and the post-Soviet policy changes have had a twofold 
negative impact on the changes of the social status of minorities. 
The members of majority groups tend to attribute the inferiority of 
minority positions in the social structure mainly, if not exclusively, to the 
non-titulars’ lack of willingness to adapt to the majority’s visions of state 
and society. The representatives of minority communities, on the other 
hand, are sensitive to their ability to influence change in state-building 
strategies since the demise of the SU. Tentatively, however, both groups 
acknowledge that some of the disparities in the status of minorities and 
majorities result from the policies of titularisation of the Baltic states.1  
The differences in the distribution of different ethnic groups across 
various sectors of employment were noted by local scholars early.2 Par-
ticularly in the framework of debates on social integration, the inequality 
of distribution of social resources was considered as a serious impediment 
to the development of the social and political activities of minority com-
munities in the region.3 So far the studies have indicated that there is po-
tentially a great risk of social exclusion for minority members, despite the 
fact that all ethnic groups are represented in different sectors of the econ-
omy. Aasland and Fløtten investigate the processes of minority adaptation 
to socio-economic and political changes and draw attention to the fact that 
social inequalities leave a remarkable imprint on opportunities to engage 
in economic, social and civic activity in Latvia and Estonia.4 What might 
give a slight indication of Latvia’s non-titulars’ alienation from political 
processes and the state in general is the fact that members of the core 
ethnic group dominate the legislative, state services and the ranks of spe-
cialists of various kinds, while non-Latvians dominate in the production 
and service areas.5  
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The situation in the Latvian and Estonian labour market could sug-
gest that the linguistic communities prefer different occupational fields as 
judged from the data available at higher education facilities. The detailed 
investigation by Aasland more cautiously puts forward that, as far as un-
employment rates are concerned, there is hardly any difference between 
citizens and non-citizens who are mainly non-Latvian.6 However, the 
reservation is made in this study with regard to non-Latvians’ concentra-
tion in the urban areas and particularly dense settlement in the Latvian 
capital, where employment conditions appear to be more favourable. Simi-
larly to Aasland, Artis Pabriks also uses the ethnic representation of mi-
nority communities in the economy and business as a proxy for minority 
exclusion from active engagement in the Latvian economy.7  
As in the other two Baltic states, Lithuania’s minority members 
tend to work more in the private sector. The research by Kasatkina and 
Leončikas indicated that there are no statistically significant differences in 
the income level among ethnic groups, despite the fact that the majority of 
non-Lithuanians assess their status to be lower than that of Lithuanians.8 
As authors observe, in Lithuania the minority population tends to overem-
phasise the negative changes in their social status since Lithuania regained 
independence. Indicative of this fact is the estimation of the social and 
symbolic disparities which are treated as a given by minority members in 
Lithuania while at the same time their personal situation does not suggest 
either a lower status in society or worse working conditions.  
The research of Kasatkina and Leončikas indicate that an absolute 
majority of non-Lithuanians have non-formal relations with Lithuanians, 
i.e. have Lithuanians among friends and within family. This fact allows 
many to conclude that at least on the everyday level this facilitates the 
adaptation or at least identification with the Lithuanian part society by the 
minority. In this respect there are no differences between Polish and Rus-
sian-speakers. However, the groups are represented differently in the mass 
media; marriages between Lithuanians and Russians are more frequently 
discussed than those between Lithuanians and Poles.9 
While research on the structure of occupation in the private sector is 
virtually non-existent in Lithuania, there are some success stories in the 
businesses of minority individuals, in most cases Russian. As had been 
indicated, while the Russian-minority is not seen in the media as a tradi-
tional minority of Lithuania and frequently is taken as a proxy for Lithua-
nians, the lives of successful Russian businessmen are widely covered by 
the media. However, at the everyday level, some prejudice remains to-
wards members of minority groups. This trend is reflected in the study of 
economic elites, issued in the daily Verslo Zinios, which focused on eco-
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nomic and business issues and prepared special supplements on specific 
fields and branches of economics. The analysis of the surnames of general 
directors, general managers, presidents and/or chairpersons of boards of 
the most successful enterprises in Lithuania, including public and private 
companies and personal enterprises reported in the daily suggest that per 
20 success-stories with Lithuanian surnames, there are two usually of 
Polish or Russian origin. 
In the case of Latvia, following Artis Pabriks, individuals with Lat-
vian names most often manage enterprises funded by the state budget. 
Their administrations are also largely staffed by core ethnics,10 while 
companies in the private sector have a distinctly mixed ethnic structure. 
Pabriks suggests that there is a significant part of private sector enterprises 
with an overrepresentation of the minority population in Latvia, including 
the ethnically mixed management of companies.11 At the same time, 
Pabriks concludes that, compared to a number of companies employing 
mixed collectives of Latvians/non-Latvians, many companies are ethni-
cally homogeneous, which, in the long run prevents the mobility of em-
ployers not proficient in the state language.12 Because these employment 
opportunities are specifically for less qualified individuals undertaking 
either manual labour or work in retail and service, it is not surprising that 
minority representatives are recruited through higher education institutions 
which provide professional training rather then academic instruction.  
Prior to the implementation of the education reforms in 2004, many 
minority students started their professional career by pursuing education in 
these facilities, providing service in their mother tongue. This to a degree 
limits their occupation opportunities to companies less stringently apply-
ing state language regulations. At the same time, higher education facili-
ties which aim exclusively at members of minority populations in Latvia 
take up the function of “containers” for personnel that, despite long-term 
professional and/or teaching experience, have limited opportunities for 
occupation in state-funded institutions functioning in the state language 
only.  
Artis Pabriks sees four possible scenarios explaining the different 
preferences of minority members in Latvia for parallel education estab-
lishments and hence for the separation of Latvian-speakers from non-
Latvians in the labour sector.13 Firstly, he argues, some establishments are 
aimed especially at the educational requirements of national minorities, 
such as RIMPAK Livonia and the Baltic Russian Institute. Secondly, 
while state-financed universities use only the state language for education, 
many private institutions employ bilingual education. Thirdly, Parbriks 
argues, national minority representatives who prefer to study in private 
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institutions are likely to be attracted by the socio-cultural factors of study-
ing in a suitable cultural and linguistic environment. Finally, some biases 
can be observed during the entrance examinations into state institutions 
when it comes to the questions of history and Latvian culture. These ex-
ams are easier to pass for the students who studied in Latvian and place 
additional hurdles for the entrance of non-Latvian students. Irrespective of 
these facts, at the period of study, Pabriks concludes, the levels of educa-
tional attainment are comparable between the ethnic groups in Latvia and 
do not testify to marginalisation of non-core ethnics.14  
Similarly to Latvia, the numbers of young Russian specialists 
graduating from higher education facilities have been constantly growing 
in Estonia. However, as in Latvia, Estonia’s non-core ethnics, despite 
being skilled labourers, are highly dependent on the acquisition of higher 
education in the Estonian language or opting for facilities teaching in 
“foreign languages.” There are no state-funded universities in Estonia 
which could cater to non-Estonian residents’ expectations to be educated 
in subjects like humanities in Russian. The proportion of specialists 
among the employed Russians of Estonia is growing mainly thanks to 
graduates of the private universities and colleges such as Sotsiaal- Hu-
manitaarinstituut and the like.15  
The study “Labour market flexibility and employment security” 
conducted in 2001 under the auspices of the International Labour Organi-
sation (ILO), concluded that the graduates of universities and colleges not 
funded by the state, i.e. not functioning in the state language, have limited 
job flexibility.16 The differences in the language of higher education are 
directly translated into the differences of occupation and particularly the 
linguistic environment at the place of work in Estonia. The occupational 
disadvantages of non-Estonians are also manifested in lower average wage 
as compared to those earned by Estonians. The Estonian Labour Force 
Surveys conducted since the mid-1990s continuously state that the 
chances of an ethnic Estonian reaching the higher wage quintile were 
more than two times higher than those of non-Estonians.17 The ILO also 
reports that even the knowledge of Estonian does not facilitate non-
Estonians’ labour competitiveness on the market. For example, in Tallinn 
the unemployment rate among non-Estonians with fluency in the state 
language was two times higher than the average unemployment level of 
ethnic Estonians. The 1999 ILO report suggests that younger non-
Estonians with secondary, vocational and higher education have up to 
three times higher risk of unemployment than their Estonian peers with 
similar educational backgrounds. The likelihood of unemployment grows 
dramatically for non-Estonians in the ages of 30–40 years with higher 
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education qualifications, reaching six times the rate of the Estonians.18 
Although the research also identifies the fluency in the state language as a 
possible explanatory factor in this dissonance, the variation in earnings is 
obvious across all age groups of Estonia’s society.  
As one easily recognises from the data reported on Estonia and Lat-
via, there is a clear difference in ethnicity and the knowledge of the state 
languages, which over the period of economic transition have translated 
into differences of social status. The opportunities for social mobility 
appear to be clearly limited for members of the non-core ethnic groups in 
the two countries. Social marginalization of minority groups appears to 
dominate the regions where successful employment is dependent on profi-
ciency in the state language. 
The inequalities between the minority and majority populations are 
not limited to Estonia and Latvia. While the levels of employment be-
tween the Lithuanians and members of minorities do not vary signifi-
cantly, the figures for unemployment separate the two groups considera-
bly. Unemployment figures also indicate significant differences among 
three of the Lithuania’s major ethnic groups. In 2002, unemployed persons 
comprised only 12% of Lithuanians, a number significantly lower than 
among minorities. The Polish community is particularly vulnerable to the 
structural impact of unemployment, as is indicated in the report of the 
Department of Statistics.19 Among Polish-speakers in Lithuania almost 
18% are unemployed, but this number is even higher among Russians, 
running at over 20% of the potential labour-force.20  
In fact, the situation is quite surprising as Lithuania’s Russians also 
demonstrate higher educational attainments than other ethnic groups, but 
are affected the hardest by unemployment. This particularly confuses the 
comparisons of implications higher education has on the economic status 
of minority groups across the region.21 The numbers of employed in 
Lithuania closely replicate the ethnic composition of society with Lithua-
nians comprising 82% of all those employed, Poles and Russians–7% 
each. However, the data on the employment structure by profession 
groups and ethnicity indicates that the higher the professional category, 
the higher the rate of Lithuanians employed therein. Likewise, tradition-
ally concentrated in the agricultural areas, Lithuanians and Poles comprise 
89 and 7% respectively in the sphere of agriculture, reflecting the propor-
tions these groups have in the overall social structure in rural areas. One 
tenth of unskilled workers comprise Poles, 7% Russians and 79% Lithua-
nians.22 What is clear from the data is that individuals of minority origin 
have a considerably higher probability of being affected by unemployment 
than ethnic Lithuanians, are unlikely to occupy positions on the upper part 
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of social ladder and are overrepresented in the bottom part of the social 
scale. 
Although studies of minority representation in the labour market 
were conducted in Estonia and Latvia, there had been only a limited inter-
est to the issue in Lithuania. However, despite the quite limited scope of 
research on the issue of ethnically specific employment, tendentious rela-
tions between the members of different ethnic groups in employment have 
been identified.23 While there are various reasons for this, the scholars of 
the Centre for Ethnic Studies argue that the tendency towards “ethnic 
closure” exists as one of the forms of adaptation on non-Lithuanians in 
Lithuania.24 Some studies suggest that “ethnic closure” could be inter-
preted as a testimony of a division in the Lithuanian society running along 
ethnic lines. Others tend to see ethnic separation as a result of limited 
willingness on the side of Lithuanians to engage with the members of 
other ethnic groups.25 The interpersonal contacts usually represent the 
actual network of personal social relations but not the assessment thereof. 
This is particularly indicative in statements such as  
 
“all respondents tend to deny premises of mono-ethnic rela-
tions; however in reality it is quite common that primary re-
lations are transformed into secondary relations. Therefore, 
it should be emphasised that the tendency observed in pro-
fessional relations regarding ethnic closure is not dominant 
as open and ethnically diverse relations prevail.”26  
 
Kasatkina and Leončikas claim in their “Process and Context of Adapta-
tion” that at least one fifth of their respondents throughout Lithuania indi-
cate that it is important to belong to the titular nationality if one would like 
to be successful in the labour market. Likewise, those minority members 
who claim to have experienced discrimination because they were not eth-
nic Lithuanians have stated that this had happened to them in the sphere of 
employment.27  
Comparable to the results presented by Pabriks for Latvia, Okun-
eviciute-Neverauskiene, Gruzevskis and Moskvina determined that 
Lithuania’s minorities predominantly work in monoethnic collectives and 
in the private sector. This indicates that the recruitment procedure in 
Lithuania follows the broader social context of minority-majority rela-
tions. The results also indicate that the economic integration of non-core 
ethnics in Lithuania proceeds through different occupations, is highly 
dependent on knowledge of Lithuanian and is predetermined by territorial 
mobility.28 The majority of the monoethnic labour collectives, however, 
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are found mainly in the areas of compact settlement of minorities: Rus-
sians and Tatars in Vilnius and Visaginas, Poles in Šalčininkai and Jewish 
minorities in Vilnius and Klaipeda. This fact in particular leads some of 
local researchers to suggest that “groups with a higher social status include 
higher proportions of Lithuanians. […] In business and professional envi-
ronment open and ethnically diverse relations prevail.”29  
Vida Beresnevičiūt÷ suggests that the sectoral and ethnic fragmen-
tation of the labour market is somewhat conducive to the persisting mar-
ginalisation of minority individuals following their belated efforts to inte-
grate into socioeconomic structures during the initial years of transition.30 
Likewise, in her ethnographic research on a concentrated minority settle-
ment in Visaginas, Kristina Šliavaite concludes that the success of social 
inclusion is largely dependent on minorities’ flexibility. Only if minority 
members are actively adapting to the new socioeconomic environment can 
they avoid remaining in the lower social strata, guarantee social mobility 
for their children and gain access to structural resources for social ad-
vancement.31  
The studies of the Estonian and Latvian labour markets claim that 
language regulations had the greatest effect on rising levels of unemploy-
ment among minorities. The Lithuanian case further suggests that despite 
minorities’ fluency in the state language, local, non-core ethnics face 
greater adaptation difficulties to the changes in the labour market. Hence, 
while the social mobility of those lacking fluency in the state language 
needs to be explored in greater detail, the difference in employment oppor-
tunities between the minority-majority in the regions with a high minority 
concentration would provide better insights. As Kasatkina and others have 
repeatedly underlined in their studies of Lithuanian society, differences in 
opportunity structures and resources between the minority and majority 
groups could be effectively alleviated only if members of minority com-
munities were positively discriminated in the competition with the speak-
ers of the state language.32  
The discussions in Estonia and Latvia have focused almost entirely 
on the issues of language proficiency of non-core group members. Many 
of the questions on minority participation in public life taking place in 
Lithuania have not surfaced in debates on the situation in Latvia and Esto-
nia. Kasatkina and Leončikas suggested that only when the political and 
legal issues of minority accommodation are resolved, can the majority 
populations start perceiving of the minority as an equal partner in the 
economic and social developments of society. In this sense, Lithuania’s 
minorities were in a much better position to be accepted as partners in 
state development when contrasted with Latvia’s and Estonia’s non-
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titulars. As we will see in the next section however, minority representa-
tion in public offices remained low across Latvia and Estonia, as well as 
Lithuania.  
 
 
2.   Russian-speakers in public office 
As we have established in the previous section of the chapter, Russian-
speakers are overrepresented in the lower strata of Estonian and Latvian 
societies, as well as in private business and entrepreneurship which are 
not, or only fragmentarily, affected by the regulations on language knowl-
edge. Some argue that the language legislation proscribing obligatory 
proficiency in the state language for employees in certain fields outside of 
public domain is to be blamed for this. Other observers also suggest that 
the reluctance of Baltic political entrepreneurs to allow more effective 
representation of minorities was more decisive.33 This part of the chapter 
investigates how the persistence of strong social networks, primarily func-
tioning in the state language, impact opportunities for the upward social 
mobility of minorities as well as minorities’ access to key social and po-
litical positions.  
During the time when the institutions of the Baltic States were re-
organised, the representatives of the majority ethnic groups made many 
initial policy-decisions. Since state institutions have been operating in the 
state language, this has de facto reduced the opportunities for employment 
in the public sphere for minority ethnics despite the absence of discrimina-
tory regulations. In one sense or another, some argue that ethnic favourit-
ism “served as an additional alienating factor between the ethnic Russians 
and the restored state.”34 Additionally, an applicant’s knowledge of the 
state language served as the criteria for employment. “If a potential appli-
cant speaks without accent, any discrimination on the ethnic basis is virtu-
ally impossible.”35 One could, of course, assume that evaluation of the 
ethnic composition of the public institutions in the region would make 
clear whether non-core ethnic groups are disadvantaged as to gaining 
access to decisive institutions.  
In “Ethnic proportions” Pabriks reviews the ethnic background of 
the individuals employed in the state institutions in order to assess the 
differences in access to the key positions between Latvia’s groups. The 
author concludes that the share of Russian, Ukrainian and other minorities 
among those employed is significantly lower than their share in the citi-
zenry would lead one to expect. He suggests that it is due to the limited 
number of applications from non-Latvians for these positions. Pabriks also 
goes on to state that even fewer applicants from a minority background 
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were hired to the respective positions due to “the applicant’s level of pro-
fessionalism and knowledge of Latvian [which] determine job selec-
tion.”36  
A comprehensive investigation of the various employment areas 
undertaken by Pabriks provides an overview of the professions where 
differences in the employment of Latvians and non-Latvians occurred. He 
concludes that the minorities are underrepresented in many district coun-
cils and administrations despite their high representation among the resi-
dents in these districts, both among permanent residents and citizens.37 
From the data obtained, Pabriks suggests that there is only a small prob-
ability that the number of minority representatives among the residents of 
the electoral districts influences the ratio of minority representation in the 
administrations. 38 Also, in the analysis of the ethnic composition of all 
Latvian 35 courts he states that while 307 judges are employed in these, 
only 23 of them are of minority descent.39  
 
“Upon reviewing the ethnic representation proportionality 
index in the surveyed districts and cities, the first conclusion 
is that minority representation is very uneven and dispropor-
tionate. […]Concerning the Russian minority’s proportion-
ality index in Latvia’s districts and cities when looked at to-
gether, out of 22 districts and cities, there are 6 administra-
tions where Russians are represented more than their pro-
portion among the citizens of the districts in question. On 
the other hand, in 16 districts one can observe the opposite 
situation–Russian representation in the administrations is 
less than their corresponding ratio.”40 
 
In a subsequent study, “In Defiance of Fate,” Pabriks comes to the conclu-
sion that “non-ethnic Latvians at large are passive applicants for the posi-
tions in the state institutions.”41 Observing a clear underrepresentation of 
members of minority communities in governmental institutions and ad-
ministration, Pabriks argues that, given the representation of minorities in 
various occupational sectors in Latvia, as well as their distribution across 
social strata, there is little support for claims of “ethnic” discrimination. 
He also suggests that in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, prison authority 
and police, as well as in some state enterprises, such as the Latvian Ship-
ping Company (Latvijas kuăniecība), Latvian Railways (Latvijas 
dzelzceĜš), Latvian Telecom (Lattelecom) and Post (Latvijas Pasts) mi-
norities are overrepresented.  
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Overall, in Latvia different ethnic groups occupy different eco-
nomic segments, leading Pabriks to suggest that minorities are not explic-
itly discriminated against in the labour market. Instead, what is observed 
in Latvia is sectoral and socio-economic stratification, which leads to 
economic asymmetry between the ethnic communities.42 Pabriks claims 
that the Latvian labour market is characterised by a lack of qualified per-
sonal. Pabriks’ statement that the “lack of Latvian language skills and the 
relative sustainability of the Russian language environment hinders mi-
norities’, especially ethnic Russian, involvement in the state universities” 
makes clear that it is not the lack of professional qualification that impacts 
labour markets the most. Rather it is the discrepancy between minorities’ 
linguistic skills and language regulations in higher education and at the 
place of work that explain asymmetric economic relations between the 
groups.43  
Arguably, the limited employment of non-core ethnics in Latvian 
public offices exacerbates the minority perception that representation is 
lacking in the government. In Lithuania, the titulars also prevail among 
legislators, senior officials, clerks and specialists, comprising around 88% 
in these groups. The Poles comprise 4% in each of the said groups and 
Russians 5%.44 The same situation can be observed in Estonia, where 
representatives of the minority occupy only a small number of positions in 
the state apparatus. Despite the election of the first Russian-speaking rep-
resentatives into the Riigikogu (1995) and repeated submissions of 
amendments calling for the liberalisation of language and citizenship leg-
islation there, no changes were achieved, which still limited non-
Estonians’ access to key socio-political positions.  
The reluctance of politicians to change these requirements is re-
flected partially in the studies on integration monitoring. The 2002 and 
2005 reports suggested that Estonians and non-Estonians have fundamen-
tally different attitudes with respect to the participation of non-Estonians 
in the Riigikogu, the government and defence forces. While non-Estonians 
appeared to support greater involvement in these institutions, Estonians 
consistently favoured limited participation.45 The study of the distribution 
of non-Estonians across different employment sectors has not been con-
ducted by the state in detail since integration monitoring in 2005. However 
the TIES 2008 study indicates that non-core ethnics are likely to find em-
ployment in transport, communication, commerce and the police or rescue 
service, as well as in positions as service-providers, mid-level specialists 
or specialists with subordinates.46 The job opportunities in the sector of 
public administration and in state services remain limited for non-
Estonians.47 The long-term comparison of the data for the period 2001–
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2006 presented in “Minority Rights in Estonia and Latvia” continue to 
corroborate earlier findings: 
 
“A disparity between the rates of unemployment among 
ethnic Estonians and non-Estonians–by a factor of two on 
average–persisted throughout the years. In 2007 the unem-
ployment rates among Estonians and minorities were 3.6% 
and 6.9% respectively. Individuals aged 15–24 faced a 
much more complicated job market situation than other age 
groups Whereas the unemployment rate among citizens of 
Estonians in 2007 was 3.9% it reached 8.3% among non-
citizens. The rate was lower among the stateless people 
(8.1%) than among Russian citizens (9.8%). […]Minorities 
are overrepresented in the low-quality workforce, especially 
in Tallinn.”48 
 
Two issues point to the similarity in the logic of employment in the 
state institutions in all three countries. Firstly, as is indicated in the over-
view of the Latvian and Estonian integration processes and in the studies 
of employment in Lithuania, the centrality of language knowledge for 
employment in public office limits access to many governmental posts for 
the members of non-core ethnic groups.49 The existence of access barriers 
suggests that proficiency in the state language was not seen as a mere 
token ensuring an individual’s connectedness with the state. Instead, lan-
guage proficiency was seen as a symbol of accepting the dominant posi-
tion of the core ethnic group in state institutions, as is observed by the 
critics of these regulations.50 This mismatch indicates in the first place that 
insufficient efforts were made by the local governments to ensure equal 
opportunities in all segments of the labour market for all state residents.  
Secondly, while the centrality of the state language has been gain-
ing acceptance with the members of minority community, those who op-
pose the view have presented considerable criticism with regard to regula-
tions of language use in public offices. Thus the minority was limited to 
participating in social life as a way of securing the decisive share of ma-
jorities’ representatives in key social and political institutions across the 
region. This was the case in Estonia and Latvia, but also in Lithuania, 
where, with the exception of the areas of compact settlement of minorities, 
public offices were to be run exclusively in the state language. For many 
members of minority communities, following the stringent regulations on 
language use meant an additional difficulty of accessing higher social 
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status, making it difficult to establish connections with those already in the 
upper part of the social ladder.  
I have argued that the differences in social status between the ethnic 
communities in the Baltic are the result of regulations on language use. 
The mainstream interpretation of disparities between the groups however 
claims that the speakers of non-state languages were less fit for economic 
developments post-1991. Most studies conducted during the 1990s claim 
that the socioeconomic differences between the core and non-core ethnics 
in the region have developed as a result of transition from industry to-
wards a service-oriented economy. Most remarkably, this view was sup-
ported and promoted by the state integration programmes in Estonia and 
Latvia in particular. 
The parity between the different ethnic communities was consid-
erably aggravated by the imposed restrictions on language use and, espe-
cially in Estonia and Latvia, with regard to terms of political membership. 
The authors of the Estonian integration monitoring suggest that the com-
bination of these factors and difference in socioeconomic positions be-
tween the Estonians and non-Estonians prior to transition have signifi-
cantly influenced the preparedness of minorities to join in and to partici-
pate in social and political processes of an independent Estonia.51 Reflect-
ing on one of the main goals of the Estonian Integration Programme, the 
authors conclude that the initial underrepresentation of minority groups in 
governmental positions further discourages non-Estonians to naturalise 
and take an active part in political decision-making. Similar opinions were 
reflected in the study of Latvian social processes.52 Both the Estonian and 
Latvian surveys point out that the members of majority ethnic communi-
ties see the underrepresentation of minorities in state positions as a result 
of non-titulars’ overall political passivity.  
Minority representatives list different opinions. The overwhelming 
part of the non-Latvian respondents surveyed by the Latvian Naturalisa-
tion Board in 1997 indicated that they would like to formalise their rela-
tion to the Latvian state. The reasons for them not to do so are connected 
mainly with the procedure of naturalisation.53 The low number of applica-
tions can be explained by insufficient command of the state language, 
insufficient familiarity with Latvian laws and history, the lack of neces-
sary information and a too expensive fee for naturalisation.54 The research 
on Estonia cites more pragmatic reasons such as reluctance to serve in the 
national army, the option to travel to Russia without a visa, as well as the 
general passivity among non-citizens.55 More recent studies of Latvian 
non-citizens have argued that persisting statelessness in Latvia can be 
explained by the non-citizens’ growing alienation from the state, as well as 
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the frequent perception of the conditions for receiving citizenship of Lat-
vian Republic as being unjust and degrading.56  
In interviews with the members of the Russian-speaking commu-
nity, the distrust of the Russian-speaking public towards the state was 
cited as the main reason for reluctance to apply for citizenship in Latvia.57 
In Estonia my interview partners claimed that many members of the Rus-
sian-speaking community see no reason to opt for Estonian citizenship as 
long as they can reside in the country with a residence permit. In plain 
words, the behaviour of non-citizens in both countries indicates that citi-
zenship is not considered to be legal proof, or even a marginal indicator of 
the person’s allegiance to the state.58  
Despite the fact that some policies relating to minority issues in the 
Baltic states were amended since the late 1990s, there is little evidence to 
suggest that over the past decade non-titulars have enjoyed better access to 
employment in the public sector. While the governments shifted priorities 
from the importance of official languages for state-building to linguistic 
proficiency per se, communication between the majority and minority 
communities did not significantly improve. To this effect, the technocratic 
approach to social integration across the Baltic states perpetuated the pre-
viously institutionalised inequalities between various language communi-
ties.59 The dominant position of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians in 
political institutions and agencies of “their” states remained a bottom-line 
for cooperation with minorities who continued to experience difficulty in 
accessing political processes.60  
The social and economic elites of minority communities in the Bal-
tic states found it hard, if not impossible, to see ways of engaging in po-
litical processes on terms dictated by majority political entrepreneurs. This 
comes on top of the difficulties in social advancement, lack of minorities’ 
visibility in political institutions and lack of acceptance from the represen-
tatives of majority ethnic groups. After being alienated from the political 
process at the initial stage of independence by the Balts “titularising” 
“their” states, many members of the minority populations do not partici-
pate in politics, as they consider these unimportant for their personal well-
being. Unsurprisingly therefore, minority representation in state and mu-
nicipal institutions have remained minimal over the past two decades. 
Effectively, a successful career in any area of public service, in the state 
sector or in the legal professions presupposes near-native knowledge of 
the state language and participation in the social networks of the titular 
nationals in order to secure access to key posts. Such candidates from 
among the minority groups were and remain few and far between.  
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Altogether of course, there were some incentives for non-core eth-
nics to seek employment in political institutions, but for many the game 
was not worth a candle. The effort required to gain access by acquiring 
linguistic competence, mobilising necessary support and standing up to 
majorities’ unwillingness to accept non-titulars as public officials was too 
great. However, while the biggest part of the Baltic minority communities 
was alienated from politics, some community representatives have ad-
vanced well in politics. In the next part of the chapter, I discuss how mi-
nority communities were represented in elected positions and whether they 
were able to contribute to the development of policies in their state of 
residence.  
 
 
3.   Minority political representatives  
Twenty years after independence, many members of minority communi-
ties across the Baltic states have opportunities to participate in the proc-
esses of direct democratic choice. However, no significant representation 
of non-titulars in the party landscape in these three countries can be ob-
served. The different foci of activities by minority and majority politicians 
suggest that the representation of minorities’ concerns in the political 
sphere is far from adequate. Although strong minority parties are largely 
absent, this does not necessarily mean that minority interests are not repre-
sented at all. More recent developments in Baltic politics suggest that even 
though the means to engage in social and political processes are made 
available for minorities, participation in these needs to take place on terms 
dictated by majority communities. This part of the chapter discusses how 
the salience of ethnic issues continues to influence representation of mi-
nority interests in Baltic politics today.  
Since the restoration of Lithuanian independence, there have always 
been representatives of the minority communities elected into local, repub-
lican councils, as well into regional administrations. In the Lithuanian 
case, Russian political forces were not consolidated until relatively late, 
but political parties and movements represented the interest of the Polish-
speaking minority throughout the period of Lithuania’s restored independ-
ence. A mixed majoritarian proportional electoral system in Lithuania 
allowed representatives of ethnic minorities, even if they did not collect 
4% of the votes, to enter the Seimas. However, with the amendment of the 
Elections Law in 1996, the threshold was raised for a single party to 5% 
and for an inter-party coalition to 7% of the vote. This reduced the number 
of minority representatives in the parliament. Although some minorities 
argued that the step was aimed at preventing their representation, the 
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Lithuanian debate (allegedly) was not aimed at the ethnic minority, but at 
the representatives of the Lithuanian public. As it was argued in the Sei-
mas then, it was necessary to “end the practice of representing three 
Lithuanians by five political parties.” However, the threshold for minority 
parties was abolished to tighten the electoral competition, eliminating the 
opportunities of smaller parties to concur with bigger political alliances.  
The representatives of the Polish minority in Lithuania established 
political organisations much earlier than the Russians-speakers. In May 
1988, the Lietuvos Lenku Sajunga (Lithuanian Polish Union, LLS) was 
established in response to the increasingly Lithuanian-nationalist rhetoric 
of Sąjūdis and mainly sought to protect the cultural rights of Lithuania’s 
Polish population. Among other goals, the LLS stated that it was inter-
ested in extending the facilities whereby members of the Polish minority 
could receive education in their native language. This agenda attracted 
many voters in the 1990 election to local councils in the Šalčininkai and 
Vilnius regions, where Poles constituted the absolute majority of the popu-
lation. These regions, like South Eastern Lithuania in general, were tradi-
tionally distinguished by their agrarian structure, low levels of income and 
low percentage of individuals with higher education. Therefore, the 
emerging rhetoric of re-Lithuanisation of the region caused a high sensi-
tivity among the local Polish-speaking population for the preservation of 
its cultural rights.  
The Polish minority was the first to form a political organisation 
registering the Polish Union in 1992. In 1994, it was transformed into the 
Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija (Akcja Wyborcza Polaków na Litwie, Polish 
Election Action, LLRA) which successfully took part in the elections. 
Further, in 2002, the Lietuvos lenkų liaudies partija (Lithuania’s Polish 
People Party, LLLP) was registered, though it was only able to achieve 
representation at the municipal level. Kasatkina and Beresnevičiute main-
tain that  
 
“the Polish minority is nearly exclusively represented by the 
[LLRA]. Although the lists of other political parties, espe-
cially those which run for the mandates in “Polish” areas, in-
clude Polish representatives, local Polish people tend to sup-
port the [LLRA], which is distinct in its pro-Polish rheto-
ric.”61  
 
Until its Fifth Congress in August 1994, when the LLS de jure be-
came LLRA, the organisation had no political arm and was merely a social 
organisation. As a political party the Lithuanian Polish Electoral Action 
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had goals very similar to those of the Union itself, representing merely a 
political alternative and striving to guarantee equal rights to all Lithuanian 
citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity. Despite the efforts of its leadership, 
the LLRA failed to consolidate the representatives of the Polish-
community, who also ran on the lists of other parties in the local elections 
of 1995. Although the LLRA came out with 68 mandates in the 1995 local 
elections, in the Vilnius, Šalčininkai, Švenčionys, and Trakai regions, 
since then the support of the voters has been consistently declining. The 
results of the municipal elections in the Vilnius region demonstrate that 
the higher the turnout of voters, the lower the support gained by the 
LLRA, despite the fact that Polish-speakers account for more than 60% of 
the whole population in that region. In the 1997 municipal elections, 
22,155 voters cast their ballots for the LLRA, which comprised 77% of the 
whole electorate of that constituency, resulting in the party having 23 
mandates in the Vilnius Region Municipality Council. In 2000, 20,559 
persons out of 31,831 voted for this political organisation, comprising 
64% and giving 20 seats in the Council of the Municipality to the LLRA.62  
The LLRA in the region of Šalčininkai has achieved similar results, 
receiving 20 seats in 1997, 18 in 2000, and 17 in 2002. These changes 
could have been determined by the long period when the party was repre-
sented in the local government but unable to fulfil the promises previously 
made to the electorate. The ethnic breakdown of political representatives 
on the municipal level indicates quite clearly that Polish-speakers do not 
tend to support ethnic political parties in all regions. Some observers take 
this as an indication of the fact that the LLRA had been consistently losing 
its political status within the Polish community.63 However, it could be 
more legitimate to suggest that voter preferences are not defined by factors 
of ethnic allegiance. Instead issue-oriented voting and preference for par-
ties with a regional agenda have developed across Lithuania.64  
Additionally since the Seimas elections have proved less successful 
for the LLRA. The party received 1,85% votes in 2000, 3.8% in 2004 and 
4.79% in 2008 and was unable to pass the 5% electoral threshold. Each 
time however, at least two representatives from the single mandate dis-
tricts could go to Vilnius (Waldemar Tomaszewski and Gabriel Mince-
wicz in 2000; Waldemar Tomaszewski and Leokadija Počikovska in 2004; 
Waldemar Tomaszewski, Michal Mackiewicz and Jaroslaw Narkiewicz in 
2008). In the municipal elections in February 2007 the LLRA received 
5.42% of the vote, being represented by 6 councillors in local government 
of Vilnius city, 20 in Šalčininkai, 19 in the Vilnius region, 5 in the region 
of Trakai and 3 in the region Švenčionys. During the period of 2007–2009 
the LLRA could nominate the Mayor of Vilnius, Arthur Ludkowski.  
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The focus on the regional, rather than ethnic issues explains why 
the LLRA continuously received proportionally more votes than the size 
of its voting minority group in the geographical locality.65 Simply, voters 
prefer the party with a clear regional appeal and a dense network of sup-
porters, which encouraged local Lithuanians, Russians and Belarusians to 
vote for this political organisation. In Vilnius City the LLRA holds a 
lower, though stable backing of the electorate and receives somewhere 
around 9% of the votes.66 At the same time, it can be expected that the 
Polish-speaking candidates in this region have also been nominated on the 
lists of other political parties. This particularly highlights the fact that even 
in the region with the highest concentration of the minority population, the 
preferences of the electorate shift towards the parties running on particular 
platforms and are not tied to ethnic representation.  
The party consolidating the interests of the Russian community 
only emerged as a political force in 1995. Lietuvos Rusu Sajunga (Lithua-
nia’s Russian Union, LRS) was seeking to unite Russian voters and to 
represent their interests in the Seimas and the higher authorities of the 
state. Some 30 different cultural organisations were united under its roof 
to represent the interests of the ethnic group in their social, economic and 
political life. Another part of the Russian-speaking minority that was keen 
to organise politically but was significantly less successful on the political 
scene was the Alliance of Lithuanian Citizens. Originally registered in 
1996, it was later transformed into the Lietuvos tautiniu mažumu aljansas 
(Alliance of the Lithuanian National Minorities) and achieved no repre-
sentation in Seimas. Both of the mentioned organisations failed to pass the 
electoral threshold and send representatives into the Seimas in 1996. Not 
until 2000 was the LRS able to collect sufficient votes to be represented in 
the Seimas by three MPs. In 2002 the Politin÷ partija Rusų aljansas (Rus-
sian Alliance) was registered as a local party in Klaipeda and took part in 
the municipal elections.  
In comparison with the LLRA, the political organisations of the 
Russian-speaking minority are less successful with the electorate. If, in 
municipal elections the LLRA receives 50 mandates in total, both Russian 
parties receive only 10–20 mandates. Several explanations are possible in 
this case. On the one hand, the turnout of the Russian electorate in mu-
nicipal elections (as in other elections) is lower than that of Poles. On the 
other hand, these two organisations might have failed to define clearly the 
objectives of their activity and they are not active enough in attracting 
their potential electorate. The fact that the Russian population is geo-
graphically more dispersed with the majority living in urban areas may be 
an important factor, as it is more difficult to reach the necessary backing 
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of voters. The Russian-speakers tend to support parties based on the prin-
ciples of their programmes, among which the left-wing parties dominate.67 
As I suggested in my discussion of the Polish vote in Lithuania, the case 
of Visaginas also indicates that there is a trend among Lithuania’s Rus-
sian-speakers to vote for programme-based parties that include members 
of Russian origin rather than ethnically formed political groups. In 1997, 
the Alliance of Lithuanian Citizens received 2,174 votes out of 7,415, i.e. 
29%, and was granted 9 mandates in the Council of Visaginas. In 2000, 
this political party received 3 mandates and in 2002 it did not reach the 
required threshold of 4%. The situation in Vilnius is quite similar. In 1997, 
a coalition of the two Russian parties received 10 seats in the city council. 
It was also represented in the council after all subsequent elections.  
Although the Lithuanian Seimas has consistently had representa-
tives of ethnic minorities, their proportion is significantly lower than the 
ethnic composition of society. While in the Seimas of 1990 representatives 
of ethnic groups accounted for 14% (19 seats), since 1992 the national 
parliament has been growing more homogeneous, representing more eth-
nic Lithuanians than minorities. The number of Polish-speaking parlia-
mentarians decreased most significantly from 8 in 1992, to 3 in 1996.68 
Some favour the interpretation that the change in electoral behaviour  
 
“could be the fact of changing strategies for participation in 
elections, i.e. from trying to compete in small parties to 
forming inter-party coalitions and integrating members of 
ethnic minorities into other existing political parties.”69  
 
However, it is clear that over the first decade of independence the oppor-
tunities for the representatives of ethnic minorities to be elected and re-
ceive a seat have significantly decreased also because of political interfer-
ence. Problems such as the gerrymandering of electoral district borders 
and the active redirection of the political agenda from ethnic issues to 
social ones have been noted.70 This also indicates that the absence of mi-
nority parties in parliament or other electoral bodies does not immediately 
indicate the passivity of the minority–in fact, the relation between the 
central government and municipalities in Lithuania allows a great number 
of instruments for local minority representatives to influence policy-
making.  
In part this had resulted from the differing perspectives of represen-
tation in the minority communities themselves. Kasatkina and Beres-
nevičiute argue that the “main characteristic of the political parties of 
ethnic minorities is that they are mainly regional (i.e. represent the areas 
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densely inhabited by representatives of national minorities) or marginal.”71 
For example, the Russian electorate is mostly spread across the cities of 
Lithuania and usually comprises a small part of the whole number of the 
electorate. There are few constituencies where Russian electors would 
have enough votes to support their candidate. For this reason, the repre-
sentatives of Russian political parties are particularly successful where 
they are able to consolidate themselves with majority representatives and 
create a Seimas coalition with the other major, predominantly left-wing 
groups.  
The Polish-speaking minority on the other hand is compactly con-
centrated in the areas where the LLRA is running local councils, a fact that 
popularises their activities and improves their chances to win seats in the 
Seimas. More obvious examples of interethnic relations in the country, 
however, can be seen in the cases of electoral districts inhabited mainly by 
ethnic Lithuanians. For example in Šiauliai, Kaunas and K÷dainiai, non-
Lithuanians were elected into municipal and national representative or-
gans, indicating that voters orient themselves not towards ethnic belong-
ing, but at the electoral platform of the candidate.  
As has been indicated by the members of city councils in interviews 
with the author, minority members can pursue their interests while being 
represented on the lists of the majority political parties. The main reason 
for this being that political mobilisation according to ethnic principle in 
Lithuania is viable only on the issues where minority interests are vested 
and clearly distinguishable from the interest of the majority. However, as 
it appears in Lithuania, support of the minority groups for the majority 
political parties was conducive for ethnic divisions in the party landscape. 
This position was perceived positively by both majority and minority parts 
of society, suggesting that interethnic relations in the country were under-
going considerable normalisation.  
The LLPA and LRS ran on a common platform during the Euro-
pean Parliament elections in June 2004, though they failed to pass the 
electoral threshold of 7%, collecting only 5.74% of the vote. In 2009 how-
ever, the LLRA alone received 8.46% of the vote, which sent Waldemar 
Tomaszewski to Strassburg. Prior to the EP elections, Tomaszewski also 
ran for the presidency in the elections of May 2009, receiving 4.67% of 
the vote. He ran on a platform that opposed “Lithuanisation” of Polish 
names and favoured the re-privatisation of land in the Vilnius region: both 
issues of high salience for the Polish electorate. Overall however, while 
the status of political representation of minority communities reflects the 
overall depolitisation of Lithuania’s society, politics are largely dominated 
by the titular parties cooperating with national minority representatives.  
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The percentage of non-core ethnics among Estonia’s electorate is 
comparable to that of Lithuania. However, the representation of the Rus-
sian-speakers in the Riigikogu has been weak since the independence. 
Since no special registration rules or restrictions on the establishment of 
minority parties exist in the country, a number of so-called “Russian par-
ties” have sought representation of minority interests in Estonia since the 
establishment of independence.  
No Russian parties were present in the first post-Soviet Riigikogu 
due to the minimal number of non-Estonians in the citizenry at that time.72 
In 1995, however, several Russian political parties, such as Vene Erakond 
Eestis (Russian Party of Estonia, VEE, later renamed Vene Balti Erakond 
Eestis, Baltic-Russian Party of Estonia) and Eesti Ühendatud Rahvapartei 
(United People’s Party, EÜR) were founded and ran as the coalition “Our 
Home Estonia,” receiving 5.87% of the vote, which corresponded to 6 
Riigikogu seats out of 101. A similar practice during the run up to elec-
tions in 1999 allowed the parties to stand separately, but the EÜR gained 
only 8.13% of the vote and a meagre 6 seats during the elections.73 Since 
then, the representatives of the Russian-speaking minority have failed to 
pass the required electoral threshold in both the 2003 and 2007 elections: 
the EÜR collected 2.2% and the VEE only 0.2% of the vote and were both 
left out of the parliament.74 Nonetheless, 6 minority representatives were 
elected through the lists of (Estonian) mainstream parties.  
Thus, the representation of Estonia’s minorities at the national level 
through party presence in the Riigikogu is very limited. However, elec-
toral unions of non-Estonians have much greater influence at the local 
level, mainly in Tallinn and in the Ida-Virumaa region. The longitudinal 
comparison suggests that even in local elections, the parties focusing ex-
plicitly on minority issues lose their appeal to the electorate. Over the past 
decade, the local minority electorate has been repeatedly avoiding voting 
for the parties with a clearly minority-oriented agenda and has expressed 
support for alliances under the stewardship of Estonian political elites. 
Once again, in comparing the situation in Estonia to that of Lithuania, the 
expectation that minority populations would start playing an active politi-
cal role if sufficient numbers of them were to naturalise, was not met.75  
The elections for the city council of Tallinn, a city with a high resi-
dent minority population, have demonstrated that Russian-speakers do not 
necessarily vote for Russian parties or names. In the elections of 2002, the 
two electoral unions of Russian-speakers received 8.4% of the vote despite 
there being around 40% minority residents in the city.76 However, there 
has been a trend of growing representation of minority groups in the main-
stream Estonian parties such as Keskerakond (Centre Party), which allows 
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them to collect high numbers of votes from both ethnic groups. However, 
even in the minority dominated Ida-Virumaa region, the voters elected the 
candidates running on the lists of main (Estonian) parties to promote their 
interests more efficiently at the national level.77  
Some local observers indicate a form of minority voters’ fatigue 
with the ineffectiveness of minority parties, while defending group inter-
ests at the national level. Others point to the awareness of the limited effi-
cacy of parties that profile themselves explicitly on a minority agenda and 
take in the constant opposition of Estonian-led parties, which still prefer to 
ignore proposals aimed at policy changes emerging from the “Russian 
parties.” Interestingly, the comments in the Russian language Estonian 
daily tend to see the failure of the VEE as a fear among Russian-speakers 
to affiliate themselves with a “Russian organization” in contemporary 
Estonia. In this context, the EÜR provided a better choice by positioning 
itself as a “Russian-speaking party.”78 In the 2007 Riigikogu elections the 
VEE and Constitutional Party (formerly the EÜR) ran, but were unable to 
pass the electoral threshold.  
As demonstrated by the Lithuanian example, Estonian Russian-
speakers tend to prefer a variety of parties and not solely parties with a 
clear and indivisible minority agenda. While the Lithuanian majoritarian 
electoral system makes sense for an ethnic vote only if the parties are 
explicitly “minority parties,” the Estonian electoral system suggests 
greater opportunities for successful participation in policy-making if 
elected through majority party lists.79 Since 2003, minority voters con-
tinuously supported those minority politicians who ran on the platform of 
“Estonian” parties, in the expectation that they would achieve greater 
influence while in the office.80 In this light, the “Estonian” parties have 
started to pay particular attention to recruiting minority politicians to their 
lists in order to attract minority voters.81 As Järve observes, “Citizens with 
a minority background are also joining mainstream parties in considerable 
numbers, an obvious change compared to the beginning of the 1990s when 
some Estonian parties sought to remain ethnically ‘clean.’”82  
Raimo Pomm indicates in his study of the Estonian case, that de-
spite the fact that Russian parties agreed on a common goal, they could 
hardly elaborate a comprehensive political programme.83 At the same 
time, the Estonian parties were successful in co-opting Russian-speaking 
elites and voters by bringing up issues of concern for Russian voters, such 
as the problems of statelessness and social exclusion.84 However, the issue 
of political membership has not been a focus of the political agenda in any 
of the three countries to an equal degree. Estonia, for example, has al-
lowed all its residents, regardless of their citizenship, to vote in local elec-
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tions, although non-citizens were not allowed to run for an office. In lo-
calities with large non-Estonian populations, notably Tallinn and Ida-
Virumaa, the state allowed a certain degree of local autonomy by allowing 
local paperwork to be done in Russian, stipulating that only communica-
tion with the centre be held in the state language. This was similar to the 
regulations made by the Lithuanian state with respect to its minority re-
gions.85  
A special solution for Estonian non-citizens allowed them to vote 
for political parties in local elections and hence acquire at least some say 
in policy-making at the local level. Unlike Estonia, Latvia continues to 
resist granting voting rights for resident non-citizens, legitimising it by 
claiming this would further blur the boundaries between citizens and non-
citizens.86 In this respect, Nils Muižnieks argues that this might be particu-
larly indicative of the dispersed settlement of the non-Latvian community 
in the country and its particularly high visibility in Riga, which–should the 
resident non-citizens be allowed to vote–would immediately change the 
political landscape of the local governments.87  
Unlike in Estonia and Lithuania, where the influence of parties rep-
resenting minority interests has consistently declined, Latvia’s non-titular 
community has grown more politically active since 1995. Four major 
parties have appeared on the political horizon to represent the interests of 
the minority community, though they all reflect very different political 
orientations.88 The special provisions made by the Saeima Election Law 
facilitate the favourable representation of ethnic minority candidates even 
if they run on the lists of Latvian parties.89 In Article 23, the voting proce-
dure described allows citizens to choose particular candidates from one 
electoral list and at the same time vote against others. Although this regu-
lation was largely formed in correspondence with the electoral regulations 
of pre-Soviet Latvia, today it seems to encourage ethnic favouritism while 
voting and hence reinforces ethnic partisanship.90 Clearly, this regulation 
disallows Latvian ethnic parties the inclusion of minority members on 
their lists, as is the case in Estonia, and facilitates the confrontation be-
tween the majority and minorities in Latvia’s politics. Hence, as was 
stated by Pabriks, the comparison of the share of candidates and those 
elected according to their ethnic origin does not suggest that the relative 
increase of minority participation in elections necessarily increases their 
share among the elected officials.  
In Latvia, the Tautas SaskaĦas Partija (National Harmony Party, 
TSP), Latvijas Sociālistiskā Partija (Latvian Socialist Party) and Līdztie-
sība (Ravnopravie, Equal Rights Movement) were mainly supported by 
Russian-speaking voters.91 Importantly, in the 1998 elections the parties 
Timofey Agarin 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
272
and movements representing minority population formed the coalition Za 
Prava Čeloveka v Edinoi Latvii (in Russian, Par Cilvēka Tiesībām Vienotā 
Latvijā, PCTVL the Latvian, For Human Rights in the United Latvia, 
FHRUL) to win 14.8% of the popular vote and occupy 16 seats in the 
Saeima. In the 2002 elections the FHRUL improved their position to 19% 
of the vote and 25 representatives in the parliament.92 By being perceived 
as a pro-Russian party and opposing the 2004 education reform, the 
FHRUL collected the majority of the Russian-speakers in the country, 
which accentuated the differences between ethnic communities.93  
The FHRUL has periodically raised issues related to statelessness, 
the use of minority languages in public life, including in the media, and 
has repeatedly proposed ratification of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities. Though the convention was eventually 
ratified in 2005, the vast majority of the coalition’s suggestions have been 
systematically rejected by other parties. The FHRUL continued to be one 
of the popular parties during the period of legislation, partially due to its 
persistent demands to allow resident non-citizens to vote in local elec-
tions.94 However, this overwhelming popularity at the local level, particu-
larly in Riga, was not translated into electoral support in the 2006 elec-
tions, where only 6.03% of the electorate voted in its favour.  
Somewhat differently, Tautas SaskaĦas Partija (TSP) sought to ad-
dress the issues of potential interest for Russian-speaking voters, such as 
citizenship and state language use. The TSP was established in 1993 as 
SaskaĦa Latvijai–Atdzimšana Tautsaimniecībai and supports issues that 
address some of the grievances of the minority populations and hence is 
very much comparable to Estonia’s Keskerakond. In appealing to minority 
voters, the TSP has a considerable number of ethnic Latvians in its leader-
ship and attempts to profile itself as “the only Latvian party where Latvi-
ans and Russians are working together.”95 In 2005, the party joined the 
alliance SaskaĦas Centrs (Harmony Centre, in Russian, Centr soglasiya) 
winning 17 seats in the 2006 Saeima elections, thus becoming the fourth 
largest party in Latvia’s Parliament. While still representing the interest of 
the minority population, SaskaĦas Centrs is the second largest opposition 
party after FHRUL, and is naturally excluded from ministerial posts in the 
Latvian government.  
Alliances between the parties representing the majority and the mi-
norities in Latvia currently appear to be impossible. In any case, they are 
highly dependent on party leadership which are heavily conflicting, as 
they generally represent directly opposing views of state-building. Thus 
there is a limited preparedness of the Latvian majority parties to cooperate 
with the minority parties. With no implicit majority-minority power-
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sharing arrangements at the national level, the representatives of the Rus-
sian-speaking community are not perceived as loyal to Latvia and are 
frequently excluded from inter-party dialogues at the national level. This 
in part explains the impossibility of appointing a higher ranked minister of 
minority descent in Latvia. While the FHRUL has been supported by a 
considerable number of voters in the 2002 elections, the party was not 
included in negotiations for government positions.  
In Estonia minority parties did not enter parliament after the elec-
tions in 2003 and 2007. Similarly to Latvian situation, the government 
coalitions were formed without the mainstream Keskerakond, which rep-
resented large sections of the Russian-speaking electorate, despite it hold-
ing nearly a quarter of the votes. In part, the situation has been interpreted 
as a projection of everyday beliefs into the realm of politics, with minor-
ity/majority parties holding nearly opposing views on the geopolitical 
orientation of Latvia and Estonia, education reforms, changes in citizen-
ship, language policies, etc. The elections for the Saeima (2005) and the 
Riigikogu (2007) after the heated debates on education reforms, the devel-
opment of the integration programmes, and the consequences of the EU 
membership stressed the growing propensity of non-core ethnics to vote 
for mainstream parties, whose focus is on minority social problems rather 
than merely promoting a minority agenda.  
In this context however one must note that minority communities in 
Latvia have been consistently voting for “their” parties, partially due to the 
closer ties between the issues of political representation and the perceived 
reasons for the socioeconomic disparities between ethnic communities. As 
I suggested earlier, the large number of political regulations in the areas of 
social, economic and cultural development in the country are perceived to 
be made from a position of majority and with limited (if any) consultation 
with local minority representatives. As had been argued by Pabriks, possi-
bly what continues to mobilise the ethnic vote on both sides of the com-
munity is a different understanding of the meaning of some central politi-
cal regulations (such as citizenship), support for the minority community 
(among others in education), and socio-economic issues of interest for 
minority voters.96 This is corroborated by the fact that the “Russian par-
ties” in Latvia receive votes very closely reflecting the share of non-
Latvians among the citizens.  
The difficulties and problems of non-core ethnic communities in 
Latvia and Estonia are comparable, but it appears that they are more se-
vere in Latvia:  
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“non-citizens have no voting rights whatsoever, minority 
schools are undergoing rigid changes which the government 
has consistently refused to negotiate, only the state language 
may be used in contacts with authorities and there are em-
ployment restrictions for non-citizens.”97  
 
This fact also explains the diversity of the interests represented by 
the range of the parties explicitly working on a “minority agenda,” such as 
SaskaĦas Centrs and FHRUL, or addressing the social agenda and sup-
porting the initiatives of “minority parties” proper such as Latvijas Sociāl-
istiskā Partija and Latvijas Sociāldemokrātiskā Strādnieku Partija (United 
Social Democratic Workers Party, LSDSP).98 However none of these 
political parties have been included in governing coalitions or could effec-
tively advise Latvia’s government in changes of policies on the issues of 
greatest concern for their electorate: criteria for citizenship, linguistic 
regulations and the improvement of social guarantees for disadvantaged 
non-Latvians.  
Although, as can be argued, support along ethnic lines has started to 
recede in the Baltic states over the past five years, it is still too early to 
speak of the full shift from minority voting. It appears that over the past 
decade minority voters in Estonia continue to shift their preference to-
wards the issue-oriented platforms of parties that include representatives 
from both the minority and the majority. Minority political entrepreneurs 
that are prepared to cooperate with majority politicians on their terms are 
increasingly accepted into the ranks of existing (Estonian) parties. At the 
same time, the Latvian political landscape seems to be undergoing a pe-
riod of consolidation around issues connected to the political representa-
tion of minorities in the state apparatus and their role in state development. 
It remains to be seen however whether the combined effect of minority 
marginalisation from decisive social and economic spheres will be retrans-
lated into the political participation of non-core ethnics in the social 
sphere, as is visible in Lithuania.  
 
 
4.   Conclusion  
The present chapter underlined some crucial aspects of social fragmenta-
tion in the Baltic societies. I make clear that minorities in the region have 
experienced difficulty in gaining access to key social and political posi-
tions in the region. They also have difficulty in being accepted in positions 
from which a status change of the minority community as a whole would 
be feasible. This clearly draws a line of comparison with the statements of 
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Baltic social scientists, who allege that Russian-speakers have difficulty 
with competitive political regimes writ large. As I have discerned in this 
chapter, obvious constraints are placed on the members of minority com-
munities in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, perpetuating structural inequali-
ties in access to key social positions, upward social mobility and the im-
provement of political status. The structural impact of titularisation limited 
representation of minorities in key socio-political positions throughout the 
region.  
As discussed, the representation of the Baltic minority populations 
in positions of influence on social, economic and political policy changes 
was marginal and could not challenge the dominance of the titular com-
munities in the public domain. The discussion in this chapter indicates that 
over the past decade the main issues on the agenda of minority political 
parties have slowly been turning away from criteria of political member-
ship and regulations of language use. However, as I have argued, despite 
representing around one fifth of the elected members of parliaments, rep-
resentatives of the minority parties have been continuously marginalised 
in Estonian and Latvian political processes. However, the issues related to 
social protection and in support of policies addressing the members of 
both minority and majority communities gained some prominence. Unfor-
tunately, even the activity of the parliamentary representatives of minority 
populations in all three countries have failed to assert any meaningful 
changes in state policies relating to non-core ethnics in the region. On a 
broader scale therefore even the members of the minority actively partici-
pating in political processes did not see their claims accommodated, even 
if these merely aimed at the improvement of relations between ethnic 
communities.  
Many non-titular residents of the Baltic states have been excluded 
from automatic membership in the political community, have been af-
fected by policies of post-Soviet nation-building and have had to accom-
modate to a marginalised social status and limited possibilities for mobil-
ity in the social structure of the Baltic societies. The only two means to 
obtain participation in the political sphere, activation of social networks 
and engagement in the non-governmental organisations, failed to secure a 
greater inclusiveness of political regimes as their recommendations to 
local policy-makers were otherwise unwelcome. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Minority engagement in civic initiatives 
 
 
The overview of the political processes taking place in the Baltic states 
made clear that opportunities for non-core ethnics to take part in both 
social life and political decision-making throughout the region were lim-
ited. In the previous chapters I have discussed the linguistic separation of 
non-core ethnics from the titular nationals of the Baltic states, as well as 
the exclusion of non-titulars from political developments. In this final 
chapter, I make clear that other means of minority participation in public 
life have equally been circumscribed. This chapter addresses the participa-
tion of minority communities in civic networks and demonstrates that even 
their expressions of the explicitly non-political agenda are treated with 
caution. While civic participation is widely treated as a way of facilitating 
policy-changes and fostering responsiveness in the state towards the 
causes of marginal groups, these objectives found little welcome with 
Baltic political entrepreneurs.  
In all three Baltic societies only a small part of the minority com-
munities are represented among the political and social elites. While Baltic 
scholars do not see this situation as resulting from discriminatory practices 
on the ground, the lack of political representation of minorities under-
mines their capacity to communicate their specific expectations to those 
who make political decisions. Even more importantly, in public discourse 
minorities of the region are not seen as viable contributors to developing 
social institutions. Thus, they have been consistently marginalised from 
the governing coalitions throughout the region. The overall limited repre-
sentation of minorities in public office and among political elites, coupled 
with their relative autonomy from the information space of the titular 
nationals, suggests that there could be many issues of contention that do 
not surface in the debates on development. In this context, the civic initia-
tives of the minority community representatives can provide a proxy 
measurement for these groups’ contribution to the increasing plurality of 
the society in which they reside.  
Civic initiatives are generally accepted as playing a mediating role 
between governmental bodies, the civil community they represent and 
groups that are underrepresented in the political, social and cultural estab-
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lishment. In the Baltic context, where the minority populations have lim-
ited representation in politics, civic groups have a rare opportunity to 
suggest improvements or corrections to policy development. This is why 
the number of minority NGOs throughout the region is great. While the 
numbers of those engaged in the activities of the minority NGOs is con-
siderably smaller than the size of the minority group itself, a great number 
of issues are covered by the civic organisations of minorities. Is there a 
specific explanation for this phenomenon? 
Though many minority residents of the Baltic states have only lim-
ited opportunities for conventional political participation, this does not 
exclude them from the effects of the politics. They have seen their elected 
representatives being marginalised by majority politicians at various levels 
of government. This marginalisation makes it difficult to identify what 
means were left for the non-titular groups to inform policy-makers of the 
changes necessary to accommodate their group-interests. In this chapter, I 
argue that many members of minority communities engaged civic groups 
to further their political, social and cultural interests. Despite their en-
gagement however, they were rarely supported by political entrepreneurs 
in their state of residence and frequently had to change the focus of activ-
ity to be accepted by political actors. This very change also indicates that 
although democratic institutions might be in place, there is still a very 
limited understanding of how democracy works throughout the region. By 
emphasising this, the final chapter makes clear that in order to prevent the 
stalling of the democratic project in the region, a fundamental change in 
relations between political institutions and the populace affected needs to 
occur. In turn, this change would increase the inclusiveness of the existing 
political regimes.  
I start by making clear why the Baltic states’ civic initiatives fail to 
play the role expected from these groups. Although civic initiatives are 
seen as facilitators of democratic learning for states and societies alike, 
across the Baltic states the work of civic groups lacks any demand. Sec-
ondly, I describe the groups of minorities who aim to support their fellow 
citizens in their adaptation to the economic and social changes taking 
place throughout the region. In the third part of the chapter I discuss the 
specific initiatives, which balance the lack of state interest in certain issues 
of social interaction between the majority and minority. Finally, I look at 
organisations that critically reflect the state policies and provide advice to 
policy-makers as to the changes necessary to alleviate socioeconomic and 
other differences between the majorities and minorities. While the pre-
liminary observations suggest that the number of civic organisations is 
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fairly low in all three states, I conclude this chapter by discussing the 
reasons for the limited activity of minorities in civic initiatives.  
 
 
1.   Civil society in the Baltic states: An oxymoron?  
The account of the democratisation process and the contribution made by 
social actors provided in the following takes many issues into considera-
tion. It also takes many aspects for granted. The basic assumption of my 
analytical approach of how social actors, limited in their political rights, 
contribute to the democratisation of society and state relies partially on the 
conceptual framework of “civic engagement.” I treat “civil society” as a 
second order predictor that makes clear what the democratisation process 
requires and what outcomes it brings. If unconstrained by two other 
forces, the impartiality of the state apparatus, the voluntary character of 
associations and the self-determination of individuals all strengthen de-
mocratic pluralism and are conducive to the democratic consolidation of 
societies. Put simply, I treat “civil society” as an indicator of changes in 
social and political environments that are conducive to establishing non-
hierarchical relations between the state and the individuals affected by its 
policies. In doing this so far, I pointed out the areas of cooperation be-
tween individuals and the state that contributed to greater bottom-up de-
mocratisation. On the other hand, throughout the previous chapters I ar-
gued that strengthening the democratic regime horizontally is possible by 
“participatory ethos,” which emerges out of interpersonal ties, the build-
ing-up of trust and increased connections between individuals.  
The common activities of individuals within the framework of civil 
society are said to increase interpersonal trust with an overall effect of 
promoting an exchange between the members of society and political 
institutions.1 The discussions of the impact civil society has on various 
institutions presume that civil associations are autonomous from the state, 
to a degree “apolitical.” When considered from this point, the organisa-
tions of Baltic minority groups could well fit into the framework, as these 
unite both citizens and non-citizens, and politically active and passive 
members of the minority community.  
In the context of the Baltic societies, it would be fairly natural that 
the civic activities of minorities would only fall into the category aimed at 
civic processes, which emphasises the expectations and directions of so-
cial policy development. These activities of minority populations are best 
described in the terms coined by Foley and Edwards, “Civil Society I” and 
“Civil Society II” (further, CSI and CSII, respectively).2 In both cases, 
CSI and CSII indicate the particular context in which these activities ap-
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pear and describe social activism as amortising the effects of state policies 
on individuals.3 There is no doubt that civil society can be a “resource” for 
the government, because it pursues collective interests and is distinct from 
political and economic groups.4  
Scholars agree that the state is balanced out by Civil Societies I and 
II. Though each of these functions in different fashion, both are working 
towards improving the relationship of an individuals’ interactions with the 
state, and not the other way around. In this sense,  
 
“[t]he political role of civil society in turn is not directly re-
lated to the control or conquest of power but to the generation 
of influence through the life of democratic associations and 
unconstrained discussion in the cultural public sphere.”5  
 
Instead, CSI assumes the function of socialising individuals into better 
citizens and CSII that of helping citizens to develop alternative mecha-
nisms to cope with state-policies. It must be noted that both perform func-
tions distinct from political activities. An example may be citizen initia-
tives to assist others in adapting to the changed political, social and eco-
nomic realities by aiming at poverty reduction and the re-inclusion of 
persons into labour market. Overall, civic actions substitute for a lack of 
state-responsiveness, outsourcing of tasks previously assumed by the state 
and the handling of issues such as social work and the support of cultural 
activities.  
In the Baltic states almost all of the civic initiatives belong to areas 
which fall roughly into the domains of CSI and CSII. The limited respon-
siveness of the Baltic political elites to the initiatives of the minority popu-
lations facilitates a specific form of civic engagement. The activities of the 
organisations aiming at supporting fellow citizens in their adaptation to 
political and social changes have been taking place at two different levels. 
Firstly, the organisations facilitating the learning of democratic practices 
have been engaged in issue-oriented work, such as the representation of 
individuals’ interests. Secondly, organisations coordinating and facilitating 
communication between the grass-roots activities, formalised organisa-
tions and the state have been emerging over the past decade. Some argue 
that this reflects the need for the civic organisations to seek steady connec-
tions with policy-makers and grant-givers in order to secure permanent 
funding along with the acknowledgement of social contribution with the 
local community and political elites.6  
To this end, the Baltic governments developed policies to assist the 
development of civil society. The Latvian Concept of Civil Society De-
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velopment (Pilsoniskās sabiedrības koncepta attīstība), the Estonian Civil 
Society Development Concept (Eesti Kodanikuühiskonna Arengukont-
septsioon) and comparable action plans developed in Lithuania were ad-
vanced for the states’ cooperation with NGOs. However, the documents 
outlined only vague concepts and guaranteed no particular steps to be 
considered by the Baltic governments to respond to or accept any policy 
advice from the citizenry. In this context the statement of the Latvian 
government was indicative of the fact that only at the level of policy im-
plementation can NGOs assist the state. Similar statements are not obtain-
able from Estonian and Lithuanian policy-makers. However, the treatment 
of civic activities by officials of the two countries does not suggest any 
different understanding of cooperation: only NGOs assisting the state in 
policy-implementation and not interfering in policy-making are treated as 
partners.  
Quite distinct from the NGOs involved with the state institutions 
are the civic initiatives of minorities supporting fellow citizens. These 
have emerged as “self-help” groups during the initial years of independ-
ence and are now largely dependant on state funding. Since many have 
developed lucid networks of activists, they seek to balance the state poli-
cies of cultural homogenisation and titularisation of the Baltic societies. In 
his observation of the minority NGO landscape in Latvia, Arturs Jansons 
suggests that the “situation [observed can be treated] as an initial period in 
the process of national minority formation, where self-identification from 
ethnic groups to national minorities is characterised by many organisa-
tional and political cleavages.”7 In their study of minorities in six Euro-
pean countries, Mikko Lagerspetz and Sofia Joons have analysed the ac-
tivities of ethnic minority organisations in Estonia as a way of construct-
ing and reconstructing cultural and personal identities. The authors con-
clude that minorities are active mainly in cultural organisations to sustain 
their cultural specificity, without engaging with policy-related issues.8 
Some could suggest that while my focus on civic organisations is 
limited to the study of minority NGOs, the unwillingness of politicians to 
take such activities seriously is rational and legitimate because minority 
ideals frequently conflict with, or even endanger, the political regime in 
the Baltic states. In the previous chapters I have presented the reasons for 
which the representatives of majorities might consider Russian-speakers to 
be potentially dangerous for the Baltic politics. But the lack of conformity 
to mainstream politics should not be mixed with lack of loyalty. Failure to 
distinguish the two might indeed explain states’ lack of responsiveness to 
the claims of minority residents. However, it does not change the under-
standing of democratisation, as both increasing the institutional respon-
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siveness to public input and committing the public to abide by the anti-
majoritarian rules. As a result thereof, the development of civil society is 
hampered by the lack of institutional accountability to individual collec-
tive action and the failure of groups to consolidate their work on the ma-
joritarian political agenda. 
Admittedly the third wave, post-communist democracies failed to 
install the anti-majoritarian rules of the game which make them different 
from past democratisation waves.9 Failure to counter the majoritarian 
institutions also determines why civic initiatives in post-communist socie-
ties rally on a broad set of ideologically-laden issues in search of support-
ers. Previous studies of the Baltic civic groups suggested that the NGOs in 
the region mobilise membership by rallying around the most salient identi-
ties of their members.10 As is described throughout this book, it appears 
that membership in a cultural, ethnic or language community would have 
great potential as the central feature of individual identity. Unsurprisingly, 
much of the research on civic groups in the Baltic states concludes that 
ethnic belonging is a particularly strong mobilising force for civic groups 
in the Baltic states.11  
Local social science research envisages the major difficulty for lo-
cal NGOs that promote the cultural and linguistic identity of their group 
members results from the monoethnic background of their members.12 
There is no doubt that the members of these groups could profit more in 
terms of social capital if they were to cooperate with the NGOs of the 
majority. The question remains whether such cooperation could allow 
minority NGOs greater leverage on political decision making. Specifi-
cally, the work of the civic groups representing minority interests is 
treated as non-existent and counterproductive in all three states. Such a 
kind of state-society relation can barely suggest any effect of democratic 
learning on the part of the state institutions since independence.  
It is in this context that one can better understand the reasons for the 
persistent mutual distrust between the minority populations and the state 
institutions across the Baltic. While the surveys conducted by the Natu-
ralisation Board of Latvia in 1997 suggested that there are reasons con-
nected to insufficient command of the state-language and the lack of trust 
toward state institutions,13 later studies cited reasons more pragmatic, such 
as the general passivity among the non-citizens.14 Similar conditions are 
mirrored in Estonia as well. The studies of the Civil Society Institute in 
Lithuania15 also suggested that the cause of the unexpectedly low interest 
of local minorities in civic initiatives and political participation is mainly 
to be sought in the non-responsive character of the national politics.16  
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Rikmann and Lagerspetz have suggested that the passivity of Rus-
sian-speakers is different from the analogous passivity of the economically 
weak groups of the titular populations.17 The researchers interpret the 
general political passivity of minorities as a result of their disillusionment 
with the political system, which has failed to provide them with the chan-
nels for participation needed to bring their causes closer to policy-
makers.18 Previously this disinterest as Poleshchuk has argued, encouraged 
governments to opt for “squeezing” the members of minority populations 
out of the country.19 With the development of the (in this case, Estonian) 
integration programmes, a certain willingness to advance non-titular popu-
lations’ interest was indicated. However, the shift in governmental priori-
ties to guarantee the representation of minorities among the citizenry did 
not cultivate an efficient representation of non-titulars’ interests.  
Increasing the civic activities of minorities, as well as facilitating 
their participation in various NGO projects, appears to have been aimed 
only at channelling their activities into a predictable direction to allow 
better surveillance of their project work and hence better control of their 
actions. In this light, Jansons observes quite distinctly that the Latvian 
government has failed to acknowledge the contradiction between sponsor-
ing the unconstrained expression of national interests by minorities and the 
political incentives to discontinue the use of minority languages in state 
institutions by halting the funding of minority schools.20 
There are, of course, several explanations for the reasons why civic 
engagement across the Baltics heavily relies on salient identities. “The 
underdeveloped civil engagement networks, fragile civil values and the 
non-functioning public space” could be one, accounting for the lack of 
citizens’ experience with responsive political structures in the past.21 It 
seems however that the continuing focus of political institutions on pri-
mordial identities as unchangeable characteristics of individuals is a result 
of both the lack of previous experience with the individual representations, 
as well as with the institutional accountability of diversity.  
As discussed in the previous chapters, decision-making at all levels 
of political institutions is extremely favourable to members of one cultural 
community. This naturally leads different groups to rally around issues 
that guarantee the greatest attention from political institutions, i.e. around 
cultural issues. On the other hand, civic activities throughout the Soviet 
and post-Soviet years of Baltic history proved effective only when groups 
rallied around allegedly incontestable ideas, such as ethnic, cultural or 
linguistic identities. The continuous success of such groups in member-
recruitment, acquisition of funding and gaining attention in public spaces 
alleviated the need to negotiate the terms of participation in civic initia-
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tives. More importantly, the recurrent successes of activities on such an 
agenda did not allow the question of whether such identities were chang-
ing to emerge in the first place. Consequently, civic groups with a focus 
on ethnocultural issues did not require citizens to consider their perspec-
tive on societal power relations. Indeed, they may have even discouraged 
their members from an overall change of attitude towards cultural issues. 
The case of the Baltic states is instructive particularly because political 
institutions claim to be culture-blind but in fact feed off the differences 
between ethnic, cultural and linguistic communities. In doing so, political 
institutions suggest that all cultural issues are ultimately political, as is any 
civic activity touching on the issue of minority culture.  
The differences in practitioners’ views aside, common scholarly 
understanding of the impact “civil society” has on relations in society is 
that it improves the responsiveness of political institutions to input from 
social actors. The investigation of Baltic politics and society in the previ-
ous chapters shows that the engagement of members of minority commu-
nities in different types of social and political initiatives have not informed 
Baltic policies. Minorities’ input was fruitless to a large degree due to the 
failure of state institutions and policy-makers to assess their impact and 
consider their expertise as essential. At the same time, the civic activity of 
minorities in the region suggests that at least parts of the minority popula-
tions are prepared to engage proactively in political processes and to help 
political institutions to fulfil their functions more effectively. A number of 
organisations are also in place undertaking policy-evaluation and advising 
in policy-making, even though apparently political elites do not take these 
as expressions of social will but as criticisms of the foundations of state-
hood. In many analyses, even the activities of the NGOs supporting native 
language learning and the sustainment of cultural traditions of minorities 
vis-à-vis the increasingly nationalising states are treated as militant and 
anti-democratic for their lack of restraint in the criticism of political proc-
esses.  
However it is hard to see where in the Baltic states the activities of 
the minority NGOs contradict democratic principles or undermine the 
ideals of participatory democracy. In many cases, specifically those mem-
bers of the minority who have no political rights in Latvia and Estonia are 
distinguished by their civic cooperation with fellow residents. They may 
assist others’ learning of democratic practices, help fellow ethnics to adapt 
to the cultural environment or suggest policy correction through analytic 
work. Unfortunately, it is also difficult to see which policy-changes were 
undertaken by the Baltic governments in response to information provided 
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by the members of these civic groups, suggesting only limited learning 
effects on the side of the Baltic political entrepreneurs.  
This is where the investigation of minority NGOs in the Baltic 
states makes an important theoretical contribution to studies of democrati-
sation in countries undergoing the consolidation of their political regimes. 
The post-communist democratisation and implementation of feedback 
mechanisms from individuals to NGOs, and later to state institutions, 
could have been considered indicative for learning of the democratic prac-
tices along the entire line of political decision-making. At the moment, 
participation in policy-making seems to make no sense in the majority of 
cases because even those actively participating are unlikely to see their 
accumulated knowledge retranslated into policy-changes through civic 
engagement. As a result, the political institutions across the Baltic are 
poorly if at all accountable to any representatives of the minority and can 
be easily manipulated to impose further restraints on the state’s respon-
siveness to society’s needs.  
 
 
2.   Minorities’ cooperation with the state  
To date minority NGOs have focused on the types of activity specific to 
the demands of their cultural community. These have been left unfulfilled 
by the state and hence require the personal engagement of like-minded 
activists. Groups that provide tutoring in native languages and enable the 
celebration of specific minority traditions allow activists to disseminate 
information on recent developments in their communities and “external 
homelands,” extend advice and practical aid, manage educational activities 
and raise funds, as well as provide emotional support for the members of 
the minority group. In this sense, the members of minority communities 
encompassing voluntary activities are also indirectly related to the self-
perceptions of the entire community. Such NGOs assist their individual 
members in achieving equal footing with the dominant ethnic groups of 
the Baltic societies.  
In Estonia the organisations that “teach,” through socialisation, the 
members of minorities about the democratic practices for more active 
civic participation have had a long history. One of these, Eesti Ametiühin-
gute Keskliit (Central Organization of Estonian Trade Unions, EAKL) was 
created in 1990 as a voluntary organisation to replace the Estonian branch 
of the Soviet Labour Confederation, which at the time claimed to represent 
around 800,000 members in Estonia. However, within a few years the 
number of trade union members had dropped but was still estimated at an 
impressive 350,000 individuals, constituting around 45% of the labour 
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force. These members were organized into 30 unions, but since independ-
ence the share of persons organised into labour-related associations has 
continuously diminished.22  
Similarly, Latvijas Brīvo Arodbiedrību Savienība (The Free Trade 
Union Confederation of Latvia, LBAS) is the nation-wide trade union 
confederation with around 160,000 members. Founded as early as 1990 in 
an effort to differentiate itself from the Soviet-type trade unions, the 
LBAS is in fact the biggest NGO in the country. In cooperating with local 
and professional trade-unions in Latvia and Europe-wide, the LBAS seeks 
to protect the interests of its members at the national and international 
levels, and also works jointly with its sister organisations. Trade unions in 
Lithuania are also well established, although these are much less central-
ised and have fewer members. Solidarumas and Lietuvos Darbo Fed-
eracija (Lithuanian Labour Federation, LDF) are the most numerous ones, 
uniting around 75,000 employees country-wide.  
The analyses of trade-union membership throughout the region 
suggest that the number of members is continuously dwindling, as they 
rely heavily on the workers of large-sized industrial plants, particularly of 
those where many Russian-speakers are employed. As a result, the trade-
unions are barely visible in small- and medium-size enterprises and also 
less prevalent in the service sector. Lagerspetz suggests that for the Esto-
nian case, due to differences in the occupation structure, it is fairly natural 
to see that the share of organised labourer among the ethnic Estonians is 
much smaller than among the minority citizens and non-citizens.23 This 
statement seems also to apply to the Latvian and Lithuanian cases.24 
Beyond activities in the labour-unions, the activity of non-core eth-
nics throughout the Baltic States seems to be rather marginal. At least, the 
scholars studying NGOs in the region suggest that the cooperation of mi-
norities with the state outside the sphere of labour-related activity remains 
low. However, despite these statements, many also indicate that the par-
ticipation of minority populations in non-governmental organisations has 
not been thoroughly inspected.25 Lagerspetz et al indicate that “whereas 
the NGO sector in general has expanded rapidly during the last ten years, 
the number of Russian speakers’ organisations has definitely remained 
lower.”26 This particularly reflects the availability of umbrella organisa-
tions, which coordinate the activities of civic groups in all three countries. 
Besides the representation of the professional interests of minority groups, 
civic groups in the region only adequately address aspects of cultural life. 
In this context, the establishment of the umbrella organisations coordinat-
ing the activities of the NGO sector throughout the region has been pivotal 
in channelling the specific responses of civic initiatives in the direction 
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envisaged by policy-makers.27 In order to facilitate contacts between state 
institutions and the groups representing minority interests, both Estonia 
and Latvia have established advisory bodies to compensate for Russian-
speakers’ limited access to political life and to engage them in the process 
of policy-making.  
Since July 1993, a Roundtable on National Minorities has been in 
place in Estonia, representing a standing committee of ethnic minority 
representatives, including non-citizens of Estonia. This organ had been 
created to promote stability, dialogue and mutual understanding between 
the different ethnic and status groups in Estonia. However, its success was 
hampered by the lack of binding decision-making power for addressing 
issues relevant to minorities. Priit Järve suggests that “the Roundtable was 
effective in providing a forum for dialogue and thus defusing the potential 
for violent ethnic conflict,” however this function had limited effect on 
minority groups.28 Instead, membership in the Roundtable should be en-
dorsed and appointed by the President, “taking into consideration the need 
to have as many different national minority associations and political 
parties represented as possible,”29 but without clear reference to the extent 
of differences in opinions represented among its members. On May 23, 
2003, the structure of the Roundtable was changed to include more than 
100 representatives of minority groups. The Roundtable meets only sev-
eral times per year to provide mere advisory notes to president, which 
further reduces the ability of the organ to react to minority concerns. The 
ability of the organ to reach consensual decisions is further constrained by 
a limited budget, which additionally disempowers it as a tool of advocacy 
for minority NGOs. On the regional level, some consultative institutions 
were also established although to a considerably smaller effect. Since 
1995 a Roundtable of National Cultural Societies was created in Ida-
Virumaa, including 22 cultural societies of minority groups and regional 
Estonian societies.30  
Finally, the Estonian Ministry of Culture established the Cultural 
Council of National Minorities in 1997 as an advisory body aimed at as-
sisting in decision-making on linguistic and cultural issues relevant for 
national minorities’ education, the distribution of financial aid and assis-
tance for NGOs in submitting grants to access international funds through 
various semi-public funds, such as Integration Foundation.31 The Round-
table of Non-Profit Organisations was created as a loose umbrella organi-
sation to represent the array of the interests of Estonian NGOs. Beginning 
with its establishment in 2001, the roundtable of Estonia’s NGOs has been 
engaged in the representation of minority organisations and functions as a 
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primary means of acquiring the funding for running cultural, linguistic and 
social projects.32  
The funds provided are genuinely sparse and based on project-
related applications. Monitoring of these activities suggests that the repre-
sentatives of minority organisations are constantly challenging the effec-
tiveness of allocating funds on this basis. Importantly, monitoring of NGO 
activity also points out that the Estonian state, while recognising the need 
for the cultural development of minority communities, reserves for itself 
the right to discontinue the financial support of these groups. This seems 
to deviate from the official line of supported activities and therefore cre-
ates the conditions for a limited engagement of minorities in the area.33  
By treating minority-oriented social work as merely social work 
projects, the Estonian state sends a clear signal to the active part of the 
minority community to mind its own business and not to interfere with 
issues falling in the domain of state responsibility. A number of organisa-
tions surveyed by Lagerspetz and Joons have been classified as participat-
ing in the more general project of “minority building,” corresponding to 
the expectations of the government and international organisations but not 
extending any initiatives that might be challenging to the state approach of 
dealing with minority populations.34  
In Latvia, an equivalent to the Estonian Roundtable was created in 
July 1996 under the auspices of the President, under the name of a Consul-
tative Council of Nationalities. Including representatives of 11 different 
ethnic minorities and members of the Human Rights Committee of the 
Latvian Parliament, the council was mandated with gathering, distributing 
and discussing information relating to minority issues. Interestingly, the 
council was also used to develop guidelines and recommendations for the 
government in the handling of minority issues. However, after the election 
of Vaira Vīėe-Freiberga as President of Latvia in 1999, the activities of 
the council were suspended.35  
In 2003 a different organ with a similar mandate as the Consultative 
Council was called into life under the roof of the Ministry of Integration 
Affairs. The Latvian establishment greeted the council positively, conceiv-
ing it as a cooperative hand in dealing with troublesome minority groups. 
Local experts however, have assessed the work of the council as being 
generally top-down-oriented and largely ineffective because it focused on 
the dialogue with minorities exclusively from the majority’s perspective.36 
Latvia’s National Human Rights Office, which was created in 1996, also 
works as an independent state institution and is responsible for carrying 
out certain human rights’ observations, comparable to those of an om-
budsman.37 Essentially, the organisation was transformed into an om-
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budsman in 2007, and remains commissioned to investigate complaints 
falling into the human rights spectrum.38 However, from the website of the 
office it appears that minority rights or advocacy for particular human 
rights of minority populations in Latvia do not fall into the main area of 
the office’s activity. 
In December 2004, the Latvijas Pilsoniskā alianse (Civic Alliance 
Latvia, LPA) was founded to further the goals set out in the integration 
programme; mainly to increase civic participation among Latvia’s popula-
tion in political debates and social processes. The LPA is an umbrella 
NGO working closely and with the discernable support of the Secretariat 
of the Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration. It is sustained 
in its activities by funds coming directly from the government and there-
fore also accountable for its activities to Latvian authorities. While located 
in Riga, it also has a network of local centres throughout Latvia providing 
information for local activists and organisations seeking funding and assis-
tance for their work.  
Around 70 NGOs are listed as working closely with the LPA, 
which allows the organisation to improve the legal and financial environ-
ment for the NGO sector in the country. It also assists in the development 
of NGOs in order to provide more efficient advocacy of the public vis-à-
vis state institutions and financial donors. While apparently the LPA is 
dedicated almost entirely to work with NGOs and organisations of various 
kinds, it seems to be directly controlled by governmental incentives re-
garding the development of civic initiatives in the country. In providing 
information about the ongoing EU projects, national legislation, funding 
opportunities, education and training of NGO activists, it also carries out 
or initiates research initiatives on behalf of the government to assess the 
processes taking place in Latvia’s civic sector. This comes to the fore in 
the LPA’s activities aimed at advocating the interests of Latvian NGOs 
versus the state, in NGOs co-operation with ministries and inter-
governmental councils, but also in its expertise and recommendations in 
policy-making in Latvia.  
The stewardship of the Latvian government in assisting the NGO 
developments in the country might appear in a positive light. However, the 
activities of the groups covered by the umbrella organisation assisting in 
acquisition of project-oriented funds have only a limited scope of activity 
and hence are minor in their effectiveness. Importantly, the foci of gov-
ernmental interactions with local civic activists seem to be clearly limited 
to cooperation in providing affirmative support to governmental goals and 
incentives. The studies of the NGO sector conducted in Latvia–Civil Soci-
ety in Latvia in 2004, and the like–have all pointed out that while the 
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number of NGOs in the country runs as high as 12,000, these organisa-
tions are only marginally supported by the state and are monitored in their 
activity during fund-acquisition.39  
The NGOs applying for state budget grants are required to follow a 
range of educational incentives, present materials on the role of national 
minorities for society in general and their group in particular and work on 
the preservation of national minority cultures and traditions.  
 
“The financial support provided by the state stimulates rapid 
capacity-growth among the national minorities’ NGOs as 
well as development of solid organizations loyal to the Lat-
vian state, which are capable of recruiting new members 
and successfully managing the available funds to efficiently 
meet their main mission, i.e., social integration as set forth 
by their statutes.” [emphasis added]40  
 
One of the functions of the Secretariat for Integration, and specifically of 
the Department for National Minorities Affairs, is coordinating state sup-
port for the general and specific activities of the NGOs of national minori-
ties. Remarkably, applications from these organisations are considered 
mainly within the framework of “delegating the functions to NGOs, […] 
which actively strive to foster social integration and to inform the general 
public on the activities and incentives undertaken or ongoing in the area of 
social integration.”41 
Janis Ikstens, in his analyses of the NGOs in Latvia, suggests that 
passivity of civic initiatives results from a particular type of “party-based 
democracy” evolving in Latvia, which leaves only a marginal space for 
civic intervention in policy-making and delegates the implementation 
capacity to local NGO activists.42 This particular view of the role civic 
initiatives play in the process of teaching fellow citizens about democratic 
practices is also reflected in the reasons for supporting the NGO sector by 
the Latvian government, which was reported to have accounted for around 
20% of the organisations’ financial resources in 2003.43  
In Estonia an umbrella organisation Eesti Mittetulundusühingute ja 
Sihtasutuste Liit (Network of Estonian Non-profit Organizations, EMSL) 
was established in 1994 to foster development and provide support for the 
Estonian NGOs. While the umbrella organisation works toward increasing 
public awareness and advocates the interests of its member groups, its 
main focus of activity lies with the improvement of relationships between 
the “third” and the public and business sectors in Estonia. This is particu-
larly done by brand-making of different NGOs and supporting many of the 
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civic activities within the framework supported by the Estonian Ministry 
of Interior, hence aiming at the overall stabilisation of society-state rela-
tions. In this sense the EMSL works in three directions; assisting in legis-
lative development to further regulate the relations between the NGO and 
the public sector, supporting NGO activists in their networking capacity 
and assisting member organisations in their contacts with state officials.44 
Remarkably, among the member organisations of the ESML only a very 
small number of minority organisations are represented, with no major 
actors specifically acknowledged for their civic impact on Estonia’s soci-
ety listed.45 The situation observable in Estonia is therefore very much 
comparable to that of Latvia, where an umbrella organisation is assisting a 
number of local NGOs in implementing the goals envisaged within the 
action plans for particular activities, passed by various ministries and 
supported by governmental funds to implement distinct policy guidelines.  
Lithuania’s Nevyriausybinių organizacijų informacijos ir paramos 
centras (Centre of Support and Information for the Non-Governmental 
Organisations, NIPC) was also initiated as a governmental initiative in 
1995, functioning under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice ever 
since.46 Established with help of the UNDP and the Open Society Founda-
tion, it is mainly funded with the support of international donor organisa-
tions. The NIPC supports NGO organisations in their activities, strength-
ening the connection between the state and society and presenting the 
interests of third sector groups to the institutions of the Lithuanian state. 
The range of goals declared on the website of the NICP corresponds with 
those envisaged by the LPA and ESML in the neighbouring Baltic states. 
However, it remains proactive in informing policy-makers of the grass-
root initiatives through organising “active dialogue in the academic and 
research fora,” which aim at bringing the ideas emerging from civic activ-
ists into the discussions of the Seimas and the Lithuanian Government. 
The NIPC also entertains standing contact with Lithuania’s NGOs work-
ing on a wide range of issues, including those not directly addressed in the 
governmental plans for funding during a particular fiscal year. This allows 
the NIPC closer cooperation with civic initiatives at the local level, and 
hence makes it more innovative in its approach to channelling the de-
mands for additional cooperation between the state and social actors.  
While being more active in this respect and somewhat clearly in-
dicting greater openness for social dialogue, the Lithuanian state has been 
continuously outsourcing its responsibilities in dealing with minority is-
sues to the NGOs of non-core ethnics. The function of the umbrella or-
ganisation coordinating the minority NGOs in Lithuania is fulfilled by the 
Department of National Minorities (TMID). The TMID not only coordi-
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nates the acquisition of finances for running new projects, but also distrib-
utes the means for projects related to sustaining the culture of non-
Lithuanians in the country. The Department is responsible for the protec-
tion of minority rights and assisting them in developing the projects aimed 
at safeguarding their national identity and cultural heritage. It also in-
cludes a steering committee to advise the government of necessary 
changes in relevant minority legislation. Overall, the department is mainly 
preoccupied with the transfer of governmental funds to the NGOs promot-
ing the issues of cultural awareness and linguistic competence of minori-
ties.  
At the same time, this state-led approach to sponsorship of the 
NGO engagement with minority groups severely challenges the under-
standing of what civic activity should stand for. On the one hand, the mi-
nority organisations are offered a number of channels to participate in 
decision-making on cultural issues. Their high dependence on state fund-
ing and support are clearly tied to affirmative action vis-à-vis the state 
policies. In Estonia, as is the case in Latvia and Lithuania, minority or-
ganisations have only a limited potential to be granted financial support 
for work not directly related to the governmental priorities for a given 
fiscal year. In all three countries, minority NGOs are encouraged to under-
take activities supporting, rather than criticising the state policies pertain-
ing to non-core ethnics.  
It is up to the civic groups proper to decide on the variations of their 
engagement and the type of cooperation with state institutions. When the 
biggest bulk of funding for their actions depends on state institutions, 
international donor organisations and is constantly under the review of 
governmental bodies, the NGOs easily risk losing funding for their activi-
ties. This suggests that the organisations of non-core ethnics only have the 
opportunity to be accepted by the state and public officials as partners in 
policy-making if they resort to an uncritical treatment of political decision-
making. As a consequence, the NGOs focus primarily, if not solely, on 
minorities’ concerns related to language, religion and culture as supported 
under the terms of ensuring national accord, proclaiming the multicultural 
character of society and sustaining a culture of conformity. 
 
 
3.   Civic initiatives supporting co-ethnics 
Among the civic organisations of minorities in the Baltic States, the 
groups functioning as advocates of the cultural and linguistic rights of 
different ethnic groups are particularly visible. Many of these organisa-
tions are also included in the register of NGOs sponsored by the state in 
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their activities to sustain the cultural distinctiveness of minorities in a 
linguistic and cultural environment dominated by the titular ethnic group.  
Civic initiatives aimed at balancing out the state’s effect on minor-
ity populations provide the backbone for the mobilisation of local minority 
populations to address policy-deficiencies. They also serve to recommend 
changes to the prevalent relations between the Baltic states and minorities 
on their territories. However, although only a few organisations deal di-
rectly with issues related to minority rights throughout the region, many 
groups are involved with work addressing minority communities directly 
by providing education in and about the issues tangent to minority groups. 
Some of the cultural NGOs in the region act much more independently 
than one can glean from their regular activity reports. As they are con-
nected to different international donors and are capable of mobilising the 
financial support of the local minority populations, many of these groups 
are addressing cultural issues of relevance for their ethnic communities.  
Across the region many organizations represent the cultural and 
linguistic interests of their ethnic group vis-à-vis the state of residence. 
Minority engagement in activities related to sustaining the cultural speci-
ficity of their groups in Estonia was assisted by the state by reinstalling the 
Cultural Autonomy Act, which allowed minority groups to create school-
ing in their native language and to opt for state support for the purposes of 
retaining their cultural specificity.47 However, while the Cultural Auton-
omy Act remains open only to Estonian citizens, a large number of non-
citizens are also granted the possibility of creating their own organizations 
for the representation of their interests in accordance with the Law on 
Non-Profit Organizations, passed in 1997.48  
Many of the organisations dealing with minority cultures are now 
members of the Estonian Union of National Minorities, which grants 
semi-official recognition for minority NGOs. For the largest minority in 
Estonia, Russians, The Union of Slavic Educational and Charitable Socie-
ties in Estonia is the prevalent cultural organisation, uniting more than 20 
groups under its umbrella. Besides the Union, a number of other organiza-
tions also represent the educational and cultural interests of ethnic Rus-
sians, including the Russian Culture Union, Tartu Russian Culture Society 
and the Union of Teachers of Russian Schools.49 These and other umbrella 
organisations are particularly involved in educating the younger genera-
tions of minority children in the language of “their” ethnic community and 
have been receiving some support from the Estonian state through the 
Integration Foundation.  
What is particularly telling in this respect is the fact that for many 
of the non-titular non-Russian NGOs the working language remains 
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largely Russian. Hence the general policy of the Estonian state to sponsor 
the fragmentation of the minority communities into speakers of different 
languages was particularly aimed at formerly russified non-Estonians. 
These groups, most often representatives of the Ukrainian, Finnish, Jewish 
and German communities, are assisted in contacts with “their” homelands. 
Similarly, the more recent preferences of the Estonian government assist 
with the financial support of non-Russian minority NGOs in their cultural 
activities, such as the organisation of Sunday schools where their lan-
guages and basic traditions are being taught. Cultural festivities and ex-
changes with representatives of diasporic organisations from other coun-
tries have been encouraged through the Integration Foundation.  
In Lithuania, minority organisations have been active in channelling 
their activities at the preservation of the traditions and culture of their kin 
in the Lithuanian environment. Among the organisations of minority 
communities, the Polish and Russian-speakers are the most active ones. 
Both the Russian and Polish-speaking communities have special facilities 
to conduct their cultural activities in Dom kultury polskiej w Wilnie (Vilni-
aus lenkų kultūros namai, Polish House) and Dom nacional''nyh obshchin 
(Tautinių bendrijų namai, House of National Cultures) respectively.50 
Similar premises are also in place in Kaunas51 and Visaginas,52 where 
members of minority organisations can conduct meetings, provide Satur-
day and Sunday classes for younger members and also conduct their regu-
lar meetings.  
The Polish-speaking community is particularly active in the Vilnius 
city municipality and region, and it has its own umbrella organisation 
which coordinates the activities of its member groups, Związek Polaków 
na Litwie (Association of Poles in Lithuania, ZPL). The ZPL was formed 
in 1989 to consolidate the interests of the Polish-speaking minority in 
Lithuania and now counts around 8,000 members. Mainly engaged in 
educational, cultural and economic activities, the ZPL also defends the 
civil rights of the Polish minority. It is recognised as the largest Polish 
organization in Lithuania and is particularly active in organising meetings 
of Polish-speakers from Lithuania and abroad and publishing journals, 
such as Nasz Czas. Similar to the ZPL, Koordinacionnyj sovet russkih 
obshchestvennyh organizacij Litvy (Lietuvos rusų visuomeninių organi-
zacijų koordinacin÷ taryba, Coordinating Council of the Russian organisa-
tions in Lithuania) works with the organisations and coordinates the activi-
ties of the Russian organisations in the country, although it also engages in 
the activities of other Russian-speaking minorities.  
Besides the most active Russian and Polish organisations, Jewish, 
Romani, German and Tatar cultural NGOs are also clearly present on the 
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landscape of culturally aware groups in Lithuania. While many of these 
groups are predominantly occupied with social work within their ethnic 
communities, they also provide services and support the activities of their 
members to facilitate their integration into the dominant society. In her 
assessment of the work conducted by these NGOs, however, Beresneviči-
ūt÷ suggests that it would be appropriate to define “the majority of these 
organisations in terms of self-help organisations,”53 playing a role of safe-
keepers against assimilation.54 However, as Beresnevičiūt÷ observes, there 
are distinct types of NGOs in Lithuania, which either represent group 
interests opposing the dominant approach of the state to their minority 
group or assume and support the roles ascribed to their groups by the ma-
jority community.  
A pilot research study of ethnic minority NGOs conducted by the 
CES in 2003 suggested that many of the issues regarding the work of 
minority cultural organisations can be clearly traced to the “closed” nature 
of the associations.55 The majority of NGOs surveyed in the study have 
indicated that the organisations’ activities consisted mainly of cultivation 
of ethnic consciousness, traditions specific to their ethnic groups and con-
nectedness to and patriotic feeling towards their “external homeland” 
through the organisation of events “traditional in their form and contents 
and addressed to quite passive elderly groups.”56 In her analyses of the 
civic activities by minorities in Lithuania, Žukauskiene sees these organi-
sations’ “ethnocentric orientations” as a result of their closed member-
ships, since the groups are oriented towards the maintenance of ethnicity, 
culture and tradition.  
Monoethnic membership in these associations can also be explained 
by these organisations’ reactive stance to the cultural and linguistic poli-
cies of the Lithuanian state.57 While the state continuously failed to pro-
vide efficient training in the issues essential for minorities to retain their 
cultural specificity, such as native language schools, history of the national 
minority community etc., these NGO groups have been providing similar 
schooling services to the members of their community on a voluntary 
basis. Clearly this determines the relations of representatives of these 
organisations to other members, who are seldom of different ethnicity. 
Therefore the NGOs oriented at providing skills in minority languages do 
not work as agents for the protection of human rights and interests of non-
core ethnics, but merely assist the members of their cultural communities 
in educational undertakings.58  
In this respect, the fact that Lithuanian legislation does not provide 
for a definition of national minority not only raises a sensitive issue for 
members of large ethnic communities, such as Poles and Russians, but 
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also of the ones experiencing “difficult relations” with the state, such as 
Jews and Roma. Both the Lithuanian government and the Department of 
National Minorities consider only those ethnic groups who file an appeal 
for the registration of a minority NGO to be a national minority of Lithua-
nia and therefore do not provide any positive support for the groups that 
have failed to register a minority NGO.59 However, the registered NGOs 
are supported in their activities and cultural programmes by the Depart-
ment of Ethnic Minorities and also receive additional financial help. 
Around 300 NGOs representing 20 ethnic communities were operating in 
Lithuania in 2007, including 62 Russian, 52 Polish, 32 German, 26 Jewish, 
21 Belarusian, 13 Roma, 32 German, 5 Greek, 12 Tatar and numerous 
other organisations.60 However, in their vast majority–around three quar-
ters of the NGOs–the organisations limit their activities solely to cultural 
activities, with only around 5% of them dealing with issues of education. 
At the same time, around 10% of the organisations also address the issues 
of concern with their ethnic group and are developing a particular agenda 
in assisting members in coping with these tasks, such as unemployment, 
social protection, religious needs, sport activities and adult education.  
Similar issues were on the agenda of minority organisations in Lat-
via, where a great variety of minority NGOs have been in place since the 
early years of independence. Work aimed at the consolidation of groups 
with similar interests in cultural issues has been dominating the debates in 
civic organisations, leading to the creation of a number of umbrella groups 
that represent the various interests extended by the minority NGOs 
throughout the country. The initial efforts to consolidate the Russian-
speakers in the country were undertaken in 1991, when Russkaya 
obshchina Latvii (Russian Community of Latvia, ROL) was founded. Due 
to the fact that the interests of Latvia’s minorities were highly divergent at 
the time and were continuously diversifying over the 1990s, the ROL 
became only one of many associations representing the interests of non-
Latvians’ NGOs. Until 2004, the ROL was the largest organisation of 
minorities in Latvia.  
The programmatic statements by the leaders of the organisation 
emphasised “Russianness” in the broadest manner possible to include all 
possible affiliates, a strategy which seems to have paid off until recently. 
The ROL was particularly known in Latvia for conducting various activi-
ties to preserve Soviet heritage in the country, such as commemorating the 
Soviet soldiers fallen during WWII and celebrating the (Russian/Soviet) 
Victory Day publicly. Local research suggests that these actions made it 
particularly “acceptable to the people whose identity is linked with those 
of the ‘Soviet people.’”61 The ROL is also known for sustaining positive 
Minority engagement in civic initiatives 
____________________________________________________________ 
301
relations with the Russkoe obshchestvo v Latvii (Russian Society in Latvia, 
ROvL), led by Tatyana Favorska, who incidentally also co-chairs the 
ROL. Both of the organisations are critical towards the relations of the 
state to minorities in Latvia.62 
These and other organisations trace their memberships to the times 
of cooperation with the Latvian Popular Front, preserving much of their 
infrastructure from the early days of Latvia’s independence. Particularly, 
Latviiskoe Obschestvo Russkoi Kultury (Latvian Society of Russian Cul-
ture, LORK) is worth mentioning here. The LORK maintains a long-
standing cooperation with various societies fostering Russian culture in 
Latvia, such as the Pushkin Society of Latvia and the Alexander Men 
Foundation, both of which promote the reconciliation of different reli-
gious groups in Latvia. These organisations usually trace their existence 
back to the years of pre-Soviet Latvian statehood and have close ties to the 
Old Believers’ community of Latvia, which sustains a regional centre in 
Daugavpils in the House of Melety Kallistratov.63 Naturally, the long-term 
contacts with the Latvian society and connections to pre-Soviet cultural 
activities allow these organisations to sustain collegial relations with the 
Latvian cultural elites. There is also evidence of close cooperation be-
tween the Old Believers’ communities and state institutions such as the 
Ministry of Integration and the Ministry of Culture.64 The organisations 
with connections to the Old Believers community and those based in Lat-
gale have enjoyed better acceptance amongst the members of the majority 
society, assuming the role of advocacy groups and influencing political 
decision-making. These organisations include groups popularising Latvian 
citizenship, urging Russian non-citizens to naturalise and providing sup-
port in political activities in civic networks.  
One of the most recent efforts to consolidate the Russian-speaking 
community in the country has resulted in the creation of the Obyedinennyi 
Kongress Russkoi Obshchiny Latvii (United Congress of the Russian 
Community of Latvia, OKROL) in 2004. Interestingly, in discussions with 
its members it became clear that the formation of the association was only 
possible on the tide of the school reform and subsequent protests. How-
ever, the issues addressed by the group suggest that significant mobilising 
potential existed prior to these political events.65 As an umbrella organisa-
tion it has both collective and individual members, with an approximately 
around 50,000 individuals being involved.66 The OKROL was initially 
created to address only issues related to education reform, leading to a 
great number of differences among its individual members. Some of its 
members stressed the importance of sustaining their ethnic identity as a 
basis for further cooperation with various state institutions, while others 
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emphasised religious beliefs and particularly the importance of Ortho-
doxy, thus creating a common core for identification of all Latvia’s Rus-
sian-speakers.  
Despite the dominance of members of the FHRUL party, the OK-
ROL declared itself an apolitical organisation at its founding congress and 
refrains from references to political programmes while continuously em-
phasising the demand for granting the Russian language the status of a 
second state-language. These issues have all been on the agenda of the 
FHRUL, who also advocates for additional support of the economic activ-
ity of minority groups, since these are considered, also in the rhetoric of 
OKROL, “severely disadvantaged” by regulations on language use in 
Latvia.67  
Until the protests of the 2004 education reforms, Russian-speakers’ 
NGOs were considered to be moderate in their claims and were perceived 
by local analysts as working with the Russian community, but not interfer-
ing in general policy-making issues. However, the mobilisation against the 
education reform also saw the rise of tensions and an increasing expres-
sion of positions undermining Latvia’s state institutions. These were as-
serted through the organisation known as Shtab (Shtab Zashchity Russkih 
Shkol, Headquarters of Protection of Russian Schools). Some of the Lat-
vian observers claim that the Shtab  
 
“used the education issue as a tool for a populist critique of 
Latvian democracy in general. Its militant name, strong links 
with Russia, and slogan ‘Russian schools are our Stalingrad’ 
suggested that the civic ideals of cooperation and dialogue 
had been replaced by resentment and isolation.”68  
 
Supported by the FHRUL, Shtab conducted activities such as poli-
ticised hunger strikes, public protest actions and calls for school boycotts, 
all of which were perceived as deeply controversial not only by the Lat-
vian community, but also by many Russian-speakers.69 Shtab was also 
known to cooperate with Lašor, which was established in 1996 with the 
goal of protecting the interests of schools with Russian as the major lan-
guage of instruction. In April 2000, Lašor prepared an appeal in which it 
called for changes in the Latvian Law on Education to stop the transition 
of state-supported education being conducted solely in Latvian.  
Many Russian-speaking minority NGOs were involved in opposing 
the school reforms and thus gaining greater visibility and the support of 
the Russian-speaking communities. Some of the organisations involved 
were preparing policy-related papers and analyses to advise the govern-
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ment of the possible corrections to be made during the implementation of 
education reforms, and continue to do so in the aftermath of protests.70 
The proposals of advocacy groups such as Shtab and Lašor were dis-
missed as being irrelevant for policy-making or even denoted as radical 
and anti-Latvian in their rhetoric.71  
It is in this context that the engagement of civic leaders from the 
minority community gained the momentum to refocus from a generally 
analytical approach in working parallel to the state, to a more reactive 
engagement in coordinating the activities of its member-groups for which 
state support was guaranteed. One of the most renowned organisations in 
this respect, Koordintsionnyi Sovet Obshchestvennyh Organizacii (Coor-
dination Council of Social Organisations) was established by fifteen mi-
nority organisations in 1999, and expanded to unite 23 groups by 2000. 
Despite its overall focus on assisting fellow members in coping with the 
effects of those policy changes that address social rather than political 
issues, the Council is perceived in the Latvian community as being ex-
tremely radical, harbouring considerable anti-state sentiments.72 The civic 
groups advocating changes in the citizenship and language regulations 
form the core of the Council include the ROL, ROvL and the Latvian 
Human Rights Committee.  
Some non-Russian minority groups are also engaged in the activi-
ties of the Council, such as Ukrainian and Belarusian organisations that 
provide social support for members of their ethnic communities. Since 
2000, the Council has been involved in several initiatives, perceived by 
the Latvian majority to be political in nature, such as the collection of 
signatures for minorities and non-citizens’ rights in the preparation of an 
“Appeal to the UN, CoE, EC, OSCE.” When some 57,000 signatures were 
collected and submitted to the Saeima in June 2000, the main ideas pre-
sented were in grave contradiction to what Latvia’s political entrepreneurs 
were prepared to accept. These included various claims referring to the 
cultural and political rights of minority populations in the country, the 
insurance of the possibility to use national minority languages in commu-
nication with the officials in the areas of compact settlement. The most 
prominent call was to the Latvian government to ratify the Framework 
Convention on National Minorities and grant the right to vote in municipal 
election to all non-citizens resident in the republic for 10 years.73  
While the council is highly critical of the direction of political de-
velopments in the country, political activity does not appear to be a viable 
option for all of them. Several Russian minority organisations, such as the 
ROvL, the Baltic Slavic Society and the Association of Russian Cultural 
Officials consider the preservation of the infrastructure and environment 
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of the Russian culture to be their major objective.74 Naturally, these or-
ganisations were also involved in the protests against the school reforms 
and expressed their concern about the future of the Russian language in 
Latvia, leading them to be classified as “radical” by the members of the 
Latvian-speaking community.75 In many cases, the claims of these groups 
were interpreted as questioning the decision-making authority of the Lat-
vian politicians and the direction of state’s political development alto-
gether.  
As was observed in Estonia over the past years, organisations pro-
viding social work and networking for minority groups on the issues of 
sensitivity for state officials have also been branded as radical and anti-
state in their orientations. For example, the NGOs providing social work 
with Russian-speaking youths are dependent on governmental funding to 
proceed with their activities and have continuously faced difficulties when 
suggesting even a spurious connection between the overall state-minority 
relations and the precarious social and economic status of their major 
target groups. In Estonia, the youth organisation Siin, which mainly works 
with Russian-speaking youth, has been continuously marginalised as a 
partner in policy-making. Later, Siin was even presented in a negative 
light by the local press after speaking up about the adverse effects of lan-
guage regulation on the younger generation of Russian-speakers in Estonia 
in 2004.76 Similarly, in Latvia the efforts of organisations (that otherwise 
focus on sports education in Riga’s Russian-speaking schools) to draw 
attention to the connection between the school reforms and numbers of 
school drop-outs have also resulted in funding cuts for the group’s activi-
ties by government-related donor organisations in 2005.77 My research in 
Lithuania did not suggest any similar actions by the local or national gov-
ernments in the country. However, the members of various youth organi-
sations in Lithuania suggested that the groups working mainly with minor-
ity populations are closely observed by groups addressing majority youth 
problems under the pretext of the increasing competitiveness for govern-
mental funding.  
The discussion of the civic networks established in the Baltic States 
under the guidance of the Baltic governments mainly suggests that the 
activities pursued by the groups are, more than anything, supporting the 
state in the fulfilment of its functions within the scope of the social poli-
cies adopted. This points to the fact that, while civic engagement might 
also be proactive, such as in the case of NGOs propagating the minorities’ 
culture to the members of their communities, and innovative, as in the case 
of the organisations helping empowerment in changing political settings, 
the activities of minority NGOs are limited in their effectiveness. While 
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the NGOs discussed in the second part of this chapter were discerned as 
undertaking project-related work corresponding to policy-preferences, it is 
natural to expect that the tensions around the cultural and linguistic regula-
tions would cause the greatest activity by non-core ethnics in the region. 
This expectation has been confirmed in this part of the chapter.  
With regard to the NGO activities of the minority groups ensuring 
the preservation of cultural and linguistic identity of their group members, 
I have outlined their particularly vibrant activity over the past decade. 
However, while discussing the issues of contention brought up by minor-
ity NGOs, I did not uncover any policy responses to the initiatives of the 
advocacy groups. The lack of policy-response to the issues of relevance 
for minority groups in the region once again indicate the Baltic govern-
ments’ hesitance to accept the members of the non-political public sphere 
as partners in policy-making and thus fail to create a more inclusive politi-
cal community of responsive and responsible citizens.  
 
 
4.   Minorities’ engagement in policy advising  
The activities of civil society aim at socialising individuals to make them 
fit into the changing socio-political and economic environment, as well as 
providing them networks on which they can rely in times of hardships. 
Besides this, there is another function of civic engagement which aims at 
providing street level expertise for state and policy-makers to address the 
issues of public concern more effectively. In this sense, “Civil Society III” 
describes the activities that aim at “teaching the state” to function respon-
sively towards the individuals its policies affect.78  
This aspect of civic engagement is particularly important in socie-
ties undergoing consolidation vis-à-vis its democratic commitments and 
elaborating a more inclusive and responsive relation between the state 
institutions and the individuals these serve. Some of the scholars argue 
that all civil society networks in one way or another promote inclusiveness 
and mutual respect. The recent debates on the contributions made by civil 
society to assist in the establishment of egalitarian rule suggest that only 
when civic networks are able to create and facilitate effective links be-
tween the political community and state institutions can the society be 
properly termed democratic. It is in this context that “civil society” can be 
seen as performing public or semi-public functions previously fulfilled by 
the state and suggesting some policy changes which would lead to the 
state re-assuming these functions.79  
Needless to say, civic activity teaching the state to perform its 
functions better makes several presumptions which are not necessarily 
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found in all political regimes. Firstly, the assumption here is that the civic 
actors teaching the state abide by the rules of democracy and hence accept 
democracy as the only appropriate political method, meaning that policy-
changes introduced should strengthen democracy, not undermine it. The 
second assumption being made is that political institutions are prepared to 
work together with civic organisations to improve the political participa-
tion of the citizens affected and hence create a more inclusive political 
regime responsive to the individuals affected by the decisions made. And 
finally, the assumption that however democratic the political regime and 
the accessibility to political decision-making may be, further improvement 
is always possible and worthwhile.  
This final point requires further emphasis with regard to the post-
communist states. The interaction between state and society was previ-
ously under the full control of the ideological apparatus, mirroring the 
conditions of a tutelary transition. Political developments in the post-
Soviet era however required some public consent and also allowed mini-
mal criticisms of the choices made by the political elites. Whether the 
failure of state-builders, political entrepreneurs and policy-makers to re-
spond to the impulses of civic initiatives is in itself an impediment for 
successful progress in democracy-building will be made clear in this part 
of the chapter. However, the analyses of the activities by minority popula-
tions criticising, and hence informing the state of changes suggest that 
throughout the region the responsiveness of the policy-makers to the input 
from the “Civil Society III” is very modest.  
One of the most renowned organisations providing an independent 
assessment of policy-making and policy-implementation in the region is 
Estonia’s Inimõiguste Teabekeskus (Legal Information Centre for Human 
Rights, LICHR) created in 1992. This NGO has been active since 1995 as 
a non-profit organization, emerging from the initiative of several individu-
als and with support from several Danish organisations: the Danish Centre 
for Human Rights, Minority Rights Group-Denmark and the Information 
Centre on Eastern Europe, Copenhagen University. Although largely sus-
tained in its activities by foreign donors, some Estonian NGOs are also 
involved in close cooperation with the LICHR including the Presidential 
Round Table of the National Minorities and the Representative Assembly 
of Non-Citizens of Estonia.  
Founded to “promote constructive dialog and to enhance the aware-
ness about human rights in the Estonian society,”80 the LICHR provides 
legal advice to minority citizens and non-citizens of Estonia and collects, 
analyses and disseminates information regarding human rights. It is highly 
visible in the international arena by cooperating with a number of Euro-
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pean experts in the areas of human rights and minority-related issues. 
While the NGO sustains close contact with the Estonian Government and 
the Riigikogu, the political parties, NGOs and numerous educational and 
cultural civic initiatives of minorities in Estonia, it seems to occupy a 
rather marginal position in the landscape of NGOs. Instead, the LICHR 
aims at influencing public opinion on the topics of integration of non-
Estonians into Estonian society and works together with organisations 
facilitating the on-the-ground processes of alleviating differences between 
the Estonian and non-Estonian populations in the country.81  
Latvijas Cilvēktiesību centrs (Latvian Human Rights Committee, 
LCC) is another well-known organisation which is prominently engaged 
in the issues concerning citizenship, education and language legislation. It 
was established in 1993 with a goal of promoting human rights and toler-
ance in Latvia through constant monitoring, research, advocacy, legal aid 
and training of a younger generation of activists.82 The LCC was also 
involved in data collection and following-up legislative decisions, policy-
making and case monitoring in various human rights areas, including 
activities regarding social integration in Latvia. Over the recent years, the 
LCC had been specialising in the monitoring of places of imprisonment 
and addressing issues tangent to human rights and the integration of soci-
ety, including minority-related issues and issues of interethnic tolerance, 
which “represent the most important problem areas of human rights in 
Latvia.”83 In its work, the LCC particularly places emphasis on the educa-
tion work with the individuals affected and organisations involved in the 
issues of human rights’ violations by publishing reports, research papers 
and information material about the situation in Latvia both locally and 
internationally. Human Rights Reports are also published annually by the 
LCC providing analyses of the developments and challenges of legal 
changes in Latvia. These allow international observers, local media, the 
public, and state officials to access independent information provided on 
minority issues in the country. The LCC also provides daily digests of the 
local media with a focus on the issues related to the integration processes.  
Although the LCC specialises in providing expert advice for the 
government, parliament, the media and educational establishments, it is 
not acknowledged as particularly helpful by the Latvian government. The 
LCC reprimands the government and local authorities for their inappropri-
ate conduct with respect to domestic issues, such as prosecution, the work 
of the security police, courts and law-making. Such actions foster an im-
age of the organisation as a critic of the governmental policies and thus an 
unwelcome advisor in issues regarding minority policies in Latvia. By 
additionally being involved in advocacy for policy changes, at various 
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times LCC members have been involved in the institutions of the Latvian 
state and in work-groups on issues of justice and media regulations, as 
well as with the Secretariat of the Special Task Minister of Social Integra-
tion Affairs. Since the founding of the LCC, it has continuously opposed 
policies related to ethnic minority groups implemented by the state institu-
tions. While expressing concerns on the scope and direction of the Social 
Integration Programme, the LCC has been advocating for the regulation of 
Latvia’s relation with its minorities, specifically contesting bans on several 
professions for non-citizens. In the course of its regular monitoring in 
2001, the LCC identified 19 professions where non-citizens were dis-
criminated against in comparison to the citizens of Latvia. In 2003, the 
LCC advocated for the equality of rights for all of Latvia’s residents to be 
advanced by naturalisation regulations and for the inclusion of new citi-
zens in elections to allow for more responsive political processes to begin 
in the country.  
Similarly to the Latvijas Cilvēktiesību centrs, Lietuvos žmogaus 
teisių centras (Lithuanian Centre for Human Rights, LŽTC) has been 
working in the field of human rights protection since 1994.84 It was 
founded by private persons to develop expertise on human rights’ educa-
tion and implemented numerous projects and activities in the field. The 
work of the LŽTC aims at the development and dissemination of informa-
tion about the internationally acknowledged standards of human rights, 
with a particular focus on the European dimension and the relevant steps 
in the promotion of tolerance and the safeguarding of diversity. The LŽTC 
had also been involved in the capacity-building of the social and ethnic 
groups vulnerable to recent social, economic and political developments. 
The group has also consistently provided consultations to the Lithuanian 
authorities on how to improve the human rights’ standards at the national 
level. Through its public work the LŽTC has also utilised the academic 
community in Lithuania to address the issues of concern for non-
Lithuanians which result from the nationalising policies of the state. It has 
also been engaged in the debates on issues of minority rights, specifically 
after the adoption of the FCNM in Lithuania.85  
Another organisation, Žmogaus teisių steb÷jimo institutas (The 
Human Rights Monitoring Institute, ŽTSI) works explicitly with local 
organisations on developing social awareness and participatory ethics with 
their members.86 While the LŽTC addresses the issues of concern with the 
affected public, the ŽTSI promotes the development of democratic societal 
structures by monitoring and enforcing human rights policies, raising 
awareness of the causes and consequences of human rights violations and 
by advocating for legislative and policy changes from a legal point of 
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view. The work conducted by the ŽTSI mainly focuses on law enforce-
ment agencies and law-makers, which are considered to require greater 
changes in their attitudes in order to advocate the principles already pro-
scribed in Lithuania’s Constitution.  
The ŽTSI carries out the same work that the LCC in Latvia does by 
specifically addressing the rights of the imprisoned and those charged with 
a criminal offence, as well as by following up on issues of discriminatory 
treatment. Another organisation in Lithuania working directly with the 
issues of human rights and focusing additionally on the rights and protec-
tion of social guarantees is the Lietuvos žmogaus teisių ir socialinių ga-
rantijų gynimo organizacija (The Organization of the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Social Guarantees in Lithuania, LŽTSGGO). By monitor-
ing the performance of various state and public institutions LŽTSGGO 
investigates breaches in the areas of human, minority and social rights. 
This organisation, founded during the Lithuanian EU accession in 2000, 
has been involved in the investigation of complaints by citizens who ap-
pealed to state institutions to eliminate violations of social rights. The 
LŽTSGGO has also been involved in policy advising on the improvement 
of the legislative acts of the Ministry of Justice and the Seimas.87 Finally, 
it needs to be mentioned that, despite the fact that in Lithuania several 
organisations work on the issues of human rights and investigate the con-
cerns of minorities, they only marginally touch upon the problems of the 
Russian and Polish-speaking communities. On the whole, the issues cov-
ered in the activities of the LŽTSGGO, ŽTSI and LŽTC address only the 
social problems of particular minority groups in Lithuania, i.e. Roma, and 
also address a wider scope of issues of individual rights.  
In many cases, the expertise provided by NGOs addresses only the 
framework dimensions of the minority groups in the country, allowing 
for–if promulgated–the overall improvement in relations between the state 
and society. The same applies for the activities of the Estonia’s LICHR 
and Latvia’s LCC and Lithuania’s NGOs, which are working on a range of 
issues, but are gaining only marginal acceptance and acknowledgement by 
their respective governments. As I have briefly described, these organisa-
tions address issues which are tangent to but not explicitly limited to mi-
nority rights. Nonetheless, even the framework in which these organisa-
tions operate does not grant their analytical approach greater recognition 
from the local governments. Despite the fact that these NGOs are not 
working directly with minority individuals and therefore provide a more 
balanced evaluation of the possible policy-changes, it appears that the 
analytical opinions and reports provided by these civic organisations are 
not taken into consideration by Baltic policy-makers. Although they are 
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funded through European institutions and structural funds, as well as by 
the international organisations sponsoring the development of the democ-
ratic participation such as Soros and Open Society Foundations, it appears 
that their expertise in democracy seems to be considered inadequate by the 
authorities.  
The organisations whose activities allow them to be classified under 
the label of CSIII, or, in the Baltic context, as analytical NGOs, are stress-
ing cooperative functions. They indicate various associations that bring 
about change in a state’s policies and attitudes towards its citizens. Clearly 
this function of civil society implies that members of the social commu-
nity do not only challenge existing power relations and, in some cases, 
undermine the legitimacy of state authority, but also perceive changes in 
the existing framework as possible and collective activity as sensible. As 
has been demonstrated in this part of the chapter, however, in the largest 
number of cases observed throughout the region, the activities of the advi-
sory, analytical organisations advocating policy-changes to accommodate 
the needs of minorities have not been considered (so far?) by the institu-
tions responsible. Therefore, while CSIII is mainly about the interaction of 
citizens with “street-level bureaucrats,” the more appropriate description 
of the work provided would need to address the incentives for change in 
policy-implementations with regard to all individuals affected.  
The model addressing the impact of the members of minority com-
munities on policy-making in the region can be applied in the majority of 
case-studies where civic engagement of members of the political commu-
nity is focused, but not limited, to group-activity within NGOs. The 
change in the practices, as can be observed in this brief review of the NGO 
landscape in the Baltic states, also requires an open institutional frame-
work flexible enough to accommodate social feedback and acknowledge 
the presence of the deficiencies in the current policy. In the region under 
consideration, civic initiatives enjoy only a limited welcome by the politi-
cal entrepreneurs and are more likely regarded as disturbing actors than as 
facilitators of better governance.  
 
 
5.  Conclusion  
The previous chapters of the book have outlined the overall negative im-
pact of institutional change on the opportunities available for local minori-
ties to voice their opinions and be heard by the (majority) political entre-
preneurs. This chapter, I believe, has clearly indicated that the participa-
tion of social actors in the making of state policies was hardly welcomed, 
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and was treated as unworthy of the attention of the politicians in the Baltic 
region.  
I have argued that the analysis of engagement by non-state, social 
actors points to significant difficulties for speaking of the ongoing democ-
ratisation of the Baltic societies and political institutions: while policy-
feedback mechanisms exist in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, they are 
hardly ever employed during policy-making. Instead, policy-makers belit-
tle the potential for civic actors’ contribution to the democratic develop-
ment of the Baltic states. In addition, by keeping tabs on civic initiatives 
state actors have previously undermined the democratisation of social 
relations between the majority and minority in the Baltic societies. The 
existing political institutions and the established practice are likely to 
ensure that such a situation persists in the future. 
The investigation into the civic engagement of minority popula-
tions has shed light on the overall hesitance of policy-makers to consider 
these as reasonable and worth pursuing. The key policy documents were 
developed to sponsor the development of NGOs and non-state funded 
organisations both, to assume the function previously provided by the 
state-institutions and to teach minorities to cope with the changing politi-
cal, economic, social and linguistic environments. However, the activities 
falling into the direct responsibility of the civic initiatives have been con-
sistently circumscribed. The lack of political will to accommodate the 
claims advanced in the civic networks by the minority members of Baltic 
societies, who have otherwise no opportunity to interfere in political proc-
esses, further testifies to the marginalisation of non-titular communities.  
Many NGO activists point out that so far Baltic policy-makers have 
been effective in curtailing civic initiatives that might be conducive to 
democratic development. Instead, non-responsive political institutions 
cultivate the political passivity of citizens and sponsor uncritical attitudes 
from among the majority and minority communities towards their state of 
residence. As a result of the continuous marginalisation from social, eco-
nomic and political processes and neglect of minorities’ civic initiatives, 
the members of minority communities are increasingly disillusioned with 
the work and potential of public institutions. They are also less likely than 
core ethnics to protest against such actions by authorities even if they 
considered their treatment unjust.88 
I have collected extensive support for such explanation of NGO ac-
tivities in interviews with the members of the Russian-speaking commu-
nity organisations throughout the Baltic States. More frequently than not, 
the point was raised that many members of the minority community see no 
reasons to cooperate with state officials in pursuit of funding that would 
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only limit their activities. Frequent parallels have been drawn between the 
responses of the state to the vibrant educational activities accomplished by 
minority communities’ members since the regained independence and to 
the political preferences of minority communities. Rarely were the initia-
tives proposed by minorities considered for promulgation or supported by 
the majority political entrepreneurs. It is hardly surprising that the lack of 
responsiveness of political institutions is leading to declining trust in 
elected representatives, who are more likely to disregard any issues of 
contention than to act on behalf of the minority communities.  
All in all, the members of the minority communities are indeed pur-
suing a range of activities, which fall into the framework of teaching fel-
low citizens to be more civic. However, these also support the members of 
their ethnic communities in everyday necessities, such as assisting in the 
adaptation to the new political, economic, social, linguistic and, not least 
of all, cultural environments. There are also organisations which pursue 
the aforementioned goals as being essential for the ongoing democratisa-
tion of the state and its policies. Through civic initiatives, they are “teach-
ing the state” by providing analytical digests, reports and public opinion 
surveys. In a political system open to learning and improvement, policy-
makers could be expected to take the know-how generated by civic activ-
ists as a foundation for policy-improvements. There is little indication of 
this happening in the Baltic states.  
If nothing else, the poor preparedness of policy-makers to allow 
minority involvement in democracy building throughout the region can be 
treated as an indicator of ethnic favouritism and/or of the nationalising 
logic of the Baltic states. This not only limits the absorption of democratic 
values by minority populations, but also makes clear to all actors involved 
that civic engagement is futile unless it is affirmative of the role of politi-
cal elites and uncritical of the dominant policies. Neither of these aspects 
has been distinguished as an attribute of a healthy and sustainable democ-
racy elsewhere in the world. I return to the question of how this dilem-
matic relation could be addressed in the conclusion of my book.  
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Conclusion 
 
Baltic democratisation: A cat’s lick? 
 
 
Over the past 300 pages, I have discussed various aspects of political 
change in the Baltic States with specific emphasis on the role of state 
institutions and citizen participation in the processes of policy-making. 
The discussion of the ways in which the expectations of minority popula-
tions have been addressed in the Baltic states have demonstrated the lim-
ited inclusiveness of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian, but also gener-
ally of the post-communist democratic political process. The context of 
debates on democratisation and state-building did not allow for a more 
speculative argument on the implications of these developments for de-
mocratisation in the region. In the conclusion of my book, I outline some 
of the major repercussions resulting from the study of the democratisation 
process in the Baltic states for the scholarly debate on the emergence of 
democracy in societies with weak democratic legacies. 
Firstly, I address the issues connected to the role of minority groups 
in the democratisation process in the Baltic states. As I indicate in the first 
chapter, various kinds of civic engagement allow different avenues for the 
individuals excluded from participation in political decision-making to 
take part in the processes of institutional development. However, through-
out the recent Baltic history individual and collective engagement has 
been not only taken for granted, but was also discarded as useless. The 
limitations on participation of minority populations undermined their 
impact on the political developments in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  
Secondly, I discuss some of the implications of limiting the in-
volvement of social actors in political processes. By revisiting the out-
comes of institution building in the Baltic states, I underline the critical 
importance of legacies in devising the local democracy models. While 
pointing out some of the issues, I argue that the contradictions inherited 
from the past are still in place. Although these are subtly blending with a 
variety of political experiences of EU conditionality, Soviet legacies and 
the pre-Soviet experiences of statehood, I argue that on many occasions 
the lack of learning from the past has inhibited a more positive develop-
ment of the relations between the post-Soviet political institutions, titular 
publics and the minority groups in the region. At the time, joining the 
Timofey Agarin 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
 
318
Western European security alliances, such as NATO and the EU, allowed 
European organisations to press for a revision of the Baltic ethnocentric 
perceptions of nationhood towards the more civic side of the scale. Now 
that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are equal partners in the European proc-
esses (although they claim not to be taken seriously enough), the relations 
between the state and society in the region are dominated by constraints of 
majoritarian institutions. There is a striking tension between the groups 
favouring pluralist-participatory and majoritarian governance in the Baltic 
societies.  
Finally, I return to discussion of the democratisation. Here I situate 
the Baltic states in the framework of present-day democratic development. 
While some of the considerations of the regional dynamics suggest that 
the Baltic states have successfully achieved the primary goals of democra-
tisation, I point out that on many occasions these were possible only be-
cause of international interference and result from the countries’ eagerness 
to the join the imaginary West. Institutional changes in post-communist 
societies examined in this book suggest that pro forma democratisation did 
not strengthen the anti-majoritarian sentiment of the population affected. 
In other words, there is some potential for the new authoritarian experi-
ments appealing to primordial identities and using powerful populist 
rhetoric.  
As my research points out, while the danger of potential fall backs 
into undemocratic practices exists in all three states, post-Soviet political 
institutions in the region are not less democratic then they are in the West-
ern European states. The changes of institutional structures across the 
region, however, failed to sponsor the democratic credentials of the Baltic 
populations. As I argue below, this is the result of citizens’ perceptions 
about democratic political institutions and the value of diversity, in the 
political arena and beyond. All this speaks for the choice of my metaphor 
of a cat’s lick, pointing out only partial success of Baltic democratisations. 
 
 
1.   Minority and majority in the making  
My book began with an argument that critical attitudes of citizens and all 
others affected by political decisions play a crucial role in the institutional 
democratisation. I have stressed the conceptual implications for the study 
of the role played by minority populations in democratisation processes. 
The main contribution made by the fringe groups in this context consists 
of their critical perceptions of political processes as providing incentives 
for policy-changes. This aspect of minority input into main-stream politi-
cal processes is comparable to what civil society “does” to politics and 
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falls together with the contribution made by pressure groups on the con-
solidation of political regimes. Hence, the minority contribution to democ-
ratisation, specifically that brought about through engagement in civic 
groups, sponsors the diversity of opinions in the public arena, which sup-
ports the democratic credentials of the state and assists state institutions in 
becoming more responsive to the demands of those affected by its poli-
cies. Decisively, popular acceptance of democracy and engagement in 
civic activity are not limited to members of the political community, but 
are open to all members of society affected by political decisions and 
interested in changing the way it touches them personally.  
In this regard my study of the Baltic states has also addressed the 
situation where the members of minority communities are rather passive in 
organising civic initiatives and/or would be unable to influence political 
decision-making even if they were active. Civic engagement in general 
requires individual awareness of the opportunity to express grievances and 
demands vis-à-vis the state as a collective interest. If one would take the 
degree to which civic actors and the state pursue their goals and, at the 
same time, respond to mutual demands to distinguish the relation between 
the democratic state and consolidated society, the Baltic polities would not 
score well. The failure of the Baltic institutions to react to the activities of 
their subjects (citizens, non-citizens and permanently resident foreign 
nationals alike), in particular to the initiatives of minority groups, suggests 
that criticism of state policies is not regarded as contributing to furthering 
democratisation.  
Minorities’ expertise was rarely taken into consideration in launch-
ing policy-changes and was frequently dismissed as not suiting the antici-
pated direction of policy-development. Baltic minority residents have not 
had a chance to learn to “trust” the state as a result of this institutional 
resistance to incentives brought about by civic initiatives. Instead, the 
members of minority communities in the region have had to come to terms 
with the decisions of policy-makers who rarely demonstrated willingness 
to respond to their concerns. Especially if civic activities were treated as 
collective expressions of individual anxieties, the engagement of minority 
groups by the majority-dominated state institutions would indicate their 
responsiveness. Rather, the failure of the post-communist Baltic states to 
respond to and take into account the diversity of public interests suggest 
that policy-makers have learnt too little about democratic political prac-
tices, and too much from authoritarian ones. This is not surprising given 
the length of the non-democratic experiences as compared to a two decade 
period of democratic rule.  
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My review of minority politics in the Baltic states suggested that 
these were made to meet majorities’ expectations more so than to liberal 
democratic norms. As I have demonstrated, by placing critical assets for 
policy-making and policy-alterations in the hands of majority communi-
ties, political changes in the Baltic states have been dominated by the 
rationale of state titularisation. The institutional design of the Baltic poli-
ties, as well as the initial steps aimed at accommodating the diversity of 
interests in the political realm were not inclusive of opinions expressed by 
minorities. In the struggle for Baltic independence, debates on the design 
of political membership, regulations of language use, education reforms 
and, ultimately, on issues relating to social integration have been con-
ducted with only fragmentary participation of minority communities. 
Rather, they were dominated by national, state-bearing majorities and 
were fought out as internal struggles between different groups of majority 
elites, with the exclusion of representatives of Russian- and Polish-
speakers.  
Before the de jure independence from the SU, some of the opinions 
from minority groups were taken into formal consideration by majority 
elites, though this was not the case after August 1991. Responding to the 
negative incentives of the majorities, non-titulars in the Baltic states could 
only disengage from political activities, just as was the case before inde-
pendence. Therefore, participation in political processes or being active in 
civic organisations was merely a sign of conformity with the existing 
regime. In part, this is what is happening in the Baltic states now. Minority 
civic initiatives that recommend policy-changes, criticise current policies 
or even support fellow citizens in coping with the effects of policy deci-
sions, are not always discouraged outright. Most frequently, it is simply 
not taken seriously by all of the sides that it aims to affect–state institu-
tions, the political entrepreneurs of the majorities, as well as the members 
of the minority publics themselves. Naturally, only limited incentives 
persist for the members of minority communities to engage in activities by 
challenging and even informing policy-makers of the changes perceived as 
necessary.  
In this context, the activities of minorities in the region have re-
mained tied to issues that have no implications for policy-making and 
therefore are ultimately non-political. This completely deflates them as 
civic activities and further perpetuates the weakness of civil society. In 
these circumstances, the members of minority communities who have 
been continuously dispensing their rights to assist in decision-making have 
learnt little about relations between the state and society specific to de-
mocratic regimes. Even in those cases when minorities’ initiatives did 
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cause changes in state policies, these changes were not presented as made 
following societal feedback, but rather as decisions made by political 
elites to meet the interests of the majority community. Could the members 
of non-titular communities have learnt any lessons from the processes of 
minority opposition to Education Reforms in Latvia in 2004, or in the 
aftermath of the Bronze Night in Estonia in 2007? Considered from the 
point of view of non-titular populations, none of these expressions of 
popular discontent have had the desired effect. Rather they supported 
minorities’ view that both the Latvian and Estonian states will not respond 
to any criticism and opposition, particularly if these are expressed by Rus-
sian-speakers.  
Under the conditions of absent or negative state response to civic 
input there is only a meagre chance for the members of the Baltic Russian-
speaking communities to develop closer ties to the state in which they 
reside. Engaging in projects and informing policy-makers of the changes 
aspired to also seems senseless, which results in mass disengagement from 
issues of politics. Instead, civic initiatives are likely to degrade into dense 
social networks, in which the people involved help one another to cope 
with the adverse impact of policies on their personal lives. Not surpris-
ingly, since EU accession the members of minority communities in the 
Baltic states have been particularly active in organising themselves in 
different NGO groups. These promote awareness about minorities’ cul-
tural and linguistic heritage and provide social support to the marginalised 
members of their communities.  
The recent social integration programme in Estonia and the Na-
tional Action Plan for Social Inclusion in Lithuania make direct use of 
these civic groups for policy purposes. Baltic policy-makers have out-
sourced some of their responsibility for the integration of minorities to 
members of non-core groups and as such co-opted NGOs as instruments 
of neoliberal minority politics. At the same time, the range of policy 
documents provides instruments to monitor minorities’ activities in the 
non-profit sector by granting some NGOs public funds for their projects, 
while withdrawing financial support from “uncomfortable” others. In 
doing so, Baltic policy-makers have once again instrumentalised the swell-
ing minority leadership to further the cohesion of ethno-cultural fringe 
groups. By sponsoring activities more akin to social networking than civic 
participation, these policies have effectively provided non-core ethnics 
with an incentive to remain uncritical of the majorities’ political choices.  
There appears to be a decisive discrepancy between the commit-
ment of Baltic policy-makers to strengthening civil society and the policy-
changes that undermine the critical engagement of Baltic residents. For 
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civil society to feature as a guarantee of healthy democracy, it needs to 
function, without institutional constraints, as a watchdog over political 
entrepreneurs and the general public. As I have demonstrated in chapters 7 
through 9, the critical activities of Russian-speakers are constrained by 
more than rigid political institutions. The failure of majority societies to 
consider the issues and claims of minority representatives to be of any 
relevance for titulars themselves indicates a deep cleavage between the 
groups which is unlikely to be alleviated in the near future.  
As I have discussed, in many cases the type of political regime and 
the state institutions in the Baltic states are so tightly connected with the 
majority group that minority groups cannot possibly engage the one with-
out addressing the other. Hence, the critical engagement of minorities 
faces multiple challenges in the process of determining and articulating 
demands, as well as pursuing their collective goals, because these are 
always challenging the set of Baltic political institutions. From this point, 
if Baltic political entrepreneurs could distinguish between the criticism of 
political performance from criticism of institutional structures of the Baltic 
states, it would be much easier to accommodate the policy-input from 
minorities. Ultimately, most of the issues minority groups across the re-
gion resent are the same ones that made titular populations chafe for the 
past two decades.  
In my book I examine only the (lack of) responsiveness from politi-
cal institutions to the claims of minority groups during the entire period of 
the post-Soviet independence. As we have seen in the chapter 2, the Soviet 
state also dealt with dissenting opinions by denying them an institutional 
response. The examination of current institutional response to challenges 
of development in the Baltic states leads me to conclude that political 
institutions continue to impede greater democratisation across the region. 
The failure of the Baltic political leadership and publics to make institu-
tions accountable to alternative opinions and/or install mechanisms pre-
venting the majority from highjacking policy-making does not mesh well 
with provisions of democratisation theory. 
 
 
2.   Institutions as tools of democratisation 
The initial discussion of the impact civic activities can have on policies 
has underlined how political institutions and political entrepreneurs could 
profit from them. In both cases, the modelling of civic activities as a part 
of democratic politicking allows conclusions about the impact citizens 
might exercise on policy-making. This is possible through the considera-
tion of their interactions with street-level public officials, electoral behav-
Conclusion 
____________________________________________________________ 
323
iour, and the use of protest or petitioning. Unfortunately, resident aliens, 
individuals disengaged from politics and those whose activities are disre-
garded do not have the same opportunities to influence political decision-
making and can only expect that their discontent will be considered in 
policy corrections. However, as I argue throughout the book, the interac-
tion between non-core ethnics and the state-institution has not resulted in 
significant policy-changes. Not even the activities of civic actors have had 
a significant impact on policy-making. Was this because their demands 
were formulated as requests from the group that was excluded from the 
politicking?  
My research suggests that the people affected by, but excluded from 
the democratic dialogue of the Baltic states failed to contribute to democ-
ratisation because they–as a group–were perceived as a disturbing factor in 
the status quo between groups. I have underlined the importance of dis-
tributing resources for participation in political decision-making among as 
many individuals affected as possible. However, as I have pointed out, 
political institutions in the Baltic states were created by and are continu-
ously dominated by the nationalising rationale. In discussing how the 
structural resources of the state were envisaged by the majority political 
entrepreneurs in terms of nation-states, I underline that the participation of 
non-core ethnics was minimal.  
My comparative perspective on the policies of state- and nation-
building in the Baltic states has emphasised the lack of provisions both 
encouraging non-titulars to participate in these projects, but also decreas-
ing their sense of alienation from engagement in the state building. In fact, 
not until the late 1990s had the Baltic states devised national integration 
programmes to encourage minorities’ participation in political processes 
and address their perception of alienation from the state more consistently. 
The contribution of minorities in determining the outcomes of political 
decision-making had to be kept to a minimum to allow an ethno-
nationalist rationale to prevail. My book puts forward the narrative of 
state-building suggesting that the mere presence of minorities in the Baltic 
states led political entrepreneurs to acknowledge their potential impact on 
democratisation and thus forego non-titulars’ participation.  
Despite limited participation in Baltic policy-making, the members 
of Russian-speaking communities have nevertheless played an essential 
role in both nation- and state- building in the region. The fact that parts of 
the local populace were excluded from decision-making at the earlier stage 
of nation-building and were later further marginalised in political and 
social processes indicates that the Russian-speaking communities were 
essential as catalysts of institutional development. While some changes in 
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the perceptions of titulars have led to corrections of the original social and 
political policies and recognition of (some of the) Russian-speakers’ inter-
ests, non-titulars are still featured as unreliable and unwelcome political 
partners. Although, particularly in the wake of EU-enlargement, political 
leaders of the Baltic states have presented some guarantees for individual 
and social rights for the members of non-core communities, the political 
rhetoric surrounding these decisions suggests that even these were not 
made to make minorities’ lives easier. Instead, political decisions were 
made as guarantees for the majority populations that the Baltic states are 
and will remain the property of the titulars.  
The post-Soviet state- and nation-building in the region has taken 
place under the influence of exclusive nationalising rhetoric, but the ten-
sions between the ethnic groups never amounted to violent conflict in the 
Baltic societies. Practically, this has meant that although the influence of 
many individuals who did not belong to titular ethnic groups was limited, 
the excluded never resorted to violence in an attempt to claim greater 
rights and take part in the formation of the “imagined” national commu-
nity. The lack of violent conflict in the region has allowed some research-
ers to state that the Baltic states have implemented only a limited concept 
of democracy at home, citing the highly-debated provisions of political 
membership and rights adjacent to citizenship status.  
Many recent studies have shed decisive light on the relation be-
tween state institutions and minority individuals. The contributions to the 
study of the post-communist Baltics could not claim that non-core ethnics 
did indeed embody political culture, which would have inherently contra-
dicted the institutional design established. Instead, scholars have increas-
ingly neglected to note that political membership in the state-community is 
essential for the analysis of relations of the state towards an individual, but 
not vice versa. Thus, the Russian-speaking minority groups in Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania have coped quite well with the nationalising logic of 
state building. How could this happen?  
My research suggests a tentative connection between current prac-
tices and the past experiences of Soviet institutions, which had formed 
both the top-down logic of state relations with the individuals it affected, 
as well as the strategies employed by individuals to avoid institutional 
impact on their personal lives. It is in this light that concerns should be 
raised about the participation of the Baltic titular publics in the process of 
democratising “their” polities. As I demonstrate throughout the book, state 
institutions have consistently promoted the interests of the majority group 
in framing Russian-speaking communities as minorities, assuming the 
tacit consent of those positively affected as a sign of agreement with the 
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overall direction of transformation. However, state institutions in the Bal-
tic states have also failed to develop strategies of negotiation with the 
groups of titulars requesting even tougher nationalising logics to be im-
plemented. Likewise, while the governments of the post-communist Baltic 
states have implemented institutional reforms, the societies affected were 
not always willing to embrace the new practices. Social disparity left 
many aspirations from transition unfulfilled, while at the same time grow-
ing individual liberties have allowed expressions of dismay in regard to 
the political, economic and social reforms. Understanding the cultural 
group-rights of majorities as being in need of safeguarding prevailed in 
discussions on policy-issues, but no bottom-line consensus was reached on 
how social actors could cooperate with political decision-making institu-
tions.  
This observation of institutional rigidity makes me conclude that 
the mechanisms of leverage available in democratic settings were never 
established in the Baltic states. This is precisely the reason why the input 
for policy-changes emerging from politically redundant members of Baltic 
societies could never emerge as a challenge to the existing status quo. The 
long-term outcome of the democratisation process in the region remains to 
be seen. However, if members of the post-communist Baltic societies had 
instruments to check institutional performance for democratic credentials, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be much further down the road to 
democracy. While my research suggests that the minority communities 
have used the most of the tools at their service to contribute to advancing 
democracy in their states of residence, the majorities have had many more 
opportunities to suggest broader democratic change.  
Certainly, the practices of institutional crafting appear to be of high 
importance for a functioning democracy, but, as I argue, democratic insti-
tutional design results from the social aspiration that these are the best 
among other possible solutions. The institutions framing Russian-speakers 
in the Baltics as a minority group also framed core ethnics into passive 
publics, ready for tutelage. As I argue with regard to the Baltic independ-
ence movements, the processes of democratisation in the region were set 
in motion by the general dissatisfaction of many citizens with their status 
in the social and political edifice, and hence conducive to social, economic 
and political changes.  
The collapse of the communist regimes testified that social factors 
are at least as important for change in political processes, as they are re-
sponsible for the instability of political institutions. However, mass par-
ticipation in actions challenging the existing status quo and led by expec-
tations of greater responsiveness of political institutions is not to be seen 
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in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. These activities require organisation and 
mobilisation, free information flow and critical individual engagement 
which are all freely available but are not activated by the Baltic residents. 
As we have seen, the Baltic state institutions have prevented even the 
members of the titular publics to influence policy-making and ultimately 
press for greater institutional change. Thus, one of the missing links is one 
of institutional response to public demand to be able to help in defining 
and crafting an effective democracy. 
It seems that in the region, the state continues to exercise a “pater-
nalist dictatorship over needs” in providing its citizens with the goods, 
services and freedoms they consider essential. In so doing the state appara-
tus secures its political authority and is unlikely to be challenged. But the 
years as a part of the Soviet Union should have taught locals better that the 
combination of paternalism and coercion leads to passive compliance and 
negative legitimacy of politics. The Soviet state became an association of 
technocrats who regulated individual lives, choices, and fulfilled essential 
needs only when facing penalties. Ultimately, paternalism could not en-
sure the dominance of one social group under communism. The question 
remains whether the discourse of democratic liberalism can downplay the 
inherent inequalities between the groups of Baltic residents and prevent 
state institutions from greater responsiveness towards the people they 
affect.  
While in communist societies, political authority was embodied in 
the party-state which claimed a monopoly of authority and the leading role 
as sole representative of the people, the analysis of this book demonstrate 
that the instrumental role of the socialist state as the means to accomplish 
the objectives of the ruling elites have largely remained in place during the 
Baltic democratisation. For the post-Soviet citizen who had nothing but a 
lifelong experience with an undemocratic regime, suspicious treatment of 
critical attitudes and dislike for collective decision-making remained a part 
of the mindset.1 Regularly, the process of democratisation would see citi-
zen demand for democratic responsiveness of institutions to outstrip what 
institutions are ready to provide, thus allowing a gradual move toward 
more democracy. On the opposite side of the scale, when citizens demand 
less democracy than institutions already offer, incipient democratic change 
stalls or moves toward less democratic political regime.  
This book provides an illustration of how these processes panned 
out in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. As I have discussed in the introduc-
tion and in the chapter 1, democratisation is nothing different from a 
movement toward more or less democratic state-society relations, which 
however, does not depend on citizens’ demand alone, but reflects the rela-
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tionship between citizen demand and institutional response. Inglehart and 
Welzel consider “shifts toward more or less democracy [to] follow the 
logic of reducing the incongruence between citizen demand and institu-
tional supply of democracy.”2 We have observed significant changes in 
the institutional opportunity structure in all three states, but have found 
only insignificant transformation of popular attitudes towards political 
structures as a result of post-communist democratisation.  
 
 
3.   Implications for studies of democratisation  
The support for democratisation throughout the CEE was remarkably 
unanimous in the 1980s, but the political and economic performance of 
post-communist regimes brought about many unexpected effects. Socio-
economic development in the initial years of transition had challenged the 
social conditions of the populace, resulting in various degrees of support 
for a new, democratic regime.3 The mixed feelings of the post-communist 
public about the initial outcomes reflect the ruptures of the turbulent tran-
sition years, as well as the not so quickly forgotten promises of the social-
ist regimes. Current research shows comparable trends in support of both 
present-day and previous regimes and the Baltic states are not exceptional 
in this respect.4  
The collapse of the Soviet communism teaches us several impor-
tant lessons regarding the regime domination, collapse and transition. The 
most important one is the ability of regime to endure despite a clear ab-
sence of popular legitimacy, confounded on the illusion of mass consent 
manufactured by the political elites. Crucially, the system remains fully 
functional if the political class can convincingly claim to exercise power 
and authority over citizenry defined by appealing to dichotomous catego-
ries, distinguishing “us” from “them.” Secondly however, and particularly 
as Baltic history demonstrates, when a regime is externally imposed elites’ 
prime imperative is to present themselves as legitimate representatives of 
their people. The years of Soviet inclusion produced a generation of politi-
cal entrepreneurs skilful in making political capital out of their ethno-
cultural and linguistic identities, equipped with the slogan of “return to 
Europe” many have transformed into Europe’s political elites.  
These processes underline a double logic. On the one hand, copy-
ing of the EU standards dominated political rhetoric, while at a deeper 
level, the adjustment often proved formal and perfunctory. Unsurprisingly, 
benchmarking the new rules of the game became less a priority and de-
mocratisation of state-society relations remained rather limited following 
the EU accession in 2004. As elsewhere in the CEE, domestic issue pre-
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vail over European and global ones in envisaging the outcomes of democ-
ratic transition in the longer run, but it is remarkable how little of EU’s 
liberal democratic values have taken root in the Baltic societies. 
In general, a political system can become institutionally democ-
ratic with the installation of competitive elections and multiple political 
parties, but the institutions alone do not produce a functional democratic 
political system. Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer pointed out, that the institu-
tions are nothing more than “the democratic hardware,” which nonetheless 
requires the “software” that suits various system components.5 The stu-
dents of democratisation and the policy-makers have long recognised that 
the opinion of the citizens affected by the democratic institutions about 
political performance is a key component of such software.6 However, 
because the acceptance of democracy does not necessarily cause the rejec-
tion of authoritarian views, the declared preference of some citizens for 
democracy cannot be equated with unconditional or unwavering support 
for the current path of political development.7 
Of course, conclusions made by Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer urge 
reservations as regards the expectations of new political regimes in post-
communist Europe and point to possible dissonances between the under-
standing and implementation of democracy. However, many social scien-
tists examining public responses to post-communist transition adopted the 
realist approach of Winston Churchill–arguing that any regime, however 
undemocratic, will survive as long as it is considered better than the other 
options available. This tacit assumption of social and political scientists 
led to the examination of to what degree and how local populations sup-
port the new regime. And, to a lesser degree do they question the reasons 
they support it?8 While political processes necessarily reflect the demands 
and expectations of members of society able to decide on the overall direc-
tion of democratic developments, it is by understanding the social context 
in which these are formulated that one can effectively study the processes 
of democratisation.  
Luckily, we do not have to evaluate hundreds of possible defini-
tions of “democracy,” as has already been done by David Collier and 
Steven Levitsky, who analysed the variety of meanings attributed to the 
word throughout post-communist Europe.9 Their study shows the ambigu-
ity of the references to this term made in CEE societies. In another aca-
demic endeavour, Janos Simon has attempted to cluster the ascribed mean-
ings of “democracy” around such notions as “institutional,” “socio-
economic” and “liberal-individualist.”10 Both these and numerous other 
studies have been successful in showing that individuals in newly democ-
ratising societies interpret “democracy” as broadly as members of “tradi-
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tional” democracies do, making clear that the “ideal democracy” does not 
exist–neither in this region, nor elsewhere in the world. It remains uncon-
tested, however, that the members of post-communist societies do enjoy 
greater freedoms and civil liberties now than before, that they benefit from 
the greater transparency of state-institutions and have on average im-
proved their living conditions and quality of life.  
The scholarship on the third wave of democratisation argued con-
sistently that citizens’ support for democratic changes involves favourable 
orientations to democratic ideals and practices.11 The regime change gen-
erates the conditions of uncertainty about the stability of political institu-
tions, which together with the limited experience and sophistication about 
the democratic decision-making might lead citizens to embrace both de-
mocratic and authoritarian political attitudes concurrently.12 Certainly, 
social insecurities have multiplied disproportionately since the collapse of 
communism and Baltic independence, but so too have the liberties of all 
individuals, producing a cumulative feeling of disparity between those 
individuals who have improved their status and those who have not.  
Despite substantial differences among and within the Baltic socie-
ties, the prospects for democratisation remain bright. This is not to say that 
the transition could not go better. The very same acknowledgement leaves 
many members of the Baltic minority communities dissatisfied with the 
results of transition and continues to cause wide-spread criticism on the 
tide of the recent EU-accession. As I have argued throughout the book, 
this public mood in the Baltic states could be attributed to many legacies 
of the past, reducing their explanatory power to minimal causality.  
Another interpretation would emphasise the positive effect of the 
Soviet past, such as an atmosphere of caution towards radical change, 
scepticism towards the decision-making process in politics and the social 
atomisation preventing Baltic residents from more active participation in 
radical politics. I, instead, chose to point out how the development of 
relations between the groups of minorities and majorities was framed by 
political institutions, and how non-titulars in the Baltic states have inter-
acted with these. Clearly, the results of democratic development in Esto-
nia, Latvia and Lithuania are not encouraging for those members of non-
core ethnic groups who would like to have a greater say in political deci-
sion-making. Neither could the members of Russian-speaking communi-
ties be happy with the radical shift in their status from the “dominant So-
viet nationality” to a minority in what many have been perceived as a 
fringe Soviet republic.  
Nonetheless, I hope to have made it clear in my analysis that it is 
problematic, even counterproductive to speak of various degrees of de-
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mocracy. To focus on the dissatisfaction of non-core ethnic groups in the 
Baltics with the current state of affairs would neglect the central role of 
democratic institutions in crafting the liberal rule of law. In this discussion 
of the process of institutional framing of non-core ethnic communities, I 
address both the perils of exaggerated expectations associated with de-
mocratic transformations as well as the role even disenfranchised minority 
groups can play in enhancing the democratic process. In doing so, I seek 
to bridge the divide of democratic theory between institutionalists and 
participatory democrats who have interpreted the preconditions, the proc-
ess and the outcomes of democratic change differently.  
The specific situation in which this dispute developed – the decline 
in popular political participation throughout the “democratic” world dur-
ing the 1970s – produced a new wave of democratic theories which have 
not found their way into the scholarship of the Baltic democratisation. 
Then, the decline in political parties’ membership and the increase in non-
electoral, non-conventional participation in the “West” has had implica-
tions for the development of new approaches to democratisation. Some 
moderate theorists maintained that proper participatory democracy is 
likely to remain “a Quixotic dream,”13 whilst pessimists have even warned 
of its inherent dangers.14 Ever since, the studies of democratic culture have 
received great interest in scholarship as these addressed public assertions 
of institutional dominance and caused political structures to change. In my 
research I demonstrate that a democratic political regime is the result of a 
complex interplay between the citizens and the state.  
In my book, I demonstrate how the members of the previously 
dominant ethno-social groups have been marginalised in the process of 
democratisation in the Baltic polities. Institutional responsiveness to pub-
lic demands and to the demands of minority groups has to this point been 
insufficient to ensure stability in the relations between the democratic 
commitments and nationalising policies of the Baltic states. Although the 
liberal goal-oriented activity of the Baltic residents is clearly apparent, the 
impartiality of the Baltic law- and policy-makers is only meagrely en-
sured, even if European institutions acknowledge them as democratic. The 
lack of exchange between the political institutions and the publics these 
affect still demonstrates considerable potential for improvement.  
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Conclusion 
____________________________________________________________ 
331
 
3 Mishler and Rose, 1997. 
4 Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, 1998. 
5 Ibid., p.8 
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